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sur,1f1ARY. 
This thesis is concerned with the study of a relatively larae 
lacuna in the history of ~1arxism in the Russian Empire. It analyses 
ii 
the evolution of one particular variant of Marxism, quite distinct from 
Leninism - a variant which has been termed "Left Communisr.1" -, which 
existed in the Russian Empire before, and for a time after the October 
revolution. As well as such "leftists" \tlithin the Bolshevik party 
itself as the IILeft Communists" of 1918, the Democratic Centralists and 
the vJorkers' Opposition, it has been demonstrated that the revolutionary 
Marxists of the Kingdom of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania also espoused 
what has been regarded as a tyoically "Left Communist" ideology. 
In 1917 these revolutionaries and V. I. Lenin car.1e to agree that 
socialist, rather than merely bourgeois-democratic revolution was oos-
sible in the Russian Empire. This position distinguished them from 
other, more moderate Marxists, such as the Mensheviks, who believed 
that the lIobjective prerequisites"for such a revolution had not yet 
matured in the Russian Empire - and If/hose evolution, furthennore, was 
dependent upon a lengthy period of capitalist development. Nevertheless, 
despite this consensus on the nature of the revolution, serious politi-
cal differences continued to divide the IILeft Communists" and Lenin. 
The confl i ct getv/een them focussed not so much on ends - in fact, 
it rather arpears that they shared hasically the same socialist objec-
tives -, but more on the means to achieve their common goal, that is, 
they advocated contradictory policies which, in their respective ooinions, 
were necessary to carry out socialist revolution itself and the subse-
quent construction of socialism. In particular, the "Left Communists" 
fundamentally disagreed with Lenin that the forces of oppressed national-
ism could assist the proletariat in its struggle for socialism, and, 
accordingly, rejected any concessions designed to win over the national 
minorities to the side of the proletariat as fruitless. Similarly, they 
denied that any compromises with the individualist ar.1bitions of the 
peasants would secure their lastin9 support for socialist revolution and 
the socialist transformation of society. Finally, they bitterly opposed 
the Leninist idea that the construction of socialism was to be the 
responsibility of the party, rather than of the majority of the rrole-
tariat, since it alone possessed the required knowledge and political 
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consciousness to accomplish this task successfully. They were convin-
ced that Lenin's concessions to the aspirations of the minority nationa-
lities and the peasants, as well as his refusal to entrust the building 
of socialism into the hands of the workers themselves would inevitably 
result in the degeneration of the revolution from its socialist path. 
To explain their support of such divergent policies it has been 
necessary to re-examine the theories of imperialisr:l to which the "Left 
Communists tl and Lenin respectively subscribed. These theories related 
both to the question of the possibility of socialist revolution in the 
Russian Empire itself, as well as to the question of the projected 
international scale of the anticipated socialist revolution, an issue 
which in turn was to become a major determinant of their views on 
nationalism and national self-determination in the imperialist epoch. 
Moreover, in order to understand the different positions adopted by 
the "Left Communists" and Lenin towards the peasants, as well as their 
conflicting estimates of the spontaneous abilities of the workers to 
construct socialism on their own initiative, it was also essential to 
examine the evolution of Marxism in its specific, indigenous milieu, 
both in Russia itself and especially in Poland Latvia and Lithuania, 
where the development of Marxism has either been little or unsatisfac-
torily studied. This approach helped to elucidate those particular 
influences which disposed these Marxists to defend policies contradic-
tory to those of Lenin. 
"Left Communism", however, ultimately never came to fruition, 
and Marxism in its Leninist variant triumphed in Russia. Some attempt 
has been made to account for the eventual demise of "Left Communism: 1 • 
The idea has certainly been rejected that its downfall was simply and 
solely caused by political machinations on the part of Lenin and his 
associates. While this in cart helps to explain the defeat of the 
"leftists" within the Bolshevik party itself, it still leaves unansl:.Jered 
the question Vlhy the revolutionary tc1arxists in Poland, Latvia and lithu-
ania were unsuccessful in carrying out lasting socialist revolutions in 
their respective countries. This fact in turn suggested that it was 
necessary to take into consideration more objective socio-economic 
factors that existed in the Russian Empire, with a view to ascertaining 
ho\'! far 'lLeft Communism" failed because it neglected realistically to 
take account both of the aspirations, and the power of the nationalities 
and the peasants, and of the weakness and shortcomi ngs of the pro 1 eta ri at 
itse If . 
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A Note on Transliteration. 
Russian language sources have been transliterated in accordance 
with the system used by the Library of Congress. Exceptions have been 
made when other spellings have become more or less conventional, e.g., 
Trotsky instead of Trotskii, Osinsky instead of Osinski;, etc. 
In the case of personal names which have differing forms in 
Russian and Latvian, the Russian form has been used, e.g., Stuchka in-
stead of Stucka, Ianson instead of Jansons, Valeskaln instead of 
Valeskalns, etc. 
Lithuanian names have been left in their original form, with the 
exception of Vincas ~1ickevitius-Kapsukas which is more familiar in its 
Russian form of Vintsas Mitskevich-Kapsukas. 
INTRODUCTION. 
In the first three decades of this century r-larxism in the Russian 
Empire was far from being the sterile, monolithic dogma of "~1arxism­
Leninism" that it was later to become. On the contrary, one character-
istic of ~1arxist thought at this time \vas its very diversity and 
heterogeneity. The spectrum of different political factions claiming 
allegiance to Marxism was certainly broad. It ranged, for example, 
from the deterministically-minded "legal r'larxists", who believed that 
socialism was "not so much a 'negation' of capitalism but, rather, 
an inevitable result of the development of capitalism itself;"l to 
the r~ensheviks, who in general still believed in the necessity of a 
revolution to overthrow capitalism before socialism could be established, 
but a revolution, in their opinion, which would be possible in the 
Russian Empire only after a lengthy period of capitalist develonment 
had prepared the "objective prerequisitesr! for socialism; and to more 
radical revolutionaries, such as the Bolsheviks and their fellO\r,J-
thinkers, who came to believe that socialist revolution was even then, 
in the early twentieth century, possible in the Russian Empire. Indeed, 
when describing this last-named species of Russian r~arxism, L. D. Trotsky 
was quite correct in maintaining that in 1917 "there were various 
conflicting currents in Bolshevism from the very first day [Of the 
revolution] .•. ,,2 - a conclusion, moreover, which justifiably could have 
been applied more generally to r·1arxism throughout the Russian Empire 
both before and for some years after 1917. However, the success and 
subsequent canonisation of Leninism have tended to overshadow the 
rival variants - especially the radical ones - of Marxist thought 
which existed and enjoyed considerable support in this period. This 
work will attempt to shed some light on one aspect of this relatively 
uncharted area. 
In particular, this study will re-examine the principles defended 
by the foremost critics of Lenin within the Bolshevik party - the 
"Left Communists", the Democratic Centralists and the Horkers' Oppo-
sition - in the years 1918 till 1921, tha~ is, in the formative and 
still uncertain period of Soviet rule in Russia. The fact that these 
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oppositionists adopted positions which in essence were identical will 
be emphasised and it further will be demonstrated that their ideas 
synthetised coherently into what can be termed a "LeftCommunist" 
ideology, distinct from Leninism. 
~'10reover, it will also be shown that this variant of r~arxism 
was not peculiar to Russia itself, but rather that it extended broadly 
throughout the peripheral areas of the Russian Empire. The present 
study will he limited to an examination of the principles esroused 
by the revolutionary r~arxists of the Kingdom of Poland, Latvia and 
Lithuania, areas crucial to the spread of the revolution to the West, 
where the intransigent commitment of these revolutionaries to what 
they considered to be socialist principles in part explains the failure 
of socialist revolution there - and the subsequent confir.ement of it 
to Soviet Russia. Such an undertaking, which itself has been generally 
disregarded, reveals a hitherto overlooked phenomenon in the history 
of revolutionary r,larxism in the Russian Empire, namely, that the 
particular combination of ideas which distinguished "Left Communism" 
as a separate variant of Russian Marxism was also found repeated in 
these narxist parties in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. 
However, despite holding the same principles, there is no evi-
dence to suggest that these ~'larxists consciously collaborated to 
produce an integrated "Left Communist" ideology - although it is 
certainly true that the IIleftists" in the Bolshevik party and their 
Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian fellow-thinkers in fact coalesced in 
their opposition towards the peace of Brest-Litovsk. Nevertheless, 
it rather will be demonstrated that they arrived at the same ideolo-
gical construct independently of each other, as the result of quite 
separate factors which influenced their thinking. 
The distinction that separated "Left Communism" from Leninism 
did not hinge, it seems, onthe question of different objectives. 
Indeed, both the IlLeft Communists" and Lenin were avowedly committed 
to the establishment of socialism. Moreover, they appear to have 
shared basically the same ideas on the feature that would characterise 
a socialist society. Like the majority of t-1arxists of their time they 
apparently conceived of socialism as the creation of a society, ultima-
tely global in scale, in which all the class and national antagonisms 
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that divided and alienated men would be eliminated, and, consequently, 
in which men would be able to participate freely, equally and collec-
tively, in consciously controlling and administering their social and 
economic life. 
Rather, the essence of their conflict focussed on the issue of 
the means that were appropriate, and in fact necessary to realise 
this desired end. The "Left Communists ll came to believe that many 
of the policies advocated and, after the October revolution, put into 
p"ractice by Lenin and his associates - in particular, Lenin's defence 
of the right of self-determination for oppressed nationalities in the 
Russian Empire, and beyond; his readiness to make concessions to the 
Russian peasants' aspirations for their own land; and his refusal to 
entrust the economic and political administration of the revolutjonary 
state in the period of the construction of socialism to the working 
class itself - were utterly inconsistent with what they considered 
to be the principles which ~ust be incorporated in the building of a 
socialist society. Accordingly, they maintained vehemently that the 
implementation of such policies would endanger the socialist character 
of the revolution. Ultimately, they feared that any compromises with 
nationalists and peasants, whom they viewed as bourgeois and petty-
bourgeois elements, as well as the retention of the old hierarchical, 
bureaucratic methods of administration and the employment of former 
bourgeois officials in positions of authority within this system, 
would only strengthen those forces that were opposed to the socialist 
transformation of the Russian Empire and, finally, would lead to the 
degeneration of the revolution. 
It follows, therefore, that not only has this study attempted 
to examine "Left Communism" as a broader current in the geographic 
sense, by demonstrating the ideological affinity that existed betVleen 
the "left" Bolsheviks and the revolutionary t1arxists of Poland, Latvia 
and Lithuania, but it has also widened it conceptually, by stressing 
the separate strands of thought that distinguished this variant of 
~"~arxism. t·Jhile '!the general question of authority and disciplirein 
a revolutionary society, particularly as applied to the organisation 
of industrY",3 may have been the "most sensitive indicator" of the 
conflict bet.'feen the "left" Bolsheviks and Lenin in the years irnrnediately 
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following the October revolution, it appears that in general those 
t1arxists who adopted a "leftist" position on this issue also opposed 
Lenin over the national and peasant policies that he defended. This 
phenomenon will also be outlined and examined in detail. 
At the same time, however, the question of proletarian democracy 
itself has not been ignored. In fact, the position of the "Left 
Communists" on this issue has been re-examined. The available evidence 
suggests that there is a need to re-evaluate the sincerity of the "Left 
Communists'" commitment to this principle. For too long there has 
been the tendency to conclude that mos t of these r~arxi sts were concerned 
only with the problems of inner-party democracy, and neglected to 
defend freedom for the working-class as a whole in the revolutionary 
state. It will be shown that this is an erroneous claim and that these 
t1arxists indeed implacably opposed the Leninist notion that the proletarian 
vanguard, the party, alone possessed the acumen successfully to carry 
out the construction of socialism. On the contrary, they insisted 
that the workers cOUild build a socialist society on their own initiative, 
and their entire stand on the question of proletarian democracy revolved 
around ensuring that the proletariat en masse was granted the opportun-
ity to do so. 
vlhile inthe course of this study it will be necessary to examine 
again the views of such prominent "left" Bolsheviks as N. 1. Bukharin, 
A. r·1. Kollontai, G. L. Piatakov, E. A. Preobrazhens!(y, A. G. Shliapnikov 
and K. B. Radek. and also of R. Luxemburg, who 0as the theoretical 
mainspring of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithu-
ania (S.D.K.P.iL.), the bastion of revolutionary Polish 11arxism, special 
attention will also be devoted to some lesser-known, yet unjustly 
neglected figures who played leading roles in these "Left Communist" 
groups. Inparticular, the ideas of N. Osinsky (V. V. Obolensky) and 
T. V. Sapronov, both of whom were in the vanguard of the first post-
revolutionary "left" oppositions in the Bolshevik party, will be ana-
lysed in some depth and detail. Moreover, the pOSitions defended by 
L. Tyszko (Jogiches) and J. r·1archlewski, among the leaders of the 
S.D.K.P.iL. hut overshadowed historically by Luxemburg, will also be 
examined. Finally, the principles espoused by P. I. Stuchka, the 
ideological leader of the revolutionary, Bolshevik-inclined wing of 
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the Social Democracy of Latvia (S.D.L.), and by V. S. t1itskevich-
Kapsukas and Z. I. Angarietis, who led the revolutionary t1arxists of 
Lithuania will be subject to a similar analysis. 
Last of all, there remains the problem' of explaining the success 
of Leninism, and the failure of "Left Communism". Certainly, the 
defeat of the "left" Bolsheviks can be explained partly in terms of 
the skillful manipulation of the party and soviet apparatus by Lenin 
and his associates. Yet in itself this seems to be an insufficient 
answer. After all, the failure of the Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian 
~1arxists to consolidate themselves in power suggests that there may 
have been other reasons for the lack of success of "Left Communism" 
than simply the manoeuvrings of Lenin. Their defeat indicates that 
it is also fruitful to consider additional, more objective factors 
operative in the Russian Empire, in order to account for the demise 
of IILeft Communism". In particular, this will require an analysis 
of the socio-political structure of the Russian Empire, that is, of 
the relative strengths of the various classes and national groups 
within it, in order to ascertain whether the policies proposed by the 
"Left Communists" were realistic solutions to the problems that 
confronted revolutionary ~larxists there. 
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Footnotes. 
1ThiS definition has been culled by P,. vJalicki from his study 
of the ideas 0 f P. B. Struve, It/ho at the turn of the century was one 
of the most prominent "legal t·1arxist" theoreticians. A. \·Ja1icki, The 
Con!rove.I..sy over Capitalism: Studies in the Social P_hilosophy of the 
Russian Populists (Oxford, 1969), p.170. 
2 L. D. Trotsky, The History of the RussianRevolution, 1 (New 
York, 1936), p.287. 
3R. V. Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1960), p.Bl. 
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Chapter 1 
THE BACKGROUND: THE ACTORS AND THEIR HISTORY 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the ideas which the "leftists!! 
within the Bolshevik party in tl,e formative years of Soviet rule -the 
!!Left Communists", the Democratic Centralists and :the Horkers l Oppo-
sition - and the revolutionary Marxists of the Kingdom of Poland, 
Latvia and Lithuania held in common, an account of the development 
of these respective groups is necessary to place them in their proper 
historlcal setting and to explain some of the factors which influenced 
them to defend principles contrary to those advocated and put into 
practice by V. I. Lenin. This also will aid in laying to rest some 
misconceptions which up till now have been perpetuated about some of 
these revolutionaries. In oarticular, this will involve a re-examination 
of the evolution of Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian ~~arxism which have 
suffered from an even more serious lack of critical attention than 
Russian t1arxism. 
The first opposition to arise within the Bolshevik party after 
its seizure of power in 1917 was the ~·Left ('·proletarian ll ) Communist!l 
movement, which coalesced at the end of 1917 in protest against the 
negotiations which Lenin and his associates were conducting at Brest-
Litovsk in order to conclude a separate peace treaty with imperial 
Germany. On December 28, 1917 the 1'10scow OblastI Bureau of the party, 
in the future to prove a stronghold of !!leftism!!, issued a resolution, 
drawn up by N. Osinsky, A. Lomov (G. I. Oppokov) and I. N. Stukov, in 
which it called for an end to these talks with Germany - and to all 
relations with the imperialist powers. Instead, it demanded that 
Soviet Russia declare a revolutionary war against world, imperialism, 
in accord with the principles formulated and accepted by the party 
earlier in 1917 at its Sixth Conqress. l On the same day the equally 
influential Petrograd Committee of the party declared its support of 
this position. 2 For the next two and a half months the dispute over 
the question of peace or revolutionary war was to cause a profound 
split in the ranks of the Bolsheviks. 
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Soon a large number of leading Bolsheviks had gathered in defence 
of this platform in favour of revolutionary war. Prominent among 
these were many renowned revolutionaries, including those Bolsheviks 
who had taken the lead earlier in opposing Lenin over his support of 
national self-determination for oppressed nations. Among these were 
N. I. Bukharin, a former ~migr~, in Lenin's opinion one of the most 
gifted Bolshevik theoreticians - he developed a coherent neo-Marxist 
theory of imperialism, that is, a theory avowedly based on r·1arxist 
principles which themselves had been updated and revised to take 
account of the developments within capitalism since r1arx's death, 
which he expounded in l!!!peria1ism and World Economy - but, according 
to A. G. Sh1iapnikov, typical of the Russian intelligentsia in that 
he had no gift for handling practical matters;3 G. L. Piatakov, a 
close friend of and collaborator with Bukharin before 1017, who was 
to conduct a stubborn defence of "leftism" in his native Ukraine and 
who in 1919 was still the most dedicated opponent of any compromises 
with nationalism; and K. B. Radek, formerly a leading theoretician in 
the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P.iL.) 
where he had defended views on the nature of imperialism and on the 
question of national self-determination similar to those of Bukharin 
and Piatakov. A number of other famous emigr~ revolutionaries with 
a record of opposition to Lenin before 1917, such as A. M. Kol10ntai, 
who had allied herself with the Mensheviks until 1915, and M. N. 
Pokrovsky, now probably best known as a historian but who had played 
a leading part in the "Vperedist" movement, also took part in the "Left 
Commun is t" movemen t . 
However, many Bolsheviks who had devoted their lives before the 
revolution to underground work for the party in Russia also became 
leading "Left Communists".4 Included among these were E. A. Preobra-
zhensky, a party activist in the Urals and in the 1920's to become 
the originator of the theory of "primitive socialist accumulation"; 
and N. Osinsky and T. V. Sapronov, continually among the leaders of 
the early "leftist" oppositions and both of whom have received less 
than their due attention from history. 
Born into a gentry family in 1887, V. V. Obolensky - he adopted 
the pseudonym of N. Osinsky - entered the revolutionary socialist 
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movement in 1905 while he was attending a gimnaziia in r,10scow, where, 
by his own account, he IIbecame convinced ... that old :1arx was obviously 
completely correct" in his theory of historical development. After 
spending most of 1906 in Germany, where he studied political economy 
at the universities of t~unich and Berlin as well as becoming versed 
in the major works of K. Marx, G. V. Plekhanov and Lenin, he returned 
to ~~oscow. In 1907, together with a group of colleagues vJhich included 
V. M. Smirnov, himself later to become a "Left Communist" and one of 
the most stalwart "left" oppositionists in the 1920's, he entered the 
Russian Social Democratic ~!orkers' Party (R.S.D.vl.P.). He worked in 
Moscow in Bolshevik propagandist clrcles, under the direction of 
Bukharin, till his arrest in 1910 when he was imprisoned together with 
Bukharin. In these years Osinsky, again by his own admission, vias an 
"Otzovist", but never a "Bogdanovist" nor an empiriocritic. Exiled 
to Tver until 1913, during v/hich time he IfJrote for the party press -
his articles appeared in Zvezda, Prav~~ and frosveshchenie -, he 
returned to Moscow where, in concert with N. N. Iakovlev and V. N. 
Maksimovskii among others, he played a leading role in the publication 
of a new Bolshevik paper, Nas~ Put'. Re-arrested and exiled once 
again, with Maksimovskii, to Khar'kov, he worked in party circles 
there during the war, with respect to which he adopted an anti-defensist 
pos iti on. After the February revo 1 uti on he ret:'lrned to Moscow where 
he helped publish Sotsia1-demokrat, the paper of the Moscow Bolsheviks. 
After spells in Kamenets and Kiev he re-appeared in Moscow in July, 
where in the face of "considerable opposition from the larger part of 
the older generation of r·10scow workers" he campaigned for an armed 
seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. Disillusioned by the opposition 
that he met, he again travelled to Khar'kov in early October where the 
local soviet had taken over the reins of qovernment already. The 
news of the Bolshevik uprising in t~oscow brought him immediately back 
there, yet too late to take part in the Bolsheviks' victory. Soon he 
was summoned, together with V. t~. Smi rnov, to Petrograd where he was 
instrumental in establishing the Vesenkha. He was a leader of the 
"Left Communist" movement in 1918 - he claimed that he ,was the author 
of their "Theses on the Current Situation", published in Kommunist 
in April, 1918 - till its dissolution in June, 1918, during which time 
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he wrote what justifiably can be considered his most important theore-
tical work, Stroite1 'stvo sotsializma: In this he attempted to explain 
why a socialist revolution was possible in Russia, and also elaborated 
what he held to be the correct blueprint for the organisation of a 
socialist society. Later he was to become a founder and leader of the 
Democratic Centralist opposition, charging that it was his first-hand 
experiences of the practical problems involved in the construction df 
socialism which he gained from his organisational activities in Penza 
and Tula that led him; to defend the extension of political and economic 
authority to the local organs undertaking this task. 5 
T. V. Sapronov was born in the late 1220's into an impoverished 
peasant family, where his first vivid memories were of the famine in 
the early 1890's. In his early teens he worked as a stevedore, a 
painter, a dvornik, and at a number of similar, manual tasks. He went 
to Moscow in 1905 where he spontaneously took part in the mass demon-
strations of the time. He worked in Bolshevik circles in ~10sco\l1 in 
1906 - although he apparently did not officially join the R.S.D.vl.P. 
until 1912 -, from which time he tried, vainly as it proved, to organ-
ise the then politically backward construction workers. \>lith the 
resurgence of the strike movement in 1912 he again attempted to 
organise these workers, eventually with more success this time - a 
union of builders was legalised in 1914 in which a Bolshevik cell soon 
was formed. Adopting an anti-defensist position during the war, 
Sapronov worked illegally in Russia, chiefly in Moscow, Petroqrad and 
Saratov, where he became a prominent figure in the leading circles of 
the Bolshevik organisations. He spent most of 1917 in the Moscow 
region, where, according to Victor Serge, he had been the chief organi-
ser of the rising in October. After the revolution he became president 
of the Moscow Executive Committee of the party. A IILeft Communist" 
in 1918, he later protested against 'the negative aspects of glavkizm" 
and, in his own estimation, V,laS "one of the first ... to begin the 
struggle against the glavkist bureaucracy", consistently defending the 
powers of the local soviets and sovnarkhozy from pre-emption by the 
central state and party apparatus. He was a founder and one of the 
mainsprings of the Democratic Centralist opposition and in the 1920's 
was to become a continual opponent of the intensifying bureaucratisation 
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of all aspects of state and party life. However, the strain of continual 
opposition apparently took its toll on him, to the extent that when 
he was just forty he had, again by Serge's account, Han aged, emaciated 
face surrounded by a mane of bri stl i n9 white." Indeed, he was a very 
sick man even before his expulsion from the party in 192? and his sub-
sequent exile to the Crimea. He was imprisoned in 1935 and died four 
years later, in 1939. 6 
While there were, admittedly, a large number of theoreticians, 
such as those mentioned or described above, among the IILeft Communist ll 
leadership, this should not lead to the false conclusion that "Left 
Communism It was nothing but an intellectual current, cut off from and 
misrepresentative of the views of the rank and file Bolsheviks. In 
fact, there is evidence to suggest that substantial support for the 
IlLeft Communist ll position existed in the lower reaches of the Bolshevik 
party. While the Central Committee, including a number of prominent 
"Left Communist" leaders, procrastinated over the decision either to 
accept peace or' to wage a revolutionary war, in favour of prolonging 
the negotiations with Germany in the hope that revolution would spread 
rapidly to the rest of Europe and so resolve this problem,? there was 
no such vacillation among many of the local party organisations. Both 
the powerful r'loscm'/ and Petrograd Committees firmly oprosed the continu-
ation of the peace negotiations with Germany and intransiqently defended 
the accepted principle of revolutionary war. 8 A number of other strong 
pa rty organisations, in the northern towns of ~1urmansk) Vologda and 
Novgorod, in the Urals and in the Ukraine, followed the lead given 
() 
by Moscow and Petrograd.~ 
~~oreover, in February a referendum of the views of 200 soviets 
on the question of peace or war was held. By a small majority these 
local soviets supported a revolutionary war against imperial Germany. 
Yet a closer analysis of these results reveals that of the industrial 
city sovi ets an oveY'li'lhe lmi ng maj ority were in favour of war, whi ch 
would seem to indicate substantial proletarian support for the "Left 
Communists'" position - and in part also to lend credence to their 
contention that to a large extent peasant, not proletarian pressure 
had impelled the party to sue for peace. 10 
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Despite this grass-roots sentiment for revolutionary war indeci-
sion continued to reign within the Central Committee. Even in'the 
face of Russia's stark military exhaustion - the army, largely composed 
of peasants in uniform, refused to fight ll - the "Left Communists" 
in the party leadership could not steel themselves sufficiently to 
compromise their principles and accept what was daily appearing more 
inevritable, a separate peace with imperial Germany. 
Yet the renewed German offensive on February 18 meant that a 
decision could be put off no longer. As the shattering news of a 
rapid, largely unopposed German advance reached the Central Committee, 
L. D. Trotsky reconsidered his position - and his vote to sue for 
peace gave Lenin and his faction in the leadership a majority.12 
However, the "Left Communists" continued to press for the unleash-
ing of a revolutionary ~var, in the hope of igniting a proletarian 
revolution in Germany and in this way halting the German advance. 
Indeed once the new, much harsher German peace terms were delivered, 
the "Left Communists" intensified their campaign of opposition. They 
, 
openly revolted against the policy of the majority, and !3ukharin, 
Lomov, t,,. S. Urit$ ky and A. S. Bubnov res i gned all thei r party and 
governmental positions in protest against accepting the draconic 
13 peace now proposed by the Germans. 
Notwithstanding the crushin9 mil itary reverses whi ch Sovi et 
Russia was then experiencing, the'''Left Communists" still enjoyed a 
broad measure of support in the lower party ranks. eri February 24 
the r·10SCOVI OblastI Bureau, ''the orqanisational centre of the 'Left 
Communists' throughout Russia",14-issued a resolution in which it 
expressed its dissatisfaction with the policy of the Central Committee 
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and condemned any noti ons of accepti ng peace wi th Germany. It was 
later supported in this action by the Petrograd City Conference and 
the Urals OblastI Committee and many party organisations in the Ukraine, 
especially in the industrial centres of Khar'kov and the Donets basin 
in general, likewise remained solid in their defence of the "Left 
Communi st" stand .16 
, 
Before the Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the party, due to 
meet on t1arch 6 to discuss the issue of peace or war, the "Left 
Communist" leadership stepped up its protests, in vain as it proved, 
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against the acceptance of peace. It even went to the lengths of issu-
i ng its ovm facti ona 1 
Petrograd Committee. 
aim of this paper was 
newspaper, Komrnunist, under the auspices of the 
Edited by Bukharin, Radek and Uritsky, the sole 
to preach against any peace vlith Germany, irre-
spective of the terms, and to arouse support' for a revolutionary war. 
However, the life of this Kommunist was brief and it ceased to appear 
after ~1arch 19 once the "Left Communists" had lost their influence in 
the Petrograd party organisations to the "Leninists".17 
In retrospect, it appears that from the time of the rene\'led 
German advance in February the '!Left Communists" had been fighting a 
losing battle. Soviet Russia's patent inability to defend itself 
against the might of German imperialism, coupled with the intense 
campaign of agitation and persuas.ion conducted within the party ranks 
by Lenin and his fellow-thinkers, caused the rank and file support 
for the "Left Communists" to wane. 
Even before the decisive defeat which the "Left Communists" 
suffered at the Seventh Congress,18 there had been clear signs that 
the lower levels of the party were deserting to the side of Lenin. 
The Moscow City Conference, held on March 4 and 5, overwhelmingly 
endorsed the acceptance of peace. Speaking for the "Left Communists", 
Osinsky and Pokrovsky, who himself later maintained that the f'1oscow 
proletariat, if not its leaders, was unenthusiastic about a revolu-
tionary war,19 could muster only 5 votes in support of their pOSitio~.20 
In Petrograd too,another former bastion of "Left Communism", rank 
and file sympathy began to diminish at the beginning of March when a 
meeting of Bolsheviks from the Vyborg, Vasilevskii ostrov and other 
regions of the city voted in favour of peace. 21 ' 
The Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, held in Moscow on 
~1arch 15 and 16, put the final seal on this phase of the "Left Com-
munist!! opposition. The meeting of the Bolshevik caucus vlhich took 
place just prior to this congress clearly revealed the rapidly dwind-
ling support for the "Left Communists III defence of revolutionary war. 
Of the Bolsheviks who participated in this caucus 453 delegates voted 
in favour of peace, while only 38 aligned themselves with the "Left 
Communist" position, a pattern which was to be repeated at the Congress 
itse If .22 
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The "Left Communists" believed that the development of imperia-
lism had created an inter-related world, or at least European economy 
in which the pre-requisites for an international socialist revolution 
had matured. 23 From this they argued that the October revolution in 
Russia could not be regarded as an isolated phenomenon but rather that 
it must be seen as the spark which would ignite a rapidly expanding 
revolutionary conflagration in the rest of Europe24 - unlike Lenin, 
who although agreeing that in the long term socialist revolution 
inevitably must become international initially was pr~pared to accept 
a revolution more limited in scope. This "different evaluation of the 
international situation,,25 underlay much of the conflict between the 
"Left Communists" and Lenin on the question of peace or revolutionary 
war with imperial Germany. 
In fact, the "Left Communists" believed, falsely as the future 
was soon to show, that the widespread strikes which were breaking out 
in Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in January, 1918 Vlere 
confirmation of their prognosjs that socialist revolution quickly 
would sweep across Europe - indeed, Lenin was one of the few exceptions 
among the leading Bolsheviks, maintaining that it was impossible to 
determine whether a general European, and especially a German revolu-
tion would break out in "some such brief period!' as the next six 
months. 26 Consequently~ they argued that it would be superfluous to 
conclude what soon would prove to be an unnecessary peace with moribund 
German imperialism, a peace, moreover, which could prove harmful to 
the development of revolution in Germany, presumably since it would 
permit the German government better to concentrate its forces on quel-
ling the rising workers' movement. Instead, it was the revolutionary 
duty of Soviet Russia to declare war in order to help their German 
comrades raise the banner of socialism in Central Europe. 27 
Furthermore, the "Left Communists" were convinced that there 
could be no permanent security for Soviet Russia unless socialist 
revolution spread into the rest of Europe, especially into Germany. 
They contended that if thi.s were delayed the warring imperialist camps 
would have the time and opportunity to reconcile their own differences 
in order to crush the common danger which the very example of a 
socialist Russia presented to them. In their eyes, the existinq 
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split in the ranks of world imperialism on which Lenin relied to give 
Soviet Russia a breathing-space (peredyshka) in which to reorganise 
its ruined economy and disintegrated army was a mere illusion, a fear 
clearly expressed by Bukharin when he declared that r:many facts indi-
cate that this agreement between the t\'lO hostile coalitions already 
has occurred.,,28 In this case any separate peace with Germany would 
be worthless since it provided no guarantee against an attack by the 
forces of world imperialism. 
However, even in the what they considered to be highly improbable 
situation that the split in the ranks of the imperialist powers contin-
ued to exist, the IILeft Communists" believed that this in itself It/as 
insufficient to prevent separat~ imperialist attacks on Soviet Russia. 
In particular, they continued to regard imperial Germany as the major 
threat. They were convinced that Germany, regardless of any peace 
treaty that it signed, would be compelled to exploit Russia's economic 
wealth, especially its grain resources in the south, if it were to 
continue its war on the v/estern front. 29 Indeed the subsequent German 
invasion of south Russia in ~'1ay, two months after the conclusion of 
peace, in order to secure the grain reserves existing there was seized 
upon by the IILeft Communists" as strikinCj confirmation of their predic-
tion that irrespective of any division between the imperialist powers 
and of any formal peace treaties there would be no security for Soviet 
Russia until socialist revolution advanced into the rest of Europe. 
Reacting to this invasion, Stukov condemned any peace with world 
imperialism as futile: 
The illusion collapsed that we can engage in a peaceful 
policy of [socialist] construction, as did the estimate, 
which we always considered to be built on sane!, that the 
struggle continuing in the Hest Cjives us the opportunity 
of a "breathinCJ-space".30 
Certain, therefore, that renewed imperialist attacks on Soviet Russia 
were both inevitable and imminent, the "Left Communists" rejected Lenin's 
notion that a unilaterial peace with Germany would buy the time neces-
sary to restore the Russian economy and military capacity. At best, 
they considered that peace \'lith Germany would provide a respite of 
weeks, a time patently too brief in which to rebuild Russia's devastated 
railways, transfer its industrial centres ,to safety beyond the Urals 
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and in general restore its production capabilities. Such a programmG 
of recovery woul d require months of peace - and wi th some justifi ca-
tion they denied that German, much less Itlorld imperialism would allow 
Soviet Russia such a prolonged respite. 31 
~1oreover, they asserted that the economic losses VJhich revolu-
tionary Russia would suffer if it accepted the onerous German peace 
terms in themselves would preclude any possibility of economic recon-
struction. Russia Itlould forfeit one quarter of its territory, inclu-
sive of one third of its grain-producing areas in the south and west 
and three quarters of its heavy industry, especially its vital coal 
and iron industries in the Donets basin. 32 Consequently, it would 
be impossible to ~aise industrial production, initially for the imme-
diate military purposes of defence and thereafter to the level 
necessary if there was to be any development towards socialis~ - and 
the limitations on the nationalisation of German-owned industry also 
included in the peace terms would undermine the socialist character 
of the economic policies of the Soviet -government. The "Left Commu-
nists" feared that the economic emasculation of Russia which would 
follow the acceptance of peace would leave it at the mercy of world 
imperialism, cnda1so highly vulnerable to the internal forces which 
favoured the restoration of capitalism. 33 
It was from this perspective that the "Left Communists ll defended 
the policy of revolutionary war as vital if the socialist character 
of the revolution were to be preserved. Peace at best might guarantee 
the territorial integrity of a truncated Soviet state, but this would 
cease to be a socialist state. Therefore, revolutionary \'lar, despite 
the risks involved, VJas the only means which offered some possibility 
for the survival of socialism in Russia. At worst, the 'left COflllTIunists" 
believed that even if this failed to set in motion proletarian revolu-
tion in the rest of Europe, then this defeat would only hasten the 
eventual, yet, in their eyes, inevitable downfall of socialism in 
R . 34 uss 1 a. 
Curiously enough, the 'left Communists': agreed with Lenin in 
his analysis of the reasons why the Bolshevik government refused to 
implement the accepted socialist policy of revolutionary war. Lenin 
argued that the peasantry, and even substantial sections of the 
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industrial proletariat, exhausted by the preceding three and a half 
years of war, simply desired peace and would refuse to fight. In 
parti cul ar, he held that thi s was true of the peasantry, the vast 
majority of Russia's population, who just wanted the opportunity to 
enjoy the fruits of the October revolution - their newly won, but 
long-cherished land. 35 The conduct of the army overwhelmingly peasant 
in its composition, was considered indicative of this. Demoralised 
by a series of shattering defeats in the war, in part caused by 
insufficient materials and equipment and latterly by the Bolsheviks' 
own propaganda for peace, the army was disintegrating rapidly and was 
,-
no longer an effective fighting force capable of defending itself, 
much less of waging a revolutionary war. Its impotence was recognised 
by the Bolsheviks themselves when they proceeded to demobilise a 
greater part of it after their seizure of power.36 
Moreover, Lenin was aware that Soviet Russia did not possess the 
economic strength sufficient to sListain a revolutionary war at the 
beginning of 1918. Russia's resources had been dissipated in the 
imperialist war, a dissipation compounded by the effective blockade 
of most of its foreign aid. In addition, the revolution itself had 
intensified the existing economic dislocation, in large part the 
consequence of the anarchic disruptions in production which followed 
from the rapid ,extenSion of workers' control in industry.37 
In these circumstances, Lenin and his associates very much feared 
that if the war with Germany was not ended qui ckly, then the peasantry, 
whose support or at least tolerance was vital for the continued 
existence of the Bolsheviks in power, would turn against the revolu-
tionary government and give power instead to a government which 
finally would conclude peace. In Lenin's mind, therefore, peace was 
necessary to consolidate the allfance between the Bolsheviks and the 
peasants and so to guarantee the survival of the revolutionary regime. 3D 
The "Left Communists" themselves emphasised that the acceptance 
of peace was a con cess i on to the pressure of 'the peasantry and of the 
"declassed" sections of the proletariat. 39 Hoy/ever, they feared that 
after the conclusion of peace this same petty-bourgeois pressure would 
compel the Bolshevik government to abandon its policy for socialist 
reconstruction in Soviet Russia - and, consequently, that the revolution 
would degenerate. 40 Again, this time looking through the prism of 
internal politics, the "Left Communists" maintained that a revolu-
tionary war was vital for the preservation of socialism in Russia. 
This alone could hasten the outbreak of revolution in the remainder 
of Europe, after which the Russian proletariat could call on its 
proletarian allies there in its struggle against the reactionary 
influence of its native peasantry.41 
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Nevertheless, even after the peace with Germany had been accep-
ted by the majority of the party and itself had become a dead issue, 
the "Left Communists ll still refused to disband. Despite its defeat 
on this question, and its noticeably declining support, the opposition 
remained very much alive in order to defend the accepted principles 
of socialist construction in face of what it considered to be an 
inevitable tendency of the party to compromise these in order to 
appease the peasantry. In fact,the fear of peasant influence forcing 
the party from the path of socialism was to become a leitmotif of the 
"Left Communists I" criticism of the internal developments in Soviet 
Russia in the months after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded, 
a fear which future Illeftist" groups inthe party re-echoed.42 
In the spring of 1918 the "Left Communists" repeatedly claimed 
that the revolution was degenerating, just as they had predicted. 
Not on ly was the maj ority in the party conti nui ng to pander to the 
peasants I lust for private property, but even in industry Leni n was 
ready to sacrifi ce workers I control, whi ch the !ILeft Communi sts II 
held to be an irreplac~able part of a genuine socialist administration, 
to state capitalist methods of organisation. In response to the 
calamitous fall in industrial production, which Lenin largely attri-
buted to the anarchic rule of the workers themselves, he insisted on 
the need to re-;ntroduce strict central control of industry, the 
system of one-man management, usually of former bourgeois specialists 
(spetsy), and the hierarchical forms of labour discipline, as well 
as the material incentives associated with capitalism. These pragmatic 
measures roused the "Left Communists" to the defence of the egalitarian 
principles which the Bolsheviks had endorsed in 1917.43 
The first major manifestation of "Left Communist!1 opposition to 
these breaches of socialist principle took place on April 4, 1918, at 
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a meeting between the leading "Left Communists" and Lenin and his 
major associates. On this occasion Osinsky presented, on behalf of 
the "Left Communists", his "Theses on the Current Situation", in 
which he summarised the reasons behind their opposition to peace and 
set out their critique of the general development in internal policy 
which had ensued from this. These "Theses" subsequently were published 
in Kommunist, a new opposition journal published by the "Left Commu-
nists" under the aegis of the ~10scow Ob1ast' Bureau, one of their most 
enduring strongholds. Edited by Bukharin, Osinsky, Radek and V. t1. 
Smirnov, this journal was of a much broader, theoretical nature than 
the now-defunct Petrograd Kommunist and largely was devoted to a 
comprehensive discussion and defence of the principles which the 
IILeft Communists" believed must be incorporated into the Bolshevik 
government's policies if the socialist character of these was to be 
preserved. Only four issues of this journal appeared, the first three 
as the official organ of the Moscow Oblast' Bureau and the last, in 
June, 1918, as a private factional journal after the IILeft Communists ll 
had lost their majority in this organisation to Lenin. 
However, even in this second phase of their opposition after the 
peace of 8rest-Litovsk the "Left Communists" still mana~ed to find 
substantial support among the rank and file of the party, albeit not 
as widespread as it had been in January and F.ebruary. Apparently 
IILeft Communism" even then remained representative of broad strata of 
party oplnlon in the heavily industrial t'loscow region, in the Urals 
and in the Ukraine. 44 
Yet by the end of May the IILeft Communists" had relinquished 
these areas to advocates of the policies implemented by Lenin and the 
party majority. Their final stand as a separate faction came at the 
First Congress of sovnarkhozy, held in Moscow in late May and early 
June, 1918, where thei~ defence of the rights of the local sovnarkhozy 
against the increasing powers assigned to the central bureaucracy was 
defeated. After this they dissolved themselves as an united opposition. 
The factors behind the disintegration of the "Left Communist" 
movement need to be stated only briefly at this point. The basic 
reason for the loss of support \vhi ch 'they suffered was the apparent 
hopelessness of the policies that they espoused. Just as their defence 
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of revolutionary war seemed impractical in the face of the might of 
German imperialism, so too their insistence on the democratic admini-
stration of the state and industry by the various local political 
and economic bodies elected by and composed of the workers themselves 
seemed an unrealistic solution to the chaos then endemic in Soviet 
Russia. Workers' control apparently was no answer to this and in 
fact in the eyes of many Bo 1 shevi ks Itlas a contributory cause of the 
current disorder. Lenin himself was convinced that workers' control 
had to be restricted if industrial production, the life blood of 
Soviet Russia, \'</ere to be revived. His practical arguments in favour 
of the return of administrative power to the central economic organs 
and of the re-introduction of strict discipline over the workers 
a 1 ready were winn'ing converts even before the outbreak of Ci vil v!ar 
in ~1ay, when the very survival of Soviet Russia seemed to demand the 
restoration of order in industry in order to increase the out~ut of 
vital military goods. At this turn in events even the "Left Communists" 
decided to bury their differences with Lenin over the correct methods 
of socialist construction in order to concentrate on saving the gravely 
threatened revolutionary state. 
Nevertheless, as the future was soon to reveal a number of 
Bolsheviks remained unconvinced by Lenin's arguments that the measures 
which he had introduced in the interests of the immediate survival of 
Soviet Russia were consistent with the principles of socialism. In the 
ensuing years the issues first raised by the tlLeft Communists" concern-
in 9 the role of the workers in the administration of the state and 
the economy, as well as their fear of th~ consequences of any comprom-
ises with the petty-bourgeois aspirations of the oeasant majority, 
again became the foci around which critics of the Darty's policies 
gathered. 
By the time that the Ninth Party Congress was held, in t1arch 
and April of 1920, a new "leftist" opposition had crystallised within 
the Bolshevik party - the group of Democratic Centralists, or, as they 
were termed in party ranks, "liberal communists".45 Even before this, 
however, there had been clear signs of the growth of opposition in 
the party, directed against the developing bureaucratisation in the 
administration of the state, the party and the economy which was 
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preventing the establishment of an effective workers' democra~y. 
t'loreover, at the heart of thi s movement were a number of former "Left 
Communists II, among whom were Osinsky, his old colleagues from his 
days in the t,10scow underground, t1aksimovskii and V. t1. Smirnov, and 
Sapronov. 46 
The first significant sign of rising discontent surfaced in 
December, 1918, when the Moscow District Committee and the Moscow 
Guberniia Executive Committee, then chaired by Saoronov, issued a 
joint resolution in protest against the centralisation of all authority 
in party and soviet affairs at the expense of the powers of the local 
party and soviet organisations. This was followed closely by an 
article written by'Osinsky, in Pravda, January 25, 1919, in which he 
criticised the increasing curtailmert of democratic principles in the 
daily functioning of the soviet and party apparatus. He called for 
an end to the practice of appointing officials in these bodies and 
instead demanded that the principle of the election of officials by 
the workers should be re-established. 47 
At the Eighth Party Conqress, in i'larch,1910, the Democratic 
Centralists developed this initial attack,declaring that it was 
necessary lito fight the growinq bureaucratism ll48 both within the 
party and administration of Soviet Russia in general. Osinsky in 
particular singled out for criticism the "degeneration" that had 
taken place within the party. He maintained that at the highest level 
all democratic practices were moribund. Not only had the Central 
Committee ceased to hold conferences, but also the meetings that it 
had previously held with local party workers and which had provirled 
an effective link between the leadership and the rank and file, had 
died out. All power within the party had been transferred to the 
Central Committee, which itself no longer actually made any decisions 
since de facto Lenin and Ta. M. Sverdlov had abrogated the right to 
formulate policy,. Osinsky continued that the same phenomenon could 
be observed at 10ltfer 1 eve 1 s of party 1 i fe, where power also had become 
concentrated in the hands of the local committees.49 
Sapronov spoke of similar developments that could be seen in 
the structure ofpo1itical and economic administration. He arqued 
that centrally appointed commissars were i~terfering in the affairs 
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of the local soviets and ir. fact were pre-empting their authority by 
taking decisions on their O\'ln initiative. In particular, the organs 
of the Cheka and the military committees, established after the Civil 
War had broken out, rode roughshod over the rights of these soviets, 
to, the extent of capriciously transferring to other posts any memhers 
of the executive commi ttees of the sovi ets \'lho opposed them. In 
addition, they refused to take any cognisance of the directives of 
the local soviets, only obeying orders emanating from the central 
government. 50 
Sapronov also pointed out that the Vesenkha analogously ,\'las 
restricting the power of these soviets in the administration of the 
economy by in fact refusing to allow them any control over the actions 
of the local sovnarkhozy. It appointed all the officials to these 
,-' 
bodies, rather than permit their election locally. At the same time, 
it also established independent departments to run industry in the 
localities, subordinated directly to the glavki, defending such a 
centralised system ,of economic ad~inistration in the name of efficiency.5l 
At the Eighth Party Conference, in December, 1919, Sapronov 
renewed his protests against the continuing centralisation of political 
and economic power. He maintained that the central organs of the 
party and state apparatus \-vere increasingly unable to deal effectively 
with the problems involved in the construction of socialism since 
they were isolated from all experience of the difficulties involved 
in this process at the local level. To cure this harmful situation 
he insisted that the necessary first step was to change the composition 
of all these bodies, especially that of the All-Russian Central 
Executive Co~mittee (V.Ts.I.K.), to include a majority of delegates 
elected :by the workers in the 1 oca 1 iti es .52 
Furthermore, he maintained that effective authority must be 
restored to the local soviets. Increasingly, all soviet officials 
had been centrally appointed and had claimed that they were subordinate 
to the central commissariats alone, and not to the local soviets as 
well. The same phenomenon was evident in the sovnarkhozy, and even 
the sovkhozy, where the administrators too vvere chosen from above, 
re0ardless of the opinions of the local soviets, and in turn asserted 
their indeoendence of all local control. Sapronov opposed this 
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development as contrary to the democratic principles of socialism. 
To put an end to it, he declared that all officials, whether in the 
sovnarkhozy, the sovkhozy, or the soviet structure itself, must be 
elected by the local congresses of soviets; that the local economic 
organs must be subordinate to the local soviets, to prevent them 
degenerating into independent bureaucracies; and that kollegii sho'u1d 
in principle be established at the head of every administration. 53 
Several months later, at the Ninth Party Congress, in March, 
1920, the Democratic Centralists presented a set of theses - "Tezisy 
o kollegia1'nosti i edino1ichii" - which can be regarded as their 
programme for the redemocratisation of the soviet state in general, 
and the administration of industry in particular. They unequivocally 
called for the re-estab1ishment of kol1egii, elected by the workers 
themselves, in all political and economic organs Y/hich possessed 
decision-making powers. Such a system, in their opinion, would con-
stitute a "higher school of state administration'l, that is, it would 
allow the workers to participate in the broad work of administration 
and at the same time would. accustom the bourgeois ~etsy to nro1etarian 
"comradely" methods of work, while providing a direct means of control-
ling them. Moreover, even individual factories and plants were not 
to be exempt from this principle, since collegial administration at 
this level was the only means by v/hich the majority of the workers 
could learn the skills required to run a modern economy and industrial 
state. 54 
Moreover, the Moscow Guberniia Committee, again a bastion of 
"1 e fti sml!, put forward its m'ln theses at thi s Congress. In these it 
defended the resolution of the Seventh Congress of Soviets, drawn up 
by Sapronov, which criticised the over-centralisation of economic 
control in the hands of the glavki and advocated the devolution of 
this power to the local soviet and party organisations. 55 
This Congress can be regarded as the zenith of the Democratic 
Centralists' movement. They had won the support of ~1. P. Tomsky, the 
leader of the trade union movement, for their demands for the restora-
tion of colle<)ial administration and, according to Sapronov, the party 
centre had recognised their strength by approving his resolution that 
had been adopted earlier by the Seventh Congress of Soviets. 56 Yet 
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Sapronov's optimism was to prove premature, as it was soon to become 
evident from the measures taken by Lenin and his associates against 
the Democratic Centralists. 
At the beginning of 1920 the Ukraine, where Saoronov had been 
sent on party work, was a stronghold of Democratic Centralism. Led 
by Sapronov, A. S. Bubnov, an old Bolshevik who had worked in f10scow 
before his arrest in 1910 and also a former "Left Communist", and 
M. Rafail (Farbman), the Democratic Centralists had won the support 
of the Khar'kov and Poltava guberniia party cot1ferences for their 
theses on the need to restore democracy in Soviet Russia, especially 
in the organisation of industry. Later they had consolidated their 
position in the Ukraine when the Fourth Conference of the Communist 
Party of the Ukraine (C.P.U.) upheld the Democratic Centralists' 
platform and rejected that which had been proposed by J. V. Stalin, 
in the name of the party centre. 57 At this ,,reverse, Lenin and his 
majority in the Darty, despite the verbal concessions which had been 
made to the Democratic Centralists at the Ninth Congress, proceeded to 
remove the oppositionists from all positions of power in the Ukraine 
and to replace them with their own ~aratchi ki .58 
Throughout 1920 the Democratic Centralists continued to object 
to the dictatorial and bureaucratic oolicies which the party vias 
implementing, bitterly complaining that the promises of democratic 
reform that had been given at the Ninth Congress had remained on 
paper and had not been put into practice. At the Ninth Party Confer-
ence, held in September, 1920, Sapronov again vehemently insisted 
that one-man management in industry and the endemic bureaucratic 
centralisation be dismantled in favour of a decentralised, democratic 
system. In addition, he maintained that the failure of the party 
to carry out the reforms consistent with a genuine socialist admini-
strative policy had been caused by the influx of bourgeois and peasant 
elements into the party. Their influence had prevented the leadership 
from conducting a firm, class policy m the interests of the proletariat.59 
_Despite continued support for the Democratic Centralists in the 
r~oscow region and in the Ukraine, they were unable to get their proposals 
accepted by the party. t1oreover, in early 1921 they were clearly on 
th~ decline, as became evident during the debates which then took place 
on the role of the trade unions in the administration of a socialist 
society. In these debates, the Democratic Centralists issued their 
own platform, a profsoiuzakh, closely followed by a supplementary 
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set of theses, Ob ocherednikh zadachakh partii. In essence, they 
argued that a general crisis was infecting Soviet Russia, especially 
noticeable in the bureaucratisation of the party itself, and that the 
only solution to this malaise was the effective redemocratisation of 
the party, and of the state and economic apparatus, which must be 
accompanied by a IIpurge" of all the non-proletarian classes in these 
organisations in order to quarantee that this democratisation would 
be conducted effectively.60 
However, their proposals failed to win many converts, in part 
since the ~Iorkers I Opposition, the other "leftist" opposition at that 
time, had captured the support of many discontented Bolsheviks - and 
also because Lenin and his supporters I'Jere manipulating the party 
machine to ensure their own vi ctory, a factor whi ch wi 11 be di scussed 
more fully later. The Democratic Centralists lost their backing in 
the Moscow region, winning only two votes in favour of their demands 
at a meeting of the raion committees of the party in early February. 
This pattern was repeated at the r~OSCOvl Guberniia Party Conference, 
held on February 19, 1921, when their programme received less than 
10 per cent of the delegates I votes, and also in the Ukraine. 51 
Aware of their weakness, the Democratic Centralists withdrew 
their theses on the trade union question at the Tenth Party Congress, 
which took place in March, 1921. Nevertheless, they did not halt 
their criticism of the development towards dictatorship in the party 
and opposed that part of the resolution on party unity adopted by 
this Congress which permitted the expulsion of factions. 62 
Despite much-thinned ranks after this Congress, a number of 
recalcitrant leaders of the Democratic Centralist movement, prominent 
among whom were Osinsky, Sapronov, V. M. Smirnov and Bubnov, continued 
to protest against the dictatorial measures taken by the party majority 
regardless of the ban on factions. At the Eleventh Party Congress, 
in r~arch anc' April, 1922, Osinsky aaain demanded the re-introduction 
of collegial administration in industry and the restoration of workers I 
democracy in party and soviet affairs.63 In the following year, he, 
together with Sapronov, V. M. Smirnov, Bubnov, Ta. N. Drobnis, Rafail 
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and other unrepentant Democratic Centralists, supported the "Platform 
of the Forty-Six", presented to the Central Committee in October. The 
signatories of this document criticised both the economic and political 
courses pursued by the party hierarchy. They attributed the current 
stagnation of industry and agriculture to the deficiencies in the 
economic policy of the leadership, which by imposing high prices on 
industrial goods and low prices for grain was causing a sales crisis 
and a consequent, ominous fall in production in both sectors. t1oreover, 
reiterating the same complaints as the previous left oppositionists, 
they called for an end to the existing dictatorship of the party 
bureaucracy which vias restricting freedom of discussion and the 
participation of the workers in the construction of socialism. However, 
in this document they offered no panacea to cure the ills afflicting 
Soviet Russia and threatening the future of socialism there, but 
rather \'lere content to ask for the summoning of a conference of party 
activists at which different diagnoses of these ills, and various 
solutions to them, could be freely discussed in order to reach an 
acceptable and workable programme of socialist reform. 54 
The ranks of the former Democratic Centralists, however, continued 
to diminish. First, Bubnov deserted the opposition, after he had 
been appointed to head the Political Control of the Red Army.55 Osinsky 
and t·laksimovskii soon followed him, which left Sapronov, v. t1. Smirnov, 
Rafail and Drobnis as the only leadin~ Democratic Centralists still 
in oppos iti on to the party bureaucracy. 66 They remained unreconcil ec 
to the leadership until they were "purqed" from the party by the 
Fifteenth Congress in December, 1927. In these years Sapronov and 
V.I,1. 3nimov - the "two irreconcilables~', as Serge described them -
were the most radical of all the oppositionists, maintaining that the 
programme of reforms proposed by the group led by Trotsv~ was insuffi-
ciently radical to solve the problems of Soviet Russia. Rejecting 
completely the idea of socialism in one country, severely critical 
of the continuation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) on the grounds 
that it was benefiting only the kulaks, not the proletariat, and demand-
ing the forcible extraction of any capital surnluses which the peasants 
had amassed in order to finance rapid industrialisation, as well as 
the creation of socialist collective farms in the countryside to th"Jart 
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any petty-bourgeois peasant resurgence in the countryside, they in-
sisted that the first yet vital step to ensure the execution of a 
genuine and effective proletarian socialist policy was the restoration 
of democracy and factional freedom within the Darty, which alone could 
protect it from further ossification into a bureaucratic elite. Sadly, 
their opposition was to no avail. At the Fifteenth Congress the oppo-
sition programme attracted the support of less than 1 per cent of the 
party membership - and the future of the party and the Soviet state 
vias at the mercy of Stalin and his apparatchiki. 67 
About the same time as the Democratic Centralist mOvaTlEflt emerged 
as a distinct faction, with its own platform of reforms, another group 
of "leftists" in the Bolshevik party also coalesced to establish a 
separate faction - the Workers' Opposition, which first conSCiously 
spoke under this name at the Ninth Party Conference. 68 In general, 
the Workers' Opposition shared the same fears as the Democratic 
Centralists regarding the effects of the increasing bureaucratisation 
and centralisation of authority in Soviet Russia, and of the restric-
tions on workers' democracy which was accompanyinq this, on the 
socialist character of the revolution. Yet the Workers' Opposition 
distinguished itself from the Democratic Centralists in several 
respects. First, it was composed overwhelmingly of workers and was 
distrustful of the more intelligentsia-dominated oDpositions. In 
fact, in the 1920's Shlia~nikov - "a former metalworker, one of the 
very few Bolsheviks who had taken part in the Petrograd revolution of 
February-March, 1917 lwho] kept about him, even when in Dower, the 
mentality, the prejudices, and even the old clothes he had possessed 
as a worker,,69 - and S. V. ~1edvedev, a Bolshevik since 1900 and the 
chairman of the Union of Metal-Workers in 1920, the leaders of this 
opposition group, refused to support the "leftists" then led by Trotsky, 
since they believed that both the party hierarchy and its opponents 
shared a common contempt for the proletariat and had no genuine concern 
in defendin0 its interests.70 Second, the Workers' Opposition believed 
that the problems then evident in Soviet Russia were not caused just 
by an over-centralisation of power and authority, but rather were 
symptoma ti c of the ali en i nfl uence of the old bourgeoi s i.e an d the 
petty-bourgeois peasants on the policy of the party and the Soviet 
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government. 7l Finally, much more insistently than the Democratic 
Centra 1 i s ts, the ~Jorkers' Oppos iti on demanded the "repro 1 etari an i-
sation" (orabochenie) of the party, state and economic apparatus as 
the sole means to prevent any further degeneration of the revolution. 72 
While the Workers' Opposition may have acted in concert only 
from September, 1920, there had been earlier indications of its 
existence. In the autumn of 1919 Sh1iapnikov, supported by Iu. K. 
Lutovinov, the leader of the Mine-Workers i Union, had called for the 
party and the soviets to leave the administration of industry solely 
to the workers, organised in their trade unions. He repeated this 
demand in a set of theses which he dre'I/ up before the Ninth Party 
Congress, in which he again urged that the organisation of the economy 
should be entrusted to the trade unions, in diametrical opposition to 
the plans of Trotsky Hho proposed to militarise the trade unions and 
manage industry on the principles of strict hierarchical discipline. 73 
As the central party and state organs increasingly interfered 
in the work of the trade unions during 1920, the Workers' Opposition 
formally united in defence of the libertarian principles of socialism, 
protesting particularly against the central appointment of industrial 
managers, usually from the ranks of the spetsy, and of the Central 
Committee's intolerable control over the trade unions, and the workers' 
local soviets. The issues raised by the Workers' Opposition found 
a response amonq certain sections of the proletariat, themselves 
suffering under the rule of the spetsy and ~isgruntled at the material 
rewards received by them and other bureaucrats, especially in the 
industrial region of r1oscow, in Samara and the Ukraine, and among the 
miners and metalworkers. 74 
The high point of the Workers' Opposition, however, was still 
to come. Its zenith occurred during the trade union debate which 
preceded the Tenth Party Congress. In thi s peri od, too, the IrJorkers' 
Opposition found a surprising spokeswoman, a fiery and articulate 
theoretician~ Alexandra Kollontai, who had been Shliapnikov's lover 
for a number of years. 
The lives of these two leaders of the Workers' Opposition present 
a striking contrast. Born into a landed family in 1872, Kollontai 
entered the ranks of the Marxist revolutionaries in the 1890's after 
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an early attraction to Populism. 75 Thereafter, she had a chequered 
career as a revolutionary. She claimed that she refused to align 
herself with either the Mensheviks or Bolsheviks before 1905, when 
she cooperated with the latter - she is said to have argued that she 
had "a greater affinity for Bolshevism, "lith its intran~igence.fl76 
In emigration after the failure of this revolution, she often found 
herself in opposition to Lenin. She supported the Otzovists' demand 
that revolutionary ~1arxists should boycott the elections to the Duma, 
and later she allied with the internationalist wing of the Mensheviks, 
during which time she became a leading figure in the "August Bloc" 
which formed in 1912 in order to oppose Lenin's attempt at the Prague 
Conference to establish the Bolshevik faction as the only legitimate 
representative of the R.S.D.W.P. In 1915 she returnect to the Bolshevik 
fold, largely in support of Lenin's revolutionary defeatist position 
in the imperialist war. In 1917, according to N. Sukhanov,77 she had 
been the only leading Russian Bolshevik in Petrograd to support Lenin's 
"April Theses", in which he called for an end to all support of the 
Provisional Government and the immediate establishment of a revolu-
tionary dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry - although even 
earlier, in March, the Bolshevik wing of the Latvian Social Democrats 
had also called for the continuation of the revolution, in order to 
establish a genuinely democratic republic of workers. 78 In 1918, 
however, she had opposed Lenin once again over the question of peace 
with Germany and had joined the "Left Communist" movement. ~10reover, 
A. Balabanoff, then a member of the party too, claimed that in these 
years Kollontai was "a frequent source of both personal and political 
annoyance to the Party leaders,,,79 althouqh the reasons for this 
contlusion remain obscure. In 1920, she joined the Workers' Opposition, 
a move which puzzled A. Rosmer, who, like V. Serge, was a sympathetic 
yet criticial observer of the young Soviet republic, since he could 
"find nothing in her origins and previous activity to have prepared 
her for this semi-syndicalist nosition"BO - and, if Rosmer is correct, 
Ko110ntai refused to answer his questions on this subject. Later, 
she was to become a Soviet diplomat, a position often reserved as 
punishment for oppositionists in the 1920's. She survived the purges 
of the 1930's, apparently the only prominent oppositionist to do so, 
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and died peacefully in 1952. Now she is probably best known for her 
views on v/allen's liberation anc sexuality - she was an advocate of "an 
oversimplified theory of free 10ve,"81 of which, being a good Leninist, 
she combined the theory with practice. 
Unlike Kol10ntai. Sh1iapnikov was an exception among the Bolshevik 
leaders in that he was a true proletarian, with little education, 
rather than an intellectual. Born into a family of "old Believers", 
Sh1iapnikov worked as a fitter in a St. Petersburg shipyard, I'Jhere 
he took part in the strike movemEnt in 1901.82 It is from this time 
that he dated his affiliation to the revolutionary socialist move~ent. 
He continued to playa leading part in this. movment, first in his 
native Murom when he joined the R.S.D.W.P., and later in Moscow and 
St. Petersburg. After being arrested several times he went abroad in 
1908, and until 1914 he worked in shipyards in France, Germany and 
Great Britain. During the war he played a prominent role in the 
Petrograd organisation of the party as well as being largely instru-
mental in re-establishing a Central Committee on Russian soil in 
1915,83 although s,everal times he again went abroad to help maintain 
contacts between ~migre Central Committee and the party workers in 
Russia. He was a good organiser and practical politician,. in Sukhanov's 
estimation, but rather deficient in the ability to think independently 
and critically.84 In February, 1917 he found himself in the capital 
during the revolUtion, where he helped to establish the Petro grad 
Soviet and in fact became a member of its Executive Committee. In 
July he became the president of the Mine-Workers' Union, in which 
there was strong support for the Bolsheviks. After the October revolu-
tion, about which he had remained ambivalent, neither wholeheartedly 
supporting nor opposing it, he was appointed Commissar of Labour. He 
now found himself on the "right" of the part." which favoured a coali-
tion government, to include both Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, 
rather than a solely Bo1shevik'dictatorship which he felt could survive 
only by the ruthless repression of all opposition, even that of other 
socialists. In fact, he resigned his position in NDvember, 1917, 
when the Left Social Revolutionaries deserted the Bolsheviks after 
they had placed limitations on the freedom of the press, but soon 
85 I submitted to party discipline and returned to the government. n 
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1919 he first put forward the ideas which were later to form the 
nucleus of the ideology of the Workers' Opposition. He remained in 
opposition in the first half of the 1920's and as a result of this 
he was removed to Paris to work in the Soviet legation in 1924. During 
this period he continued to write his history of the revolutionary 
movement, a history based on his own experiences, which was published 
under the titles Kanun semnacltsogo goda and Semnadtsaty god. Despite 
his renunciation of his opposition and his return to the "general line" 
of the party in 1926, he became a victim of the "purges" in the 1930's. 
In her polemical pamphlet, The Workers' Oppositio~, circulated 
to the Bolshevik ,delegates at the Tenth Congress, Kollontai presented 
what can be justifiably considered to be the credo of this movement. 
She gave a compelling account of the evils of bureaucratic administra-
tion then pervading the state, the economy and the party itself; she 
provided an explanation of the source of these, accusing the spetsy 
and peasantry of selfishly influencing the oarty to imnlemr:rt policies 
which ran contrary to the principles of socialist construction; and, 
finally, she offered a simple solution to the~e ills - eliminate all 
non-proletarian influences from the administration of the party, the 
state and the economy, and entrust the future of socialist construction 
into the hands of its rightful builders, the workers, who alone could 
return Soviet Russia to the path of proletarian nurity and prevent the 
degeneration of the revolution. 86 
However, the same fate befell the Workers' Opposition as the 
Democratic Centralists. The Tenth Congress decisively rejected the 
proposals that it made. In January, 1921, Lenin had argued that the 
Russ i an workers were sti 11 too backward and inexper; enced to admi ni ster 
successfully a modern industrial state, with some justification in view 
of the chaos that had emerged from the system of workers' control 
that had existed in 1917 and 1918.87 Moreover, the threat posed to 
the survival of the Bolshevik regime by the numerous peasant revolts, 
especially severe in Tambov, a threat which was exacerbated by the 
Kronstadt revolt in the midst of the Tenth Congress, also helped Lenin 
to suppress the opposition in the party by calling for unity in face 
88 of this common danger. Yet there was more behind the defeat of the 
Workers' Opposition, and of the Democratic Centralists too, than 
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Lenin1s appeal to reason and ~einstinct for self-preservation. He 
was not hesitant to utilise his control of the party organisation to 
ensure that the opposition was crushed. Victor Serge, a sympathetic 
but still critical observer of party life in these years, emphasised 
this mctor in Lenin1s success: 
The Party steamroller was at work. I took part in the dis-
cussion [on the role of the trade unions] in one of the 
districts of Petroqrad and was horrified to see the voting 
rigged for Lenin1s-and Zinoviev1s I majority l.89 . 
Balabanoff in essence agreed that Lenin and his apparatchiki 
were unwilling to tolerate any opposition then. Referring to the 
preparatory period leading up to t~e Tenth Congress, she clearly des-
cribed the lack of opportunities for any critics of the party!s 
policies to express their views. She unequivocally declared that 
"there was no possibility, even at that time, of publicly criticising 
the Central Committee or of placinCl an unofficial opinion before the 
party rank and file .... ,,90 The dice were heavily loaded against the 
oppositionists. 
The nucleus of the Workers I Opposition, Shliapnikov, Medvedev 
and Kollontai, who despite the ban on factions within the party imposed 
by the Tenth Congress refused to halt their opposition, soon was to 
raise this very question of the suppression of all opinions that 
conflicted \-lith those of the leadership. In February, 1922~ they 
sent a petition to the Comintern -the IIDeclaration of the Twenty-
Two ll -, claiming that this was the only recourse left open to them by 
the actions of the Central Committee. In this document, they bitterly 
protes ted aga ins t the conti nui ng increase in the autocrati c pov/ers of 
the party hierarchy, which was not hesitant to use its authority to 
stifle all criticism in the party.9l 
Moreover, these oppositionists remained unreconciled to the NEP. 
In 1924, Shliapnikov unleashed a bitter attack on the policy. He 
believed that it had been designed to satisfy the desires of the 
petty-bourgeois peasants and, therefore, detrimental to any progress 
towards socialism. Yet he was not surprised at this development, 
regarding it merely as the reflection of the influence of petty-
bourgeois elements in the party which, he claimed, contained less 
. q2 
than 20 per cent genuine proletarians after 1922.~ 
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However, the final remnants of the Workers' Opposition remained 
ineffectual, and slowly but inexorably disintegrated. Its final demise 
came in 1926, when Shliapnikov and Medvedev, the" last surviving leaders 
of this group, recanted under pressure from the party hierarchy. 
This survey of the rise and fall of the left oppositions in the 
early years of Soviet Russia serves to demonstrate that at time 
"l eftism" was a current within Bolshevism \'1hich enjoyed the sympathy 
and support of a substantial segment of the party. In essence, this 
strand of Bolshevism intransigently upheld what it considered to be 
the accepted principles and ideals of socialism in face of the compro-
mises which Lenin and his associates made in order to resolve a number 
of immediate and vital problems then confronting the revolutionary 
state, compromises which inevitably entailed deviations from these 
principles. As such, "leftism" was able to tap a reservoir of idealism 
which existed among many Bolsheviks, and non-party workers too, who 
during the revolutionary fervour of 1917 had come to believe that 
the socialist millenium was realisable on the morrow of the revolution. 
Moreover, an analysis of the origins and experiences of the 
prominent personalities in these movements fails to reveal any common 
denominator, except an uncompromisinn, devotion to received ideals, 
which helps to explain their opposition. Intellectuals and proletarians, 
emigres and Bolsheviks who had lived and worked in Russia before 1917, 
pre-revolutionary opponents of Lenin and Bolsheviks loyal to him -
they all were to be found in the ranks of the "leftists" after 1917. 
The history of the group of Polish revolutionary narxists who 
defended beliefs very similar to those of the 1I1eft" Bolsheviks dates 
back to 1893, when a deep and lasting split occurred within the Polish 
~ ... Socialist movement. In that year a small number of Polish emiqre 
socialists, led by Rosa Luxemburg, L. Jogiches (Tyszko), J. ~larchlewski 
an~ A. Warszawski (Warski), deserted the newly formed Polish Socialist 
Party (P.P.S.). Luxemburg and her fellm'l-thinkers refused to accept 
the national policy adopted by the P.P.S. which claimed that the 
restoration of an independent Polish state was a ore-requisite of the 
eventual success of socialist revolution in Poland. On the contrary, 
following in the footsteps of Proletariat,93 the first revolutionary 
socialist party in Russian Poland,94 Luxemburg and her suoporters 
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maintained that the struggle for Polish independence would do nothing 
to foster the development of socialism in Poland, but in fact any 
support for narrow national objectives would endanger the success of 
the latter. To defend their oltm beliefs they established their own 
journal, Sprawa Rabotnicza, in 1893 and in 1894 formed a separate 
party, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland (S.D.K.P.), 
later to become the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and 
Lithuania (S.D.K.P.iL), when a group of like-minded Lithuanian Marxists, 
led by F. Dzierzynski, united with it in 1899. For the next twenty 
years this party firmly rejected any compromises with the forces of 
nationalism but rather emphasised the international character of the 
revolutionary socialist movement, maintaining that this was the only 
policy consistent with the principles of f1arxism. 
This division in the ranks of Polish socialists, however, created 
a historical problem since both factions claimed to be the true heirs 
to the principles of Marxism - indeed, the P.P.S. was not hesitant 
to utilise r1arx's own pronouncements in favour of the restoration of 
an independent Poland to Justify their own pretensions to his heritage. 95 
Consequently, the paradox that demands explanation is that, on the one 
hand, Luxemburg and her associates in the S.D.K.P. denied Marx's own 
teachings on Poland, while, on the other hand, they insisted that they 
were the only Polish revolutionaries who were the true successors of 
Marx. However, to understand this situation it will be necessary to 
re-examine the roots of Polish Marxism, especially the factors which 
helped fashion the ideology of Proletariat, the predecessor of the 
I 
S.D.K.P. 
The origins of Proletariat can be traced back to the 1870's, 
when the dominant intellectual current throughout Poland was positivism. 
While this has provoked the contention that "in the ideology of the 
first Polish socialists one can easily trace the influence of the 
[positivist] trends prevailing in the entire society, [positivist] in 
the sense that their programme was both divorced from romanticism and 
sought inspiration in scientific theory ... ,"96 there has been a failure 
to examine in greater depth the imprint of Polish positivism on the 
thinking of the first Polish Marxists. 
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After 1864 positivism, or realism as it sometimes was termed, 
grew to become the major ideological current in Russian Poland. 
Essentially, the dominance of positivism can be explained in terms of 
a reaction to the failure of the national revolt of the romantically-
minded Polish gentry who had sought to restore a Polish state indepen-
dent of Russia. Borrowing from the latest developments in West 
European social, political and philosophical thought, especially from 
the positivist philosophy of August Comte, the majority of the Polish 
intelligentsia, led by Alexander Swi~tochowski, asserted that the 
romantic tradition, which had dreamed of Polish independence and had 
dominated Polish political thought since the Partitions, must be 
discarded. Hhat \'1as now required was a "scientific" analysis of the 
problems and weaknesses then existin0 in Polish society, from which a 
programme of practical reforms to resolve these could be derived. 97 
The Positivists argued that the crushing of the rising of the 
gentry in 1863 had shown conclusively the futility of all ideas of 
re-conquering Poland's lo~t statehood by a heroic rebellion against 
the dominion of the partitioning powers. They believed that the future 
survival of Polish society and culture depended on a programme of 
I 
"organic work", designed to promote Poland's economic development and 
improve the education of its people which, it was hoped, ultimately 
would be to the benefit of all the peqple, rather than on insurrection. 
which would weaken the nation only further. 98 
Additional justification for the Positivists' approach apparently 
was provided by the studies of the causes of the Partitions then 
being undertaken by some notable Polish historians in Cracow, the most 
prominent of whom were J. Szujski and M. Bobrzynski. These historians 
concluded that the basic sources of the disintegration of the old 
Polish commonwealth had to be sought within Polish society itself, 
rather than in its geographic position between Russia and Prussia, 
since for centuries this Polish state had survived despite its vulnera-
bility to pressures from both east and west. They maintained that the 
Partitions had overtaken Poland because of its own economic backward-
ness and its anarchic political system, the most famous' example of 
which was the liberum veto which allowed the gentry, in defence of 
their narrow self-interests, to forestall any attempts of the central 
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0(1 government to carry out reforms to modernise and strengthen the country.J.-
It was a logical step from this analysis of the factors underlying 
Poland·s decline to the Positivists· programme, with its emphasis on 
internal modernisation as the sole basis of the future of Polish society, 
whatever political form this would take. 
The Positivists themselves were reSigned to the fact that the 
future for the Kingdom of Poland lay within the bounds of the Russian 
Empire. t1oreover, they believed that the Kingdom had much to gain from 
this union ~nce they felt that its prosperity now was dependent on its 
economi c integrati on with Russ i a. The removal of the tariffs on Pol i sh 
goods in 1851 and the subsequent expansion of the railway system into 
the interior of Russia had opened up a potentially vast market to 
Polish industry and had provided a great stimulus to it. 100 
Therefore~ considering a ny national insurrection to be doomed 
from the outset and underlining the economic benefits from integration, 
they advocated a policy of loyalty to Russia - and of the other parti-
tioned areas of Poland to -Prussia and the Hapsburg Empire. They hoped 
i 
that this abnegation of politics would bring the Russian government 
to grant some measures of autonomy to the Kingdom of Poland - in fact, 
the policy of Russification was intensified after the abortive rising 
of 1863-1864 - and at the same time allow the Poles themselves to 
concentrate their energies on the economic development and cultural 
regeneration of their nation. Moreover, they accepted that it would 
take time before any tangible benefits emerged from their programme. 
J. Kraszewski, of the romantic school before 1863, openly admitted 
th is: 
We believe neither in revolution nor in radical utopias 
which profess to change society overnight and to cure all 
its social ills by means of some panacea .... Vie believe in 
slow and gradual progress which through reforming indivi-
duals, increasing enlightenment, encouraging work, order 
and moderation shoul& accomplish the most salutgry revolu-
tion, or rather evolution in the social system. 10-1 
However~, in the 1870·s great changes were taking place in the 
Kingdom of Poland. Industrialisation, stimulated by the opening of 
the Russian market and later by the surplus of labour available after 
the Polish peasants had been emancipated in 1864, and in part by the 
emphasis of the Positivists themselves on economic modernisation, was 
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progressing rapidly. While this appeared to be a vindication of the 
Positivists' theory of "organic \\fork!!, this success also had its 
negative aspects. Industry \lias prospering but the rapidly growing 
working class which was being created in the ~rocess was suffering 
grievous deprivations in the first rigours of industrial revolution. 
Reacting against the failure of the Positivists' programme to deal 
v'Jith the social ills accompanying this economic grO\·;th, socialists 
began to appear in Poland to champion the rights of the workers. 102 
~1uch has been written about the influence of tlarxism on the 
formation of the ideas of these early Polish socialists, particularly 
of those who formed Proletariat. It generally is argued that the 
leaders of this party, the majority of vJhom came from the intelli-
gentsia, such as L. Wary~ski and S. Mendelson, became indoctrinated 
wi th r,larxi sm when they "'Jere students in St. Petersburg and hrought 
it back with them to Poland. 103 Admittedly, there is no reason to 
doubt that Harynski and his colleagues did receive an introduction 
to Marx's basic ideas at that time, but in itself this is insufficient 
to prove that they deri ved thei r programme solely from t1arx. On the 
contrary, they stubborn ly opposed ~~arx' sown pronouncments in favour 
of a restored Polish state and revised his ideas on this question to 
suit IrJhat they considered to be the only method to achieve socialism 
in Poland. Indeed, an analysis of their programme points to the 
conclusion that this was a hybrid, in part dravm from flarx and in 
part fromihe conclusions of the Positivists.104 
In keepir.g with the spirit of the time, they did not deny that 
a scientific approach to analysing and understanding the problems 
of Polish society was methodologically correct. v!hat they did object 
to, however, was the acceptance of the existing socio-economic system 
implicit in the Positivists' theory of "organic h'ork",and of the 
economic and social oppression h'hich this perpetuated. Apparently, 
It/hat the first Polish r'iarxists accepted from r~arx was his notion of 
'!scientific socialism", which combined idealism 'tIith an empirical 
analysis of societies, and their ills, on the basis of which the 
sources of, and solutions to these could be sought. They did not 
apply dogmatically his prescriptions regarding Polish society but 
rather conducted their own investigation of Poland's problems from 
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which they derived their ovm set of measures to resolve these. lOS 
Proletariat admittedly was consistent with Marxist doctrine in 
that it believed that the fundamental source of the injustices in 
Polish society was to be found in the existing economic system \t/hich, 
it claimed, had reached the stage of capitalist development in the 
Kingdom of Poland. The answer to this, in their minds, was simple -
the destruction of capitalism and the creation of a society based on 
106 economic equality \'Jould resolve all these problems. 
However, developing their prognosis of how this social revolution 
must occur, these Polish r,1arxists scorned any notions that it could 
take place in combination with a national rising for Polish independence. 
Not only would national independence fail to solve the problems of 
economic and social oppression, caused by capitalism rather than 
national subjugation, but also any concern vlith nationalism \'JOuld 
help to conceal the real essence of this oppression from the workers, 
dull their class consciousness and divert them into a struggle for 
national, not class aims, and, ultimately, hinder the development of 
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Furthermore, they, like the Positivists,' were convinced that 
the success of any social revolution in the Kingdom of Poland depended 
on the victory of a similar revolution throughout the Russian Empire, 
arguing with great justification, given the experiences of the nine-
teenth century, that any attempt at revolution on a Polish scale 
would prove fruitless as long as the power of the Russian autocracy 
remained intact. This impelled them to union with the Russian popu-
1 is ts of the Narodna i a Vol i a, wi th the aim of creati ng the combi ned 
revolutionary movement which they felt to be essential if the autocracy 
was to be overthro\'/n and the way cleared for radical social and 
economic changes in the Kingdom of Poland itself. lOB 
Moreover, their analysis of the class structure then existing 
in the Kingdom of Poland confirmed them in their rejection of national 
revolution. The power of the gentry, the social base of the indepen-
dence movement, had been destroyed in the rising of 1863 and its 
aftermath, when the autocracy had emancipated the Polish peasants and 
generous ly endowed them wi th 1 and taken from the gentry in order to 
punish and weaken the latter and secure the support of the former. 
After this the gentry had become a reactionary class, solely intent 
on preserving the vestiges of its power and privileges. They also 
claimed that the bourgeoisie, itself as much Jewish as Polish, had 
no desire to become separated from Russia since its prosperity vias 
based both on its access to Russia's market and on the guarantee of 
social peace and stability which the power of the autocracy could 
provide it. 109 Besides, as the Positivists had done before t~em, 
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they dismissed the peasants as a potential force for national revolu-
tion, arguing that they IIwith very rare and insignificant exceptions 
have always acted in a hostile manner against uprisings for national 
independence. lIllD Consequently, Proletariat considered the exploited 
and impoverished vJOrkers to be the only revolutionary class in Russian 
Poland, and believed that once they had freed themselves of all 
remaining nationalist influences they would become conscious that 
their own interests would be best served by a united revolutionary 
struggle with the exploited classes in the remainder of the Russian 
Empire, in order to establish the pre-condition for any future social 
111 revolution, the destruction of the autocracy. 
Accordingly, contrary to 11arx's own views, Proletariat asserted 
that revolutionary socialists in Russian Poland had no choice but to 
reject any policy in favour of national independence and to support 
the struggle for an international, or at least a general Russian 
revolution. They believed that Marx's defence of Polish independence 
was founded on an incorrect analysis of Polish and, especially, of 
Russian society, particularly since the strong revolutionary movements, 
such as the Populists, then emerging in Russia itself had invalidated 
his justification for the re-creation of a Polish state as a barrier 
to the extension of Russian despotism into Central Europe. In their 
minds, the old Russia itself was doomed. 112 
In one sense, it is possible to argue what these Polish narxists 
, 
had done had been to ~ccept much of the Positivists' analysis, while 
injecting a revolutionary twist into it. They agreed with the Positi-
vists that the future of the Kingdom of Poland was linked vvith that of 
Russ i a. They rej ected, however, the concept of "organi c \'lark II whi ch 
they considered to benefit only the Polish bourgeoisie and rather 
fOl'esaw the future freedom of the Polish pearle frorl economic, social 
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and even national oppression as contingent upon the transformation of 
the Russian Empire into a democratic, and ultimately socialist 
bl . 113 repu 1 c. 
Although Proletariat was unable to survive the repressive 
measures taken against it by the tsarist regime in the 1880's, it did 
leave a legacy for the Polish socialist movement, as the future was 
soon to show. The S.D.K.P. rallied under the same banner of uncom-
promising revolutionary internationalism, initially developing and 
justifying their refusal to make any compromises with nationalism in 
the narroVJ context of the question of Polish independence. 
The S.D.K.P., partic~larly Luxemburg, warmly praised the anti-
national position adopted by Proletariat. 114 Convinced that the 
pursuit of national aims had nothing in common with the struggle for 
socialism and fearful that any concentration on these would distract 
the Polish proletariat from pursuing its class objectives, in the 
years after 1893 she expanded the ideas first espoused by Proletariat 
into a coherent theory which purported to substantiate the S.D.K.P.'s 
opposition to national self-determination for Poland. She accepted 
much of Proletariat's analysis of Polish society in the late nineteenth 
century, agreeing that the power of the gentry, the class whi ch had 
been the driving force of the national movement, had beer. destroyed 
by its defeat in 1864, and that the bourgeoisie, the traditional cham-
, 
pions of nationalism,had refused to support independence for the 
Kingdom of Poland since its material interests were best served by 
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Moreover, she argued that capitalism had developed in Russian 
Poland largely as the result of the abolition of the customs barrier 
with the Russian Empire in 1851, which in turn had led to the increas-
ina economic inteqration of these two countries. To destroy this 
~ ~ . 
integration by the creation of an independent Polish state would sloVJ 
down the growth of cap'italism and, consequently, delay the establish-
ment of the pl'e-requisites of socialism and the intensification of the 
class struggle in Russian Poland itself. 116 
Relying on this theory of the rlorganic incorporation" of the 
Kingdom of Poland into the Russian Empire, which she developed most 
fully in her doctoral dissertation, The Industrial Development of 
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Polani, presented in 1897, Luxemburg explained the apparently para-
doxical resurgence of national movements in Russian Poland in the 
1890's. She asserted that although the Polish bourgeoisie had pros-
pered from economic union with the Russian Empire, this union was now 
posing a serious threat to its interests. Admittedly, this had 
stimulated the growth of capitalism in Russian Poland but at the 
same time it had created a revolutionary Polish proletariat, the 
appointed Ilgrave-digger" of capitalism itself. As a result of this 
she contended that the Polish bourgeoisie, and its reactionary allies, 
the gentry and the petty-bourgeoisie, had gathered under the flag of 
national independence in order to separate Russian Poland from Russia 
and so to retard the development of capitalism and the subsequent 
class struggle there. l17 
She concluded from this analysis that it was essential to oppose 
this revival of Polish nationalism in order to avert the possibility 
that the Polish Itiorkers might be deluded into supporting a lTlovement 
which in fact was directed against their bwn class interests. She 
insisted that the interests of the Polish proletariat demanded that 
it unite with the Russian proletariat in a common struggle to over-
throw the autocracy and establish a democratic Russian republic, of 
~vhich the Kingdom' of Poland "lou1d be an autonomous oart, as the first 
step on tre path towards a future s oci ali stRuss i a. 
Luxemburg herself was aware that the position that she and her 
colleagues adoDted with respect to self-ctet~rmination for Poland contra-
dicted that of r1arx and Engels. Yet she still claimed in all honesty 
that the S.D.K.P. was the only revolutionary socialist Polish party 
which truly adhered to Marxism since she was convi~ced that the essence 
of this was not the unreflective and dogmatic reiteration of the 
pronouncements of Marx and Engels on particular questions, but rather 
the application of its method of historical analysis to concrete 
social situations - and she later asserted that her party had pursued 
just this course: 
The S.D.K.P.iL., in justifying its programme of autonomy 
proceeds not from the metaphysical right of nations to 
self-determination ... but from the social development of 
Poland and Russia and the realisation of the consequences 
of this development in the sT~~it of the revolutionary 
policy of the working class. 
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While the opposition of these Polish Marxists to national self-
determination at first was applied only to the case of Poland, in later 
years they expanded this into a general policy. They readily embraced 
the developing neo-Marxist theories of imperialism which, among other 
things, provided a universal justification of their own rejection of 
Polish independence. By emphasising the trend in capitalist develop-
ment towards ever greater economic integration, these theories attempted 
to demonstrate that in the contemporary epoch of finance capitalism, 
or imperialism, a united international economic system had been 
created in which the prerequisites for socialist revolution on a 
global, or at least European scale had matured. One inference drawn 
from these theories was the conclusion that nation states were now 
obsolete, both in the restricted sense that they were considered too 
small to foster further economic growth and, more generally, because 
the predicted socialist r2volution .would establish an international 
workers· republic in which they would become unnecessary. Prif1led by 
their own analysis of the progressive effects of the integration of 
the Kingdom of Poland into the Russian Empire, it seems plausible to 
contend that these Polish Marxists were prepared mentally to acaept 
these theories of imperialism which both confirmed and were confirmed 
by their views on the development of Poland. 119 
However, largely as a result of its national policy, the S.D.K.P. 
in the early years of its existence was unable to build up a strong 
indigenous base of support in the Kingdom of Poland itself. S. Pestkov-
skii, himself a party member, agreed that this failure \'las caused by 
the rigid internationalist outlook of the party vlhich, he claimed, 
alienated the majority of Polish v..rorkers "among whom patriotic tradi-
tions still were very much alive.,,120 In the 1890·s, therefore, the 
S.D.K.P. remained basically an organisation of emigres, a leadership 
of intelligentsia lacking a mass follovling. 
At last, durinq the revolution of 1905, this party - now trans-
formed into the S.D.K.P.iL. - did succeed in winning the support of 
substantial sections of the Polish proletariat. The outburst of strikes 
by the St. Petersburg workers, in pr'otest against the massacre on 
IJBloody Sundayll, as well as against the continuation of the war with 
Japan, provoked solidarity strikes in the Kingdom of Poland. Taking 
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advantage of this spontaneous revolutionary action of the Polish 
proletariat, the S.D.K.P.iL. came forward to put itself at the head 
of this movement, defending the immediate economic demands of the 
workers while at the same time insisting that they should fight in 
concert with their Russian brothers for a democratic republic in the 
Russian Empire at large, a republic in which autonomy for the minority 
nationalities would be guaranteed. By all accounts, this programme 
was accepted by many of the Polish workers and they certainly exerted 
no strong pressure for independence, possibly since the S.D.K.PjL. 's 
claim that they would advance their interests best in alliance with 
the Russian oroletariat seemed to be confirmed by the revolutionary 
upheaval in ~ussia itself. 12l 
Yet the success of the S.D.K.P.iL was to prove short-lived. In 
the period of reaction which followed theicrushing of this revolution 
the rank and file support which it had gained in the Kingdom dwindled 
and the party again was reduced largely to a handful of intelligentsia 
living abroad. 122 
The events of 1905, however, did leave their mark on the thinking 
and actions of theS.D.K.P.iL. Convinced that the failure of the 
revolution had underscored the need for united action of the part on 
the proletariat of the Russian Empire as a whole if the autocracy was 
to be overthrown, in 1906 the narty, while still rejecting the point 
in favour of national self-determination in the programme of the 
R.S.D.W.P. - the principal reason for its refusal to join this party 
in 1903 -, agreed to unite with the Russian Darty, as an autonomous 
member of it. 
~~oreover, despite continuin9 differences of OplnlOn vlith Lenin, 
the S.D.K.P.iL. moved closer to Bolshevism in the years after 1905. 
At the party's Sixth Congress Tyszko openly declared that I!Bolshevism, 
freed from the negative features which it acquired in its peculiarly 
Russian setting, I' \vas the only bulwark of revolutionary r1arxism in 
Russia and accused the Mensheviks of opportunism because of their 
conciliatory attitude towards the "vacillating and fainthearted ll 
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The differences which did remain between the leaders of the 
S.D.K.P.iL. and Lenin - on the issues of national self-determination, 
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the organisation of the party and the proletarian movement in general, 
and the role of the peasants in the revolution - can be understood 
only in the context of the former's ovm experiences and their 
rJpeculiarly Polish setting". Regarding the first issue, the very 
existence of the S.D.K.P.iL. was founded on its opposition to self-
determination for Po-land. Consequently, Lenin's support for this 
concept, regardless of his motivation, was totally unacceptable to 
the S.D.K.P.iL. and even after union with the R.S.D.W.P. it continued 
to adhere to its ori gi na 1 pos i ti on. 
On the question of organisation, the views of these Polish 
~1arxists were coloured by their negative appraisal of the tactics of 
the P.P.S., as v/ell as by their understanding of the Geman Social 
Democratic Party (G.S.D.P.), in which Luxemburg, Tyszko and r1arch-
lewski had participated since the mid-1890 ' s. 
sharply attacked the Blanquist ideas held by 
the struggle for socialism rests on 
Luxemburg, in particular, 
the P.P.S., arguing that 
the objective development of bourgeois society ... the 
source of which in the final analysis is economic develop-
ment .... Socialist asoirations and the workers I movement ... 
ever more coalesce and simultaneously become a historical 
force which is conscious of its aims and which progresses 
with the fatalism of the laws of nature. In its clearest 
form the example of this is the almost mathematical grO\\Ith 
of German Social Democracy.124 
Yet at the same time they considered the leadership of the G.S.D.P. 
itself to be a reactionary body, isolated from and dampening the 
revolutionary enthusiasm of the otherwise radical mass v/orkers ' 
movement. There fore ~ when Tyszko decl ared that the aim of the 
S.D.K.P.iL. after its union with the R.S.D.H.P. was to try to incor-
porate into the Russian party lithe general line of VIest European social 
democracy, adapted to Russian conditions,,,125 he presumably meant that 
the revolutionary ~1arxists in the Russian Empire should base their 
tactics on the mass workers' movement, both in opposition to the 
Blanquist trend in Lenin's concept of a disciplined, conspiratorial 
party as the driving force of socialist rev?lution, and also as a 
guarantee that the revo luti ona ry 1 eadershi p \</oul d not become detached 
from the revolutionary proletariat and act as a brake on its development, 
as had occurred in Germany. 
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On the peasant question, they agreed that the agrarian conditions 
in Russia itsel f were such that the peasantry could become an important 
revolutionary force which, as Lenin proposed, the Russian proletariat 
could utilise as an ally in its struggle against the autocracy and 
the bourgeoisie, with the added ca~eat that the revolutionary prole-
tariat must not make any concessions to the petty-bourgeois aspirations 
of the peasantry for its own land. 126 In Poland, hOlt/ever, they argued 
that the agrarian situation was different, with the consequence that 
the smychkC!., the revolutionary alliance of the proletariat and the 
peasantry, was an impossible tactic there. They maintained that 
capitalism in agriculture in Poland had developed faster than in 
Russia, so that class differentiation in the Polish countryside had 
proceeded much further. As a result of this a large body of peasant 
proprietors had been created who, like their counternarts in West 
Europe, were regarded as bulwarks of reaction - Marchlewski scathingly 
called them "fanatics for private property,,127 - and also a lar~e 
rural proletariat on whom alone the workers could rely for consistent 
support in their struggle for socialism. By their own admission, it 
was fear of strengthening the existing "kulak" elements that led them 
to reject any alliance with the Polish peasants. 128 
Already seriously weakened in the Kingdom of Poland after 1905, 
the S.D.K.P.iL. vias to suffer a still worse blow. A split occurred 
in the party, between its emi9re centre and its members still active 
in the Kingdom, largely in Warsaw and Lodz. The issues at stake were 
tactical, but the conflict was intensified by the dogmatic refusal of 
the leadership to enter into any discussion of them. The party 
activists in the Kingdom desired to use the newly-legalised trade 
unions as part of the revolutionary movement and also to unite with 
the P.P.S.-Left (Levitsa), now that this faction had abandoned its 
support of Polish independence. Finally, in 1911, as a result of the 
leadership's failure even to consider these proposals, the members of 
the rarty organ i sa ti ons in Warsaw and Lodz set up thei r own central 
committee in Cracow, the Regional Committee (Zarzad Krajowy), led by 
. '--~~r---~~ 
J. Hanecki~ L. Domski and J. Leszczynski-Lenski, and later supplemented 
by Radek, in opposition to the ~lain Committee (Zarz~d Glowny) in 
B 1· 129 er 1 n. 
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This faction of the S.D.K.P.iL., known as the Rozlamowcy (the 
"splitters"), was also distinguished from the old leaders of the party 
by the fact that it stood closer to Lenin on the question of party 
organisation - even the tsarist authorities believed that it "[bore] 
a cl early Bo lshevi k character. ,,130 Yet the Rozramowcy adamantly 
opposed national self-determination, supporting the traditional 
position of the S.D.K.P.iL. In fact, it was in the name of the 
Regional Committee that Radek in 1915 published his famous set of 
theses, in which he presented his neo-Marxist analysis of the imperial-
is t epoch in justification of the contention that revolutionary 
Marxists could not make any concessions to narrow national demands. 131 
However, after the outbreak of war in 1914 the b/o factions of 
the S.D.K.P.iL. began to merge, largely since their previous differences 
seemed unimportant in view of their common stand tp\tlards the \tfar. The 
t'lain and Regional Committees subscribed to the same resolution presented 
to the Zimmerwa1d Conference in September, 1915, in which they condemned 
the war as a struggle between the rival imperialisms of the German 
and British alliances and demanded that revolutionary socialists convert 
this into an international civil \'Iar for socia1ism. 132 In 1916 they 
formally re-united and it was as a unified party that the S.D.K.P.iL. 
was to face the revolutionary upheaval in the Russian Empire in the 
fo 11 owi ng years. 
This revolution in Russia nevertheless brought v/ith it the very 
possibility that these Polish t~arxists had dreaded - the restor.ation 
of the Polish state - when both the Provisional Government and even 
the Petrograd Soviet issued declarations in support of independence 
for Poland. The Polish Social Democrats bitterly opposed this, arguing 
that it would be a reactionary policy which would result in separating 
t~e Polish workers from their revolutionary Russian comrades and 
leaving them at the mercy of their native bourgeoisie: In fact, they 
even pleaded, unsuccessfully, with the Bolsheviks to resist this. 133 
Instead, \;rhen the Bol shevi ks themselves sei zed pO\,/er in October, they 
granted the right of self-determination to all the national minorities 
in the former Russian Empire. 
Throughout 1918 the S.D.K.P.iL. continued stubhornly to struggle 
against the very idea of an independent Pola,nd, but to no avail. In 
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November, after the collapse of the German and Austro-Hungarian 
Empires which brought an end to their military occupation of Poland, 
a new government, headed by I. Daszynski, a Galician socialist, was 
set up in Lublin and declared Poland an independent national state, 
an action supported even by many of the Polish workers. 134 The 
worst nightmare of the S.D.K.P.iL. finally had been realised. 
The last act in the life of the S.D.K.P.iL. was its transforma-
tion into the Communist Workers', Party of Poland (C.H.P.P.), in union 
with the P.P.S.-Left, in December, 1918. Yet the programme of this 
new party was distinctly that of the S.D.K.P.iL·. It proclaimed that 
its immediate aim was the establishment of a dictatorship of the 
proletariat in Poland which, however, would not remain independent 
but would become part of an international socialist republic; and 
it dismissed the peasantry as a potential ally of the proletariat in 
this revolution, typified by its refusal to consider any division of 
the land in Poland to secure the support of the peasants. 135 
In the next two years the C.!"-P.P. rrade little progress towards 
realisino its aims. The revolutionary workers' councils which had 
, 
formed spontaneously at the end of 1918 and in which the Polish 
Communists had found some solid support, especially in Warsavl and the 
Dabrovla industrial basin, had disintegrated during 1919. t'loreover, 
:;. 
the government of the new Polish state clearly was consolidating 
itself, although the C.W.P.P. still refused to accept the fact that 
an independent Poland in fact did exist. Nevertheless, a final 
opportunity was provided for the C.W.P.P. to take power in Poland 
when the Red Army invaded in 1920. A Provisional Revolutionary 
Committee for Poland, consisting of Marchlewski, Dzier~y~ski, F. Ko~ 
and J. Unszlicht \'las established in Bialystok in August, 1920, but 
only for a short time. As a result of their refusal to make any 
compromises with national sentiment and of their rejection of the 
peasants' aspirations for the land, the Polish Communists failed to 
secure any strong indigenous support - and the victory of the Polish 
legions over the Red Army finally crushed their hopes of a speedy 
proletarian revolution in Poland. Thereafter, the C.W.P.P. began 
to reflect on the lessons of its defeat - and eventually to reject 
the programme that it had inherited from the S.n.K.p.iL. 136 
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In Latvia, too, there appeared a group of revolutionary ~1arxists 
who held beliefs similar to those of the flleft'l Bolsheviks and tbe 
S.D.K.P.iL. They emerged from the Latvian Social Democratic Labour 
Party (L.S.D.L.P.), the first socialist party in Latvia, \'Jhich was 
formed in June, 1904, when a Congress V1as held in Ri ga to uni te a 
number of socialist circles which had arisen in the late 1390's, 
mainly to defend the economic interests of the workers. This new 
party also included a number of Latvian emigres, former members of 
the flNew Current fl (Jauna Strava), a movement of Latvian intelligentsia, 
embracing both revolutionary democrats and socialists, which had been 
active during the 1890's.137 
In certain respects the history of the L.S.D.L.P. is akin to 
that of the S.D.K.P.iL. While the L.S.D.L.P. favoured union with the 
R.S.D.H.P. to promote a common revolutionary struggle against the 
autocracy, it refused to do so if such a merger woul d force it to 
accept the programme of the Russian party in, its entirety. Therefore,! 
in order to ensure its right to formulate its independent policies, 
especially with respect to party organisation and to agriculture, the 
L.S.D.L.P. demanded that any united party of Social Democrats in the 
Russian Empire must be organised on a federative basis, a position at 
that time defended even by P. I. Stuchka, soon to become the leader 
and principal theoretician of the Bolshevik wing of the Latvian party 
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Stuchka was born of a peasant family in 1865. After studyinq 
law at St. Petersburg university, he returned to Latvia where he took 
a leading part in the "New Current". As editor of its paper, Dienas 
Lapas (Daily News), he imparted a socialist colouration to it. Arrested 
in 1897 and later exiled to Vitebsk, he only returned to Riqa in 1904 
when he participated i~ the founding of the L.S.D.L.P. Elected to the 
Central Committee in 1906, he soon left the party in opposition to 
its fvlenshevik-oriented leadership and because of its failure to 
discipline the anarchic tendencies of some of its members. In St. 
Petersburg from 1907, he continued to oppose the f1ensheviks in the 
Latvian party and in fact became the ideological leader of the Latvian 
Bolsheviks. In,these years too, he developed, independently of Lenin, 
what was to become the programme of the Latvian Bolsheviks on the 
agrarian and national questions, refusing any concessions to the 
peasants' aspirations for land and firmly rejecting any compromises 
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with the growing forces of Latvian nationalism which he condemned as 
a reactionary, bourgeois movement. After the October revolution he 
became Commissar of Justice for the new Soviet Russian republic. In 
December, 1918, he returned to Latvia to become the president of the 
newly-formed Provisional Soviet Government there, until its collapse 
in ~1ay, 1919. He returned to ~10scO\1/ in 1920, where he lived until 
his death in 1932. During this period he was appointed President of 
the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., while continuing to lead the now 
illegal Communist Party of Latvia and to represent it in the Comintern. 
He also produced a number of works on the constitutional law of the 
Soviet Union in the 1920's, most notably The Revolutionary Role of 
Law and the State and A Course of Soviet Civil Law. 139 
The L.S.D.L.P. soon had the opportunity to show its mettle. In 
1905 it led and directed mass strikes of the Latvian workers in pro-
test against the slaughter of the St. Petersburg demonstrators on 
liB 1 cody Sunday". Throughout 1905 the party conti nued to control the 
escalating strike movement and the increasirg revolutionary activities 
of the Latvian proletariat. Yet the Latvian Social Democrats still 
had no immediate intention of exploiting this turmoil in order to 
establish a proletarian dictatorship in Latvia, but rather called 
'. . I 
for the creation of a democratic Russian republic in ItJhich autonomy, 
not independence, would be granted to all the minority nationalities 
in its confines. 140 In fact, the Second Congress of the L.S.D.L.P., 
in June, 1905, rejected 'the demand for an armed unrising in Latvia, 
on the grounds that since the Russian nroletariat itself was "insuffi-
ciently organised and prepared" to carry this out successfully, any 
rising of the Latvian ItlOrkers, in isolation from similar happenings in 
the rest of the Russian Empire, would be doomed to failure in face of 
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This Congress also adopted a programme for the young party, in 
large part drawn from the Erfurt Programme of the G.S.D.P. In itself, 
this influence of German Marxism on the ideology of the Latvian Social 
Democrats .is quite understandable, since in the 1890's, when the Russian 
socialist movement was still in an embryonic form, it was to the 
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German Social Democrats that the intellectuals of the "New Current" 
turned for Marxist literature, and an example. 142 Moreover, the 
application of German rather than Russ.ian ~1arxist principles in Latvia 
did not seem far-fetched to the Latvian socialists, since they con-
sidered Latvia, with a higher level of capitalist develooment and of 
education than Russia, to be more like the vlest than Russia. In 
particular, they believed that the existence of a sizeable and educated 
working-class in Latvia, created by this greater development of 
capitalism, would make it possible to organise a party more on the 
lines of the G.S.D.P. than on the lines of the small, consoiratorial 
, . 
R.S.D.W.P. Furthermore, they maintained als6 that capitalism in 
Latvian agriculture had progressed more than in Russia itself, with 
the consequence that in the Latvian countryside a greater differenti-
ation of clas~es, into large landowners and prosperous peasants on 
the one hand, and landless peasants and batraki on the other, had 
taken place. Accordingly, they concluded that the agrarian programme 
of the G.S.D.P.,143 or rather its failure to formulate any specific 
policy to '.'lin the support of the peasants for the proletarian revolution, 
was more suited to Latvian agrarian conditions than the policy of 
Lenin, ~"ho favoured a division of the pomeshchiks' estates among the 
peasants to gain them as allies - and at the $ame time to destroy the 
remaining feudal lati~undia in Russia, in order to accelerate capita-
list development ,in agri culture and hence intensify the c1 ass struggl e 
in the countryside. The Latvian Social Democrats argued that to apply 
Lenin's policy in Latvia would reverse the capitalist concentration 
that already had occurred, which in turn would ~onvert the proletari-
anised peasants back into petty-bourgeois proprietors and so ultimately 
. 144 delay the development of socialist revolution in the countryside. 
Yet the failure 'of the 1905 revolution had shm·Jn clearly to the 
Latvian Social Democrats that union with t~e Russian socialists in a. 
unified struggle against the autocracy vias essential, since there 
could be no hope of a successful revolution in Latvia while its power 
remained unshaken in the rest of the Empire. 145 Consequently, at its 
Third Conqress in 1906, the L.S.D.L.P:. - nm'i renamed the Social Demo-
cracy of ~atvia (S.D.L.) 146 - voted in favour of joining the R.S.D.V!.P., 
;insisting, however, that it retain its status as an autonomous 
51 
territorial organisation of the latter, much like the S.D.K.P.iL., 
and the right to reject the policies of the latter that it considered 
, 147 inappropriate for Latvia, especially its agrarian programme. 
Therefore, it was as a member of a ,united Russian Social Democratic 
party that the S.D.L. faced the harro\lJing years after 1905 when it 
was to suffer both from the repressive actions taken against it by 
the tsarist authorities and from an ever-widening split in its own 
ranks. 
In the reacti on that fo 11 o\lJed 1905 the strength of the pa rty 
declined sharply. The membership of the S.D.L. fell from a peak of 
15,000 in 1905 to about 2,000 in 1910. 148 Nevertheless, it still 
remained numerically the strongest proletarian party in the Russian 
Empire, with a basis of popular support, albeit reduced, among the 
workers, unlike the R.S.D.H.P. itself which remained largely a body, 
or perhaps "head" i~ a more apt coinage, of revolutionary intelligentsia. 
In these years the S.D.L. also became divided into two rival 
factions, one of which, including the Central Committee, was symoa-
thetic to the Mensheviks, while th~ other was a pro-Bolshevik splinter. 
! ' 
Their dispute did not essentially involve the party's programme - the 
Latvian Bolsheviks did not attempt to remodel the agrarian and national 
\ 
policies on Leninist lines. Rather, the fundamental disagreement 
between them appears to have centred on the Latvian Bolsheviks' 
objection to the Central Committee's emphasis 'on the, use of legal means 
to advance the workers' cause, to the detriment of the illegal revolu-
tionary struggle, as well as the former's desire for a closer union 
with the Russian Bolsheviks. 149 
Despite the increasing formation of Bolshevik cells in the 
S.D.L. from 1912, the ~~enshevik-dominated Central Committee remained 
in control of the party until 1914. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks had 
been gaining ground among the local party organisations before 1914, 
particl;llarly in Riga, while the flenshevik leadership itself was emascu-
lated by a number of arrests carried cut by the Okhrana, which purposely 
was helping the Bolsheviks win control of the Social Democratic parties 
in the Empire in the hope this would provoke a split in and so weaken 
the revolutionary movement in general. As a result of these respective 
changes in strength, an equal number of Menshevik and Bolshevik 
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delegates was to be found at the Fourth Congress of the S.D.L., held 
in Brussels in January, 1914. 150 
However, thanks to the defection of a police agent from the 
Mensheviks to the Bolsheviks, the latter were able to take control of 
the Central Committee at this Congress and subsequently to utilise 
'their newly-won power to "purge ll the party of ~ienshevik sympathisers. 
Yet the Latvian Bolsheviks were not Lenin's puppets and while generally 
pursuing Bolshevik policies they declined to merge formally with 
Lenin's party, in the fear that this would lead to a final split in 
party unity, a much cher,ished :tradition within the S.D.L. 15l Indeed, 
in the previous year the Latvian Bolsheviks had rejected Lenin's 
proposal that they include a demand for national self-determination 
in their platform, and in ~1ay, 1914" Janis Berzins, a leader of the 
Latvian Bolsheviks, again emphasised their independence of Lenin when 
he bluntly told him that they would "hardly support [him] everywhere 
d . h·.,152 an 1n ever:-yt 1ng .... ' 
The final split inthc ,S.D.L. was delayed by the outbreak of 
the war. The majority of Latvian Social Democrats, Bolsheviks and 
t1ensheviks alike, It/ith the exception of a group led by A. Pekmanis 
and J. Grasis, adopted a defeatist position with respect to the war, 
in the belief that the Latvian people had nothing to gain from a 
victory of the Russian autocracy. International social revolution was 
. ' 153 
seen as the only way to end the war to the adva~tage of the Latvi ans . 
After the February revolution the strength of the Bolshevik-
domi nated S.D.l. r:ose spectacu larly. Putting forv/ard increasingly 
radical demands, the S.D.L. refused to support the Provisional Govern-
ment - in its eyes, lIa government of the pomeshchi ks and the 
bourgeoisie ll154 -, calling instead for the transfer of all power to 
the soviets, \'Ihich had formed spontaneously in Latvia, and the crea-
tion of a socialist Latvian republic, as an autonomous part of a 
future Russian socialJst republic. The support which the S.O.L. won 
for its programme \'las nothing short of sPE!ctacular, as was evident 
from the dazzling victories that it achieved in the elections to both 
the city and rural dumas and soviets. The pinnacle of its success 
came when it received 72 per cent of the votes cast in the elections 
to the all-Russian Constituent Assembly. Yet the hopes of the 
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Latvian Bolsheviks for a parliamentary seizure of power soon were to 
be frustrated by the German occupation of Latvia. 155 
The last chapter in the life of the S.D.L. occurred in t'1ay, 1918. 
The Latvian r·1ensheviks, opposed, to the Bolshevik dictatorship in 
Russia, finally broke with tradition and demanded the creation of an 
independent. democratic Latvian state, for which act they were expelled 
from the S.D.L. 156 Defending their revolutionary internationalism to 
the end, the Bolsheviks of the S.D.L., who by then had formed the 
Communist Party of Latvia (C.P.L.), seized power in the confusion 
which followed the collapse of the German Empire at the end of 1918 
and established a dictatorship of the proletariat in Latvia. During 
the few months in which it held power, this revolutionary Communist 
government, led by Situchka, attempted to carry out the complete 
socialist transformation of Latvia, at the same time declaring that 
the future of socialist Latvia lay in union with Soviet Russia. However, 
by the summer of 1919 the dreams of the Latvian Communists had vanished, 
shattered by the Allied intervention and :their own failure to \'/in a 
solid base of support among the Latvian population, and an independent 
Latvian state, led by the bourgeois government of K. Ulmanis, had 
been created. The Latvian Communists again went underground, to tend 
their wounds and analyse the reasons for their defeat. 
Finally, one aspect of the ideology of the Latvian Bolsheviks 
merits some brief. attention in this chronicle of their emergence as a 
separate faction in the S.D.L., namely their unbending international 
outlook which even led them to oppose Lenin's support for national 
self-determination. In this case, the rationale behind their position 
is similar to that of the S.D.K.P.iL. 
It appears that the Latvian Bolsheviks believed that the legiti-
mate national grievances of the Latvian people against the German 
ncbi1ity and bourgeoisie and the Russian bureaucracy were being 
exploited by the rising Latvian bourgeoisie to further their own class 
objectives. They felt that their own bourgeoisie aspired to capture 
the political and economic power of the German and Russian ruling 
classes for itself and that it was camouflaging its true aims under 
the nationalist flag, in the hope of winning the support of the 
Latvian workers in its struggle. Stuchka in particular dismissed 
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the idea that the Latvian bourgeoisie had any genuine interest in 
national goals~ but'rather was certain that it was influenced solely 
by the pursuit of its class interests, to which it readily would 
sacrifice the Latvian national cause. He justified this claim by 
indicating that in 1905 the Latvtan bourgeoisie was reluctant to 
support autonomy, much less independence for a Latvia in which the 
tide of social revolution was high, preferring instead to remain 
within the bosom of the Russian Empire whose power it savl as a shield 
for its threatened economic interests, while in 1917 it had become 
the ardent champion of Latvian independence only when it came to fear 
that continued union with revolutionary Russia would pose a greater 
danger to its existence.157 Apparently afraid that the Latvian prole-
tariat might be deceived into supporting national aims which at best 
would fail to foster its class interests and at worst would thwart 
these by giving power to the bourgeoisie, he insisted that the Latvian 
workers dissociate themselves completely from the national movement 
and focus their energies on the battle for socialism, in union with 
their only true allies, the proletariat of the remainder of the Russian 
Empire. 
Moreover, in Litvia itself the pursu~t of national goals was 
to prove an obstacle to the development of a strong, united proletarian 
. movemeni. The working class there was nationally heterogeneous, with 
large percentages of German, Russian, JevIish, Polish and Lithuanian 
as well as Latvian workers. 158 Consequently, it would appear reason-
able to speculate that the creation of a socialist party v/hich sup-
ported Latvian nationalism would alienate the non-Latvian workers and 
so weaken the. ~oletarian movement. Possibly this factor also played 
a role in the Latvian Bolsheviks' condemnation of nationalism. 
The emergence of the revolutionary neo-Marxist theories of 
imperialism, which explained the outbreak of war in 1914 in terms of 
the contl~adictions inherent in the world capitalist system and postu-
lated that international socialist revolution, now objectively ripe, 
was the only solution to this, provided a 'comprehensive theoretical 
basis for the Latvian Bolsheviks' rejection of nationalism. They 
took these theories as confirmation of their opposition to self-
determination for Latvia and their defence of the primacy of the 
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international unity of the workers. 
The history of the Lithuanian Social Democratic movement, and 
of the appearance of a "leftist", international wing "'/ithin it, has 
many parallels with that of the socialist movements of Poland and 
Latvia. This movement dates back to 1896, when the Lithuanian Social 
Democratic Party (L.S.D.P.) vias founded in r~ay of that year. This 
new party was composed ,of a number of small socialist groups which 
in the previous few years had represented the interests of the numeri-
cally. weak, yet nationally diverse working class of Lithuania, includ-
ing also a group of Lithuanian intellectuals who had deserted the 
liberal-democratic movement then united around the positivist oriented 
journal, Varpas (The Bell), and who ideologically were "closer to the 
Polish Social Derno'crats C .e. the, S.P.K.P.iL] th~n to the P.P.S. 1I159 
However, from the very beginning of this party's existence the 
split which vias to plague it for the next twenty-two years was clearly 
in evidence. A grpup of Lithuanian socialists, led by S. Trusevicius 
(Zalewski) and F. Dzieriy~ski, ,opposed that 'part of the proposed 
party programme Vlhi ch advocated that L ithuani a should separate itself 
from Russia. E. Dbrriasevi~ius, the author of this programme, justified 
this on the grounds that since the Russian proletariat and peasantry 
had shown no revolutionary zeal to overthrow the autocracy, revolu-
tionary change in Lithuania depended on its liberation from the reaction-
ary power of the stagnant Russian Empire. 160 Admittedly, at that time 
Domas~viciu~ did not foresee an independent Lithuani~n state as a 
stepping-stone to socialism, but rather he felt that the revolutionary 
struggle would prosper best in a federal republic, embracing Lithuania, 
. - ,' 161 
Poland, Latvia, Belorussia and the,Ukraine. 
On the other hand, Trusevicius, nzier~y~ski and their fellow-
thinkers in the Lithuanian s0cialist movement maintained that the 
success of the proletarian revolution demanded the unity of all simi-
lar movements in the Russian Empire, including that of the oppressed 
Russian vwrkers, against their common foe, the autocracy, reiterating, 
albeit in more radical terms, the idea earlier defended by the Lithu-
anian liberals that even the struggle for a democratised Lithuania 
required union 'with the progressive liberal opposition in Russia 
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against the reactionary tsarist government. 162 Consequently, Truse-
vicius anc his followers refused to join the L.S.D.P. because of its 
separatist aspirations and established their own party, the Union 
of Lithuanian Workers (U.L.W.), which advocated that the struggle 
for socialism in Lithuania must be conducted in alliance with the 
revolutionary workers· movem~nt which it felt was emerging in Russia. 
However, Dzierzynski and the~emaininq "internationalists", including 
V. Perazich and M. and L. Goldman, entered the L.S.D.P. where they 
conti nued to defend the pol i cy of unit!' with the workers in Russ i a .163 
Yet the internationalist faction in the L.S.D.P. proved to be 
in a minority .164·· The First Congress in 1896 approved ~he programme 
drawn up by Domasevicius which had as its immediate goal the creation 
of a democratic federal republic, excluding Russia. As Domatevicius 
later admitted, the main influences on th~ formation of this programme 
were the Erfurt Programme of the G.S.D.P., which divided the political 
struggle for socialism into' two distinct stages - in the first stage, 
the goal of the workers was a general democratic reform of society in 
I - I ' 
order to crealethe conditions in which a mass movement for socialism 
, . 
could develop freely -, and the platform of the P.P.S., which main-
tained that independerlce from the reactionary influence of Russia was 
. . t f th . t f·' l' 165 a pre-requlsl e or e V1C ory .0 SOCla .lsm. 
Although the internationalist wing of the L.S.D.P., which found 
strong ,support in the party organisations in Vi lnius, succeeded at the 
Second Congress in 1897 in pressuring the separatist leadership to 
amend its national programme in such a way that it would be possihle 
to include Russia as a member of the socialist federation of the 
future, the seraratists and their policy remained dominant until 
1905. 166 In particular, the internationalists were weakened by the 
defection of Dzierzynski to the S.D.K.P. in 1899, where he \1aS the 
drivinq force behind the union of this party with the U .L.H. to form 
the S.~.K.P.iL.167 
The 1905 revolution ju~tifiably can be re0arded as a turning-
point in the history of the L.S.D.P., Itlhen it ,started to evolve 
towards an internationalist position.1 68 1905 had provided solid 
reasons for are-eva luati on of the party· s pol icy by some of its 
leaders. In the first place, it was clear th~t Russia no longer could 
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be looked upon as a bastion of reaction from which Lithuania had to 
separate if it was to make any progress toltlards democracy, and even 
socialism. Moreover, the failure of the revolution in Lithuania, as 
in the other borderlands of the Russian Empire, could be attributed 
to the survival of the autocracy which, after it had suppressed the 
revolutionary upheaval at the very heart of the Empire, turned its 
still mighty polt/er to crush the budding revolutions on its periphery. 
The logic of the situation underlined the need to unite with the 
workers' movement in Russia in a concerted struggle to destroy the 
old regime, after which Lithuania It/ould become an autonomous part of 
a democratised Russian republic in which the fight for socialism 
could continue more openly and freely. 
In fact, it was only after 1905 that V. S. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, 
the future leader of the Communist Party of Lithuania, decisively 
broke with the idea of a national socialist movement in Lithuania 
separate from that in Russia. 169 Born into a prosperous peasant 
family in 1880, his revolutionary career dates from 1898 vlhen he was 
expelled from a Catholic seminary for his participation in the 
activities of the left-wino" revolutionary democratic groun associated 
with Varpas, that is, the group which had affinities to\'Jards Social 
Democracy, to which he was converted finally in 1903. Driven by the 
threat of arrest to emigrate to Sltlitzer1and in 1902, where he became 
familiar with the teachings of revo1utionary,~1arxism, he returned to 
Lithuania in 1905 when he led a strike of,agricultural workers in the 
north. Arrested in 1907, he was in prison and exile in Russia until 
1913, where he became acquainted with such prominent Bolsheviks as 
Ia. t1. Sverdlov, t·,. Frunze and I. Koz10v. By then he was a conrnitted 
internationalist,insisting that the future revolutionary activity 
of the L.S.D.P. must.be bound up "inseparably!! \'lith that of the 
R.S.D.H.P. He escaped to Cracow in the spring of 1914, from v/here he 
went first to Britain and then to the United States. In emigration 
during the war he adopted a revolutionary internationalist position -
"I, together with the Polish Social Democrats, defended the Luxem-
burgist point of view on the national question,!170 - and attacked any 
compromises by socialists with chauvinism. Returning to Russia 
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in June, 1917~ he opposed the Provisional Government and entered the 
ranks of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd. An advocate of the Bolshevik 
seizure of power from September, 1917~ he led the Lithuanian section 
of the Bolshevik party in the October revolution. Later he was to 
become the first oresident of the ill-fated Soviet reoublic in , . 
Lithuania and Belorussia. After the collapse of this regime in 1919 
he continued to playa prominent part in the work of the again illegal 
Lithuanian Communist Party, and, after his return to Soviet Russia 
in 1921) he represented this party in the Executive Committee of the 
Comintern until' his death in 1935. 171 
After 1905 too, Zigmas Aleksa-Angarietis, \'iith Kapsukas one of 
the future leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party, himself became 
one of the mainsprings of the revolutionary internationalist wing of 
the L.S.D.P. Also of peasant origins, his revolutionary activity 
was noticed first in 1904 when he was expelled from the Warsaw veteri-
nary institute for his part in a demonstration aqainst the continuing 
war with Japan. Soon released, he returned to Lithuania and entered 
the L.S.D.P. in 1906, immediately joining the "Vilnius Opposition tl 
which attacked the party leadership for its support of Lithuanian 
nati ana 1 i sm and its compromi ses' with the L ithuani an 1 ibera 1 movement. 
At the Seventh Congress of the L.S.n.p:, where he advocated the union 
of all revolutionary socialist oarties in the Russian Empire in the 
struggle to overthro\,1 tt)e autocracy, he was elected a member of the 
Central Committee. Arrested in 1909, he was in prison and exile in 
. . . 
Russ i a until he was freed by the February revo 1 uti on. Ouri ng the war 
he entered the Bolshevik party, sharing its defeatist policy with 
respect to the war - and its call to transform the imperialist war 
into an international civil war for socialism. Commissar for Lithuanian 
Affairs in Soviet Russia after the October revolution, he became a 
member of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party in 
November~ 1918, and Commissar for Internal Affairs in the short-lived 
Lithuanian Soviet Republic. After this, he remained in the leadership 
of the party which was established then in Soviet Russia, during 
which time he, like Kapsukas, was a Lithuanian representative on the 
Executive Committee of the Comintern. He died in 1940, apparently a 
vi ctim of the "purges" of the 1930 IS. 172 
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In the years following the 19n5 revolution the internationalist, 
" 
or !lautonomist" faction in the L.S.D.P., which supported the creation 
of an autonomous Lithuania in a democratised Russia~ grew stronger. 
In June, 1906, the Vilnius organisation of the pa rty came out strongly 
in favour of this policy. This was approved by the party conference 
in September, 1906, despite the opposition of the "federalists'! \'Iho 
continued to hold .the view that Lithuania should be separated from 
Russia. At the Seventh Congress, the !lautonomists" ag,linwere victor-
ious and the parJy programme VIas revised to include their demand for 
an autonomous lithuania within a Russian republic, and for union with 
, '173. 
the R.S.D.W.P. . . 
Moreover, this division in the L.S.D.P. on the national question 
began to widen. In general, the "autonomists", led by Kapsukas, 
Angarietis and P. Eidukevi~ius, defended more radical policies, oppo-
sing the attempts of the !lfederalists" in the upper echelons of the 
party to liquidate illegal revolutionary work, while the !!federalists!l 
themselves, still led by Domasevi~ius, increasingly deserted to the 
camp of the Lithuanian bourgeoisie, in support of national rather 
h 1 1 . 174 t an pure y c ass alms. 
Kapsukas later explained the motivation behind the "autonomists!" 
refusal to make any compromises with the forces of nationalism in 
terms which ar~ quite understandable if viewed from the perspective 
of a revolutionary socialist of an oppressed nation. He maintained 
that in Lithuania support for national objectives would not benefit 
the workers but only ·the rising Lithuanian bourgeoisie. Independence 
from Russia would separate the admittedly weak proletarian movement in 
Lithuania from its strongest ally, the rapidly gro\ling revolutionary 
I . 1 f R' d 1 . h f . . b ., 175 WOr(lng c ass 0 USSla, an eavelt at t e mercy 0 ltS own ourgeolsle. 
Yet underlying this there also seems to be the fear that the Lithuanian 
proletariat, suffering from national as well as class oppression, 
would fall prey to the appeal of nationalism, in which case the 
"autonomists!1I inflexible defence of the international solidarity of 
the socialist move~ent can be regarded as an attempt to ensure that 
the Lithuanian workers were not attracted by the false claims of the 
nationalists into supporting aspirations which only could harm the 
realisation of their ovm objectively-deterr.Iined class interests. 
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In addition, the national composition of the proletariat in 
Lithuania - the majority of workers were Polish or Jewish, rather than 
Lithuanian 176 - appe~red to make any concessions to Lithuanian national 
demands fraught with dangers of division for the socialist movement. 
Consequently, the "autonomjsts'" emphasis on class, rather than 
national interests was a realistic response to this situation, since 
this would prevent the fragmentation of the orbletariat into even 
smaller, more vulnerable organisations established according to 
nat i ona 1 ity . 
In light of the tradition of hostility to nationalism displayed 
by the "autonomists" in the L.S.D.P., their acceptance in later years 
of- the neo-~larx'ist theories of imperialism is quite reasonable. By 
claiming to prove that sociaiist revolution must develop on an inter-
national scale and, consequently, condemning national movements as 
reactionary and contrary to the interests of the proletariat, these 
theories proffered a general substantiation of the "autonomists'" 
I 
opposition to Lithuanian independence which, it seems plausible to 
contend, also helps to explain their adherence to these. 
The final split in the L.S.D.P. was delayed by the r~pressive 
measures taken against the party by the tsarist authorities in F)OG, 
which affected the Bolshevik-inclined internationalists more severely 
than the more mode0ate nationalistfaction. 177 Moreover, during the 
war many of the internationalists found themselves in Russia, either 
in exile or as the result of the evacuation of industry from Lithuania, 
when a large number of them joined the Bolsheviks, the only revolutionary 
party which refused to support the idea of a Russian victory.178 
. " ., 
In 1918, however, with the revival of the activity of the L.S.D.P. 
following the revolutionary upheaval in the Russian Empire in 1917, 
and also the ret~rn of many workers to Lithuania after the peace of 
Brest-Litovsk, the party at last was divided. In t1arch, 1918, the 
proletarian majority of the rarty left its ranks because of the national-
i st and Germanophile orientation of the leadership \!/hich hoped to 
utilise German support to establish an independent Lithuanian republic, 
separated from Soviet Russia. Like the Lithuanian Bolsheviks, who 
had opposed Brest-Litovsk on the grounds that this would allow German 
imperialism to crush the social revolution developing in Lithuania, 
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they opposed the policy of the leadership becaose instead of rrovid-
ing freedom for Lithuania this would deliver it into the hands of 
o 17() German reactlon. -
This splinter group planned to form a new internationalist party 
in Lithuania~ the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania and Belorussia, 
which would include also the Russian Social Democrats in Lithuania 
and the P.P.S.,Left. However~ in June~ this embryonic party again 
was cut in two over the question of whether a Soviet republic should 
be established in Lithuania or a Constituent Assembly called to 
decide the countryls future. Eidukevicius~ supported by a minority 
of this emerging party, demanded the immediate creation of a soviet 
regime in Lithuania which was to become an autonomous Dart of Soviet 
Russia and when this was rejected refused to part~cipate further in 
the party IS activities .180 This group became the nucleus of the 
Communist Party 9f Lithuania, founded in October, 1918, which, after 
it had been strengthened by the influx of Lithuanian Bolsheviks from 
o 0 d . 00" b lnls 181 Ytth LOth 0 C RUSSla, selZe power 1n ecem er, ~J l. e e, uanlan om-
munists were unable to consolidate their rule and, in the face of 
mounting internal hostility, especially from the peasants, and foreign 
intervention, Soviet Lithuania collapsed. Then, like their counter-
parts in Poland and Latvia, they began to ponder over the causes of 
their defeat .- and later revised their programme in the light of the 
conclusions that they drew from this appraisal. 
The following study will examine the principles v/hich the "left" 
Bolsheviks, the S.D.K.P.iL. and the revolutionary internationalist 
factions of the S.D.L. and the L.S.D.P. held in common. However, 
before proceeding to analyse these it will prove useful to consider the 
ideas which both Lenin and these groups shared, in order better to 
understand the nature of their disagreements on the particular appli-
cations of them. This task also will involve a re-examination of their 
vie\'/s concerning the nature of the revolution which they anticipated 
would take place in the Russian Empire since the policies which 
revolutionary t1arxists would defend would depend on the stage of 
deve100ment which they believed that this country had attained . 
. . 
62 
Footnotes. 
lprotokO't Tsentral 'nogo Komiteta R.S.D.R.~, avgust 1917-
mart 1918 goda ~~oscow, 1958),pp-:l84"':'135. 
2Istoriia K.P.S.S., 3 (Moscow, 1967), p. 520. 
3p. .• G. Shliapnikov, Kanun semna~tsato~ god a (r10scow, Petrograd, 
1923), p. 217. 
4For an extensive list of many of the leading Bolsheviks who 
adhered to the "Left Communist" movement, see Korhmunist, No.1, 1918, 
p. 1.' 
5N. Osinsky, "Avtobiografiia," Deiate1i S.S.S.R. i Oktiabr'skoi 
Revo1iutsii, published as a supplement to EntsikTopedicheskii Slovar' 
Russ-kogo 8ib1iograficheskoqo Instituta Granat (t10scow, 1927-1929)-,-
volume z,'columns 89-98. 
6This brief account of Sapronov's career has been culled from 
several sources. See T. V. Sapronov, "Avtobiografiia," ibid., columns 
9-13; V. Serge, t·1emoirs of a Revolutionary (London, 196~po. 230, 
234, 254; and T. Sapronov, Iz istorii rabochego dvizheniya (DO 
1 i chnym vospomenaniyam) (Newtonvi 11 e, , 976; reprint OfMOscow-Leni ngrad, 
1925 edition), with an informative introduction by V. BonnelL 
7Protokol~, pp. 167-173. 
8 Ibid ., pp. 183-186. 
a ~Consult R. I. Markova, "Bor'ba V. I. Lenina s trotskistami i 
'levymi kommunistami', v period Brest3,;" '1oprosy Istorii K.P.S.S., No.5, 
1959, pp. 56,05; Z. 1. Berlina, N. T. Go'rbunova-;-ITBrestskii mir i 
mestnye partiinye organizatsii," Voprosy Istorii, No.9, 1963, pp. 40-
43; and Istoriia K.P.S.S., 3, o.-S-m:-These regions were to be 
centres oT- rT1eftism" in the succeeding years. 
10For the results of the referendum, see Leninskii sbornik, .XI 
(Moscow, Leningrad, 1.929), pp. 59-60. Analysing the social forces 
which they believed had compelled the revolutionary government to accept 
peace with Germany, the "Left Communists" declared: "R.epresentatives 
of various elements made up this majority in favour of peace .. There 
were first the weary anc! declasse soldier masses largely composed of 
peasants. Second, there were some workers, of Russia 's Northern indus-
trial region, where separation from southern sources of raw materials 
such as coal and iron had combined with general agricultural disrup-
tion to produce starvation, an increased decline in industry, unemploy-
ment and disruption of the normal course of productive work. This had 
led to the undermining of the pro1etariat'i cJass character ... or at 
any rate to a reduction in its militancy as a class. Finally, there 
63 
, 
\AJere represented peasants of the northern and cr:ntral industrial 
region, exhausted by the war, the bad harvest, supply difficulties and 
the disruption of urban industry. II "Theses on the Current Situation, II 
Kommunist, No.1, 1918 (Moscow), pp. 4-9, thesis 2. A translation 
TfIlese IITheses" prepared for publication in Critique has been used 
throughout. 
llL. Stupochenko, IIV 'Brestskie dni '," Proletarskaia Revo1iutsiia, 
No.4, 1923, pp. 102-103, \'lhere he argues thatN.V. Krylenko, a lead-
ing Bolshevik commissar in the army, had informed the Central Committee 
of this fact. 
12pro!OkO ly,. p. 200. 
13 Ibie1-, D. 216. 
14Z. L. Serebriakova, Oblastnye ob"edineniia Sovetov Rossii, mart 
l~l]-~eka~c'_ 1918 (r~oscow, 1977), p. 9f:--
15protg_koly, p. 187 
16Ber~ina, Gorbunova, Brestskii mir, pp. 41-42. 
17For an account of this aspect of the, "Left Communists "' activi-
ties, consult L. Schapiro, 'The Origins of the Communist Autocracy. 
Political Opposition in the-SOVleT-Sfate:--Tfr'stpnase:--1917-'1922 
TCambri age, rlass., 1955), pp. 134-135. 
18At the Congress, 30 of the delegates Noted for Lenin's resolution 
in favour of peace, 12 opposed this, while 4 abstained. For these 
figures, consul:t; Sed'rnoi Ekstrennyi SlIezd R.K.P.(b.), mart 1918 goda (Moscow, 1962), p~75 .---.-----------
19t1. N. Pokrovskii, Qktial?!-.2.kai~_J~vo1iutsiia (iloscov/, 1929), 
p. 17. 
200cherki istorii moskovskoi orqanizatsii K.P.S.S. (t1osCOVJ, 1966), 
p. 305. 
21Berlina, Gorbunova, Brestskii mir, p. 41. Consult also Markova, 
Bor'ba, p. 66, for a list of the other areas then deserting the "Left 
Communi sts II . 
22Schapiro, Communist Autocracy, p. 135. For the voting figures 
at the Congress itself, see Sed~~oj __ S"~zd, p. 228. 
64 
23For a more extensive analysis of the theories of imDeria1ism 
which Marxists in general, Euronean as well as Russian, ha~ developed 
in the early twentieth century, see chapter three of the present work. 
24V. G. Sorin, Partiia i ~ppozits~ia: Fraktsiia levykh kommunistov 
(t,10scow, 1925), p. 41. Sorin himself was a prominent 'I Left Communist" 
in 1918. 
25 See the speech of Bukharin, Sed'moi S"ezd, p. 37. 
26V. r. Lenin, "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion 
of a Separate and Annexationist Peace," Collected Horks, 26 (1,10scow, 
1964), p. 444; and "The Revolutionary Phr-ase,IrCoTlected vlorks, 27 
Uloscm'i, 1965), p. 23. ' 
27A. S. Bubnov argued in this manner at the Seventh Congress: "So 
we c~n,$ay that if in October ... we could talk of the threshold of 
revo 1 uti (\n i n ~les t Europe' and in Germany, then nO\ll we can say that 
the revolution is approaching a more critical phase, that it is on the 
eve of revealing itself in the form of the acutest class conflicts, 
that is, in the form of open civil war. And if this is actually the 
case - and we are convinced that this is so - th~n now, in a situation 
when the revolutionary crisis in Hest Europe not only is maturing, but 
already has matured, when we have such a situation that the interna-
tional revolution is on the point of breaking out in the fiercest, 
widest form of civil war - the argument to conclude peace in this 
situation strikes a blow to the cause of the international proletariat. 1I 
Se~'moi SlIezd, p. 50. 
28 Ibid ., p. 27. E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 3 (London, 
1953), pp:-23ff. presents an account of the tentative schemes in 
Allied circles, espeCially in Britain, to reach a "negotiated peace 
with Germany at Russia's expense." While these never came to fruition, 
he believes that it was possible that some of the Bolshevik leaders 
had heard rumours about them and that this may have influenced their 
defence of revolutionary war. 
29"Viator ll , IIVneshniaia po1itika sovetskoi respub1iki,1I Kommunist, 
No.3, 1918 (Moscow), p. 3. 
30r. T. S. (Stukov), IIV bor'be s kontr-revoliutsiei ," Kommunist, 
No.4, 1918 (~1oscow), p. 2. 
31 See the speech of Bukharin, Sed~moi_S"ezd, p. 30. 
32For a detai1ed analysis of the economic losses imposed on Soviet 
Russia by the 8rest-Litovsk treaty, consult A. Lomov, 1I~1irnyi dogovor' 
i narodnoe khoziaistvo Rossii," Biulleteni.!:S.N.Kh., No.1, 1918, pp.3-13. 
65 
33See the speech of Osinsky, Sed'moi S!lezd, pp. 83-84. 
34V. G. Sorin, "K voprosu 0 sovetskoi v1asti," Kommunist, No.4, 
1918 (Moscow), pp. 7-8. 
35 v:. 1. Lenin, "Report at the meeting of the All-Russia C.E.G.~ 
February 24, 1918," Co 11 ected , t~orks, 27, pp. 44-45. 
36V. I. Lenin, Revolutionary Phrase, pp. 20-21. Consult also 
Sorin, f~tiia, p. 4t::-
37Lenin, Revolutionary Phrase, pp. 21-22. 
38Sorin, ~art~~, pp. 81-82. 
39Theses, thesis 2. 
_.---
40 Ibid ., thesis 9. 
41 K. B. Radek, "Posle piati mesiatsev," Kommunist, No.1, 1918 
(t10s cow), p. 3 . 
42vJhile the Russian ~1arxists certainly shared ~1(1,rx 's fear of the 
peasants, it is [Jossible that this was intensified by the distrust 
that many of the Russian intelligentsia had of the reactionary nature 
of the "chernye liudi",' particularly after the peasants' hostility to 
the naroCfiilKi. 
43Theses, 10 and 11. 
--
440 . V. Oznobishin, "K voprosu 0 bor'be s fraktsiei 'levykh 
kommunistov',1t Voprosy Istorii, No.9, 1971, pp. 70-73 
45 Bo1 'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 21 (r~OSCOV", 1931), column 
242. 
46,1\. G. Titov, "Razgrom anti parti inoi qruppy 'demokrati ches kogo 
tsentralizma',1t Voprosy Istorii K.P.S.S., No.6, 1970, p. 85. Titov 
presents a clear chronologfCal account-of the various stages of the 
rise and fall of'the Democratic Centralist movement, but his analysis 
of the motivation of this opposition group and the causes of its 
failure is fallacious. 
47 I bid., p. 85. 
66 
48Vos'moi S"ezd R.K.P.(b.), mart 191~qoda (r1os COItl, 1959). See 
the speech of Osinsky, p. 164. 
49 Ibid ., pp. 164-167. 
50 Ibid ., pp. 201-203, for Sapronov's speech on this issue 
51 Ibid ., pp. 203-204. 
52Vos 'mai a Konferentsi i a R. K.P. (b.), dekabr' 1019 goda (r1oscow, 
1961). -S'ee the speech of Sapronov, pp. 64-65. 
53Ibid ., pp. 67-68.. 
540eviatyi S"ezd R.K.P.(h.), mart-a~rel' 1920 qoda (r-10SCOVl, 19(;0), 
I!Tezisy 0 kollegial'nosti -,---ecrfrlOITchTi, pp. 565-567. These theses 
were drafted and signed by Osinsky, Sapronov and r1aksimovskii. 
55Sapronov, Avtobi~grafii~, column 12. 
56 Ibid ., column 12. For Tomsky's defence of collegial administra-
tion, see his speech, Oevi~tyi ~~'ezd, pp. 159-164. 
57Institut Istorii Partii Ts.!~._ K.P.Ukra~ - Fi1ial Instituta 
Marksizma-Leninizma pri Ts. K. K.P.S.S .. , Kommunisticheskaia ¥artiia 
UKrainy-v-re"zoliutsiakh i resheniakhs-freZClOV i konferentsii ,918-1956 
TK1e"v·; T958), p p. 69 -71. " 
5CTitov, ~azqrom, p. 88. 
590ev_iataia Konferentsiia R.K.P--.:..~, sentiabr' 1920 Goda (t1osCOVl, 
1972). See the speech of Sapronov, especially pp. 156-159-'.-
60"Ocherednye zadachi Dartii," Pravda, January 22,1921. This 
platform was presented by Bubnov, n.-S-.-Boguslavskii, A. N. Kamenski;, 
t1aksimovskii, Osinsky, Rafail (tt Farbman) and Sapronov. 
61Titov, Razgrom) pp. 89-90. 
62 Ibid ., p~ 90. 
630dinadtsatyi SlIezd R.K.P.(b±_~art-a~~l' 1~~2 goda (l10sco\'l, 
1961), pp'. 86-89. 
64A translation of this platform, includinq a list of those v/ho 
subscribed to it, can be found in E. H. Carr, The Interregnum (London, 
1954) pp. 367-373. 
67 
65G. Haupt, J.-J. Marie, !'A. S. Bubnov," t~akers of the Russian 
Revolution (Ithaca, 1974), p. 113. 
66Titov, Razgrom, p. 93. 
67 Ibid , pp. 93-95, for a brief account of the decline of the 
"Sapronovite ll opposition. 
68M. S. Zorkii, Rabochaia Oppozitsiia (Leningrad, Moscow, 1926), 
pp. 16-17. 
69V. Serge, Memoirs p. 123. 
70A. G. Sh1iapnikov, "Nashi raznoglasiia,'! Pravda, January 18,1924. 
710esiatyi S"ezd R.K.P.(b), mart 1921 gOd
a 
(rloscow, 1963). Among 
the numerous vJorkers I Oppositionists who argue in this vein, see 
especially the speeches of E. N. Ignatov, p. 318; A. S. Kiselev, 
p. 281; and Shliapnikov, p. 74. 
72Zorkii, Rab~~haia Oppozitsiia, pp. 24-27. 
73 Ibid ., pp. 16-17. Also consult E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik 
Revolut-:ron: 2 (London, 1952), p. 213. ---
74For the bases of support for the Workers' 'Opposition~ consult 
Zorkii, Rabochaia Op~ozitsiia, p. 50; ahd Marcel Liebman, Lenin and 
Leninism~don, 19 5), p. 213. 
75'A. t.1. Ko11ontai, "Avtobiografiia,'1 Deiateli, 1, columns 194-211, 
for her O\'tn account of her career. 
76Cited in A. I. Solzhenitsyn, Lenin In Zurich (New York, 1976), 
p. 279. 
77N• N. Sukhanov, The RussianRevo1utio~, 1 (New York, 1962), 
p. 288. 
78For an account of the position adopted by the Latvian Bolsheviks 
in ;larch, 1917, consult A. Ezergailis, The 1017 Revolution in Latvia 
(New York, 1974), pp. 41, 51.' 
79A. Ba1abanoff, t1y Life fls A Rebel (New York, 1938), p. 251. 
BOA. Rosmer, Mo~~ow Under Lenin (London, 1971), p. 168. 
81 This description was coined by Serge, Memoirs, p. 205. 
82Consult A. G. Shliapnikov, !!Avtobiografiia," Deiateli, 3, 
columns 244-251, for his own account of his revolutionary career. 
68 
33Shliapnikov, Kanun, pp. 182-183. Solzhenitsyn has even des-
cribed Shliapnikov as--the actual leader of fue Bolshevik party in Russia 
in the war years. See his Lenin, p. 293. 
84Sukhanov, ~e~~l~tion, 1, pp. 43-44. 
35J . Reed~ Ten Days That Sho<?J~ The-.!Iorld (New York, 1967), pp. 
271-273. 
86A. ~1. Kollontai, The ~Lork~T.s~~position (London, 1968), passim. 
37 V. I. Len in, "The Second All-Russ i a Congress of r,1i ners ," Co 1-
lected Works, 32 (Moscow, 1965), pp. 60-62. 
88V. I. Lenin, "Summing-up Speech on the Report of the Central 
Committee of the R.C.P.(b.)." ibid., especially pp. 192-200. 
89S M' 123 - erge, emOlrs, p. . 
90Balabanoff, Rebel, p. 252. 
91 This declaration can be found in Zorkii, Rabochaia Oppozitsiia, 
pp. 60ff. For the Workers' Oppositionists' defence of their action, 
see the speech of Shliapnikov, Odinadtsatyi Sltezd, pp. 186-189. 
92sh1iapnikov, Nashi raznoglasiia. 
93Ros a Luxemburg, The National Question, edited by H. navis (New 
York, 1076), pp. 70 and 78 admits that the S.D.K.P. had laid claim to 
the mantle of Proletariat. 
94 1n 1795 the Russian Empire, the Hapsburg Empire and Prussia had 
comoleted the final division of the former Polish state among themselves. 
After these Partitions the respective areas of Poland became known 
as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Austrian Poland and Prussian Poland. In 
1815 a new redivision took place. when the Grand Duchy was renamed the 
Kingdom of Poland, or Russian Poland. This study deals with the revolu-
tionary Marxists of this part of Poland. 
95Luxemburg, Nati ona 1 Questi~, p. 69. 
69 
96A. Bromke, Poland's Politics: Idealism vs Realism (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1967), pp. 20-21, where he cites from the Polish-historian, 
H. Hereszycki. Also consult A. L. Pogodin, Glavnye techeniia pol'skoi 
.Q£liticheskoi mysli, 1863-1907 (St. Petersburg, 1908), p. 157.' 
97Pogodin, ~lysli, pp. 137-139. Admittedly, there had been advo-
cates of positivism even in Russian Poland even before 1863, notably 
A. Zamoyski and A. Wielopolski, but they had remained largely prophets 
in the wilderness before the ignominious defeat of 'the 1863 revolt. 
For an account of the early origins of positivism in this part of 
Poland, consult S. Blejwas, "The Origins and Practice of 'Organic 
Hork' in Poland: 1795-1863," Polish Review, No.4, 1970, especially 
pp. 45-53. -
98For a brief, yet clear account of the main ideas of the Positi-
vists, consult Bromke, Poland's Politics, pp. 12-13. 
99~1. Lednicki, Life and Culture of P_oland (New York, 1944), 
pp. 22-26. 
100Swietochowski in particular believed that the Kingdom of Poland 
had ~ained~reat economic advantages from union with the Russian 
Empire. See Bromke, Poland's Politics, p. 22. 
lOlC,'ted' 'b'd 13 ln ~_., p. . 
102J . r1archlewski, Sotsial'nye otnosheniia v Pol'she (~1oscovr, 
1920), p. 13. 
103L. Blit, The Origins of Polish Socialism: The History and Ideas 
of the First Polish Socialist Pa~t~?78-1286 (Cambridge, 1971), 
pp. ""6-22. 
104The fact that Marxists easily could adapt to and apply certain 
ideas of the Positivists is not surprising when one considers the 
remarkable similarities in the methodology and sociology of r,1arxism 
and Positivism. 80th viewed society as a historically developing 
"organism", subject to "scientific" analysis, and both claimed that 
social conditions determined man's consciousness and "rays of thinking. 
For a fascinating analysis of the convergence of Marxism and Positi-
vism in these respects, consult M. Mandelbaum, History, Man, & Reason: 
~~~n Ninetee~th-Century Thouqht (Baltimore, 1971), pp. 163-191. 
105Luxemburg, ~~tional Question, pp. 77-30. 
106R. Arskii, "Iz istorii sotsial 'no-revoliutsionnoi partii 
'Proletariat',11 Krasnaia Letopis', No.8, 1923, pp. 46-47, vrhere he 
quotes extensively from the "Brussels Programme" issued by this party 
i r. 1882. 
107 Ibid ., p. 47. 
108 Ibid ., pp. 55-56. 
70 
109Ibid ., p. 53. The Polish f1arxists in general neglected any 
ana1ysiS;-or the national composition of the bour0eoisie in the Kingdom 
of Poland and did not question whether the negative attitude of this 
class towards Polish independence was at least in part caused by the 
fact that itself it was far from being homogeneously Polish. R. t1ellor, 
Ea~tern ~urope: A Geography of the Comecon Countries (London, 1975), 
p. lQ,Iiiaintains that 'iin 1895, in Russian Poland, Jews formed 14 per 
cent of the total population but co~prised 84 per cent of the merchants 
II 
110Cited in Blit, Polish Socialism, p. 49. After 1864 K. Krzywicki, 
a leading Positivist,naa-condemned the Polish peasants as at best 
passive and at worst reactionary. Ibid., p. 8. In fact, in the 
nineteenth century the peasantry consTStently opposed every revolt 
of the gentry and it is quite possible that this left a legacy of 
distrust of the peasants among the Polish intelligentsia. 
lllArskii, Proletariat, pp. 47, 53. 
1l2Harynski in particular believed that social revolution was 
brewing in the Russian Empire in the 1870's and 1880's. For his 
defence of this, see Slit, Polish Socialism, pp. 44-45. 
l13Arskii, froletariat, p. 56. 
114Luxemburg, National Question, pp. 63-64. 
l15 Ibid ., pp. 177-178. 
l16 Ibid ., pp. 179-180. 
1l7 Ibid ., pp. 180-182. 
1l8V. Leder, "Natsional'nyi vopros v po1'skoi i russkoi Sotsial-
demokratii," Ptoletarskaia Revo1iutsiia, Nos. 2-3, 1927, p. 184. He 
quotes from the resolution on the question of autonomy for the Kingdom 
of Poland, composed by Rosa Luxemburg and adopted by the Sixth Congress 
of the S.D.K.PjL. in 1908. See also Luxemburg, National Question, 
pp. 77-80, where she defended the view that the essence of t1arXTSm was 
'the dialectical method of historical analysis", rather than the mechan-
i cal repetition of specific statements on certain questions made by 
t1arx. 
71 
119K. B. Radek, "Theses and Resolution of the Editorial Board of 
Gazeta Rabotnicza, Organ of the Regional Presidium of the S.D.K.P.iL.,'; 
in O. (;-ankin, H. Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the Horld Har (Stanford, 
1940), pp. 507-518. In tnese, Radik-in essence subscribed to the 
same theory of imperialism as Bukharin and Piatakov, but he in parti-
cular emphasised the implications of this theory for nation states, 
condemning them as reactionary. 
l20S. Pestkovskii, 111905 god v Pol 'she," Krasnaia Letonis', No.5, 
1922, p. 245. Also consult Pogodin, Mysli, p-.-104, where he agreed 
that the Polish \'Iorkers V/el~e firm patrTots. 
l21 Ibid ., pp. 248-249. Also consult: 1. Krasnyi, ;iF. E. Dzerzhinskii. 
(MateriaTyo zhizni i podpol'noi deiatel'nosti), II Proletarskaia 
Revoliutsiia, No.9, 1926, pp. 35-36; Luxemburg, NationalQUci'stion, 
-p.-i52; and H. Davis, "Introduction,!! Na!..ion..~l.-JLuestion, p. 13. 
122Krasnvi, Dzerzhinskii, p. 46. 
l23Cited in A. Kraevskii, "K kharakteristike ideologii Sotsial-
Demokratii Pol'shi i Litvy," Proletarskaia __ Re~gliutsiia, No.6, 1931, 
p. 27. 
124Cited in ibid., n. 18. 
125Cited in ibid~, p. 28. 
l26See the speech of Tyszko at the Sixth Congress of the S.D.K.P.iL., 
cited in ibid., pp. 43-45; for Luxemburg'S evaluation of the revolu-
tionary poten"tia1 of the Russian oeasants, refer to ibid., pp. 45-46. 
l27J . Marchlewski, Voina i mir mezhdu burzhuaznoi Pol'shei i 
pro1etarskoi Rossiei U1oscow,-19210P. 36.-r1archlevlsv.; was one of the 
rew-l-e-aaers of"t1ie-s-.D.K.P.iL. to analyse the problems of the country-
side, yet he still denied that it was necessary for the Polish ~'1ar-xists 
to formulate a separate agrarian programme designed to meet the needs 
of the oeasants in Poland. See A. Kochanski, S.D.K.P.iL. w 1atach 
1907-1910 (Warsaw, 1971), pp. 208-209. -- ---
l28 K. B. Radek, "Avtobiografiia,!I Deiateli, 2, column 147. Radek 
was a member of the S.D.K.P.iL. until T9~v/Fen he joined the Bolshevik 
party. 
129For a thorough account of "one of the most obscure and difficult 
episodes in the history of Polish socialism," consult J. P. Nettl, 
Rosa~~~emburg (Abridged edition, Oxford, 1969), pp. 344-361. 
72 
130 Cited in B. la. Shabachnikov, "V 1. Lenin i 'Rozlamovskaia ' 
oppozitsiia v S.D.K.P.iL.," Lenin i Pol'sha: Problemy, kontakty, 
otkliki (~1osco\'J, 1970), pp. T88-"m9-.~-Also"-refer to Leder, Natsional'-
n~i_v<Ypros, pp. 187-188. 
131Radek, Theses and Resolution, pp. 507-518. 
132"Declaration of the Polish Delegations," in Gankin, Fisher, 
The Bolsheviks, pp. 335-337. This declaration was signed by both 
factions of £fie S.D.K.P.iL., as well as by the P.P.S.-Left. 
133Sed'maia Aprel'skaia) Vserossiiskaia Konferentsiia R.S.D.R.P.(b.), 
(~loscow, 1958. See the speech of Dzieriyl1ski, pp. 214ff. 
134~1. K. Dziewanowski, The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline 
History (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p.7L r'1archlewski, Voina, p. 4, 
admitted that the workers in Poland had supported national indeoendence 
in 1918, but he argued that they had been deceived into this by the 
prospect of a socialist Poland, under Daszynski IS government, \'vhen 
in fact Poland soon became a "reactionary bourgeois" state. 
135 For a brief, but clear account of the formation of the C.W.P.P., 
see Dziewanowski, f~m~uni~~~rty, pp. 75-79. 
136Ibid ., pp. 80-95. 
137For a detailed, yet readable account of the emergence of the 
L.S.D.L.P. as a united party, consult V. E. Johnson, Social Democrac"~ 
and the Latvian Revolutionary Novement, 1900-1914 (Unpl:iDTfSlleGlTaster s 
thesis, University of ~Iashington, 1974),pp.-r5-=23. 
138Bruno Kalnins, "The Social Democratic t10vernent in Latvia," in 
Revo1utio_n and Po]itics in Russia: Ess~s in ~1emory of C. 1. Nico1aevsky, 
edited by Alex. and .Janet Rabinowitch (Bloomington, 1972), pp. 136-137. 
For Stuchka's position on federation from 1904 until 1906, consult 
I. Apine) "Vzgliady Stuchki nCl natsiona1 'nyi vopros (po rabotam do-
oktiabr'skoao perioda),!1 in" P. Stuchka: revoliutsioner, myslitel I, i 
gosudarstvermyi deiatel I, edited-by G.I.--Kurp-nek (Riga, 1965), pp. 
23"=-24: - -
139Consult P. 1. Stuchka, "Avtobiografiia," Deiateli, 3, columns 
128-129: and S. V. Zieme1is, "Petr lvanovich Stuchka;'Voprosy Istori; 
JS.?S.S., No.7, 1965, pp. 89-92. 
140 E. A. Ames, The Revolution in the Baltic Provinces of Russia 
(London, 1907), p. Tt. -----
1411. lanson (Braun), !'Latviia v pervoi po1ovine 1905 goda," 
Pro1etarskaia Revoliutsiia, No. 12, 1922, p. 33, where he cites from 
~reso'ution adopted by the Second Congress. 
73 
142For an account of the contacts bet\'/een the Latvian socialists 
and the G.S.D.P. in the 1890's, consult Kalnin~, Social Democratic 
t1lovement, pp. 134-135. Also refer to P. L. Valeskar~Razvitile 
marksTstko-leninskoi filosofii v Latvii," Voorosy Filosofii, No.7, 
~-------1967, p. 3. . 
i43At the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of Latvia Stuchka 
admitted that the Latvian Social Democrats had adopted the agrarian 
programme of the G.S. D. P. Consult 1. Krastyn', !lK vo~rosu ob agrarnoi 
politike Kommunisticheskoi partii Latvii," Voprosy Istorii K.P.S.S., 
No.4, 1959, p. 78. 
144 Ibid ., pp. 77-78. Also consul t Ianson, Latviia, p. 14, where 
he stresses the irreconcilable hostility of theLatvlan Social Demo-
crats to any policy t:i.1t would "foster ... the interests of the petty-
bourgeois (petty-proprietor) class and strengthen their property' 
[rights] at the expense of the interests ... of the workinCJ class." 
145Ziemelis, Stuchka, pp. 8~-90. 
146p . 1. Stuchka, !lIz proshlogo Kommunisticheskoi partii Latvii," 
Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, No. 12, 1922, p. 56. 
l47Chetvertyi (Ob!ledini-t:~~r:~xi.L~ezd R.S.D.R.P., aprel' 1906 
goda (Moscow, 1959), pp. 413. For the final terms of this union, see 
"Proekt uslovii ob"edineniia L.S.D.R.P. s R.S.D.R.P.," ibid., pp. 
530-531, especially part 7, whic~ concerns agrarian policy. 
148K. Pechak, !lSotsial-demokratiia Latviia (Kommunisticheskaia 
partiia Latvii) v period s 1~09 po 1915qg.," Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, 
No. 12, 1922, p. 63. Kalnins, Social Democratic t1ovement, pp. 142, 
145, presents very similar figures:-- ._-
149pechak, Sotsial-demokratiia, pp. 69-70. 
150 Ibid ., pp. 73-75. Also consult Kalnins, Social Democratic 
Movement:;-pp. 150-151. 
151pechak, Sotsial-demokratiia, pp. 75-77; and also p. 67, where 
he mentions the----ncharacteristic" unity of the S.D.L. For a contemporary 
account which substantially confirms Pechak's analysis, consult 
A. Ezergailis, liThe Bolshevisation of Hle Latvian Social Democratic 
Party,'! Canadian Slavic Studies, no. 2,1967, pn, 242-253. 
152Cite~ in Kalnin~, Social Democratic Movement, p. 153. For 
Lenin 's !1ro~csal, see V. I. Lenin, !lDraft Platform for the Fourth Con-
gress of the Social Democrats of the Latvian Area," Collected Horks, 
19 (r'1oscow, 1963), especially pp. 115-118. 
74 
153pechak, SQtsial-demokratii~, pp. 80-81. 
154p. I. Stuchka, "Koa1itsionnoe ili demokraticheskoe pravitel'stvo,tl 
V bor'be za Oktiabr' (Riga, 19(0), pp. 44-45. 
155V. t"1ishke, tlPodgotovka oktiabria v Latvii," Proletarskaia 
Rev01iutsiia, No.1, 1928, pp. 39-40, where he presents the statistics 
of the S.D.L.'s electoral successes in 1917. 
156Kalnins, Social Democratic Movement, p. 155. 
157p. I. Stuchka, "Demokraticheskii tsentra1izm," V bor'be, pp. 
132-133. Also consult Apine, Vzg1iady Stuchki, pp. 25, 33. 
158For the national stratification in the Latvian towns, consult 
Pervaia ~seobshchaia perepis' nase1eniia rossiiskoi imperii, 1897q. 
Na1ichnoe naseleniia oboeqo pola po uezdam, s ukazaniem chisla lits 
preobladaiushchikh rodnykfi lazykov (St. Petersburg, 1905), p. 3. 
1590ch~~ki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Litvy, 1 (Vilnius, 
1973), p. 72. For a detailed account of the composition of the 
L.S.D.P., consult L. Sabalinunas, "Social Democracy in Tsarist Lithu-
ania, 1893-1904," bneJ::ican Slavic and East European.Reviev/, No.2, 
1972, pp. 330-332. For the position of the IIVarpininkasyn, consult 
A. L. Pogodin, "Litovskoe natsiona1'noe vozrozhdenie v kontse XIX 
veka," Russkaia ~1ysl', January, 1909, p. 138. 
1600cherki, p. 71. 
161 I bid., p. 70. 
1F2 Ibid ., pp. 71-73. For the position of the Liberals, consult 
Pogodin~zrozhdenie, p. 141. 
1630cherki, pp. 71-72. 
164Tomash, himself a supporter of the internationalist wing, agreed 
that this was the case. Tomash (E. Soko1ovskii), "Vospominaniia 0 
Fe1ikse Dzerzhinskom," Pro1etarskaia Revo1iutsiia, No.9, 1926, p. 68. 
1650cherki, pp. 69-70. 
166Ibid ., pp. 86-87. See also Sabaliunas, Social Democracy, p. 340. 
167Krasnyi, Dzerzhinskii, pp. 26-27. 
75 
168Shestoi S"ezd R.S.D.R.P.(b.)~ avgust 1917 goda U'1oscow, 1958). 
See thespeech"of Kapsukas, pp.·91-92. 
16Q ~Ocherki~ p. 236. Consult also Z. Angarietis~ "Iz deiatel'nosti 
Sotsia1-Demokraticheskoi Partii Litvy v gody reaktsii (Vospominaniia 
byvshego chlena Ts.K. S.-D.P.L.)," Pro1etarskaia Revoliutsiia, No. 11, 
1922, p. 77, where he claims that in 1905 Kapsukas had remained part 
of the old "patriotic" leadership which had advocated separation from 
Russia; and V. S. r1itskevich-Kapsukas, "Avtobiografiia,1! Deiateli, 2, 
column 43, where he admitted this himself. 
HOV. S. r1itskevich-Kapsukas, HIstoki i zarozhdenie Korrmunisti-
cheskoi partii Litvy," Pro1etarskaia Revo1iutsiia, No.1, 1921, p. 164. 
171Mitskevich-Kapsukas, Avt~biografiia, columns 42-43; R. I. 
Ma1iukiavichius, "Vintsas MitskTiivichius," Istoriia S.S.S.R.~ No.2, 
1968, pp. 62-67; and R. I. t1a1iukiavichius, "Revoliutsioner leninskoi 
zakalki," Istoriia S.S.S.R., No. 4, 1970~ p[). 113-116. 
172E. V. Grishkunaite, "Zigmas An:)aretis," Istoriia S.S.S.R., 
No. 5, 19E7~ pp. 138-144. 
173Angarietis, Iz deiatel'nosti, pp. 78-79. Also consult v. S. 
f'.1itskevich-Kapsukas "19059. v Litve,n Pro1etarskaia Revoliutsiia, 
No. 12~ 1922, pp. 71-72. 
1740cherki, p. 235; and Angarietis, ~_deiate1 'nosti, pp. 83-00. 
175V• S. r·1itskevich-Kapsukas, "Bor'ba za sovetskuiu v1ast ' v Litve 
i zapadnoi Belorussii (konets 19189. i nacha10 1919g.),11 Pro1etarskaia 
Revoliutsiia, No.1, 1931, p. 78. 
176Anaarietis, Iz deiatel'nosti, p. 74. 
'. -
177}bid., pp. 88-90. 
178Kapsukas, Shestoi S"ezd, p. 92. 
179S. Girinis, "Kanun i sumerki sovetskoi vlasti na Litve," Pro1e-
tarskaia Revo1iutsiia, No. 8~ 1922, pp. 75-76. For the attitude of 
the Lfffiuci.-nian BoTSlleviks towards the treaty of Brest-Litovsk~ see the 
declaration of the Lithuanian section of the Bolshevik Party, Pravda, 
February 3/16, 1918. 
WOG" "" K lrlnlS, .anun, p" 76. 
18lltIhile the Lithuanian COlrnlunist Party may have grown quickly 
at the end of 1918, as Kapsukas claimed, it still was a very small 
organisation, with only 1290 members throughout Lithuania. v. s. 
t·1itskevich-Kapsukas, "Revoliutsiia v Litve (1912g.) i sozdanie 
vremennogo revoliutsionnogo raboche-krest'ianskogo pravitel'stvo," 
Istori~},!arksist, Nos. 2-3,1935, p. 44. 
76 
77 
Chapter 2. 
THE "LEFT Cor'1MUNISTS" AND LENIN: THE DEFENDERS OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVISr~. 
, 
Although the "Left Communists" and V. I. Lenin were to come into 
conflict over the policies which they considered to be appropriate for 
the construction of socialism in the Russian Empire, they were united 
in the pursuit of common goals. They believed that the creation of a 
socialist society, ultimately embracing the whole world, would usher 
in a new realm in human history, a "kingdom of freedom", justice and 
equality. The achieve this end, however, they were convinced that 
capitalism first had to be destroyed. Only when this system had been 
overthrown, and the economic exploitation that was characteristic of 
it eliminated, would the class and national antagonisms which divided 
and alienated men be overcome. Then men \'Iould become free consciously 
and collectively to organise and plan their social life, and, conse-
quently, to attain mastery over nature amI control of their own destiny. 
Yet other self-professed Marxists in the Russian Empire, such 
as the ~lensheviks, shared this vision. Nevertheless, they disagreed 
with their more revolutionary-minded colleagues that socialist revolu-
tion could be successful in a relatively backward country, like the 
Empire. They maintained that socialism could be constructed only in 
mature bourgeois societies \r,here the "full development" of capitalism 
had created the tlobjective prerequisites" for its establishmen~. It 
was the gradualism implicit in this argument that the "Left Communists" 
and Leni n re fused to accept. \~hi le they too accepted that the growth 
of capitalism was the ultimately determining factor that was impellinq 
society in the direction of socialism, they also held that men, in 
this case, the revolutionary proletariat, need not remain passive but 
consciously could intervene to accelerate the march of history tm"Jards 
its appointed socialist end. In 1917, they acted on this belief and 
seized power in the Russian Empire with the avolt/ed intent of building 
soci ali sm there. 
This split in the Marxist movement in the Russian Empire into an 
economic deterministic wing, which believed that the victory of 
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socialism depended upon the presence of certain economic, social and 
political preconditions which would be the product of the gradual 
growth of capital i sm - traditi ona lly, these "objective prerequisites" 
were considered to be the domination in the economy of highly concen-
trated and centralised industries which the revolutionary proletariat, 
itself a majority, could utilise as the basis for an organisation of 
production, planned to meet the needs of society -, and a revolutionary 
activist wing, which claimed that the proletariat need not await such 
a maturation of capi"-talism before it could proceed to the construction 
of a socialist society, can be related to a similar dualism in K. t1arx's 
and F. Engels' theory of history. As an explanation of the course of 
historical development, this theory has been described aptly as "a 
peculiar amalgam of deterministic and activistic elements."l The 
existence of these two strands in Marx's and Engels' thought later 
allowed their successors to emphasise either determinism or activism, 
while defending their interpretation as consistent with the principles 
of t1arxism. 
To be sure, there is a distinct determinist thread running 
through t1arx' sand Engels' phi losoohy of hi story. In general> they 
contended that the sys tern of producti on \'1as the foundati on on V1hi ch 
the political, social and intellectual structure of society was based. 
In a preface to The Communist ~1an;festo, written in 1888, Engels 
unequivocally defended this belief: 
The Manifesto being our joint production, I consider myself 
bo'und to s ta te that the fundamental propos iti on, whi ch forms 
its nucleus, belongs to t1arx. That proposition is: in every 
historical epoch, the prevailin0 mode of economic production 
and exchange, and the social organisation necessarily follow-
ing from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from 
which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual 
history of that epoch .... 2 
However, they stressed that the "mode of producti on 11 did not 
remain static and unchanging. They believed that as the productive 
forces of a soci ety grew, they eventually came into confl i ct vii th the 
existing "re l ations of production", that is, the organisation of pro-
duction and exchange, which then became an obstacle to their further 
growth. They maintained that when this stage of develooment had been 
reached, a revolution was necessary in order to free these forces from 
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their existing confines and restructure the economy in such a manner 
that their continued expansion was guaranteed. r~oreover, this revolu-
tionary change in the economic substructure of society also "JOuld 
entail a similar transformation in its superstructure, that is, in its 
political, social and intellectual frameltlOrk. 3 
A concrete example of how they conceived this process will help 
in understanding this feature of their theory. Analysing the emergence 
of capitalism, they argued that the expansion of demand, largely 
caused by the opening up of vast overseas territories, doomed the old 
fuuda1 guild system of production since this was unable to produce 
sufficient goods to satisfy the new demands placed upon it. First, 
the manufacturing system had replaced feudalism, only to be superseded 
itself by the system of mechanised industrial production as markets 
continued to grow. Consequent upon this economic revolution there 
had taken place a political revolution in which the rising capitalist 
bourgeoisie had seized political power and used this to remove all 
remaining feudal barriers to the free development of capitalism.4 l'1arx 
and Engels succinctly descrihed this development: 
... the means of production and 0 f exchange, on It/hose founda-
tion the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in 
feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of 
these means of production and of exchange, the conditions 
under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the 
feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacturing industry, 
in one word, became no longer compatible with the already 
developed productive forces; .they became so many fetters. 
They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder. 
Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied 
by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and 
by the5economical and political sltfay of the bourgeois class. 
Furthermore, f1arx and Engels asserted thi1.t the continuing growth 
of capitalism would lead to a similar situation. The existing bourgeois 
relations of production no longer would foster, but rather would impede 
economic development. When this situation had evolved, so Marx and 
Engels claimed, the 1I0bjective prerequisites" for the socialist trans-
formation of society would be mature. 6 
Marx and Engels believed that the concentration and centralisation 
of production in large enterprises - in part, the result of technological 
progress and the use of machinery in industry in order to raise output 
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to meet increased demands, and a process which in turn continually 
was destroying the possibility of profitable production in smaller, 
less technically advanced businesses - had created the economic basis 
for the establishment of socialism. This feature of capitalist expan-
sion had led to a dramatic rise in the quantity of qoods produced, 
which they considered to be a necessary prerequisite of socialism. 
They believed that a socialist society could not be constructed if the 
economic needs of the people could not be satisfied. They rleclared 
that "slavery cannot be abolished without the steam engine and the mule 
and spinning jenny ... and that, in general, people cannot be liberated 
as long as they are unable to obtain food and drink, housing and 
clothing in adequate quality and quantity. ,) Apparently, they "Jere 0 f 
the opinion that mechanised industry, the product of capitalism, had 
provided the wealth sufficient to guarantee such a provision of goods, 
and that after capitalism itself had been overthrown, the industrial 
system brou9ht into existence by it would becorYle the foundation of an 
organised system of production, controlled by the vvorkers themselves 
and planned to meet the material requirements of society. 
At the same time, the concentration of the means of production 
in the hands of an ever-diminishing number of capitalist magnates was 
swelling the ranks of the proletariat, seen by Marx and Engels as the 
"gravedigger of capitalism." Under capitalism, the proletariat was 
forced to live in the most miserable, poverty-stricken conditions. 
As a consequence of this deprivation, Marx and Engels were convinced 
that the \'Iorkers quite naturally would acquire a revolutionary conscious-
ness, that is, the realisation that capitalism was the cause of its 
sufferings, and the resul ti ng wi 11 to overthrow it. t,1oreover, they 
also argued that the continuing centralisation of production in large 
factories was welding the workers into a unified class, aware both of 
its common interests and increasingly of its strength to destroy 
() 
capitalism.(' 
However, the question which remains unanswered in this broad 
outline of the economic determinist element in t'1arx's and Engels' 
thought is how they established the level to vvhich capitalism must 
develop before it could be replaced by socialism, that is, how they 
defined when the "objective prerequisites" for socialist revolution had 
ripened. In what often is taken as Marx's quintessential exposition of 
his theory of history - his preface to ~Contribu~ion to the Critique 
of Political Economy - he implied that capitalism ",ould have to be 
developed "fully" before the transition to socialism could be accomplished 
successfully. He clearly stated: 
No soci a 1 0 rcler ever peri shes before a 11 the producti ve 
forces for which there is room in it have developed, and 
new, higher relations of production never appear before 
the material conditions of their eXistgnce have matured 
in the womb of the old society itself. 
On other occasions, Marx and Engels again alluded to the fact 
that the construction of socialism must be preceded by the extensive 
growth of caoitalism. They asserted that this alone would create the 
required high "development of productive forces ... because without it 
want is merely made general, and the struggle for necessities and all 
the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced."lO Indeed, 
Marx clearly warned against premature attempts at socialist revolution, 
arguing that these were bound to fail lias long as in the course of 
history in its Imovement', the material conditions, which necessitate 
the abolition of the bourgeois mode of production, and, thus, the 
final overthrow of bourgeois political authority are not as yet 
crea ted. II 11 
In fact, the conclusion which emerges from this examination of 
~iarx IS and Engels I definition of the lIobjective prerequisites" of 
socialism is that they failed to produce any precise criteria which 
could be applied concretely to predict when the economic preconditions 
for a successful socialist revolution had become sufficiently mature. 
They never quantified the absolute level of production or the degree 
of industrial concentration which they considered to be necessary 
before socialism could be established. 
Yet while Marx and Engels believed that economic development was 
the basis of historical evolution, they certainly rejected the impli-
cation that progress would be the automatic consequence of the imper-
sonal workin0s of economic forces. They were adamant that althouqh 
economi c growth created the potenti a 1 fo r the advance of soci ety to 
higher levels, conscious human activity was vital if this potential 
82 
was to be realised. Emphasising the role of the actions of men in the 
onward march of history, t1arx declared: 
History does nothing; it 'does not possess immense riches', 
it 'does not fight battles'. It is men, real, livinq men, 
who do all this, who possess things and fight battlei. 
It is not 'history' which uses men as a means of achieving 
its OltJn ends. History is nothing but the activity of men 
in pursuit of their ends. 12 
In their explanation of the transition of society to succeeding 
stages of development, f!,arx and Engels clearly assigned an important 
role to willed and conscious human action. In his account of the 
emergence of capitalist society, Harx argued that the rising bourgeoisie 
had fought consciously to win the economic and political supremacy for 
which, admittedly, the material preconditions had matured. He stressed 
the part played by the bourqeoisie in this process: 
they [the bourgeoisie] ... employ the pm'fer of the State, 
the concentrated and organised force of society, to hasten, 
hothouse fashion~ the process of transformation of the 
feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and 
to shorten the trans iti on. Force is the mi dwi fe of every 
old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an 
economic power. 13 , 
Similarly, in the future transition from capitalism to socialism, 
they again insisted that men, in this case, the revolutionary workers, 
must act if this was to come to fruition. vlhile they held that the 
preceding development of capitalism had made socialism economically 
possible, they denied that socialism would emerge as the result of 
the operation of sUDra-human economic forces. On tr.e contrary, they 
maintained that the proletariat had to destroy the old bourgeois system 
and then to proceed wittingly to the socialist transformation of 
society. In The Communist f1anifesto they affirmed this belief: 
the first step in the revolution by the ':Jorking class 
is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, 
to win the battle of democracy. ' 
The proletariat Ittill use its political supremacy to 
wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bour~eoisi~, to 
centralise all institutions of oroduction in the hands of 
the St1!e~ i.e., of the proletariat organised as a ruling 
class. 
Consequently, it should be clear that a dualism, that is, an 
interaction bet\'Jeen determinism and activism, exists within t'!larx's and 
Engels' theory of history. Although they postulated that economic 
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development was the ultimate determinant of historical pro~ress, at 
the same time they asseverated that it \'/as also necessary for men to 
act if the evolution of society from a lower to an economically potential 
higher stage in fact was to be accomplished. In his discussion of the 
prerequisites for socialist revolution, Herbert Marcuse admirably 
captured this characteristic of Marx's and Engels' thou~ht: 
[these objective conditions for socialism] ... become revolu-
tionary conditions ... only if seized upon and directed by 
a conscious activity that has in mind the socialist goal. 
Not the slightest natural necessity or automatic activity 
inevitably guarantees the transition from capitalism to 
socialism .... The realisation of freedom and reason reauires 
the free rationality of those who achieve it. 15 ' 
t·10reover, on occas i on t1arx and Enge 1 s, contrary to thei r more 
deterministic contention that socialist revolution could occur only 
in mature capitalist societies, adopted a more optimistic assessment 
of the prospects for this in countries that were economically relatively 
backward. In The German Ideology, they quite specifically denied that 
a country had to possess a highly developed capitalist economy before 
such a revolution "las possible. Referring to Germany, they argued: 
Thus all collisions in history have their origin, according 
to our vi el;I , in the contradi cti on between the productive 
forces and the form of intercourse. InCidentally, to lead 
to collisions in a country, this contradiction need not 
necessarily have reached its extreme limit in this particu-
lar country. The competition with industrially more advanced 
countries, brought about by the expansion of international 
intercourse, is quite sufficient to produce a similar contra-
diction in countries with backward industry (e.g. the 
latent proletariat in Germany broyght into vievi by the 
competiti on of Engl ish industry). . 
Later, in The_ Communist r1anifesto, they again re-iterated the 
belief that the first battleground of socialist revolution would be in 
Germany, despite the fact that this country was less advanced economic-
a lly than either Great Britain or France. In fact, it appears as if 
they felt that this revolution was imminent: 
The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, 
because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolu-
tion that is bound to be carried out under much more; 
advanced conditions of European civilisation, and with a 
much more developed proletariat, than that of England was 
in the seventeenth, and of France in the eighteenth century, 
and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be 
but a prelude to an immediately following proletarian 
revolution. l ? 
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In these instances, Marx and Engels implicitly were stressing 
the activist strand in their theory of history. They believed, or 
at least hoped, that the German proletariat could overthrow the 
bourgeoisie and destroy capitalism before all the f!objective prere-
quisites!! for socialist revolution had matured. Apparently, they 
also supposed that in the very process of constructing socialism the 
German workers could use their newly won political power to create 
the appropriate economic foundations. 
In fact, in discussing the prospects for socialist revolution 
in the Russian Empire Marx and Engels carried this line of argument 
further. In this case, they denied that capitalism vias a necessary 
prerequisite for the establishment of socialism. Reflecting on his 
theory of the stages of historical develorment, from feudalism through 
capitalism to socialism, Marx himself rleclared that this need not 
become a universal pattern. In elaborating this theory he claimed 
that he had "only ... traced the path by which the capitalist order in 
Hes tern Europe developed out of the feudal economi corder. ,,18 
Indeed, Marx continued that the capitalist stage of development 
could be avoided, and socialism directly established in the Russian 
Empire itself, a view which the Russian Populists shared. He consid-
ered the commune to be the potential basis for the new socialist order. 
However, he also held that capitalism had been developing in the 
Russian Empire since the Emancipation of 1861, and that it was slowly 
but surely eroding the rural community. Nevertheless, he still 
believed that a political revolution, if it came in time, could act to 
preserve the commune and so Drovide for Russia "the finest occasion 
that history has ever offered a people not to undergo all the sudd~n 
1° turns of fortune of the capitalist system.!1 J In effect, he was 
arguing that men, in this instance the revolutionary Russian Populists, 
consciously could intervene in the march of history and act to alter 
decisively the course of the evolution of society that otherwise 
would be fundamentally determined by the workings of economic forces. 
He proclaimed: 
Only a Russian Revoluton can save the Russian village com-
munity. The men who hold positions of social and political 
power, moreover, do their best to prepare the masses for 
such a cataclysm. If such a revolution takes nlace in 
time, if it concentrates all its forces to assure the free 
development of the rural community, this latter will soon 
become the regeneratin9 element of Russian society, and 
the factor giving it superiority over the countries enslaved 
by the capitalist system.2rJ 
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Engels too agreed that there existed Ilthe possibility of trans-
forming this social organisation (communal property) into a higher form 
in the event it persists until the time when circumstances are ripe for 
such a change .... 0:21 Yet by the 1390' s he began to have grave doubts 
that the commune vwuld survive so long. I-le felt that communal culti-
vation was rapidly disintegrating as a result of the growth of capital-
ism and that individual peasant farming was in fact replacing it. 
Accordingly, even if proletarian revolution in West Europe, which he 
apparently more than t~arx stressed as a Ilnecessary precondition for 
raising the Russian village communityll to the level of socialism -
although they both believed that a revolution in Russia could act as 
the spark for socialist revolution in the West -, was victorious, he 
feared that it \'/ould be too late' to save the commune as a basis for 
socialism, since the Russian peasants had "already forgotten how to 
cultivate their lands for their common good.,,22 
Indeed, Marx also presented what can be considered to be a more 
general justification of this position. Defining the prerequisites 
for so~ialism, he maintained that "the greatest productive power is the 
revolutionary class. The organisation of revolutionary elements as a 
class supposes the existence of all the ~roductive forces which could 
be engendered in the bosom of the old society. 1123 Hhile it would be 
an exag~eration to conclude from this statement that Marx denied that 
some degree of capitalist development must orecede socialist revolution, 
since the "revolutionary class", the proletariat, ViaS the child of 
capitalism itself, it is possible to infer that he reoarded socialism 
as realisable simply when the workers had acquired the consciousness 
and unity necessary to overthro\,1 the bourgeoisie and use the political 
pm'ler which it consequently would gain to reconstruct society accord-
ing to socialist principles. In other words, it seems that nan< consid-
ered the maturity of the proletariat itself to be the ultimate criterion 
by which to judge whenthe "objective prerequisites" for socialism had 
ripene,d within capitalist society, rather than attemrting to determine 
these in terms of some quantitative measure of capitalist development. 
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The purpose of outlining these two strands, the determinist 
and the activist, in ~Ilarx IS and Engels I thought is not simply to 
defend them from the unjust accusation that they had reduced the 
entire course of historical development to dependence solely on the 
action of economic forces. Certainly, there had been a growing ten-
dency by Marxists, especially in l~est Europe, in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century to regard Marxism as a narrow economic deter-
ministic doctrine. In 1800, Engels himself tacitly admitted that such 
a development had taken place. Yet, while explaining why he believed 
that this had occurred, he took pains to deny that this interpretation 
was correct: 
Marx and I ourselves are partly to blame for the fact that 
younger people sometimes lay more stress on the economic 
side than is due to it. We had to emphasise the main 
principle vis-~-vis our adversaries, who denied it, and we 
had not always the time, the place 'or the opportuni ty to 
allow the other elements involved in the interaction [i .e., 
the political and social s~ijerstructure, the action of me~ 
to come into their rights. 
This discussion is also pertinent because the stranri which is 
emphasised often depends on the socio-economic environment into which 
Marxism is transferred. Generally. in the expansion of Marxism from 
the advanced capitalist societies of Illest Europe to the industrially, 
and politically, less developed countries of East Europe and Asia it 
was a more activist interpretation of this ideology that eventually 
was to become dominant. - evident in the triumph of Bolshevism in 
Russia and of Maoism in China, in particular. The fact that revolu-
tionary t1arxists in such countries shoul<i emphasise the activist 
element in r1arxism is quite understandable. Since their native 
societies were economically backward in comparison with the West, an 
acceptance of the determinist interpretation of ~1arxism - this variant 
of Marxism postulated that socialism could be established only after 
the IIfull development ll of capitalism had created the 1I0bjective pre-
req ui sites II for thi s -, Vlhi ch had become the 1I0rthodoxy" of !1arxi s t 
movements in the late nineteenth century, especially in Germany, 
would have forced them to consign socialist revolution in their ovm 
countries to the distant future, when gradual capitalist growth would 
have created the necessary economic preconditions. 
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Nevertheless, r1arxism in the Russian Empire in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century also appears to have been equated largely 
with economic determinism. 25 This phenomenon is not surprising, 
however, when one considers the historical context in which this 
doctrine evolved. The rise of Marxism was basically a reaction to the 
preceding failure of Populism, whose adherents aspired to establish 
a democratic socialist republic in the Russian Empire based on the 
mir, so by-passing the capitalist stage of development. The first 
Marxists in the Empire, many of whom, such as G. V. Plekhanov and 
P. B. Akselrod, themselves were former Populists, explained this 
failure in terms of a fundamental deficiency in Ponulist ideology. 
They argued that capitalism already existed in the Russian Empire and 
inexorably was destroying the mir. Hence it was futile to rest any 
hopes of founding a new socialist order o~ this structure. Yet, in 
their desire to refute the claims of the Populists, it seems that 
these revolutionaries tended to over-emphasise the determinist strand 
in ~1arxism.26 They maintained that while the growth of capitalism 
in the Empire was inevitable, this process also would be slow. Con-
sequently, they believed that a lengthy period of capitalist expansion 
would be necessary before all the vestiges of the old feudal, or, as 
some Russian ~ilarxists believed, Asiatic Russian order were eliminated, 
and the prerequisites for socialism created. 
In particular, it appears that Plekhanov especially, unlike 
M. N. Pokrovskii, who categorically maintained that the Russian Empire 
27 had a feudal past, was of the opinion that it was not so much a 
feudal society as a form of "Asiatic despotism", a factor which he 
considered to be the greatest obstacle to the future development of 
capitalism, and eventually of socialism there. Certainly, in this 
respect Plakhanov was perfectly loyal to his professed masters, r1arx 
and Engels, who themselves had often maintained that the Russian 
Emoire was a semi-Asiatic society. 
The basis of Asiatic society, in r'1arx's and Engels' opinion, 
was climatic and geographical. It emerged in primarily agricultural 
countries which were dependent upon extensive irrigation'works for 
their continued existence. Strong states had emerged in order to 
ensure that these works were provided. The basic units in such 
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societies were self-sufficient village communes, independent of 
each other, but in common dependent upon the state, which owned the 
land, and the vital irrigation works. This socio-economic basis 
permitted the state to have unlimited political power over its members, 
and for its ruler, and the state bureaucracy, to exploit the populace, 
by means of taxation and rent. 28 Hhile the Russian Emrire itself 
lacked the massive waterworks that were a criterioh of Asiatic 
societies, Marx and Engels nevertheless classified it as such, since 
it did possess the same socio-economic structure as these societies, 
that is, a multitude of atomised communes and a strong, centralised, 
despotic state. Engels declared: 
Such a complete isolation of the individual [villaqe] 
communities from each other, which in the whole country 
creates identical, but the exact opposite of common, 
interests is the natural foundation of Oriental despotism, 
and from India to Russia this societal form, wherever it 
prevailed, has always produced despotism and has always 
found therein its supplement. Not only the Russian state 
in general, but even in its specific form, the despotism 
of the Tsar, far from being susnended in mid-air, is the 
necessary and logical product of the Russian social 
conditions .29 
Moreover, it seems that Marx and Engels considered that such 
societies were remarkably resistant to internal change and development, 
but rather would continue to perpetuate themselves unless some external 
impetus upset their equilibrium. The challenge posed to them by the 
penetration of West European capitalist powers was seen by them as 
one such possible impulse. Particularly, they regarded British 
expansion into India as the cause of the dissolution of the 010. 
Asiatic order that had existed there - and th.e stimulus to the armvth 
f . l' 30 o caplta lsm. 
Plekhanov accepted much of t1arx's and Engels' analysis of 
"Oriental desootism" as it applied to the Russian Emoire. He too 
believed that it had possessed the communal organisation of society 
typical of Asiatic societies and that it Hould continue to function as 
such but for the impact, or rather fear of the West, provoked especially 
by the Crimean Har. The challenge which the West posed alone, in his 
view, had compelled the autocracy to reform and modernise Russian 
. d h f h d 1 d 1 t f . t 1· 31 soclety an so open t e way or t. e gra ua ~ve opmen 0 capl a 1sm. 
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However, he maintained that the old order was dying but slowly. 
rrOriental despotism", though moribunc', was still far from dead in the 
Russian Empire. Indeed he was particularly afraid of its resurgence. 
His fear was especially evident in 1906, when he opposed Lenin's 
policy to nationalise the land and give it to the peasants in order 
to win their support for a socialist seizure of power. He argued 
that such a policy, by restoring the state to its former position as 
the sole owner of the land, would create the basis for the re-establish-
ment of the old I\siatic system once the revoluticn degenerated, as, 
in his opinion, it inevitably must in a Russia that was still in the 
initial stages of capitalist development. 32 In a sense, therefore, 
his rejection of an early socialist revolution in the Russian Empire 
seems to have been based on the belief that a long period of capitalist 
development was necessary not just to create the positive prerequisites 
of socialism, but also to rrwesternise" the Empire thoroughly and so 
destroy finally all the foundations for any restoration of the old 
':semi-Asiatic order" there. 
Indeed, Lenin too often referred to the Russian Empire as a 
"semi-Asiatic" rather than a feudal state, in which the ruling class 
was the government bureaucracy, both before and after, but not during 
the revoluton of 1917. Despite agreeing with Plekhanov on this inter-
pretation, he rejected his caveat that a premature socialist revolution 
in the Empire, lacking the support of a similar revolution in West 
Europe, could lead to the resurgence of an "Oriental despotism" -
and, when the chance to carture power and establish a minority revolu-
tionary socialist government offered itself in 1917, he seized the 
t "t 33 oppor Unl y" 
For whatever reason, whether they regarded the Russian Empire 
as a feudal or an Asiatic society, the interpretation of ~1arxism 
which posited that a lengthy period of capitalist expansion was the 
necessary precondition for socialism remained dominant into the twen-
tieth century. In particular, the r~ensheviks subscribed to the view 
that socialism could be established only in advanced bourgeois socie-
ties, where the prolonged development of capitalism had produced a 
broad industrial base, composed of large-scale enterprises, and also 
a numerous, educated and organised working class. They denied that 
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socialist revolution could be victorious in semi~developect countries, 
such as the Russian Empire, where these "objc=:ctive prerequisites" 
were not yet present. Plekhanov, the "father of Russian t1arxism", 
adopted a rigid determinist viev! of historical progress, ar9uing that 
lIthe political development of a country proceeds apace with its 
economic development.,,34 Outlining the implications of this approach 
for the prospects of socialism in the Russian Empire, Akselrod 
declared: 
At the present level of Russia's development the Russian 
proletariat cannot qo farther than radical democratic 
liberalism in its direct practical strivings. At-the 
present time, there cannot be any talk of conquest by the 
proletariat of political power for itself or [even] of 35 
reforms of bourgeois society under the socialist banner. 
In fact, in the early years of the twentieth century the majority 
of f1arx is ts in the Russ ian Empi re - L. D. Trots ky was an excerti on -
agreed that only a bourgeois-democratic revolution was possible, 
a lthough they a 1 so accepted the argument, ori gi na lly put forvJard by 
Plekhanov, that this revolution must be carried out by the proletariat, 
since they believed that the bourgeoisie itself was too weak and ana-
thetic to accomplish this task. 36 Yet by 1917 a number of Illeft" 
Bolsheviks, and Lenin himself, together with the factions of revolu-
tionary f','arxists in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, had come to reject 
this prognosis of the character of the coming revolution in the Russian 
Empire. Acting in the spirit that "above all else, a ~1arxist should 
avoid historical fatalism,"37 an attitude VJhich an emphasis on the 
determinist element in Marx's doctrines tended to nurture, they denied 
that socialist revolution must be postponed until the further growth 
of capitalism had prepared more fully the economic, and political pre-
conditions for this. However, at the same time they still defended 
the premise that society necessarily progressed through succeeding 
stages of development, insisting that sufficient prerequisites for the 
establishment of socialism did exist in the Russian Empire. 
In 1918, in his defence of the le9itimacy of socialist revolution 
in Russia, N. Osinsky rejected the contention of the deterministic-
minded ~lensheviks that "socialism [could] replace only a very highly 
flourishing capitalist society and ~ould] be constructed only by a 
strong and highly developed proletariat.:,38 He did not deny that r··1arx 
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and Engels in general terms had defined the trends of capitalist devel-
opment which were creating the material foundations for socialism. 
In particular, he accepted that the centralisation of industry, the 
technological change which accompanied this, and the resultina growth 
in production was one precondition for the construction of a planned 
socialist economy. He also agreed that the concentration of capital 
in the hands of an. ever-decreasing number of large entrepreneurs was 
strengthening the ranks of the proletariat. t10reover, the proletariat, 
which itself was becoming increasingly united and organised as a 
consequence of the collective, large-scale nature of cGpitalist pro-
duction, would be subjected to growing exploitation and impoverishment 
as capitalism developed, VJhich in turn \'lOuld arouse in it the conscious-
ness to revolt and overthrow the bourgeoi s i e. t,lhi 1 e as i ns ky aqreed 
that these inter-related developments ultimately were caused by the 
expansion of capitalism, he correctly emphasised that Marx and Engels 
had given no precise criterion of the stage to which capitalism must 
advance before socialism became objectively possible. He argued in 
the following manner: 
r1arx speaks ... only about the forces whi ch lead tov/ards 
socialist re~olution and socialism. He does not say what 
deqree of development they must reach for the tendencies ... 
which are preparing the revolution to become the irll11ediate 
prerequisites, the movin~ forces of the revolution. He 
also does not refer to the question of how these contra-
dictory - positive and negative - tendencies are combined 
in historical development on the path to the final [revolu-
tionary] explosion and how they \,/ill be combined at the 
moment of this explosion. In other words, he ddes not 
indicate the signs by which it is possible to saY1~hat a 
country has become ripe for socialist revolution.~ . 
By refuting the "orthodox" economic determinist interoretation 
of Marxism, espoused by the ~·1ensheviks and the majority of Social 
Democrats in West Europe, that socialist revolution could be victorious 
only in highly advanced capitalist societies, Osinsky de facto sub-
scribed to a more activist variant of Marxism. Implicit in his argu-
ment was the conviction that even in relatively backward capitalist 
countries, such as the Russian Empire, th~ proletariat could seize 
power successfully and proceed to build socialism. 
Later, durin9 the period of IIt'!ar C~mmunism!l, N. 1. Bukharin 
also presented a critique of the economic determinists' definition 
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of the 1I0bjective prerequisites!' of socialism, presumably to defend 
the Bolsheviks from the accusation then bein~ hurled at them by the 
German Social Democrats that they had seized power prematurely. ~le 
dismissed the view that socialism could be established only in mature 
capitalist societies, which possessed a structure of larqe-scale, 
centralised industry and various organisations of economic regulation. 
To justi fy this argument he asserted that since the immediate factor 
whi ch ItlOuld cause the proleta riat to revolt would be the destruction 
of the productive forces within capitalist society itself, the result 
either of a recurrent crisis of over-production, or, more likely in 
the imperialist epoch, of a war, then the workers could not expect 
to lay hol d of an economic system in which these "objective prerequi-
sites ll had been preserved intact. He continued, moreover, that this 
sys tem VIOU 1 d be des troyed even further in the very course of the 
revolution. Consequently, he claimed that since the prbletariat 
itself 1'lOuld have to re-construct the very economic basis of society 
after its revolution, the relative under-development of capitalism was 
no obstacle to socialist rcvolution. 40 
Rather, Bukharin stressed that the most important prerequisite 
for socialism was the existence of a "revolutionary class!!. He 
clearly implied that if capitalism had developed sufficiently to 
produce such a class, then socialist revolution was objectively possible. 
He wrote: 
The 'maturing' of communist relations of production vlithin 
capitalism is that system of cooperation which is embodied 
in the production relations 'of the workers and which simul-
taneously welds the human atoms together into the revolutionary 
class, the proletariat. 41 
In the 1920's, G. L. Piatakov, a IIleftll Bolshevik since Horld 
War 1, retrospectively defended the Bolsheviks' activist approach to 
socialist revolution in the Russian Empire. In a conversation with 
N. Valentinov, he argued that the premise that the proletariat could 
seize pm'Jer successfully only after the extensive development of 
capitalism had created lithe so-called objective rrerequ;sites for 
socialist revolution ll had been disproved by the Russian experience 
itself. He now frankly admitted that, in his opinion, these precon-
ditions had been absent in Russia in 1917. He maintained, however, 
that this had been unimportant, since the proletariat, after it had 
established its revolutionary dictatorship, had been able to use its 
pol i ti ca 1 supremacy to cons truct "the necessary [economi cJ base for 
socialism. n42 In a sense, this belief in the ability of the revolu-
tionary class to act to impose its will on historical development can 
be regarded as an unspoken assumption of many of the Bolsheviks durin~ 
1917, an assumption, nevertheless, which was less clear to them in 
this period since many of them assiduously attempted to prove that the 
economic foundations for socialism had matured in the Russian Empire. 
The revolutionary r.1arxists of the Social Democracy of the King-
dom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K:P.iL.), under the ideological 
leadership of Rosa Luxemburg, also refused to remain hidebound by the 
di ctates of the Il orthodox II economi c determini s ti c i nterpretati on of 
t1arxism. Like the "left" Bolsheviks, they construed r~arxism in a 
more activist fashion, although they too subscribed to the belief 
that history necessarily progressed through definite, economically 
determined stages. Accordingly, Luxemburg maintained that some degree 
of capitalist development was the essential precondition of socialism. 
Yet she also insisted that this premise must not lead revolutionary 
socialists fatalistically to anticipate the victory of socialism as 
the inevitable outcome of the action of impersonal, economic forces 
which would evolve as capitalism expanded to a burstinq-ooint. She 
argued that such a conclusion would prove disastrous, since socialism 
\-lOul d not arpear simply "as manna from heaven. l' On the contrary, she 
emphasised that a vital part of Marx IS teaching was the conviction 
that the proletariat consciously must strive to establish socialism, 
in the process of which it1.'lould become "instead of the pO'rJerless 
victim of history, its conscious guide.,.43 She continued, moreover, 
that by its revolutionary action the proletariat in fact could hasten 
the victory of socialism. Explaining her philosophy of history, she 
dec 1 ared: 
Scientific socialism has taught us to recognise the object-
ive laws of historical development. Man does not make 
history of his own volition, but he makes history neverthe-
less. The proletariat is dependent in its actions upon 
the degree of righteousness to which social evolution has 
advanced. But again, social evolution is not a thing apart 
from the proletariat; it is in the same measure its driving 
force and its cause as well as its product and effect. 
And. though we can no more skin a period in our historical 
development·than a man can jump over his shadol'l4 it lies 
withi n our powe r to acce 1 era te or to retard it. 4 
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The pro-Bolshevik wing of the Social Democracy of Latvia (S.D.L.) 
also adopted an activist interpretation of r~arxism. In 10 18, P. I. 
Stuchka, the leadi~g theoretician of these Latvian Bolsheviks, rejected 
the deterministic argument of K. Kautsky and similar narxists ItJho, on 
the grounds that the level of its capitalist development was too low, 
"declared that socialist revolution in Russia [was] premature.,,45 
Furthermore, in refuting the opinions of the Latvian i'lensheviks, Stuchka 
denied that "socialism in Latvia [woulcU become possible only when it 
[became] a fact in the economies of the industrial countries [of the 
\<Jest], on which we are dependent. ,,46 He was adamant that the Latvian 
proletariat need not remain passive until socialist revolution was 
victorious in West Europe, but rather that it must stru~gle for social-
iSm in Latvia itself, notltlithstanding the fact that this country was 
not at the same height of capitalist development as the West. Moreover, 
Stuchka clearly implied that this relative backwardness vlOuld not pose 
an insuperable obstacle to the success of the Latvian workers in 
. . 1· 47 constructlng SOCla 1sm. 
However, it must be admitted that there were some grounds for 
Stuchka to advocate socialist revolution in Latvia. While still under-
developed in comparison to the West, Latvia was one of the most advanced 
areas of the Russian Empire, possessing a relatively large industrial 
base and a strong, organised and politically conscious proletariat.48 
In fact, even earlier Stuchka had reached the conclusion that the 
seizure of pOI'Ier by the proletariat was possible in Latvia. Pmalysing 
the "moving forces" of the 1905 revolution, Stuchka concluded that the 
proletariat. rather than the bourgeoisie was the mainspring of the move-
ment to overthroltJ the feudal autocracy and, consequently, to give free 
rein to the development of capitalism in the Russian Empire. Yet from 
this analysis Stuchka additionally had inferred that it would be pos-
sible for the proletariat to advance quickly ,beyond the bourgeois-
democratic stage of the revolution and to use the political power 
which it had conquered to institute socialist policies. He speculated 
in the fo 11 ovti n 9 manner: 
Having overthrown the existing autocracy, we will destroy 
the obstacles which are imoeding the full flowerinG of the 
rule of the bourgeoisie, b~t at-the same time we a1so 
destroy the obstacles in the way of the conquest of power 
by the working class. Can we really say that \lIe are partici-
pating in the revolution only with the aim of transferring 
the reins of government into the hands of the novl oppressed 
bourgeoisie? Of course not. This then means that the aims 
of the revolution also are not bourgeois .... 49 
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The revolutionary Lithuanian Marxists, the internationalist wing 
of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (L.S.D.P.) and those who had 
joined the ranks of the Bolshevik party before or during 1917, also 
claimed that socialist, rather than bourgeois-democratic revolution 
was realisable in Lithuania in 1917 and 1918. They tacitly admitted 
that their policy was contradictory to that which the dictates of 
economic determinism would demand when they frankly accepted that what 
traditionally were considered to be the prerequisites of socialism -
a highly developed industry and a strong revolutionary proletariat -
were absent in Lithuania. Despite these deficiencies, they maintained 
that the Lithuanian workers should seize Dower and, with the aid of 
their Russian and German brothers, could build socialism. 50 
It appears that Lenin himself rejected the idea that economic 
backwardness inevitably destined socialist revolution in the Russian 
Empire to failure, in favour of adopting a clearly more activist -
and optimistic - assessment of the prospects for the success of 
socialism there. Recounting a conversation which he claimed to have 
had with Lenin in Geneva in 1904, N. Valentinov, at that time a 
Bolshevik but soon to become a convert to Menshevism, maintained that 
Lenin had minimised the emphasis which should be placed on the economic 
prerequisites necessary for the establishment of socialism. Instead, 
Lenin underlined the importance of the organisation and revolutionary 
enthusiasm of the proletariat in carrying out socialist revolution. 
In fact, Valentinov stated that Lenin categorically denied that it 
vias possible abstractly to predict the level to which capitalism must 
develop before socialism became objectively possible. He summarised 
Lenin's argument: 
There is no absolute and formal yardstick fer a country's 
economic preparedness for socialism. It cannot be said that 
a certain country is ready for socialism, once, say '6() per 
cent' of its population is working class. 'Truth is always 
concrete: everything depends on the circumstances of time 
and place'. A country may have only fifty very large 
factories among its tens of thousands of miscellaneous 
enterprises .. From a formalistic point of view, such a 
country has at that stage no socialist orospects whatsoever. 
The number of large enterprises is ridi~ulo~sly small and 
the number of workers employed in them is insignificant 
compared with the total numbers of the working masses. 
Yet, if the most vital part of the country's production 
(coal, iron, steel, etc.) is concentrated in these fifty 
concerns, end if all their workers are superbly organised 
in a revolutionary socialist party, if their combative 
spirit is at a high level, then the problem of that country's 
socialist prospects and of the importance of a 'handful' 
of workers will not look at all the way it does to the 
'vulgarisers of Marxism'. Struve was such a 'vulgariser'. 
In the days when Struve was a '1 eaa 1 r1arxi s t I, he had once 
ar 9ued , in a private conversation, after referring to all 
the laws about the pre-conditions for the victory of 
socialism, that it was out of the question even to think 
of socialism in Russ1a as something possible within the 
next hundred years. 
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There seems no reason to dispute the accuracy of this report since 
it is quite consistent with Lenin's own, explicitly stated beliefs. 
Earlier, in What Is To_Be Done, he had revealed clearly his faith in 
the power of human action to make a revolution when he declared: "Give 
us an or9anisation of revolutionaries and we will overturn Russia!1!52 
During the revolutionary turmoil in the Russian Empire in 1917, he 
derisively called the ar9ument of A. I. Rykov, that "socialism must 
come from other countries with a more developed industry ... ," "a 
parody of r1arxism."53 Again, in 1921, Lenin 'attacked the view that 
t~arxism could be equated with a rigid economic determinism. He regarded 
such an interpretation as alien to the spirit of Marxism and even 
argued that "politics must take precedence over economics. To argue 
otherwise is to forget the ABC of ~larxism. ,,54 
~Jhile both the determinist and activist interpretations of r~arxism 
have claims to legitimacy, it still remains to explain \"Jhy many Marxists 
in tre Russian Emnire, contrary to the orevailin9 determinist orthodoxy, 
Should adopt the activist variant. One part of the answer to this 
question seems to lie in the realm of human aspirations. It is quite 
possible that these revolutionaries, having given their lives to the 
elimination of social oppression, injustice and inequality, should 
desire to taste the fruits of their efforts in their lifetimes. However, 
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if. they ';,ere to embrace the determinist strand in r'larx's and Engels' 
theory of history, logically they would be compelled to accept that 
the establishment of socialism in the still-backward Russian Emoire , 
must wait the creation of the necessary economic prerequisites which 
would be the result of the SlO'lI, albeit inexorable grOl·,th of capitalism. 
Accordingly, it would fall to the lot of their children, or their 
grandchildren, to consummate their ideals. Consequently, their emphasis 
on political action as a means to speed un the unfolding of history 
becomes understandable. 
Nevertheless, this appears to be only part of the explanation. 
It is also reasonable to consider the influence that native traditions 
had on their political philosophy, particularly since revolutionary 
activism had been a leitmotif of indigenous social thought in the 
Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. Among others, N. G. Cherny-
shevskii particularly emphasised the power of hUf11an action in bringing 
about the revolutionary transformation of society. The sources of his 
thought were disparate. Apparently, he borrowed from G. Hegel the 
idea that history was moving towards a predetermined, rational end, 
yet at the same time he rejected Hegel's idealism. For this he sub-
stituted a materialism, taken especially from L. Feuerbach and also 
from the positivists, such as A. Comte, that is, the belief that socio-
economic forces were the factors leading to the creation of a just, 
ordered society. Yet while he believed that society was evolving in 
this direction, he also insisted that the actions of men, in his 
opinion, of a self-conscious revolutionary intelligentSia, could 
accelerate the achievement of this end. Chernyshevskii extolled the 
role of this revolutionary elite, of "strowl personalities, who [,,/Ould] 
impose their character on the pattern of events, and hurry their course, 
who [woul~ give adirection to the chaotic upheaval of forces (already] 
taking place in the movement of the masses.1!55 In fact, this belief, 
that men had the power consciously to fashion history, was a fundamental 
feature of Populist ideology, which for much of the second half of the 
nineteenth century was the dominant revolutionary current in the 
Russ i an Empi re. 
It is credible, at least, to postulate that this tradition was a 
source of the activism displayed by the revolutionary ~1arxists in the 
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Russian Empire. Certainly, it is possible to detect the marks of native 
revolutionary thought in Lenin's interpretation of ~1arxism. In particu-
lar, Chernyshevskii has been singled out as a major influence on the 
formation of his ideas. Lenin himself admitted that he had gained his 
baptism as a revolutionary from a study of the writings of Chernyshev-
skii, from which he gained a rudimentary knowledge of philosophical 
materialism and Hegel's dialectic, as well as a deep and lasting dis-
trust of liberalism. Apparently, he also took from Chernyshevskii 
his belief in the power of committed revolutionaries to move history in 
the direction of their ~oals.56 
Admittedly, it is possible to trace other indigenous influences 
on Lenin's thought. For example, the ideas of P. N. Tkach~v, who 
believed that a political revolution, carried out by a small, yet 
tightly disciplined and organised minority, would clear the way for a 
following socio-economic revolution, bear a striking resemblance to 
the views later expressed by Lenin, most notably in What Is To Be Done. 57 
Yet the purpose of this discussion ;s not to present an exhaustive 
account of the ~lements of continuity between native revolutionary 
theories or, more precisely, Western socialist theories that were 
embraced and adapted to Russian conditions by the Russian revolutionary 
intelligentsia from the middle of the nineteenth century, and the 
variants of revolutionary r~arxism that evolved in the Russian Empire. 
Rather, the intent is simply to point out that the revolutionary 
activism characteristic of the revolutionary r~arxists in the Empire 
should not be· seen simply as an intellectual deduction which they 
derived from their reading of Marx and Engels, but that autochthonous 
traditions also impelled them in this direction. While this appears 
to be true particularly of Lenin himself, it is also plausible to hazard 
that his fellow revolutionaries, wittingly or unwittinoly, were subject 
to the same i nfl uences in the shari ng of their thought. 
However, one question still remains to be ans\'/ered. In 1905, 
these revolutionary r-larxists maintained that 'only bourgeois-democratic 
revolution was possible in the Russian Empire, yet in 1917 they boldly 
contended that socialist revolution now was a realistic prospect. It 
seems that some explanation is needed to account for this development 
in their thinking. 
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In addressing this question, it becomes clear that a dualism, a 
blend of activism and determinism, also characterised their thought. 
~Jhi le they 1 egitimately stressed the activist strand in t1arxism, that 
men, in the process of making their own history, could speed up social 
development, they also believed that men could not make their history 
just to satisfy their aspirations and ideals, irrespective of the socio-
economic context in which they had to operate. Rather, it appears 
that their acceptance of Marxism also bound them to the premise that 
history progressed through economically determined sta0es, which meant 
that capitalism must precede socialism. Consequently, the very inner 
logic of their ideology compelled them to establisr. that capitalism 
in the Russian Empire had developed sufficiently to create the "objec-
tive prerequisites!! which would make the socialist revolution for 
which they strove realisable. The judgement of a leading Soviet his-
torian provides a good insight into the more determinist strand in the 
thinkinn of these revolutionary Marxists. Describing the attitudes 
of the Bolsheviks in 1~17, he stated: 
Proletarian revolution is not just the good intention of 
the ideological leaders of the proletariat, but rather 
it is an objective phenomenon that is in conformity with 
the laws of historical development [zakonomernost'j. 
This conclusion of the Bolshevik-Leninists was the result 
of their analysis of imperialism. Relying on this, the 
comrades of V. I. Lenin, under the direction of their 
leader, consciously prepared to assault tsarism and the 
bourgeoisie. Their theoretical investigations served 
their revolutionary practice.58 
However, this statement is doubly significant. It alludes to 
some link bet\'leen imperialism and the legitimacy of socialist revolu-
tion and thus indicates one avenue to pursue to discover how these 
tlarxists came to justify their contention that the Russian Empire was 
economically ripe for socialist revolution. 
Nevertheless, it would be naive to imagine that these Marxists 
studied the characteristics of imperialism with the sole aim of proving 
that the "objective prerequisites!' for socialist revolution had matured 
in the Russian Empire. Rather, it seems that the motivation of their 
researches was the desire to explain the expansionist policies by the 
major capitalist powers of the \I/orld, a subject which seemed particularly 
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relevant after the outbreak of war between rival imperialist powers 
in 1914. 
Moreover, from their analyses they were able to draw a number 
of conclusions. First, they attributed the continuing survival of 
capitalism to its ability to expand into and exploit the non-capitalist 
areas of the world. This expansion had helped maintain the profitabi-
lity of capital and at the same time had allowed the bourgeoisie in 
the advanced capitalist countries to I1bribe" their own workers into 
political passivity by granting , them higher wages, which ultimately 
were wrung out of the wretched, exploited masses in the colonies. 
Yet they were sure that this stage had now come to an end. They argued 
that in the twentieth century the world had become completely divided 
among the rival capitalist powers, so that no longer could the problem 
of securing a profitable outlet for the investment of growing accumu-
lations of capital within these countries be solved hy the peaceful 
acquisition of colonies. Any attempts by these powers to expand no\'/ 
\vould bring them into mutual conflict - the outbreak of war in 1914 vIas 
regarded by them as striking confirmation of the validity of their 
theories - and the crisis which would be caused by this would spark 
off a whole series of revolutions by the proletariat to put an end to 
the carnage and destruction of war and. to destroy the source of this, 
capitalism itself. Furthermore, they also contended that the economic 
developments which had taken place within the imperialist states had 
established the necessary orerequisites for the construction of 
socialism. In the present context it is this conclusion that is 
particularly relevant and hence the following discussion of their 
theories of imperialism will be limited largely to this issue. 
Initially, it is necessary to remember that to the majority of 
these t,1arxists the v!Ord l1imperialism" was not simply an all-encompassing 
term to describe any policy of territorial aggrandisement carried out 
by large powers at the expense of smaller and weaker rivals. Certainly, 
they recognised that such expansion was ,a feature of the modern 
imperia1ism that they were studying. Yet they insisted that this 
phenomenon could be explained satisfactorily only in terms of the 
internal economic changes undergone by the countries that were pursuing 
imperialist po11cies. 59 
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In general, they began their studies of imperialism by analysing 
60 these internal developments. They maintained that as capitalism had 
continued to grow, production increasingly had become centralised in 
ever larger enterprises, basically as the result of the destruction 
of smaller, less efficient rivals which occurred during the periodic 
crises of over-production that were typical of capitalism. This pro-
cess eventually had led to the formation of mononolies in individual 
industries, by the amalgamation of the few remaining large firms into 
trusts, syndicates or. cartels, which were established to eliminate 
competition in their own branches of production, regulate output, and, 
consequently, prices, and in this "lay to preserve profitability.6l 
The same concentration of capital had taken place in banking. 
Thi s had resulted in the forma, ti on of a few banks of great wea lth and 
power in each capital is t country. t10reover, these ban ks had become 
the chief investors in industry, so that in effect a f11er:.ler (sras~chivanie) 
between banking and industrial capital - termed finance capital by 
Bukhari n, 62 who apparently borrowed thi s name from R. Hilferding - had 
been established. In turn, this union had led to an even greater 
regulation of each national economy since it was evidently in the 
interests of the banks to limit the competition among the various 
monopolised industries in which they had invested their capital in 
order to maintain their profitability.63 
However, they argued that the centralisation of ~roGuction in 
huge, technologically advanced enterprises, typical of capitalism in 
this stage of development, had caused such a dramatic increase in output 
that it could not be sold profitably on the home market. This deficiency 
in internal demand had driven the national monopolies to a policy of 
territorial expansion in order to secure the outlets for their goods 
sufficient to guarantee their profit levels. 64 
Moreover, just as production had expanded markedly, so too the 
accumulation of capital had increased at a breath7taking rate. This 
rapid accumulation had the same effects on the policies of the national 
monopolies as the rise in production. 
areas for exploitation in which their 
ably since the opportunities for this 
They were forced to seek new 
capital could be invested profit-
. 65 had been exhausted domestically. 
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One conclusion that these Marxists drew from their analysis of 
the recent developments in capitalist economies was obvious. They 
claimed that countries in which finance capital was becoming dominant 
had been compelled, by the need to protect the profits of capital, to 
adopt policies of territorial expansion into weak and backward areas 
of the world. In other words, they regarded imperialism as the inevi-
table product of finance capitalism, or, as Bukharin unequivocally 
declared, "imperialism ~s] the policy of finance capital .... 1166 
Yet their study of the evolution of imperialism led them to 
another important discovery. They argued that the expansion achieved 
by the major capitalist powers had been largely peaceful in its initial 
phases, nrimarily s~nce there had been an abundance of areas still 
unoccupied by any of them. However, they believed that by about 1900 
there was no free territory remalnlng in \'Ihich nevI empires coulc1 be 
established. 67 Nevertheless, the growth of caoitalism continued, so 
that the driving force of this expansion, the necessary search for ever 
larger areas of exploitation, was still o~erating. Accordingly, they 
postulated that any further territorial aggrandisement by these imperia-
list countries inev~tably would lead them into conflict with each other. 
However, the question which still remains unresolved is the 
manner in which these Marxists araued that imoerialism had created the 
prerequisites for socialist revolution. The answer falls into two 
re 1 a ted pa rts, connected wi th the economi c structure that was character-
istic of imperialist countries, and the alignment of classes, and the 
class tensions, that would be produced within them. 
First of all, they maintained that the organisation of production 
which had been achieved in finance capitalist states provided the 
necessary economic basis for socialism. In particular, the syndicates 
and trusts and their entire administ~ative apparatus, as well as the 
state institutions which the "magnates of capital" had created to 
regulate the economy in their interests, were considered to be the 
building blocks with which to construct a planned economy. They then 
believed that the proletariat, after it had overthrown the bourgeoisie, 
could take over intact this economic structure and adapt it readily 
in the reconstruction of industry accordinq to socialist principles. 68 
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Moreover, they asserted that the evolution of industrial capital-
ism into finance capitalism inevitably would result in increased 
exploitation of the proleteriat and, consequently, the intensification 
of class antagonisms. Specifically, they argued that the increase in 
prices which the monopolies would implement to maintain their profits 
'tJOuld worsen the economic position of the workers, who would be burdened 
even more ~y the effects of protective tariffs, and also by the 
increased taxes which would be levied as the imperialist powers built 
up their military forces to safequard their existing status. In addi-
tion, they pointed out that the workers' situation had deteriorated 
even further during the imperialist war when they had suffered not 
only heightened economic deprivation and political oppression, such 
as the ban on strikes and the introduction of labour conscription, but 
also actual physical destruction on the battlefields themselves. They 
were convinced that these sufferjngs and hardships would engender in 
the proletariat the necessary consciousness and will to rise and 
seize power from its capitalist oppressors. 59 
Certainly, there is no doubt that the majority of revolutionary 
Marxists in the Russian Empire believed that capitalism in its imperial-
i st stage of development had created the "objective prerequisites" 
for socialism. Bukharin, one of the first Bolsheviks to analyse in 
depth the characteri sti cs of imperi ali sm, boldly decl ared that !limperi a 1-
ism is the policy of finance capitalism, i.e., a hi0hly developed 
caoitalism imolying a considerable ripeness of the organisation of 
production; in other words, imperialist policies by their very existence 
bespeak the ripeness of the objective conditions for a new socio-
. f ,,70 economlC arm .... 
The revolutionary Polish Marxists essentially agreed with Bukharin's 
conclusion. In 1915, speaking for the Regional Presidium of the 
S.D.K.P.iL.~ K. B. Radek, after emphasising that the concentration of 
capital had made "socialism ... already possible economically,:! averred 
that "imperialism is a policy of ca!=litalism in that stage of develop-
ment ~'1hich makes a socialist organisation of production possible.',71 
Luxemburg, for once found herself in agreement with Radek. In 1915, 
she too declared that the "capitalist desire for imperialist expansion 
~\fa~ the expression of its highest maturity in the last period of its 
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life," at \>/hich stage it had "created the objective premises for its 
own final overthrow. IJ2 Later, the revolutionary Latvian and Lithua-
nian Marxists also subscribed to this theory, declaring that imperial-
ism had produced the socio-economic preconditions for socialism. 73 
Before 1917 there was a consensus among these r1arxists that the 
"objective prerequisites!1 for socialist revolution existed in the 
advanced imperialist countries of West Europe. Nevertheless, it 
appears that they were less than unanimous that such a revolution was 
possible in the Russian Empire on account of its relative economic 
backwardness - until 1917 Lenin himself repeatedly denied that the 
coming revolution in Russia Vlould be socialist. Yet in 1917 they 
openly proclaimed that socialism was objectively possible in the Empire. 
However, it appears that even before 1917 Bukharin had consid-
ered socialist revolution to be a realisable prospect in the Russian 
Empire. In Imperi_alism and I-Jorld Economy, the core of which was written 
in 1915, he categorised Russia as one of the leading imperialist 
powers, in particular stressing its expansion into Central Asia, 
~1anchuria and ~10ngolia in the late nineteenth centuryJ4 Although he 
accepted that the economic structure of the Empire was less developed 
than that of France, Germany, Britain and the United States, at the 
same time he hastened to add that it would be mistaken to conclude 
from this qualification that it was not one of the I!foremost countries!l, 
in which the Illobjective prerequisites! for the social organisation of 
producti on" had matured. 75 
Moreover. during the war a number of other Bolsheviks, such as 
N. M. Lukin, G. I. Safarov and especially G. I. Oppokov (Lomov), 
reached the same conclusion as Bukharin that socialist revolution was 
possible in the Russii'\n EmrireJ6 A leading "Left Communist" in 1918, 
Lomov maintained that finance capitalism existed in the Empire. He 
pointed to the increased centralisation of oroduction, the strengthen-
ing of monorolies, particularly in the cotton, metallurgical and 
machine-building industries, and the concentration in banking in 
supnort of his claim. He continued that this centralisation and the 
regulation of production which had accompanied it, a process which had 
been intensified by the open intervention of the tsarist state in 
controll ing the economy during the war, had created the l10bjective 
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prerequisites ll for socialism!? 
In 191? itself, many Bolsheviks, prominent among v/hom were many 
future "leftists ll , argued that since finance capitalism had developed 
in the Russian Empire, then sufficient economic prerErjuisites for sbdalist 
construction were present. Bukharin himself was to maintain repeatedly 
that finance capitalism, similar to that in West Europe, had existed 
in Russia before 19l??8 He continued that the centralisation of 
production in trusts and syndicates, controlled and organised by the 
banks, had created the economic structure which the proletariat, after 
it had seized political power, could utilise as the foundation for 
regulated, socialist industry .19 V. t,1. Smirnov agreed v1ith Bukharin's 
analysis. He asserted that in the Russian Empire the concentration of 
industry and the growth of a system of economic regulatory organs, 
processes which had been accelerated by the bourgeoisie and its state 
during the war, had proceeded sufficiently far that the successful 
transition to socialism \'las now possible.80 Safarov too vias convinced 
that the supremacy of finance capitalism in Russian industry was 
unquestionable, insisting that the exigencies of the \'Iar had compelled 
the bourgeoisie to use the power of the state to centralise and orqanise 
production in order to guarantee the output of the military goods on 
which its survival depended. He claimed that this development clearly 
proved that lithe social-democratic regulation ... of the econoMY vias 
possible,1I81 once the proletariat had overthrown the ruling capitalist 
oligarchy and taken over the economic apparatus which it had built. 
Later, in 1918, Osinsky declared that the economic preconditions 
for socialist revolution had existed in the Russian Empire. In his 
justification of this contention, he presented one of the clearest 
accounts of what he, and presumably his fellow Bolsheviks, consicered 
to be the lIobjective prerequisites ll that were sufficient for the con-
struction of socialism. 
At first, he argued in a rather abstract manner, maintaining that 
if socialist revolution \'las to be successful there must be present lIa 
considerable accumulation, both of productive power and of socialised 
labour (connected with the concentration and centralisation of capital), 
and also of the social power of the working class - 'the gravedigger of 
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capitalism' .,,82 He continued, however, that these "positive prerequi-
sites" by themselves were no guarantee of a revolutionary upheaval. 
In addition, a crisis in the capitali~system was necessary, caused 
either by the recurrent problem of over-production or by war. In either 
case, the productive forces of society would decline - factories would 
close, and existing machinery and ~oods would be destroyed -, the 
petty-bourgeoisie would be ruined economically and swell the ranks of 
the proletariat, and the means of production would become even more 
concentrated in the hands of the magnates who alone had the wealth 
and power to survive such periods. Moreover, the proletariat would 
be subjected to even harsher exploitation and deprivation, which would 
spur it to revolt and destroy the existing capitalist system. 83 
In explaining why socialist revolution had been oossible in the 
Russian Empire, Osinsky gave a detailed definition of the "positive 
prerequisites" of socialism. He maintained that Russia had possessed 
a highly develoned industrial structure, in which lar~e-scale enter-
prises were dominant - he cited the mining, metallurgical, machine-
building, transport, chemical and sugar industries as examples -
which could "serve as the technical basis for the organisation of 
la rqe-scale socialist industry. ,,84 tloreover, these industries had 
been trustified or syndicalised, a process which had been encouraged 
by the interventi on ·of the banks, and, consequently, the framework for 
a centrally planned regulation of production had been created. Further-
more, the syndicates and trusts, together with the distributive organi-
sations set up by the state during the war, and with the existing con-
sumer and cooperative societies, provided the necessary network for 
controlling the distribution and consumption of goods and materials.85 
In fact, Osinsky was arguing that finance capitalism was the 
necessary pre-condition of socialism. The organisations which he 
claimed would provide the foundations for a socialist economy were 
typically those which, according to r·larxists, had developed as capitalism 
had evolved into imperialism. 
The revolutionary Polish Marxists did not discuss so extensively 
whether the "objective prerequisites" for socialist revolution existed 
in the Russian Empire. The fact that this revolution was not consoli-
dated in Poland probably minimised the need for them to prove that the 
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economic bases for the construction of socialism were present both in 
Poland itself and in Russia in general. Yet it is possible to deduce 
that they would have agreed with the Bolsheviks that Russia was mature 
enough economically for socialist revolution. Indeed, Luxemburg, 
while she had little to say directly on this issue, certainly rejected 
the idea that socialism in Russia was doomed to failure on the grounds 
that capitalism in it was insufficiently developed. She wrote in this 
vein to Luise Kautsky at the end of 1917: 
Are you happy about the Russians? (i .e. post October). Of 
course they will not be able to maintain themselves in this 
witches' sabbath, - not because statistics show that economic 
development in Russia is too backward, as your clever husband 
[Karl Kautsky] has figured out, but because the social 
democracy in, the highly develoDed west consists of pitifully 
wretched cowards, who, looking quietly on, will let the 
Russians bleed themselves to death. But such a col lanse 
is better than to 'remain alive for the fatherland' .. It is 
an historical de§g, the traces of which will not disappear 
in eons of time. 
It is possible to infer from this statement, especially when it 
is taken in conjunction with Luxemburg's self-professed belief that 
history necessarily developed through succeeding stages, that she 
considered that capitalism in Russia had advanced to a level that 
would have permitted the successful construction of socialism. 
However, in 1918, Radek, in the leading circles of the S.D.K.P.iL. 
till 1917 when he joined the Bolshevik party, presented his theory 
to justify the possibility of socialist revolution in relatively 
back\'Iard capitalist countries. He denied that the "full development" 
, 
of capitalism must precede the construction bf socialism. Rather, he 
argued that once the main branches of industry and transoort had 
become centralised, then what can be regarded as the minimum economic 
prerequisites for a successful socialist revolution had been established. 
At that stage, he continued, the oroletariat, even if it still was a 
minority, could overthrow the bourgeoisie and use the existing large-
scale industrial structure as the foundation on which to build a 
socialist economy, after which it gradually could proceed to socialise 
the remaining backward sectors of the economy, especially agriculture. 
All that the proletariat needed to carry out such a revolution was the 
political \'Ii11 , which, in his opinion, it was bound to acquire as the 
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result of the exploitation and misery that it must continue to suffer 
as long as capitalism survived.87 
Radek applied this theory to the Russian Empire in order to 
legitimise the socialist character of the October revolution. He 
insisted that the "commandinCl heights" of the Russian economy - the 
coal, metallurgical, oil, transport and banking industries - had 
reached that level of concentration and centralisation at \'lhich they 
could be transformed into the first links in a slowly growing chain 
1 d · 28 of socia ist pro uctlon. 
ID 1017, Stuchka, the pre-eminent theoretician among the Latvian 
Bolsheviks, also inferred that Russia was economically ripe for 
socialist revolution. He denied the claims, apparently advanced by 
the Latvian liberals and Mensheviks, that since Latvia was more devel-
oped than Great Russia itself it would be in the interests of social 
progress if it became independent. On the contrary, he maintained that 
Russia, whose industry recently had undergone a process of concentration 
and centralisation unparalleled anYlrJhere, except in the United States, 
itself had now outstripped Latvia in terms of capitalist development.89 
Two implications can be made from this argument. First, it seems that 
Stuchka believed that the "objective prerequisites" for socialism - a 
modern, large-scale industrial base - existed in Russia. He suggested, 
moreover, that the victory of socialism in Latvia would be facilitated 
if it remained united with this fast-growing, and potentially revolu-
ti onary Russ i a . 
The revolutionary Marxists of Lithuania openly admitted that 
Lithuania alone did not possess sufficient economic prerequisites for 
the construction of socialism. Yet they refused to concede that this 
ruled out the possibility of socialist revolution there. They defended 
this ,position by arguing that since Russia itself after 1917 had 
become a socialist state and since Germany, where all the preconditions 
for socialism had matured, was on the verge of revolution, then it 
was possible for the nroletariat to seize power in Lithuania, despite 
its bachJardness, and thereafter to seek the political sUfJport and 
material aid of its Russian and German comrades in building socialism. gO 
Lenin himself agreed that the characteristics that capitalism 
had acquired as it had evolved into its imperialist form had "created 
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all the objective premises for the realisation of socialism."91 Yet 
before 1917 he had argued that socialist revolution would be limited 
to West Europe and the United States, repeatedly denying that such a 
revolution vias possible in the Russian Emnire. 
In October, 1915, Lenin insisted that only a bour0eois-democratic 
revolution could take place in the Russian Empire, even though this 
would be carried out by the proletariat in alliance \liith the peasantry.92 
Later, in November of the same year, he admitted that while "the 
obj ecti ve cond iti ons in Hes tern Europe [were] ri pe for soci ali s t revo 1 u-
tion," such a revolution \'/aS still premature in the Russian Empire. 
The task which remained to be accomplished there was the destruction 
of the autocracy, and of the vestiges of feudalism. To achieve these 
aims, the proletariat, in alliance with the peasantry, must fight to 
establish a democratic republic and then to confiscate the Domeshchiks' 
estates. In effect, Lenin categorised the' coming revolution in the 
Russian Empire as bourgeois-democratic because of the nature of its 
0") 
objectives.-'-.l Furthermore, in February, 1916, he again adamantly 
rejected the idea that socialist revolution Itlas realisable in the 
Empire. He continued to argue that the proletariat first must partici-
pate in the struggle to ensure that the bourgeois revolution was 
victorious, after which, presumably, the preconditions for socialism 
would mature. 94 
t1oreover, there is nothing snecific in Lenin's major study of 
imperialism, Imperialism, The Highest Stage ~f Capitalism, to warrant 
the contention that before 1917 he regarded socialist revolution as an 
imminent prospect in the Russian Empire. Certainly, he conceded that 
finance capitalism, typified by the formation of monopolies and the 
merger of banking ~nd industrial capital, had "made enormous strides 
in Russia.,,95 Nevertheless, he also pointed out that the Russian 
Empire was still economically backward, a country IIwhere modern capita-
, list imperialism is enmeshed, so to sneak, in a particularly close 
netword of pre--capitalist relations~!l% that is, feudalism. It is 
plausible to conclude from this qualification that Lenin even then 
believed that the Russian Empire first must pass through the bourgeois-
democratic stage' of development before there could be any thought of 
socialist revolution. 
110 
Yet less than a year later, in March, 1917, as soon as he had 
recei ved news that the autocracy had been overthroltm and a repub 1 i c 
established in the Russian Empire, it aprears that Lenin began to 
revise his strategy. In his Draft Theses_, written two days after the 
report of the February revolution reached him in Switzerland, he argued 
that the Russian proletariat should continue !lthe fight for a democratic 
republic and socialism."g7 In the first of his Letters fr9m Afar, 
issued a few days later, he again urged that the Russian workers, in 
alliance only with the proletarianised and poor peasants, not the 
peasantry as a whole, and, subsequently, with the proletariat of the 
remainder of Europe, must struggle to transform the revolution from the 
bourgeois-democratic to the socialist stage. He argued: 
\:Jith these two allies, the proletariat, utilisir.g the pecu-
liarities of the present situation, can and will orocee.d, 
first, to the achievement of a democratic republic and 
complete victory over the landlords, instead of the Guchkov-
Milyukov semi-mmarchy, and then to socialism, which alo~e 
can give the war \'Jeary pearle peace, bread and freedom.9o 
In the last of these Letters froll1 Afar, Lenin outlined the ooliti-
--------- -
cal measures wh·ich had to be implemented to guarantee this transforma-
tion in the nature of the revolution. First, and most important, the 
workers and peasants must destroy the old state, and its organs of 
coercion - the army, police and bureaucracy -, and convert· their o\'ln 
soviets into the real sources of nolitical OOV-fer. HOlt/ever, the success 
of this step demanded that the proletariat secure the support of the 
entire peasantry, then solely interested in the confiscation and divi-
sion of the land. Thereafter, the workers, now allied only with the 
, . 
poor peasants, mus t proceed to "control ... pl~oducti on and di s tributi on 
of basic products and establish 'universal labour service'." Lenin 
was quick to add the caveat, nevertheless, th~t these policies alone 
would not signify the victory of socialism, rather only I!the transition 
to socialism which cannot be achieved in Russia directly, at one 
stroke, without transitional measures, but is quite achievable and 
Qq 
urgently necessary as the resu It of such trans i ti ona 1 measures. :'-'-' 
It was a programme based o~ these prescriptions that Lenin, on 
his return to Russia in April, 1917, advocated that the Bolsheviks 
should pursue. To the consternation of the majority of the rarty, 
then led by J. v. Stalin and L. B. Kamenev, who believed that the 
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bourgeois-democra ti c regime whi ch had repl aced the autocracy would 
continue to exist for a prolonged period, Lenin argued that the situa-
tion in which to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat in 
Russia was at hand. To achieve this end, he demanded that all Dower 
be transferred to the soviets - v"hich, in his eyes, was equivalent 
to the "smashing" of the bourgeois state. Once this new government 
had been set up, it vvas to carry out the nationalisation of the land 
and the banks. Yet Lenin again hastened to warn that the Russian 
proletariat should not imagine that it was possible immediately lito 
'introduce' socialism;" rather it was possible "only to bring social 
production and the distribution of products at once under the control 
of the Soviets of Horkers' Deputies. "100 
r1owever, there was an internal contradiction in the position 
that Lenin had adopted. In April, 1917 he i~acto espoused a politi-
cal programme - the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat -
that was appropriate for a socialist revolution, v/hile at the same time 
he refused to admit that such a revolution was objectively possible 
in the Russian Empire. Certainly, later in 1917, he contended that 
the economic prerequisites for socialism had matured in Russia. In 
Ib.~m.rend.inq Catastrophe And How To Combat It, written in Seotember, 
he defended his policy during 1917 on these grounds. He proceeded 
by arguing that imperialism, which "is merely monopoly capitalism," 
existed in Russia - he cited Pro~ugol, Prod~~et and the sugar syndicate 
as a few examples of this phenomenon. He continued, moreover, that 
during the imperialist war the ruling capitalists had converted their 
monopolies into state monopolies, in order to use the pOvlers of the 
state to protect their profits. This development, Lenin claimed, had 
made socialism objectively possible, since "socialism is merely the 
next step forward from state-capitalist monopolyl1 - and this was 
present in Russia. He wrote in more detail: 
ImDeria1ist war is the eve of socialist revolution. And 
th~s not only because the horrors of the war give rise to 
proletarian revolt - no revolt can bring socialism unless 
the economic conditions for socialism are ripe - but 
because state-monopoly capitalism is a complete material 
preparation for socialism, the threshold of socialism, a 
rung on the ladder of history between which and the rung 
called socialism there are no intermediate rungs. 10l 
In October, he again insisted that sufficient "objective 
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prerequisites" for successful socialist revolution VJere to be found 
in Russia. On this occasion, he stressed the high levels of capital-
i s t development in banking and other major industries, which had 
become increasingly centralised and organised during the war. He 
maintained that the revolutionary state must take over these industries 
intact, after which it could use the institutions for controlling pro-
duction that they had created as the skeleton for the construction of 
a regulated socialist economy. Without these basic prerequisites, 
there would have been no realistic prospects for socialist revolution 
in Russia. He declared: 
Capitalism has created an accounting apparatus in the shape 
of the banks, syndicates, postal service, consumers' societ-
i e.'3, and offi ce employees uni ons. Hithout bi r1 banks 
socialism would be impossible. 
The big banks are the 'state apparatus' which we need 
to ~rtinl~ aboutlB~cialism, ~nd which we take ready-made from 
cap' a , sm. . . . -
Nevertheless, this smacks of a ~~~~acto justification of the 
programme that Lenin advanced in April. It is more credible to seek 
an explanation of his policies in his estimate of the political oppor-
tunities that the February revolution had opened up, an approach, more-
over, "'hich has the merit of consistency with the activist attitude 
towards revolution that he previously had defended. The destruction of 
the autocracy had 1 eft a politi ca 1 vacuum, wh; ch had been fi 11 ed by a 
system of dual pm-fer - the Provisional Government and the soviets. 
Apparently. Lenin believed that the former would be unable to consoli-
date itself in power since it would lose its popular support by its 
refusal to take Russia out of the war and to give the land to the 
peasants. Consequently, it seems that he felt that the Ro1shevik party, 
by exploiting the revolutionary enthusiasm that the February revolution 
had unleashed and by promisinq to meet the unsatisfied demands of the 
workers and peasants - for peace, bread and land -, could win over the 
masses to back its seizure of power. Once the. dictatorship of the 
proletariat had been established, presumably the Bolsheviks would use 
the authority of this state to carry out measures that would hasten the 
transition to socialism in Russia. 
However, it still remains that by October, 1917, the majority of 
revolutionary l'larxists in the Russian Empire had come to agree that the 
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conditions for socialist revolution had matured there. Yet one problem 
persisted. They had to exolain why this revolution first had broken 
out in a relatively backward country, such as the Russian Empire, rather 
than in one of the advanced caoitalist societies of West EuroDe. 
In 1918, Radek presented retrospectively a theoretical justifica-
tion for this phenomenon. He maintained that in highly developed 
capitalist countries the ruling bourgeoisie possessed very strong 
weapons of coercion - the army and the police - which it could use to 
suppress successfully any risings by the impoverished workers. Therefore, 
it was quite understandable that socialist revolution would occur first 
in more backward capitalist countries where the bourgeoisie as yet were 
less organised to crush the revolution of the proletariat. He argued: 
The strongest caoitalist orqanisation cannot protect the 
masses from the singularly excruciating agonies which are 
created by caDitalist anarchy; nevertheless, it can hold 
these masses in obedience much more readily than the 
younger capitalist countries can. 
_The socialist revolution beoins first of all in those 
countries where the canitalist or~arisaticn'is weakest. 
The capitalist countries with the least organised institu-
tions of coerci~n are the tara,ets for the socialist break-
. 103 . througn .... 
In essence, Bukharin defended the same hypothesis as Radek, develop-
ing his previouS ideas about the !lower of mature capitalist societies 
to prevent proletarian revolution. Before 1917 he harl postulated that 
as finance capitalism had grown the role of the state had changed. As 
the concentration of industry and banking' had increased, the collective 
ownership of capital - in the form of trusts, syndicates and cartels -
had become"characteristic". Bukharin contended that this development 
had continued until, during the war, one gigantic economic organisation, 
embracing all the bourgeoisie, had been created. Moreover, this organi-
sation had taken over, or more precisely, merged with the existing 
state apparatus, with the consequence that the state, formerly the 
impartial arbiter between competing capitalists, had become the naked 
weapon of the nO\,/~unifi ed bourgeoi s i e. He attri buted to thi s "imperi a-
list pirate state, [this] omnipotent organisation of bourgeois domin-
ance ... giganti~ power, spiritual (various methods of obscurantism: 
the church, the press, the school, etc.) as well as material methods 
(police, soldiery) ... ,"l04 which it could use to quell any revolts by 
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oppressed and exploited workers. 
After the October revolution Bukharin expanded this argument to 
account for the outbreak of socialist revolution in a backward country, 
such as Russia. He claimed that in these countries the direct fusion 
of the economic and political power of the bourgeoisie had progressed 
least. Consequently, he asserted that it was precisely in these 
countries, the weakest "links" in the "chain" of world imperialism, 
that the proletariat had the best opportunity to overthrow capitalism. 
In the Economics of the Transformation Period he concluded: 
The concentration of the social strength of the bourgeoisie 
in state power, which had intergrown with the economic 
organisations of capital, created an enormous resistance 
to the workers' movement. Therefore, the collapse of the 
capitalist world began with the weakest systems in terms 
of political economy, witO the least developed state 
capitalist organisations. 105 . 
Lenin himself apparently had adopted the same explanation. In 
early 1918 he justified the outbreak of socialist revolution in Russia 
on the grounds of the relative economic and political backwardness of 
that country. Yet he added that while this factor had made it "im-
measurably more easy for us [the Russian~ to start" this revolution, 
at the same time it would make it equally difficult for them to bring 
. t t f 1 1· 106 loa success u conc USlon. 
Nevertheless, despite the agreement between the "Left Communists" 
and Lenin on the nature of the revolution in the Russian Empire in 
1917" policy differences continued to divide them. In particular, the 
"Left Communists ll attacked the national and agrarian policies advocated 
by Lenin, in the belief that the implementation of these \llOuld present 
grave dan0ers to the consolidation of the socialist revolution. More-
over, they also beca~e highly critical of the restricted role that he 
allowed the proletariat in the administration of the revolutionary 
state and in the construction of socialism generally, arguin~ that 
this curtailment of proletarian democracy would frustrate the achieve-
ment of socialism. 
The aim of the remainder of this study is to focus attention on 
the contradictory policies on these issues espoused by the "Left Com-
munists" and Lenin, and also to attempt to discover the causes of their 
disagreements. The next 100ica1 step seems to be an examination of 
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their respective national policies, since this too will involve a 
deeper analysis of their theories of imperialism, the differences in 
which apparently lie at the roots of their conflict on this question. 
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Chapter 3. 
IMPERIALIsr1 NlD ,THE ~IONAL QUESTION. 
The conflict over the divergent national policies which the 111 eft I! 
Bolsheviks and the revolutionary ~larxists of Poland, Latvia and Lithu-
ania, on the one hand, and V. I. Lenin, on the other, advocated that 
revolutionary Marxists should follow was not based on any fundamental 
difference of opinion on the ultimate position which nations would 
occupy in the socialist society of the future. On the contrary, both 
parties envisioned socialist society in its final form as a supra-
national, global system in which nations would become assimilated. 
Rather the debate It,hi ch took place between them was of a tacti ca 1 order, 
focussing on the respective national policies which they believed that 
revolutionary r~arxists should pursue in the epoch of if'lperialism. 
Defending a national policy which they claimed to be consistent ItJith 
the spirit, if not the letter of Marx·s and Engels· teachings, the 
I!leftl! Bolsheviks and their Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian co-thinkers 
opposed any deviation from a strict, class internationalist policy in 
the direction of concessions to narrowly nationalist aspirations. They 
considered that such concessions were redundant in the imperialist 
epoch, when socialist revolution had beco~e ripe on an international 
scale. At the sar.1e time, moreover, they feared that any support for, 
or ever toleration of nationalism would so confuse the workers that 
they would fail to realise where their true interests lay and, conse-
quently, that the international socialist movement would be divided and 
vJeakened. Lenin, however, came to perceive the powerful revolutionary 
potential of national movements, particularly in the Russian Empire,l 
and the possibility that the Bolsheviks could capture them as allies 
in their own struggle to overthrow the autocracy, and later the Provi-
sional Government. Therefore, he was prepared in the short run to make 
concessions to national movements, which, paradoxically, he too argued 
were true to the spirit of Marxism, in order to secure their support 
for the Bolsheviks· seizure of power. At the same time, he never lost 
sight of his own long term socialist objectives which by their 
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cosmopolitan character were ultimately contradictory to nationalism. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to analyse the diver0ent national 
policies defended by these ~1arxists, particularly as they related to 
their theories of imperialism. 
It will prove to be instructive first to examine briefly K. Ma~'s 
and F. Engels' own views on the q1estion of nationality. An analysis 
of their theory of nationality, as far as they elaborated one - it 
appears that they never constructed a comprehensive and definitive 
theory on this subject 2 - will aid in discovering the roots of their 
self-avowed internationalism, a step which will later be of use in 
understandi ng that the internati ona 1 ism manifested by the "1 eft" 
Bolsheviks and their Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian comrades was not 
derived directly from the "founding fathers", but from their own studies 
of imperialism. Moreover, this analysis will also reveal certain 
seemingly divergent strands in Marx's and Enqels' aoproach to the 
national question, which later helped permit their self-professed 
followers to espouse contradictory national policies, while at the 
same time attempting to justify them by appeals to what they claimed 
would have been the "founding fathers '" position in their circumstances. 
r~arx's and Engels' approach to the whole question of nationality 
was basically a derivative of their theory of the evolution of capitalism. 
They regarded nations as historical phenomena which had developed only 
with the grO\l/th of capitalism; they had not existed since the dawn of 
human hi story. t~hil e a common 1 an9uage, common territory and common 
tradition may have been necessary conditions for nationhood, in them-
selves they were insufficient to account for the formation of nations. 
After all, oeoples who shared these common characteristics had existed 
for centuries before emerging as an integrated nation which aspired to 
establish its own independent state, separate from other nations. 
Lackin9 in this combination of factors was the dynamic element \\Ihich 
Marx and Engels isolated as essential for the creation of a nation. 
This motive force. in their opinion, was capitalism, which overcame the 
feudal barriers and particularist loyalties separating related national 
groups. They emphasised that the economic cohesion \'lhich resulted 
from capitalist development was the fundamental cause of the integration 
of nations into functioning entities. 
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According to f·1arx and Engels, the groY/th of capitalism had led 
to the concentration and centralisation of the means of production, and 
of population, in large industrial centres, and to the expansion of 
commodity production. This increasing production and exchange of 
commodities, typical of the caoitalist mode of production, required the 
formation of large, united markets, freed from provincial seoaratism, 
internal taxes ard tariffs. These demands of trade, and the imnroved 
communi cati ons Y/hi ch were consequently requi red, overcame the di sunity 
of nationally akin groups which had existed under feudalism and became 
the catalyst of their integration into active and conscious nations. 
Marx and Engels described this process: 
The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the 
scattered state of the population, of the means of produc-
tion, and of property. It has aC1010merated population, 
centralised means of production, and has concentrated 
oroperty in a few hands. The necessary consequence of 
this was political centralisation. Indeoenrient, or but 
loosely connected, provinces with separate interests, 
lal,l/s, governments and systems of taxation became lumped 
together into one nation, "lith one government, one code 
of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier and 
one customs-tariff. 3 
Parenthetically, this statement highlights another fundamental 
feature of narx's and En0els' theory of nationality. \'!hile recognising 
that a nation was composed of a number of classes, they emphasised 
the leading role of the bourgeoisie in its formation. They believed 
that the bourgeoisie was the class which was interested in the creation 
of large, united territories for the sale of its commo~ities and, 
therefore, that it was the political force behind the establishment of 
national markets to satisfy its needs. t·1oreover, to maintain the 
inviolability of the national marret which it had formed and thus to 
secure its own future development, the bourgeoisie set up its o\'ln 
independent political and economic unit, the nation state, separate 
and protected from competing nations orqanised in their own states.4 
r~arx and Engels, however, did not regard this stage in historical 
development as final. Just as capitalism and its attendant nation 
states had replaced feudalism and the narrow provincialism character-
istic of it, so too capitalism and its nation states were destined to 
be replaced by a higher form of society. They maintained that as 
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capitalism continued its inexorable growth it would require eve~ 
expanding markets for the sale of the commodities that it produced. 
Hence the nation states formed in the first flush of capitalist develop-
ment would after a time become too small to meet the demands of contin-
uing capitalist expansion. To satisfy these grol'Jinq needs these states 
would have to expand too - either by acquiring colonies, or by absorb-
ing smaller nations. Marx and Engels welcomed this trend of capitalist 
development towards greater economic centralisation as proqressive, for 
they considered that it was laying the foundations both for the creation 
of an international proletarian movement and for the eventual or0anisa-
tion of an international socialist economy.5 
r,1arx and Engels gave a clear explanation of what they anticipated 
that the ultimate outcome of this process of capitalist expansion would 
be. Aoparently, they saw the growth of capital ism as a means of uniting 
men, who would have become almost wholly proletarianised, on a 010bal 
scale. Then they believed that the conditions would be ripe for the 
proletariat to carry out a \t/orld revolution and establish a universal 
communist society. Consequently, nations in r1arx's and Engels' theory 
of history were just building-blocks on the path to this final end, 
admittedly a stage above feudal separatism yet themselves limited and 
doomed. They outlined their prognosis in The German Ideology: 
... only with this universal development of the productive 
forces is a universal intercourse between men established, 
which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon 
of the l~propertyless!1 mass (universal competition), makes 
each nation deoendent on the revolutions of the others, and 
finally has pu~ world-historical, emnirically universal 
individuals in the place of local ones. Without this, (1) 
communism could only exist as a local event; (2) the forces 
of intercourse themselves could not have developed as 
universal, hence intolerable pOl'/ers: they would have 
remained home bred conditions, surrounded by superstition; 
and (3) each extension of intercourse would abolish local 
communism. Empirically, communism is only possible as the 
act of the dominant peoples "all at once ll and simultane-
ously, which presupposes the universal development of 
oroductive forces and the world intercourse bound up with 
, . fi 
commUnl sm .... -
Therefore, while their theory of capitalist growth strongly influ-
enced their position on the national question, it is always necessary 
to bear in mind that they \'Jere basically concerned with the integration 
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of men, that is, of the international proletariat, which would result 
from this process. In general, their position on the national question 
was an offshoot of their desire to further this integration, as a 
prerequisite for the eventual establishment of socialism on a global 
scale. 
Nevertheless, it is quite clear that this economic determinist 
strand in r·1arx IS and Engels I theory of history vIas a fundamental deter-
minant of their national policy. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century capitalism had grown to such a degree that they doubted the 
economic viability of the independent states which the small nations 
of Europe aspired to set up. They feared that such small nation states 
would be unable to provide a sufficiently broad territorial foundation 
to sati s fy the appetite of capital i sm for ever 1 arger markets. r1oreover, 
they believed that to destroy the existing multi-national states in 
order to grant self-determination to nations irrespective of their 
size - they scathingly titled this proposition ~'the principle of 
nationalities ll - I'lould be reactionary. By reversing the centralising 
tendencies of capitalist development such a policy would destroy the 
existing large-scale economic units, and, by implication, the inteqra-
tion of the proletariat which had resulted from this, which they con-
sidered to be an advance on the path towards socialism. Accordingly, 
they limited their support of self-determination to the large "historic 
nations ll of Europe, notably the Italians, the Poles, the Germans and 
the Hungarians, which would be able to promote the further development 
of capitalism, and the grovJth and unity of the proletariat, which in 
turn would foster the eventual victory of socialism. In fact, f'iarx 
and Engels were quite prepared to ignore the demands of small nations 
for self-determination where they believed that this would endanger 
their vision of historical development.? 
\tlhile this discussion of Marx IS and Engels I theory of nationality 
has emphasised that much of it was founded on their views of economic 
development, it would be mistaken to conclude that their own position 
on the question of which nations should be granted self-determination 
was in every instance based solely on narrowly economic determinist 
criteria. Ceteris paribus~ they did favour the creation of ever 
larger economic units, which they saw as progressive towards the 
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creati on of an ul timate ly uni ted worl d economy. Yet the !lother thi ngs II 
were not always "equal" in their eyes. On occasion, political consid-
erations led them to support the division of existing, large multi-
national states Itthen they believed that such a course of action would 
ultimately redound to the advantage of the socialist cause.8 
The best illustration of the political criteria that Marx and 
Engels applied in justification of the division of such states was 
revealed in their defence of national self-determination for the Poles. 
The position that they adopted on the Polish question clearly demon-
strates that in specific circumstances the "founding fathers" were 
prepared to sacrifice the immediate advantaaes of economic unification -
the three sectors of the former Polish state had by then become incor-
porated, economically and politically, into the three partitioning 
powers - if this sacrifice would othen.·!ise further the cause of 
revolution. At the same time, an analysis of their views on this 
issue will also focus on an additional factor which they considered 
to be a basic and inalienable precondition for the successful develop-
ment of the international proletarian movement. 
There were a number of tacti ca 1 reasons vlhy t~arx and Enge 1 s 
consistently supported the restoration of an independent Polish state. 
First, they maintained that the Germans were bound to the arch 
reactionary Holy Alliance - in their eyes this was an invention of 
tsarist Russia - by the partition of Poland. While the Germans helped 
suppress the Polish revolutionary movement and retained part of Polish 
territory, then they would remain bound to Russia and the defence of 
reactionary Russian policy and, consequently, they \'lould be unable to 
destroy completely the patriarchical feudal ahsolutism which existed 
in their own country. They were convinced that "the restoration of a 
democratic Poland&as] the first condito!l for the restoration ofa 
democratic Germany,n 9 which was one of their primary aims. Second, 
they sal'J a re-established Polish state as a barrier against reactionary 
Russian intervention in West and Central Europe to suppress revolution-
ary movements there. 10 Third, they believed that independence \'/as a 
prerequisite of any revolutionary social change in Poland itself. They 
argued that the Polish aristocracy had used the Partitions to prevent 
social revolution in Poland; therefore, they saw an inseparable 
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connection between Polish independence, the overthrow of the reaction-
ary aristocracy~ and agrarian revolution. ll Finally, they feared that 
the continuing partition of Poland was an obstacle to the development 
of the international revolutionary movement. They argued that this 
was effectively divi ding the pro 1 etari at of the partiti oni ng powers 
from their Polish brothers, for the Polish workers would not distin-
guish between the different classes of their oppressor nations and, 
consequently, they would support their Oltln bourgeoisie in a national 
rather than a class struggle. Therefore, in order to unite the prole-
tariat internationally and to allow the development of a genuine 
socialist movement in "Poland" it It/as vital to re-establish an indepen-
dent Polish state. 12 
This last factor is worthy of some expansion for it reveals a 
cardinal belief of Marx and Engels regarding proletarian internationalism. 
While they always remained staunch internationalists, committed to 
the promotion of international socialism, at the same time they VJere 
firmly convinced that a true international revolutionary movement of 
the proletariat was "possible only among 8='ree ancD indeflendent 
nations.,,13 They were afraid that national oppression, and the national 
antagonisms arising from this, would so blinn the proletariat of an 
oppressed nation to its basic class interests, which ~1arx and Engels 
maintained were fundamentally the same as those of its fellow prole-
tarians elselt,here, that is, they were supra-national, that it would 
follow its national bourgeoisie along the path of chauvinism. In such 
situations Marx and Engels believed that the proletariat of the 
oppressor nation had to support the right of the oppressed nation to 
self-determination, for only such a policy would free it of all charaes 
of chauvinism and therefore permit it to win the confidence of the 
na ti ana lly oppressed pro 1 etari at and so ens ure the soli darity 0 f the 
. t . 1 . 1· t t 14 I 1 . t . 1n .ernatlona SOC1a 1S movemen. n a very rea sense, 1 1S 
possible to interpret this dictate as a necessary means, in ~'larx's and 
Engels' opinion, to guarantee the international unity of the proletariat, 
which they considered to be being prepared objectively hy the economic 
expansion of capitalism. 
Although Marx and Engels took such political considerations into 
account when framing their policy on any particular national question, 
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there is little doubt of the ultimate fate of nations which was 
predicted by their theory of historical evolution. Capitalism, which 
had given birth to integrated nations, as it continued to grow led to 
an increasing internationalisation of economic life which was inexorably 
breaking down national barriers and integrating the proletariat into 
one united world class. This same capitalist development was at the 
same time creating the prerequisites for socialist revolution, which, 
in turn, would intensify this trend to the internationalisation of 
society. ~10reover, this revolution would destroy all economic exploita-
tion which Marx and Engels saw as the source of all national oppression 
and antagonisms. As a result of this, the international proletariat, 
whi ch itself had no interest in defendi ng nati ona 1 di stincti Q'lS, woul d 
be free to establish a cosmopolitan society consistent with its 
presumed supra-national class interests. In The Communist nanifesto 
they unequivocally outlined this vision: 
The Communists are further reproached with desiring to 
abolish countries and nationality. 
The working men have no country. He cannot take 
fro~ them what they have not got .... 
National differences and antagonisms between peoples 
are daily more and more vanishinq, o1tJing to the development 
of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world 
market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the 
conditions of life corresponding thereto. 
The supremacy of the pro 1 etari at wi 11 cause them to 
vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilised 
countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the 
emancipation of the proletariat. 
In proportion as the exploitation of one individual 
by another is put to an end, the exploitation of one nation 
by another will also be put to an end. In proportion as 
the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, 15 
the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end. 
At first siaht, an analysis of the arguments presented by the 
"left" Bolsheviks and the revolutionary t1arxists of Poland, Latvia and 
Lithuania against granting self-determination to oppressed nations can 
lead to the simple conclusion that their national policy was heavily 
influenced by the determinist strand in ,,1arx's and Enqels' own theory 
of nationality. They too came to believe that the development of 
capitalism had rendered nation states obsolescent, and that to bow to 
the nationalist demands of the bourgeoisie and break up existing 
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large multi-national states to satisfy them would be reactionary -
although it should be borne in mind that from their origins, before 
any coherent and general theories about the obsolescer.ce of nation 
states had been fully developed, these Polish, Latvianand Lithuanian 
r~arxists had opposed nationalism as reactionary on political grounds, 
fearing that it would distract the proletariat from the pursuit of its 
true international class interests. 16 Preservation of existing large 
capitalist states intact as the bases for the transition to the united 
international socialist society of the future and rejection of any 
concessions to national prejudice - such were to become the planks of 
the platform of these tt1arxists on the national question. 
\>Jhile this national programme does bear a striking resemblance 
to that of Marx and Engels themselves, these Marxists never claimed 
that they had derived it directly from the teachings of the Ilfounding 
fathers". In fact, they had no hesitation in dismissing as no longer 
valid a number of the r,1arx IS and Engels' own prescriptions on the 
national question, most notably the latter's defence of self-deter-
mination for Poland. They insisted, however, that their own policies 
were consistent with the spirit and principles of Marxism, as apnlied 
to the radically changed conditions that existed in their own epoch. 
They contended that with the evolution of industrial capitalism into 
finance capitalism, or imperialism, it had become necessary to revise 
policies appropriate for the earlier epoch but now anachronistic, 
including r'1arx'sand Engels l own national policies. In 1915, ~1. 1. 
Bukharin, then a leading "leftist" theoretician in the Bolshevik party, 
based his criticism of Lenin's support for self-determination for 
oppressed nationalities on this very argument: 
Vlhat? The Sixties of the last century are lIinstructive" 
for the twentieth century? But this precisely is the 
root cf our logical disagreements with Kautsky, that they 
(sic) "instruct" us with examples for the pre-;mrerialist 
epoch. Thus you advocate a dualistic conception: in regard 
to the defence of the fatherland you stand on the basis of 
the present day, while in regard to the slogan of se1f- 17 
determination you stand on the position of the past century. 
This same argument was to become a common theme of these Bolsheviks 
in their opposition to Leninls national nolicy. Another leading HlefC 
Bolshevik, G. L. Piatakov, a close associate of Bukharin, argued in 
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early 1917 that lithe demand for [nationail independence has been taken 
from another his tori ca 1 epoch [an cO it is reactionary, for it wants 
to turn history back. lIlS In 1915, K. B. Padek, then a leading member 
of the Social Dewocracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, justi-
fied the national policy pursued by his fellow Polish t1arxists in much 
the same vein, insisting that "any references to t~arx's position with 
regard to national questions in the period 1848-1871 have not the 
slightest value.!l Economic, social and political conditions had 
changed since then and it was not in the spirit of ~1arxism "to formul ate 
an attitude towards concrete questions in terms of 'abstract rights , .,,19 
R. Luxemburg agreed with Radek's judgement, asserting that "in the era 
of unchained imperialism there can be no more national "lars. [The 
defence Of] nation 0 l interests serve only as a means of deception, to 
make the labouring masses of people subservient to their deadly enemy, 
imperialism. 1I20 T!1e Latvian and Lithuanian narxists adonted basically 
the same defence of their position on the national question, subscrihing 
to the premi se that "the peri od of nati ana 1 '-lars and t!1e formati on of 
national states ended with the Franco-Prussian war in the period of 
the 1870 's. ,,21 
On the basis of these claims it appears that a closer examination 
of the views of these r'larxists on the nature of the imneria1ist eroch 
is necessary in order to understand their opposition to national self-
determination. This task, however, will first of all require a digres-
sion into the evolution of neo-Marxist theories of imperialism in the 
twentieth century, since a number of the conclusions drawn from these 
theories were assimilated by the revolutionary t1arxists under discussion 
here. 
Neo-Marxist theories of imperialism, that is, theories that 
purportedly were based on Marxist principles, which themselves had been 
revised and brought up to date to take into account develonments within 
capitalism since t1arx ' s death - there is no comprehensive theory of 
modern imoerialism in r1arx's own writings -, first appeared in the first 
decade of the twenti eth century. Ini ti ally, they were the product 
largely of the Austrian and German r1arxists) such as R. f-!ilferding, 
K. Kautsky and O. Bauer. It seems, however, that the original intent 
of these ~1arxists, especially of Hilferding, was not deliberately to 
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produce a theory of imperialism, but rather~ explain in Marxist terms 
the recent growth of national monopolies, the role of the banks in the 
formation of cartels, trusts, syndicates an0. other monopolistic organi-
sations, and the relationship between these developments and the grov/th 
of protectionism and the export of capital.22 
Hilferding was among the first r~arxists to orovide a comprehen-
sive theoretical analysis of modern imnerialism, an analysis which was 
important not only for its originality but also because much of it was 
accepted and incorporated into the theories of imperialism produced by 
such eminent revolutionary t1arxists as Bukharin and Lenin. Hilferding's 
own theory of imperialism was in large part the offshoot of his efforts 
to revise Marx's analysis of capitalism to account for the developments 
in the system mentioned above. His explanation of imperialism was 
based on his theory of finance capital, the fundamental features of 
which have already been discussed in the preceding chapter. In fact, 
Hilferding had been the first leading Marxist theoretician to provide 
a coherent theory of contemporary capitalism, as it had qrovm and 
evolved since ~1arx first analysed it. He was the author of the very 
concept of finance capital, which most Marxists of that time, both the 
revolutionaries and the revisionists, assimilated into their own thinking. 
While Hilferding was most concerned to explain the changes which had 
occurred in the structure of national capitalism, his studies quite 
naturally led him to offer an account of imperialism. 
In essence, Hilferdinq considered imperialism to be the logical 
outcome of the emergence of finance capital itself, that is, the combina-
tion of banking and industrial capital in the shape of hu~e trusts, 
cartels or syndicates. He contended that the cartelisation of industry 
had limited the investment opportunities in them, since the regulation 
of production to maintain prices and, consequently, profits made extra 
capaci~y unnecessary. At the same time, investment in the remaining 
uncartelised industries had also become unprofitable, since the rate 
of profit in them was considerably lower than in the cartelised industries. 
Yet while domestic investment opportunities had diminished radically, 
capital had continued to accumulate. He maintained that this develop-
ment, taken in its entirety, had if not caused then made much more 
urgent the export of capital overseas, to less developed countries 
where it could be profitably invested since the rate of profit was 
higher there. 23 
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Moreover, he believed that the increasing trend to protectionism, 
designed to protect the home market for the national monopolies, was 
an additional stimulus to the export of capital. Tariff barriers 
provided a barrier to the export of goods by the cartels, which was 
essential if the latter were to keep their production costs down, and 
profits up, by maintaining their scale of production now that this 
had been curtailed domestically by the increase in prices associated 
with cartel policy. The investment of capital overseas meant that 
the cartels could avoid the obstacle of tariffs ~y producing within 
the overseas country itself - and so preserve their levels of oroduction, 
and their rrofits. 24 
However, the export of capital itself, according to Hilferding, 
also had political effects. The overseas territories in which carital 
had been invested had become annexed by the metropolitan finance 
capitalist state. He argued that the cartels were driven to annexation 
in order to maintain their monopoly in these foreign markets by erect-
ing tariff barriers to keep their rivals out, to secure the raw materials 
that existed there, and also to protect their investments. He was 
convinced that the magnates of finance capital had sufficient power 
within their own state to compel it to pursue such a predatory policy 
f . 25 o expanslon. 
Hilferding pointed out yet one more consequence of the export of 
capital. He believed that capitalism itself was becoming internationa-
lised in the process, by stimulatinq capitalist development in the 
backward countries in which canital was invested. Moreover, he main-
tained that the very export of capital, while initially provoked by 
the prospect of higher profits overseas, was leading to the equalisation 
of the profit rates among countries, or, as he stated, it "was instru-
mental in levelling out national profit rates." By implication, this 
meant that capitalism in the previously under-developed areas of the 
world was advancing to catch up with that in the leading finance 
capitalist states, since according to the economic theory of t1arxism 
the rate of profit "depends on the organic components of the capital, 
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that is, on the level which capitalist development has reached. rr26 
Consequently, it appears that Hilferding regarded imperialism 
itself as tending to create a global capitalist system, at a relatively 
equal level of development - and relatively equally prepared for 
socialism, since he regarded finance capitalism itself as a system 
which had led to an increasing regulation of the economy, and the 
elimination of much of the previous anarchy of production associated 
with industrial capitalism. The cartels, controlled by the banks, had 
been the means of achievinn such an oraanisation within a national 
<." ... ' 
capitalist system, an organisation which was but a short step from 
socialism. 27 However, if imperialism, the policy of finance capitalism, 
was creating a similar system throughout the world, by equalising the 
differences between existinq national economies, it seems plausible to 
posit that implicit in Hilferding's analysis was the belief that the 
preconditions for socialism were slowly but inexorably being established 
on an international scale. 
Nevertheless, Hilferding and like-minded i1arxists in Germany and 
Austria did not subscribe to the view that imperialism, and the rival-
ries among the leading capitalist powers that it produced, would 
inevitably lead to ~uch an intensification of the contradictions of 
capitalism that a revolutionary upheaval, in which the proletariat 
would seize power and proceed to construct socialism, could not be 
avoided. Rather, it appears that they believed that the proletariat 
could accomplish the transition to socialism "relatively painlessly", 
that is, without the need for a violent revolution. Hilferding, in 
particular, considered that all the proletariat had to do was to take 
over the six largest banks in a country and then it would be in control 
of the economy, which it could reorganise on socialist principle/8 -
a very different notion from that of the revolutionaries, such as 
Bukharin and Lenin, who called for the revolutionary destruction of the 
existing finance capitalist states as a necessary prelude to socialism. 
K. Kalltsky, who agreed with much of Hilferding's analysis of 
imperialism - while himself additionally emphasising that imperialist 
expansion was concerned mainly to secure the agricultural zones needed 
to provide the food and raw materials required by a rapidly expanding 
industrial society - maintained that imperialist rivalries need not 
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lead inevitably to an armed conflagration, which Vlould produce the 
crisis that would provoke a proletarian revolution. On the contrary, 
he believed that it was quite possible that the imperialist powers 
vlOuld realise the "economic bankruptcy!! of their continuing rivalries 
and conflict and, consequently, would agree to form some sort of 
"ultra-imperialist!! federation to eliminate them. He clearly stated: 
What Marx said of capitalism can also be applied to imperial-
ism: mono!Joly creates competition and competition monopoly. 
The frantic competition of giant firms, giant banks and 
multi-millionaires obliger! the great financial groups, \'/ho 
were absorbing the small ones, to think up the notion of 
a cartel. In the same way, the result of the Vlorld Illar 
be D-Jeen the grea t i mpe ri ali s t powers may be a fede ra ti on . 
of the strongest, who renounce their arms race. 
Hence from a purely economic standpoint it is not 
impossible that capitalism may still live through another 
phase, the translation of cartellisation into foreign 
policy: a phase of ultra-imperialism, which of course we 
must struggle against as energetically as we do against 
imperialism, but whose perils lie in another direction, 
not in that of the arms race and the threat to vlorld 
power.29 
Once this "ultra-imperialist ll state, a sort of United States of 
Europe, had been established, a state, moreover, in which the prerequisites 
for socialism 'tlere mature as a result of the high degree of organisation 
and planning of the economy produced by finance capitalism, it appears 
that Kautsky believed that the proletariat could take it over peacefully, 
presumably by parliamentary means. 30 
11any of the ideas elaborated by Hilferding and Kautsky were 
incorporated by the majority of revolutionary r1arxists into their theories 
of imperialism. Nevertheless, while the revolutionaries agreed with 
certain of the conclusions of these revisionists on the nature of imreri~­
ism and its implications for the emergence of socialism, they rejected 
their prognosis that a peaceful path to socialism existed. On the 
contrary, they insisted that the contradictions within capitalism, 
particularly in its imperialist form, must lead to a revolutionary 
upheaval, in II/hich it II/ould be overthrown by the proletariat. 
It is reasonable to start with a discussion of Bukharin's analysis 
of imperialism, since he \'las among the first of the revolutionary 
~larxists to produce a coherent theory to explain this phenomenon. He 
accepted much of Hilferding's analysis of imperialism,3l and agreed 
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that the basic source of imperialist expansion was the fact that capi-
talism, when it had evolved into finance capitalism, could no longer 
continue to function within the confines of existing national boundaries. 
Consequently, the search for profits had driven finance capitalist 
states to expand overseas in order to secure new territories in which 
to market their goods, find profitable investment outlets for the 
capital that was accumulating rapidly at home, and to guarantee the 
sources of raw materials required by their growing industries. In his 
opinion, the continuing development of capitalism required the creation 
of increasingly large, integrated economic units. 32 
Moreover, he maintained that imperialism had accelerated dramati-
cally the internationalisation of the world economy, a view v/hich is at 
least consistent with, if not directly derived from Marx's and Engels I 
own thoughts on the effects of the growth of capitalisf1. In fact, he 
believed that in the imperialist epoch this process had reached that 
stage at which the world had become so economically united that it was 
no longer possible to consider events on a narrowly national scale. 
At the same time, he emphasised, as Hilferding before him had done, the 
trend towards the levelling of economic differences in the various 
capitalist countries of the world which accompRnied the exoansion of 
capitalism. He described this process: 
The tendencies of modern development '(;mperialism) are 
highly conducive to the growth of international relations 
of exchange ... , in that the industrialisation of the agrarian 
and semi-agrarian countries proceeds at an unbelievably quick 
tempo, a demand for foreign agricultural products is created 
in those countries, and the dumping policy of the cartels is 
gi ven unusual impetus. The growth of the world market connec-
tions proceeds apace, tying up various sections of the world 
economy into one strong knot, bringing ever closer to each 
other hi therto "nati ona lly" and economi ca lly secl uded regi ons, 
creating an ever larger basis for \I[orld production in its 
neVi, higher, non-capitalist form .... 33 
Indeed, as earlier discussed, in 1915 Bukharin declared that these 
economic developments associated with the imperialist stage of capitalism 
had hrought the leading capitalist powers to the level where I!as far as 
the possibility of social production is concerned, the foremost countries 
are all on a comparatively equal level ,1134 that is, that the prerequisites 
for socialism were equally mature in them. Later, on the eve of the 
Bolshevik coup in 1917, he reneated that in the capitalist countries 
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of the world lithe conditions for the struggle [for socialism] to a 
significant degree have been equalised by the levelling influence of 
imperialism and the world war,1I35 from which he concluded that the 
coming proletarian revolution could not but take place on an inter-
national scale. 
In ~·1arch, 1919, at the Eighth Party Congress, he expanded somewhat 
on this argument. Adding some detail to his analysis of the imperialist 
world, he postulated that it could be divided into two, and only two, 
main categories: the first embracing those countries which oossessed 
a capitalist socio-economic structure, and the second including the 
colonies, where capitalism was still to develop and feudalism remained 
dominant. He continued that within the group of capitalist countries 
were included North America and Europe, including the Russian Empire, 
and that in these countries the preconditions for socialism had been 
created as a result of the preceding development of finance capitalism. 36 
So far, however, there apoears to be little difference between 
the views on imperialism defended by Bukharin, on the one hand, and 
Hilferding, and Kautsky, on the other. They generally agreed that the 
growth of finance capitalism had established the prerequisites for 
socialism, and on an international scale. Nevertheless, Bukharin took 
violent exception to the notion held by these revisionists that socialism 
could peacefully emerge from finance capitalism. He believed that once 
the world had been carved up by the major imperialist powers the rival-
ries between them \'JOuld reach a crisis, in the shape of a war. The 
sufferings which this would imoose on the proletariat would rouse it 
to overthrow the capitalist system before it could coalesce into a 
single united world, or even European trust, which the proletariat 
then could peacefully take over and transform into a planned socialist 
economy. He attacked Kautsky's theory in the follm'ling manner: 
But is not the epoch of "ultra-imperialism ll a real possi-
bility after all, can it not be effected by the centrali-
sation process? Will not the state capitalist trusts 
devour one another gradually until there comes into existence 
an all-embracing power which has conquered all the others? 
This possibility would be thinkable if we were to look at 
the social process as a purely mechanical one, without 
counting the forces that are hostile to the policy of 
imperialism. In reality, however, the ",!ars that will 
follow each other on an ever larger scale must inevitably 
result in a shifting of social forces. The centralisation 
process, looked at from the capitalist angle, will inevi-
tably clash with a socio-political tendency that is anta-
gonistic to the forrler. Therefore, it can by no means 
reach its logical end; it suffers collapse and achieves 
completion only in a new, purified, non-capitalist forrl. 
It ;s for this reason that Kautsky·s theory is by no 
means realisable. It looks upon imperialism not as an 
inevitable accompaniment of capitalist development, but 
as upon one of the IIdark sides II of capital is t development 
His concept implies a slurring over of the gigantic 
contradictions whi ch rend asunder modern soci ety, anrl in 
this respect it is a reformist concept .... The future 
of the world economy, as far as it is a capitalist economy, 
will not overcome its inherent lack of adaptation; on the 
contrary, it will keep on reproducing this lack of 
adaptation on an ever wider scale. These contradictions 
are actually harmonised in another production structure of 
the social organism - through a well clanned socialist 
organisation of economic activities. 31 
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VIhile denying Kautsky·s vision of a' united, ultra-imrerialist 
European state, Bukharin did not reject out of hand his notion of the 
creati on of a. "United States of Europe in some form. Apparently, 
he believed that the economic integration that \vas typically produced 
by imperialism was leading in this direction. Hm·/ever, he insisted 
that it was the task of the proletariat to complete this nrocess in a 
revolutionary manner. At the Berne Conference of the Russian Social 
Democratic \JJorkers· Party in February, 1915, he declared that "in 
reply to the imperialist unification of the countries from above, the 
proletariat must advance the slogan of socialist unification of countries 
from below - republican socialist states of Eurone - as a political-
')0 juridicial form of the socialist overturn."J() 
On the basis of his analysis of the imperialist epoch, Bukharin 
developed a prognosis of the nature of the expected socialist revolution. 
He was convinced that this revolution, when it did break out, would 
spread quickly on an international scale. The workers, revolutionised 
by the miseries inflicted upon them in an imperialist war, 'tlould rise, 
destroy their finance capitalist states and establish an international 
socia1ist society, for which the prerequisites had matured. ft.t the 
end of Imperialism and World Economy, his major theoretical treatise 
on this subject, he clearly outlined his vision of the scope of the 
coming socialist revolution: 
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The war severs the last chain that binds the workers to the 
masters, their slavish submission to the imnerialist state. 
The last limitation of the proletariat's philosophy is being 
overcome: its clinging to the narrowness of the national 
state, its patriotism. The interests of the moment, the 
temporary advantage accruing to it from the i~peria1ist 
robberies and from its connections with the imperialist 
state, become of secondary importance compared with the 
lasting and general interests of the class as a whole, with 
the idea of social revolution of the international prole-
tariat which overthrows the dictatorship of finance capital 
with an armed hand, destroys its state apparatus and builds 
up a new power, a power of the '.'Jorkers agai nst the bourge-
oisie. In place of the idea of defending or extending the 
boundaries of the bourgeois state that bind the productive 
forces of world economy hand and foot, this pml/er advances 
the slogan of abolishing state boundaries and merging all 
peoples into one socialist family.39 
Bukharin's theory of imperialism, and the vision which he derived 
from it of the eagerly anticipated socialist revolution as an international 
phenomenon sweeDing across Europe, was widely accepted by many of his 
fellow Bolsheviks. 40 Piatakov, his old ally in the campaign against 
Leni n I s support for nati ona 1 se If-determi nati on duri ng the VJar years, 
was prominent among them. Piatakov too defended the view that the 
prerequisites for socialist revolution had matured on an international 
scale as a result of the developments of capitalism in its imperialist 
phase. He foresml/ the creati on of an internati ona 1 soci ali st soci ety 
in the wake of this revolution.4l Indeed, during the war he had 
openly nredicted, in a manner very similar to that of Bukharin, that 
socialism would conquer internationally: 
We picture this process as the united action of proletarians 
of a 11 countri es, "Jho break dOltm the fronti ers of the bourge-
ois state, who remove the frontier posts'4~ho blow up 
national unity and establish class unity. 
The revolutionary Polish r1arxists' analysis of the characteristics 
of the imperialist world led them to basically the same conclusions 
as the "left" Bolsheviks regarding the nature of the anticipated socia-
list revolution - although Rosa Luxemburg'S m'ln particular theory of 
imperialism was rather different from thc.t of Bukharin, and of most 
other revolutionary r~arxists. Speaking for many of his fello\tl Poles, 
Radek, whose own views on imperialism were much the same as those of 
the "left" Bolsheviks, maintained that in Europe socialist revolution, 
"for which the economic conditions ... ll-/eri) already ripe," would 
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break out on an i nternati ona 1 scale under the slogan ~ lIaway with 
fronti ers, II 'tlhi ch had already been trans cended by the consequences of 
imperialist developments - the colonies, hOl'lever, were excluded from 
the orbit of immediate socialist revolution. Thereafter, an inter-
national socialist society and economy would be established, which 
would eliminate the contradictions of capitalism and open the way to 
further harmonious economic progress.43 
In retrospect, F. E. Dzierzy~ski imolicitly confirmed that the 
S.D.K.P.iL. had acted on this belief. He asserted that he and his 
comrades had been certain that socialist revolution would sweep 
across Europe in a mighty wave, with no protracted period of transi-
tion between the fall of capitalism and the successful establishment 
of an international socialist society. In 1925, he argued to this 
effect: 
.We believed that there could be no transitional period 
between capitalism and socialism and., consequently, that 
there was no need of independent states, since there would 
be no state organisation under socialism. We did not 
understand that there would be a rather lonn. transitional 
period bebleen capitalism and socialism, during which, 
under the dictatorship of the proletariat, classes and a 
proletarian state supported by the peasantry ltd 11 exist 
side by side .... 44 
Luxemburg's theory of imperialism, as presented in her The 
Accumu13tion of Capital, was quite different from that generally sub-
scribed to by her fellow revolutionaries, in that she did not consider 
the transformation of industrial capitalism into finance capitalism -
marked by the growth of cartels, trusts and other monopolistic organi-
sations - to be the source of imperialism.45 Moreover, she did not 
dwell on the need to export capital as a stimulus to expansion. Rather, 
she insisted tnat imperialism was a phenomenon rooted in the very nature 
of capitalism itself. 
At the basis of her theory was the postulate that capitalism could 
continue to grow only if there existed additional markets outsice the 
capitalist system in which the capitalists could sell their commodities 
and so realise their surplus value. Hithout the availability of such 
markets the process of extended reproduction could not take place, since 
the demand for the goods of the capitalists would be insufficient. She 
declared that lithe immediate and vital conditions for capital and its 
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accumulation is the existence of non-capitalist buyers of surplus 
value, which is decisive to this extent for the problem of capitalist 
1 t · ,.46 accumu a 1 on .. 
She continued, however, that such markets could, and had been 
found. She cons i dered the peasantry within a canita 1 is t country, whom 
she regarded as petty commodity producers still not encompassed within 
the capitalist system, to be one potential market. The alternative 
market was, in her opinion, the exploitation of foreign countries which 
had not yet reached the capitalist stage of development. Capitalism, 
for the sake of its survi va 1, was compe 11 ed to expand overseas. She 
argued: 
Capi ta 1 needs the means of producti on and the 1 abour pOltler 
of the whole globe for untrammelled accumulation; it cannot 
manage without the natural resources and the labour power 
of all territories. Seeing that the overwhelming majority 
of resources and labour pm'fer is in fact still in the orbit 
of pn=-capitalist production - this being the historical 
milieu of accumulation - capital must go all out to obtain 
ascendancy over these territories and social organisations 
.... Caoital will endeavour to establish dominance over 
these countries and societies. 47 
Accordingly, she concluded that "imperialism ;s the oolitical 
expression of the accumulation of capital in its competitive strugqle 
for what remains still open of the non-capitalist environment. ,A8 
Developing her argument, she maintained that as capitalism neces-
sarily expanded into pre-capitalist economies it Ilass imilated" them, 
that is, they continuously and progressively were transformed into 
49 actual capitalist economies themselves. Ultimately, she foresaw 
the creation of a united vlorlct canitalist economy, at vlhich point 
capitalism, having exhausted the sources for the realisation of sur-
plus value, could no longer continue. 50 
She hastened to add, however, that capitalism would collapse 
before it had in fact established this sinole world economy. As imperial-
ism developed, it would lead to increased tensions and rivalries 
among the leading capitalist Dowers as they frantically tried to absorb 
the remaining, yet rapidly diminishing non-capitalist areas of the 
world. The rise of militarism and the wars which would ensue from 
these rivalries would impose additional sufferin0s on the aTready 
exploited workers s sufferings which would impel them to l!revolt 
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against the rule of capital" and create an international socialist 
society.51 
Despite the differences beb/eer: the theories of imperialism 
produced by Luxemburg and her comrades-in-arms, their conclusions were 
remarkably similar. She too believed that imperialism was that stage 
of capitalism at which the preconditions for socialist revolution were 
ripe. Moreover, she foresaw the coming socialist revolution as inevi-
tably occurring on an international scale, since the preceding evolu-
tion of capitalism had laid the basis for "an harmonious and universal 
system of economy. ,,52 In The Juni~~~":phlet she stirringly proclaimed: 
(Th~ brutal triumphant procession of capitalism through 
the I'lorld, accompanied by all means of force, of robbery, 
and of infamy, has one bright phase: it has created the 
premises for its own final overthrow, it has established 
the capitalist world rule uoon which, alone, the socialist 
world revolution can follow. 53 
The conclusions that the revolutionary Marxists of Latvia and 
Lithuania reached from their own studies of imperialism were the same 
as those of the rlleftll Bolsheviks and S.D.K.P.iL. At the Conference of 
the Communist Organisations of the Occuried Territories, held in f1oscow 
in October, 1918, they presented a brief account of their thinking on 
imperialism, and of its implications for socialist revolution. They 
too accepted that imperialism was the inevitable product of the need 
of capitalism to exoand as it evolved into finance capitalism. This 
expansion had led, in their minds, to the internationalisation of the 
economy, and in fact had created in Europe a closely integrated socio-
economic structure - just as they believed that Latvia and Lithuania 
themselves had earlier become 1I0rganically" integrated into the Russian 
Empire as a result of the development of canitalism there. They contin-
ued, moreover, that within Eurooe as a whole the prerequisites for 
socialism had matured. Consequently, they anticipated that socialist 
revolution, when it did occur, would inexorably develop on an inter-
national scale, embracing all Eurone, not as an isolated national event. 
The promotion of this international revolution was, in their opinion, 
the ~resent duty of the proletariat, regardless of nationality.54 
The question which remains to be answered concerns the relation-
ship between these theories of imperialism and tr-:e problem of national 
self-determination. The answer, in fact, is relatively straightforward. 
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These revolutionary Marxists believed, as Marx and Engels themselves 
had, that the source of national oppression and antagonisms was rooted 
in the contradictions inherent within the capitalist system itself and 
could not be eliminated until capitalism \lIas destroyed. However, their 
analysis of the imperialist epoch had led them to the conclusion that 
socialist revolution, which would sweep away capitalism internationally, 
was imminent. Accordingly, any specific policies \lJith reSDE'ct to the 
problems of national oppression were redundant, since in the near future 
the international victory of socialism vJOuld automatically solve all 
such questions. 
Certainly, this line of reasoning appears to have been the basic 
motivation underpinning the rejection by the "left" Bolsheviks - the 
initial cause of the anti-nationalism manifested by the Polish, Latvian 
and Lithuanian Marxists was, as discussed above, different - of any 
compromises with the forces of nationalism. During World War 1 
Bukharin and Piatakov had cateqorically denied that there could be any 
solution to the "enslavement of nations" until capitalism was overthrown, 
since the "'self-determination of nations I ••• cannot be realised within 
the limits of capitalism.,,55 Indeed, Bukharin firmly believed that the 
establishment of small nation states in the imperialist epoch would be 
"utopian ll , since they would be too \'1eak, economically and politically, 
to compete with the existing large imperialist powers, and, consequently, 
would soon be annexed by their more pO'v'lerful rivals. 56 Accordingly, 
he and Piatakov considered that the only genuine answer to the problem 
of national oppression would be provided by social revolution, which 
their theory of imperialism predicted vIas no longer merely !1a theore-
tical prognosis ... [but] on the order of the day of the proletariat's 
concerted acti on. ,,57 
The Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian Marxists also asserted that 
one implication of their theories of imperialism vIas the redundancy of 
the need to support self-determination for oppressed nationalities, 
since the widely anticipated international socialist revolution would 
automatically solve this problem. However, it would be mistaken to 
consider that their oprosition to national self-determination was just 
a corollary of their analyses of imperialism. Their hostility to 
nationalism had a different dynamic than that of their Russian comrades, 
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in that it was at first founded on their fear that resurgent Polish? 
Latvian and Lithuanian nationalism would prove appealing to the workers 
and distract them from the pursuit of what they held to be their true 
class interests. 
Nevertheless, while bearinq in mind the original impetus to their 
anti-nationalism, it still remains true that their theories of imperial-
ism provided an additional, and more conprehensive justification for 
their denial of any support for narrow nationalist objectives. The 
Polish Marxists, like the IIleft" Bolsheviks, believed that as long as 
capitalism existed IIthere could be no 'national self-determination' 
either in war or peace.,,58 They maintained that the creation of an 
international socialist society, for which imperialist developments 
had established the foundations, would provide the only real answer to 
existing problems of national oppression. In an official statement 
of the position of the Regional Presidium of the S.D.K.P.iL. on this 
question in 1915, Radek unequivocally defended the view that national 
antagonisms \'iere merely a symptom'of "capitalist private rroperty ... 
Cane] class dominance: fl 
... Social Democracy has to educate the masses of the 
people of the oopressed as well as of the oppressing nations 
for a united struggle, which alone is capable of abolishing 
national oppression and economic exploitation~ by leadinq 
mankind beyond imperialism towards socialism.~~ 
The revolutionary ~·1arxists of Latvia and Lithuania also saw no 
solution to problems of national oppression short of the establishment 
of socialism. Till then, they believed that any genuine national self-
determination \;lould be unrealisable, since the caoitalist system, Itlith 
its attendant class exploitation, was considered by them to be the 
basic cause of IInational enslavement. 1I However, once proletarian 
revolution, nov! imminent internationally, had destroyed capitalism, 
at the same time it would have destroyed "all the sources and causes 
of national enslavement." Consequently, all national problems would 
disappear as a matter.of course and there would be freedom for all 
60 peoples. 
Moreover, the Latvian md Lithuanian Marxists, aware that the 
smallness of their countries would imperil any independence that might 
be granted to them, emphasised one specific economic factor against 
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the viability of self-determination in the epoch of imperialism. P. I. 
Stuchka, the leading theoretician of the revolutionary Latvian r1arxists 
on the national question, affirmed that it would be llimpossible to 
form an independent economy"Gl in Latvi a itself, since it was so tiny. 
However, he generalised that the economic developments of capitalism 
in the imperialist epoch had undermined the bases of state independence 
for small nations, which, as a result of economic weakness caused by 
their size, would find themselves at the mercy of their large imperial-
ist neighbours. 62 The Lithuanian Marxists similarly doubted that 
Lithuania, situated between two imperialist giants, the German and 
Russian Empires, could survive as an independent state. They too 
extended this conclusion to apply to all small nations in the imnerial-
is t world. V. S. t1itskevich-Kapsukas bluntly argued that there could 
be no independence for little states while imperialism remained domi-
nant; thus to advocat~ self-determination for such states would be 
deceitful, for true independence could not be realised. G3 
The "left" Bolsheviks themselves, as indicated above, aqreed 
with this conclusion, as did the Polish Marxists. Luxemburg, in parti-
cular, was convinced that the small nations then demanding self-
determination lacked the size and resources required to crea~ economies 
which could compete successfully with those of the large imoerialist 
powers. Consequently, to grant such nations independence would prove 
to be futile, for since they could not survive economically as indepen-
dent units they \A/ould inevitably become dependent, both economically 
and politically, on one of the great powers. 64 
Hhile the theories of imperialism held by these ~1arxists, theories 
which they considered to be a legitimate extension of the economic 
principles to be found within l1arxism, was a very major cause of their 
opposition to independent statehood for small nations, they also 
attacked the concept of self-detennination on political grouncls - the 
original basis of the anti-nationalist position adopted by the Polish, 
Latvian and Lithuanian t1arxists. They contended that if revolutionary 
t~arxists supported the claims of nations for self-detennination this 
would sow such confusion among the proletariat, particularly of oppressed 
nations, that it would find itself pursuing national revolution at the 
expense of its interests in class international revolution. Hence they 
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feared that the oroletariat would be solit on national lines and that 
• I 
the international class solidarity~ considered vital in the strugq1e 
for socialism) would be destroyed. In 19~5 the "left': Bolsheviks 
clearly expressed their fear of nationalism as a rival to socialism 
for the loyalty of the proletariat. Bukharin and Piatakov declared: 
... the attention of the masses is transferred to a diffe-
rent level, the internationru character of their activities 
is lost, the forces of the proletariat are split, the entire 
line of tactics proceeds in the direction of national struggle 
and not class struggle. b5 
Piatakov enlarged on this fear of the :'left': Bolsheviks both 
during and after 1917. At the April Co~ference in 1917 he asserted 
that the continued support of Lenin ano his associates for national 
self-determination was strengthening the separatist movements in the 
borderlands of the Russian Empire. These movements, he claimed, were 
led by the reactionary nationalist bourgeoisie who urgently desired to 
set up their own independent states in order to isolate themselves from 
the imminent socialist revolution in Great Russia. He maintained that 
future acceptance by the Bolsheviks of the right of the minority nations 
of the Empire to secession vlOuld be the betrayal of the proletariat of 
these nations, who would be delivered into the hands of their own 
bourgeoisie. 66 Returning to this theme at the 8th Party Congress in 
1919, Piatakov affirmed that the exoerience of the previous 2 years had 
confirmed his warning that national self-determination would become the 
symbol under which all counter-revolutionary forces would ral1y.67 
Piatakov found strong support for this contention at the April 
Conference from DZierzynski. Convinced that the situation in Poland 
was characteristic of what was occurring in the other border regions of 
the Russian Emoire, Dzierzynski argued that it was the landlords and 
petty-bourgeoisie of the minority nations who desired indepenrlence in 
order to safeguard their own property interests from the contagion of 
socialist revolution then anticipated in the heart of the Empire. He 
pointed out that in these circumstances revolutionary socialists could 
not condone se1f..,.determination, for this would cut off the proletariat 
of these national regions froTJ1 the revolution in Russia and from its 
comrades-in-arms, the revolutionary Russian proletariat. He too consid-
ered that this would be a betrayal of the proletariat, which would find 
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itself at the mercy of strengthened anti-socialist, national forces. 68 
Subsequently, in 1918, Rosa Luxemburg, who hac! shared DZierzyflski 's 
negative appraisal of the potential effects of supporting a policy of 
national self-determination, presented a comprehensive and impassioned 
account of what she considered to be the politically reactionary conse-
quences which had resulted from Lenin's advocacy of the right of seces-
sion for the minority nations in the Russian Empire. This Has not a 
new critique of national self-determination but rather a comprehensive 
restatement of the political arguments which she had originally put 
forward in the 1890's as reasons why revolutionary j\1arxists must oppose 
national independence movements. 69 
She opened her case by arguing that during the peace negotiations 
with Germany at Brest-Litovsk Lenin and his supporters among the Bol-
sheviks had granted the right of self-determination, including the right 
to separation, to the minority nations of the old Russian Empire, in 
the hope that such a magnanimous !"Jolicy would win over these nations to 
a voluntary union with Soviet Russia in defence of the gains of the 
revolution within the old territorial framework. The outcome of this 
po 1 i cy, however, had turned out to be the 0ppos ite of what Leni n had 
desired. I'lith the aid of German imperialism the bourgeoisie of these 
nations, especially in Poland, the Ukraine, the Baltic states and 
Finland, had taken advantage of this riqht to set up their own indepen-
dent national states. She continued that by this act they had created 
a ring of counter'-revolutionary states surrounding the socialist heart 
of Russia. f!1oreover, she asserted that the very fact that Lenin and 
his associates had proclaimed the right to self-determination had 
caused such confusion among the proletariat of these nations that they 
had been unsure of the correct revolutionary class attitude to adopt 
towards national independence. Consequently, they had abandoned the 
opposition to this which their class international interests demanded 
and had followed their national bourgeoisie. At the same time the 
very secession of these nations from the old state had separated the 
proletariat of them from the Great Russian proletariat, with the effect 
of so weakeninq them that they had been "criopled ... and delivered into 
the hands of the bourgeoisie of the border countries. n70 In conclusion, 
Rosa Luxemburg was convinced that these results had sufficiently 
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demonstrated the counter-revolutionary nature of a policy of support 
for national self.,.determination~ while at the same time proving the 
hollowness of self-determination for nations, rather than for the 
bourgeoisie of nations, while the capitalist system survived. 71 
The Latvian Bolsheviks shared the same pessimistic prognosis of 
the politically reactionary nature of granting the right of self-
determination to minority nations. Stuchka had consistently feared 
that any acceptance of national self-determination by revolutionary 
socialists would confuse the proletariat of such nations about the 
primacy of the class struggle and make it susceptible to the insidious 
appeals of bourgeois nationalism. In particular he was afraid that 
the Latvian proletariat would succumb to the Latvian bourgeoisie1s 
newly-found desire for independence in 1917.12 The very fact that 
before 1917 this bourgeoisie had not claimed the riqht to self-determina-
, 
tion Stuchka regarded as additional confirmation of his thesis of the 
counter·-revolutionary nature of national movements. rie argued that the 
Latvian bourgeoisie had demanded secession from the Russian Emnire only 
after it had first begun to fear, in the course of 1917, that socialist 
revolution might spread outwards from Great Russia into Latvia and 
consequently threaten its own position of dominance there. 73 
The internationalist wing of the S.D.P.L. also considered any 
support for national self-determination to be a threat to the class 
interests of the proletariat. Kapsukas condemned the slogan of national 
independence as a device of the bourgeoisie which was only interested 
in setting up its own class state. Moreover, he felt that in the 
framework of the Russian Empire the application of this policy would 
be highly reactionary, for it would cut off the minority nations from 
the proletarian revolution in Great Russia itself. 74 Angarietis fully 
supported Kapsukas l analysis, claiming that after the October revolution 
the bourgeoisie had used the right to self-determination in its own 
counter-revolutionary interests to set up an independent bourgeois 
Lithuanian state. 75 
However s not only die' these "leftists" oppose self-determination 
for nations as contrary to the class demands of socialist revolution 
but they also rejected the concept of self-cetermination for the prole-
tariat of nations. This proposal had been put forward by Bukharin at 
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the 8th Party Congress in the attempt to reconcile the contradiction 
facing ~larxists between support of self-determination for nations, 
which were mu1ti~c1ass by nature, and their advocacy of socialist 
revo 1 uti on, "/hi eh they were convinced cou1 d be achi eved by the i nter-
national class action of the proletariat alone. Bukharin maintained 
that at the level of historical development when the preconditions for 
socialist revolution had matured in the depths of capitalist society 
it would be anachronistic for revolutionary socialists to countenance 
self-determination for oppressed nations. Rather they should defend 
the policy of self-determination for the workers of oprressed nations 
since, with socialism imminent, the proletariat alone, even if a 
minority, could legitimately "exoress the will of a nation.,)6 
The other "left" Bolsheviks, however, did not accept Bukharin's 
proposed reconciliation of nationalism with socialism. Piatakov 
scathingly rejected the ve~y notion of self-determination for the 
workers of a nation. He held that the international nro1etariat in 
its entirety, not just the proletariat of a given nation, \'lOu1d have 
a direct interest in the fate of that nation once socialist revolution 
had been victorious. In the event of a conflict arising between the 
desire of the proletariat of any nation for independent statehood and 
the interests of the international proletariat in the broadest possible 
economic and political unity, then precedence must be given to the 
latter. He clarified his position with reference to the Ukraine. He 
argued that not only the U~rainian workers but also the oro1etariat 
of Great Russia and of other potential Soviet republics, such as Latvia, 
Byelorussia, and similar regions, would be concerned with the fate of 
the Ukraine, rich in the material resources vital for the economy of 
the remainder of the new Sovi et federation. In these circumstances the 
Ukrainian proletariat could not be allo"Jedto determine independently 
the form of the Ukraine's future existence but must bow to the decision 
of the international proletariat on this issue.?? Refusino categori-
cally to suprort any policy of "self-determination for the toiling 
masses of each nation," Piatakov defr.nded t~e oath of "strict proletarian 
centralisation and proletarian union,,?8 as the only admissible orogramme 
for revolutionary socialists. 
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The S.D.K.P.iL. ,likewise had rigidly upheld the centralist posi-
tion propounded by Piatakov. This Darty consistently denied that 
revolutionary ~1arxists could tolerate a policy which permitted the 
proletariat of any nation to determine its fate irrespective of the 
wishes and needs of the international proletarian movement. Speaking 
for this party of "Left Communists," Radek maintained that 'Iin a 
socialist society it is impossible for an isolaterl national group to 
exercise the right of self-determination on questions which concern 
all citizens.,,79 On the contrary, he insisted that the resolution of 
the position of any nation after the coming socialist revolution must 
take place on an international scale: 
... instead of individual nations having to decide sepa-
rately about subdivision on the basis of their own supre-
macy ... all citizens concerned would particioate in that 
decision .80 ,---- ' 
The revolutionary ~1arxists in Latvia and Lithuania adopted the 
same stand on this question. They too considered a policy which 
granted the riqht of IIse lf-determination to the proletariat of a 
given nation ll to be theoretically untenable from the point of view of 
revolutionary socialism. They believed that the only method by which 
the proletariat could gain real freedom was by cooperation on an 
international scale through which alone they could achieve socialisr:l, 
not by any policy of national isolation, either with or without the 
national bourgeoisie. They declared: 
Therefore the opposition 'to the utopian and non-class 
slooan of IIself-determination of nations ll of the sloClan 
"self-determination for the oroletariat" of a aiven -
nation is incorrect both theoretically and practically, 
for the proletariat can win self-rleterminaticn only on an 
international scale.8l 
The preceding account sets forth the economic and political argu-
ments which these revolutionary t'larxists shared in their opposition 
to nationm self-determination. Although they recoonised that their 
own national programme differed in many particular respects from that 
elaborated by the IIfounding fathers,lI they nevertheless honestly 
claimed that their policy VJas a legitimate interpretation of t1arxist 
principles, adapted to take account of the chanqed conditions of the 
imperialist epoch. Convinced that their analyses of imperialism had 
shown that an international socialist revolution was imminent, they 
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maintained that national independence was no longer a progressive 
solution to the problems of national oppression, since the establishment 
of a supra-national socialist society would automatically eliminate all 
the causes of national antagonism. In addition, the creation of new 
nation states, itself no real solution to national problems as long 
as capitalism existed, would run counter to the integration of the 
world economy already realised and would merely attempt to thrust 
capitalism back within boundaries that it had already transcended. 
t10re.over, they v,;ere certain that any support of national self-determina-
tion would be a political threat to the cause of revolutionary socialism, 
for such a policy, by permitting the proletariat to fight for national 
objectives, would divert its attention from the pursuit of the inter-
national class struggle, where they believed its true interests lay. 
Finally, they considered a policy restricting self-determination to 
the workers of a nation to be a vain attempt to reconcile the contra-
diction betvleen the international class demands of socialist revolution 
and the claims of oppressed nations for independence. They asserted 
that the interests of the international proletariat, rather than those 
of the proletariat of anyone nation must take precedence in determining 
the place of nations in socialist society. 
In contrast, an analysis of Lenin's position on the problem of 
national oppression clearly demonstrates that he adopted a more flexible, 
pragmatic national policy which promised to win the support of the 
oppressed minorities of the Russian Empire for the Colsheviks. Despite 
their obvious cifferences in policy, however, Lenin also shared many 
of the basic premises on which his protagonists founded their attack 
on sel f-determination. He too subscribed to the belief,common to 
many Marxists, that nations and nation states were historical categories, 
the products of the development of capitalism, and, as such, destined 
to perish with the advent of socialism and the cosmopolitan society 
which would accompany it. Accordingly, any support that he gave to 
national movements was of a limited, short-term character, for in his 
vision of future society they had no place. He declared: 
... (there is] a universal historical tendency to break 
down national barriers, to wipe out nntional differences, 
a tendency toward the assimilation of nations, which with 
each decade becomes all the more powerful, and which pre-
sents one of the greatest moving forces transformin9 
capitalism into socialism.82 
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Moreover, Lenin did not deny a number of conclusions which his 
fellow revolutionaries held regarding the nature of the im~erialist 
epoch. He too atJreed that with the deve1o!Jment of imperialism "the 
productive forces of world capitalism have outgrown the limited bounda-
ries of national state divisions. ,,83 Furthermore, he also was of the 
opinion that the evolution of capitalism into imperialis~ had laid 
the material foundations for socialism. During World War 1 he openly 
asserted: 
Capital in the advanced countries outgrew the'liMits of 
national states, established monopoly in the place of compe-
tition and thus created all the revolutionary premises for 
the realisation of socialism.84 
However, there exists a paradox which demands explanation. Despite 
their apparently common ana lyses of imneri ali sm, Lenin proposed a 
national policy contradictory to that \'/hich the "left" Bolsheviks, as 
well as their Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian fellow thinkers espoused. 
Unlike them, he refused to accept that self-determination for oppressed 
nations was a totally redundant policy in the epoch of imperialism. 
In his opinion, it was still perfectly legitimate, in certain cases, 
for revolutionary ~1arxists to support inderendence for oppressed 
nations, a tactic which he applied within the Russian Empire with the 
intention of securing the support of the oppressed ~inorities in the 
the Bolshevik's struggle for power. 
The solution to this apparent contradictior can be found by a 
closer examination of Lenin's o\'ln particular theory of imperialism, in 
order to ascertain how it differed from the theories to "<Jhich his 
fellow revolutionaries subscribed. The distinctive feature of Lenin's 
analysis was his emphasis on the H1aw of the uneven development of 
capitalism. II He postulated that as canita1ism developerl it did so at 
different speeds in different countries. Therefore, rather than raising 
all capitalist countries to the same economic level - and integrating 
them into a united world economy at a relatively similar level of 
development -) the growth of capitalism led to an increasin9 economic 
inequality among them. 85 Indeed, in his major theoretical "Iork on 
imperialism, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin cate-
-.,-~ 
gorically rejected Kautsky's theory that anr:ultra-imperialist" stage 
of deve10~ment was possible: the law of the uneven development ruled 
this possibility out. He stated: 
... the only conceivable basis under capitalism for the 
division of spheres of influence, interests, colonies, 
etc., is a calculation of the strength of those oartici-
pating: their general economic, financial, military 
strength, etc. And the strength of those participants in 
the division does not change to an equal degree, for the 
even development of different undertakings, trusts, 
branches of industry, or countries is impossible. Half 
a century ago Germany was a miserable, insignificant 
country, if her capitalist strenqth is compared with 
that of Britain of that time; Japan compared with Russia 
in the same way. Is it "conceivable" that in ten or 
twenty years I time they relative strenqth of the imoerial-
is t powers wi 11 remain unchanged? It is out of the 
ques ti on, 86 
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One conclusion which Lenin drew from this theory of capitalist 
development was that while in general the prerequisites for socialism 
had been prerared by preceding capitalist Clrol'lth, trey had not been 
prepared equa lly ina 11 countri es . A lthouqh he aC]reed that :lthe 
fundamental distinguishing features)~7 of the epoch were imperialist, 
he continued that there still existed countries where early capitalist, 
and even feudal characteristics remained dominant. From this Lenin 
predicted that socialist revolution would not sweep across the world 
in one mighty \'1ave, but that it \A[ould rroceed more fitfully: it was 
possible that initially this revolution would be confined to "a few 
nn 
capitalist countries, even [to] one country taken separately."L'U In 
fact, in the war years he unequivocally asserted that "since the 
develop~ent of capitalism rroceeds extremely unevenly in different 
countries ... , from this it follows irrefutably that socialism cannot 
achieve victory simultaneously in all countries. It will achieve 
victory first in one or several countries, while the others \llill remain 
b . b ...89 H .. d th for some time ourgeo1s or pre"", ourgeo1s.' _ ,e cnV1Slone I e course 
of socialist revolution as a more complex, protracted process than his 
rivals: 
A socialist revolution is not only a single act, not only 
a sinale battle on a sinqle front, but a whole epoch of 
accentuated class conflicts, a 10n0 series of battles on 
all.f~onts, ~6e., on all questions of economics and 
po 11 tl CS •••• 
In early 1916, Lenin, on the basis of his analysis of the conse-
quences of the uneven develoDment of capitalism, proceeded to classify 
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the countries of the imperialist world according to three main cate-
gories. Into the first cateqory, wtlere he maintained that the prere~ 
quisites for socialistm had matured, he assigned lithe advanced 
capitalist countries of Vlest Europe and the United States, [\Alhere] 
progressive national movements came ,to an end long ago." In the second 
category he included "East Europe: Austria, the Balkans and particularly 
Russia." Before 1917 he denied that socialist revolution vIas possible 
in these countries, averrinq rather that there "it was the twentieth 
century that particularly witnessed the development of bourqeois-
democratic national movements and intensified the national struggle." 
Accordingly, in Lenin's opinion, the democr~tic revolution, which would 
clear the way for th~ free development of capitalism, and subsequently 
lay the foundations for socialism, had still to be completed. In the 
final categOl~y were lithe semi-colonial countries ... and all the colonies. 
In these bourgeoi s-democrati c movements either have hard ly begun, or 
still have a long way to go.!,91 
In his debate with his more internationalist-minded colleagues 
over self-·determination Lenin \'las to use this theory of imperialism, 
and the three-fold classification derived from it, to justify his 
contention that his national policy was in fact consistent with the 
spirit and principles of revolutionary t1arxism. He agreed., hOI'Jcver, 
with his adversaries that they were correct to reject any claims for 
national self-determination in ~lest Europe and North America, where 
as a direct result of the war socialist revolution had become the 
imminent stage in historicq.l development. 92 Revolutionary t1arxists, 
therefore, could not countenance any support for the establishment of 
new, indenendent states there, since the tolerance of narrow national 
demands in this situation would divert the proletariat from the pursuit 
of its revolutionary socialist tasks. Furthermore, he and the f'leftists" 
shared the same attitude towards the colonial world. Since there \lIas 
no immediate possibility of socialism there, it was consistent revolu-
tionary policy for ~larxists to support national movements VJhich not 
only aspired to liberate the colonies from feudalism but would also 
oppose the common enemy of the advanced proletariat, world imperialism. 93 
The dispute between Lenin and the "leftists", therefore, occurred 
over the national policy which revolutionary r1arxists should adopt 
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in multi-national states like the Russian Empire, which Lenin claimed 
were neither fully capitalist nor colonial, that is, in states where 
the bourgeois~democratic revolution had not yet been finally concluded. 
Accordingly, in one sense, their debate over national self-determination 
can be seen as a corollary of their differing assessments of the ripe-
ness of the Russian Empire for socialism before 1917, an interoretation 
given some justification by Lenin's subsequent reversal of his national 
policy after 1917 v/hen he had come to believe that the Russian revolu-
tion was in fact socialist. Before then, Lenin had ar~ued that the 
correct revolutionary policy was one of support for national movements 
aspirinq to independence, since this would hasten the destruction of 
all remnants of feudal absolutism and consequently permit the accele-
rated develof)ment of capitalism, I'!hich in turn would lay the material 
f d t · f . l' 94 oun a 10ns or SOC1a 1sm. 
Nevertheless, while Lenin's analysis of imoerialism could serve 
as a theoretical justification, arguably loyal to the spirit of tlarxism, 
for the role which he gave to revolutionary national movements in the 
struggle of international socialists against imperialism in such 
countries as the Russian Emoire. it would be rather naive to ima0ine 
that he derived his national policy from this theory. This.was cer-
tainly not the case, as an examination of the evolution of his national 
policy will reveal. 
Initially, in 1903, Lenin had subscribed to the view that revolu-
tionary t1arxists must restrict the riqht of self-determination to the 
proletariat of a nation. 95 However, the first Russian revolution of 
1905~ which had reached its highest pitch in the non-Russian border 
regions of the Empire, opened his eyes to the revolutionary potential 
which the suppressed nationalism of these minority nationalities 
offered. Eventually, by 1913. Lenin had come to revise his national 
policy to that of unqualified support for the self-determination of 
such nations. 9C He hoped that this programme would enable the Bolsheviks 
to exploit this rent up revolutionary energy for their ovm ends. 
Yet Lenin did not rest his defence for self-determination just 
on the experience of the Russian Empire. He proceeded to justify his 
national policy in broader, more general grounds. He contended that 
one notable feature of the contemnorary epoch had been the accelerated 
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growth of the backward countries of the world caused by imperialist 
expansion. However, at the same time this expansion had led to the 
"progressing oppression of the nations of the world by a handful of 
great powers,"97 ~vhich in turn had roused the former to resist this 
subjugation. Moreover, he asserted that this process was not only 
confined to the colonial and semi-colonial world of Africa and Asia, 
QO but was also evident in Europe - and especially in the Russian Empire.~() 
Accordingly, he criticised the "leftists" for their neglect of the 
movements of the oppressed national minorities in this empire, for as 
much as the nascent colonial nations they were fighting against great 
power imperialism and thus were potential allies of the proletariat 
in its own struggle against imnerialism. 99 
At the same time Lenin affirmed that his national programme incor-
porated a principle which Marx and Engels themselves had emphasised as 
vital for revolutionary socialists to consider in elaborating their 
national policy. He maintained that the "leftists '11 insensitivity to 
the plight of subjugated nations could crinple the international unity 
of the proletariat. He argued that if the proletariat of a dominant 
nation de facto supported its own bourgeoisie by denying the right of 
self-determination to an oporessed minority nation, then the proletariat 
of the latter would come to distrust the sincerity of the former's 
commitment to international socialism. As a consequence of this, Lenin 
feared that the proletariat of the oppressed nation would fall under 
the influence of the chauvinism esroused by its own bourgeoisie and 
proceed to pursue national rather than socialist objectives. To avert 
this danger he believed that revolutionary Marxists must urge the 
proletariat of the dominant nation to support granting the right of 
self-determination to its national minorities. In the lonq run this 
policy alone would guarantee the international proletarian unity essen-
tial for socialist revolution, whereas the "leftists':' policy, although 
strictly anti-national in form, would in fact create national divisions 
in the international proletarian movement. However, Lenin also stressed 
that the proletariat of the oppressed nations had the right to reject 
the self-determination offered to it and in the interests of the 
future international socialist society voluntarily to choose to remain 
united with the majority nation. 100 
160 
The ambivalence in Lenin's attitude to self-determination revealed 
in the last statement, the ambivalence between his support of national 
movements on tactical grounds and his commitment to international social-
ism, is a motif of his policy. Vlhile he recognised the need to defend 
a policy of self-determination for national minorities, it would be 
mistaken to conclude from this that he unconditionally backed the claims 
of every minority that demanded independence. On the contrary, he con-
sistently maintained that wherever the aspirations of national movements 
threatened the development of socialist revolution, then these national 
interests had to be sacrificed: national self-determination was deserv-
ing of support only where this oromised to be ultimately heneficial to 
the progress of the socialist cause. 10l In particular, in the context 
of the Russian Empire Lenin did not desire that his advocacy of self-
determination should lead to the secession of the non-Russian nations. 
Rather he hoped that the mere fact of granting this right would prove 
to the minority nations that their interests would be safeguarded with-
in the present territori a 1 framev·JOrk and that, consequently, they would 
agree voluntarily to maintain the existing state. 102 
In fact, after the October revolution Lenin was to revert to his 
original national policy, on the grounds that national self-determina-
tion was now harmful to the Dro~ress of socialism. By the time of the 
Eighth Party Congress it had become clear that the policy of granting 
the right of secession to the minority nationalities of the old Tsarist 
Empire had failed to win them over to voluntary union with the new 
Soviet Russian state. Strong separatist movements had arisen among 
them, particularly in Finland, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and the Ukraine. 
Fully aware that the loss of these important areas of industry and raw 
materials would gravely weaken Soviet Russia itself, Lenin abandoned 
his former position of b,lanket supflort for national self-determination. 
Nm'l he distinquished between nations "on the way from the r1iddle AlJes 
to bourgeois-democracy, or from bour0eois to Soviet or proletarian 
democracy.,,103 On the basis of this distinction he arqued that for 
nations in the latter category the proletariat alone was the legitimate 
representative of the will of the nation. Consequently, at this stage 
of development the right of self-determination should be limited to 
the proletariat of a nation which, according to the tenets of revolutionary 
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Marxism, would not be interested in utilising this right to set up its 
own independent nation state but would adopt an anti-nationalist policy 
consistent with its presumed class interests in the establishment of 
. t t . 1 . l' 104 ln erna 10na SOCla lsm. 
The adoption of this theory was siqnificant in the context of the 
Russian revolution. Since Lenin had deemed that the October revolution 
was socialist, then the appropriate national policy for the 801sheviks 
nO\,i to pursue was one that restricted the right of self-determination 
to the proletariat of oppressed nations in the old Empire. This argu-
ment also provided a theoretical justification for Bolshevik interven-
tion in the borderlands of the old Empire to maintain them within the 
boundaries of the new Soviet state. If a minority nation demanded 
secession, then the Bolsheviks could argue that this was a counter-
revolutionary policy imposed on the nation by the bourgeoisie, since 
the proletariat, now the true representative of the nation, would 
re fuse to exerci se its ri ght of independence in favour of a "voluntary H 
union with Soviet Russia. Soviet intervention, therefore, could be 
defended as the protection of the rights of nations, while at the same 
time this fortunately would coincide with the furthering of the 801-
h ·, 1 t' 105 s eVl ( revo u 10n. 
From the preceding analysis of the national policies resnectively 
advocated by Lenin and his protagonists on this issue it is Dossible 
to postulate that the latter's attitude to the question of self-deter-
mination was more generally subscribed to than orevious studies have 
indicated. Not only was there a strong "leftist" opposition to Lenin 
\'/ithin the Bolshevik party itself but a number of other revolutionary 
Marxist parties in the Russian Empire which were affiliated to the 
Bolsheviks also defended the same views. 106 In fact, it can even be 
argued that the devotion to the principles of internationalism and the 
rejection of all national aspirations which were characteristic of the 
"leftists" found wider ideological acceptance among revolutionary 
r,1arxists there than the more pragmatic path pursued by Lenin. 
Furthermore> this account, taken in conjunction with the analysis 
presented in the opening chapter, also serves to refute the notion that 
the opposition of the revolutionary Marxists of Poland, Latvia and 
Lithuania to national independence was !lblind subservience" 107 to the 
1 (-12 
dictates of Lenin, who, despite his avowed support of self-determination, 
in fact desired to preserve the existing Russian state intact as a 
territorial basis for socialist revolution. It is clear that the stand 
taken against national self-determination by these Marxists was the 
result of an independently and indigenously developed policy, based on 
their interpretation of the correct national oolicy prescribed by the 
principles of t7arxist theory. In no \'lay was their policy influenced 
by Lenin, who had urged that in the interests of the international 
socialist revolution it was the duty of the proletariat of minority 
nations to reject applying the right to secession granted to them. 
Althou9h the national programme advocated by the "leftists", and 
the analysis of the imperialist epoch on which this was qrounded, found 
broad support among revolutionary r·1arxists in the Russian Empire, the 
mere fact of such acceptance in itself is no criteri on by whi ch to 
judge the realism of their views. In the first place, it is apparent 
with the benefit of hindsight that their prognosis that socialist revolu-
tion would sweep victoriously across Europe was mistaken. Lenin's 
vision of this revolution as a more protracted process, initially limi-
ted in scale, proved more correct. Nevertheless, all these ~1arxists, 
Lenin included, were mistaken in their belief that imperialism had 
made an international socialist revolution inevitable in the near or 
more distant future. In fact, again retrosrectively, Kautsky, the 
butt of many of their attacks, appears to have been more prescient, in 
that an organisation akin to his vision of an ultra-imDerialist confed-
eration, the European Economic Community, has emerged - even though it 
is admittedly bedevilled by internal tensions. 
~1oreover, surveying the history of the Russian revolutions of 
1905 and 1917, it becomes evident that the movements of the non-Russian 
minorities, opposed to the centralisation and Russian domination of the 
state under tsarism and the Provisional Government, were rowerful dis-
ruptive forces. 10G The consequences of the 1I1eftists'1l failure to tap 
this revolutionary potential by their neqlect of national aspirations 
for independence are, at best, matters of con,jecture. 10:' However, an 
examination of the abortive Soviet revolutions in Poland, Latvia and 
Lithuania gives some credence to the conclusion that one cause of the 
weakness and eventual failure of the revolutionary governments there 
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was this typical 1I1eftist" refusal to bow to national sentiment in the 
slightest degree. 
The ayai1able evidence suggests that the S.D.K.P.iL. under-
estimated the force of nationalism. It seems that there were strong 
currents in favour of Polish independence, even among many of the 
workers, particularly in 1918. 110 Apparently, the S.D.K.PJL. 's rejec-
tion of any concessions to such wirlesoread national sentiment severely 
weakened it during the years of revolutionary turmoil and left it \'lith 
"no influence in the mainstream of Polish political life.,,111 Later, 
the Polish Marxists in fact admitted that their uncompromising anti-
nationalism had been a contributory factor in their failure to seize 
power when, in 1923, at the Second Congress of the Communist Wor~ersl 
Party of Poland, they abandoned their former unflinching opposition to 
national self-determination - and accepted that an independent Poland 
did, and would continue to exist. 112 
~1uch the same pattern existed in Lithuania an(! Latvia. Kapsukas 
himself admitted that one reason why the rigidly internationalist 
Union of Lithuanian Workers had failed to win support among the workers 
in the 1890 I S was its refusal to accept that nati ona 1 oporessi on was 
still a bone of contention for the workers. 1l3 He could well have 
added that the intransigence of his own colleagues on this question 
also cost them support in later years and was one of the factors which 
helped exolain their defeat in 1919. Subsequently, like their Polish 
comrades, the Lithuanian Communist Party tacitly accepted that its 
failure to take into account the desire for independence that had become 
widespread in its own nation was a contributory cause of the lack of 
success of the revolution in Lithuania - and revised their programme 
accordingly.114 The Latvian t1arxists underwent the same rearpraisal of 
their own national oolicv, and in the 1920's were orepared to make 
concessions to the ~ide ~f Latvian nationa1ism. 115 ' . 
While this would seem to suggest that Lenin's national policy \'/as 
more successful in achieving its ends, a closer examination of the 
results of this policy reveals that this was not the case. It is true 
that Lenin was more aware of the revolutionary potential which the 
national minorities in the Russian Empire represented and accordingly 
was prepared to make concessions, of a short-term and ultimately limited 
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character, to their aspirations in order to vlin their support for the 
Bolsheviks' own seizure of power. With this in mind he advocated 
granting them the right to self",determination~ However, his policy 
was not an unequivocal success; whi le it may have encouraged nati onal 
revolts first against the autocracy and then against the Provisional 
Government, it proved unsuccessful, as the "leftists" had feared, in 
s~curing the voluntary union of the national minorities to the neVi 
Soviet Russian state. Ultimately, once the Bolsheviks had sufficiently 
consolidated their power, coercion was used to bind these nations again 
to "Nother Russ i a. ,,116 
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liThe iss ue was settl ed fi na lly ... by force of arms.... The idea that 
the theory of self-determina.tion was responsible for the breakuD of 
the Russian Empire was just as badly overdravm as the opposite propo-
sition, that the adherence of the border republics to the Bolsheviks 
was due to the same theory. Concrete evio.ence is lackin~ that the 
theory of se If-determinati on had much to do with the outcome one 
way or the other." 
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Chapter 4. 
THE PEASANTRY AND THE AGRARIAN QUESTION. 
The different agrarian programmes which the "left" Bolsheviks and 
the revolutionary t1arxists of the Kingdom of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania 
and V. I. Lenin considered necessary for the revolutionary government 
to pursue were not based on any disagreement on the appropriate struc-
ture of socialist agriculture. In fact, both parties shared the vision 
which had become a Marxist orthodoxy in the late nineteenth century, 
namely that a system of socially owned large-scale farms, collectively 
cultivated by a then proletarianised peasantry, \'las the only form which 
socialist agriculture could assume. Rather the conflict bet-ween them 
was of a tactical nature, centring on the policies which they held to 
be essential to realise this common aim. On the one hand, it is 
plausible to postulate that the "Left Communists '! formulated their 
agrarian programme strictly on the principles elaborated by K. narx 
and F. Engels, mindful of their caveat that any deviation from these 
pri nci p les would have consequences threatening further progress towa rds 
the socialist transformation of agriculture, and of society generally. 
Lenin, on the other hand, realistic as ever, came to recognise that 
in the Russian Empire rigid application of the traditional Marxist 
agrarian programme would alienate the peasantry, the bulk of the popu-
lation, from the Bolshevik revolution. Once he became aware of the 
need to capture the support of this majority if the Bolshevik party 
were to overthrow the Provisional Government and consolidate its 
seizure of power Lenin was prepared in the short run to sacrifice long-
accepted Marxist doctrines to the expediency of securing this support. 
Only after the revolutionary government had become firmly established 
\'JOuld it be possible to revert to the traditional Marxist programme 
for the reorganisation of agriculture on socialist lines. 
It is first necessary, therefore, to examine the legacy of ideas 
on the agrarian question which Marx and Engels bestowed on their suc-
cessors. An understandi ng of the "Left Communi sts '" criti ci sm of 
Lenin's pragmatic approach to agrarian policy only makes sense in this 
context. 
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t1al'x and Engels themselves were convinced that small peasant farm-
ing was historically doomed since in capitalist society this vJOuld 
become an increasingly uneconomic mode of production. At the root of 
this conviction was their belief in the superiority of large-scale 
capitalist production. They supposed that progress in agriculture would 
occur in the same manner as in industry~ production would become 
increasingly concentrated in ever larger, more efficient capitalist 
enterprises.' From this they concluded that small peasant farming 
would be unable to continue to exist in the face of growing competition 
from large-scale capitalist agriculture, particularly since the growth 
of industrial capitalism had also deprived the peasant of his handicraft 
industry VJhich in the past had been vital for his independent survival. 
In The Peasant Question in France and Germany Engels argued that I!the 
development of the capitalist fOl~m of production has cut the life-
strings of small production in agriculture; small production is irre-
trievably going to rack and ruin. 1I2 He later continued: 
it is the duty of our Party to make clear to the 
peasants again and again that their position is absolutely 
hopeless as long as capitalism holds sway, that it is 
absolutely impossible to preserve their small holdings 
for them as such, that capitalist large-scale production is 
absolutely sure to run over their impotent antiquated 
system of small production as a train runs over a push-
cart. If vie do this we sha 11 act in conformity wi th the 
inevitable trend of economic development, and this develop-
ment wil1 3not fail to bring our words home to the small peasants. 
As a natural consequence of this development of large-scale 
capitalist agriculture ~'1arx and Engels also foresaw the inevitable 
transformation of the independent peasant into a wage-earning proletarian. 
HOI'/ever they not only regarded the extinction 0 f the peasantry as 
economically preordained but they also l'ielcomed this. To them the 
peasantry was a backward, ignorant, and reactionary class, both 
economically and politically. They believed that the only motivation 
of the peasantry \lJas the des ire to protect its property, and so its 
independent existence~ against the encroachment of capitalism into 
agriculture. They described this in The Communist t·1anifesto 
Of the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie 
today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. 
The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face 
of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and 
essential product. 
The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the 
shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight 
against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their 
existence as fractions of the middle class. They are 
therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, 
they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel 
of his tory. 4 
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FurthermOl~e, the "founding fathers 1I not only despised the peasantry 
as a feudal remnant, sunk in the lIidiocy of rural life '!, and incapable 
of organising politically in defence of its own interests, but they 
also feared it as a potential buhvark of counter-revolution. They 
were afraid that the landlords and the bourgeoisie would be able to 
manipulate the peasantry by playing on its property instinct and so 
turn it against the revolutionary proletariat, whose pursuit of socia-
lism \'JOuld entail the abolition of all private property. Trey expressed 
this belief in the counter-revolutionary nature of the peasantry, v/hich 
became a leitmotif of their political outlook, in the following manner: 
The "dangerous class", the social scum, that passively 
rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers 0f old society, 
may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a prole-
tarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare 
it far more for the part of a bri bed tool of reacti onary 
intrigue.5 
Their analysis of the "laws" of agricultural development and of 
the class psychology of the peasantry led Marx and Engels to formulate 
an agrarian programme which they demanded revolutionary socialists 
should pursue. The implications of their economic analysis formed one 
basis for their proposal that the large capitalist estates, once 
expropriated by the revolution, should be preserved intact and handed 
over to the rural pro letari at for communal cul tivati on. To bow to 
peasant prejudices in favour of the division of these estates into 
small-holdings 1:Jou·ld destroy the progress that had been made tovvards 
a more efficient and productive form of agriculture. They firmly 
believed that large-scale agriculture was a prerequisite of socialism. 
Moreover, the political consequences which they anticipated would 
result from such a division confirmed them in their belief that large-
scale capitalist agriculture must be defended against attempts to 
break it up. Land division would only strengthen the class of peasant 
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proprietors VJho were innately counter-revolutionary and antagonistic 
to socialism. Hence Marx and Enqels considered it senseless for the 
revolutionary proletariat to carry out such a measure which could 
only increase the opposition that it would have to overcome in creating 
a socialist society. However, they made the proviso that the peasants 
were not to be coerced into collective agri culture for this woul d 
certainly turn them against the revolution; rather they were to be 
guided along this path by persuasion and the force of example. In the 
interim period they were to be left in possession of their land.n 
An examination of the agrarian policies advocated hy the "left!! 
Bolsheviks during and after 1917, as well as by the revolutionary 
Marxist factions in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania certainly appears to 
support the contention that they derived their agrarian programmes 
from the basic teachings of r~arx and Engels. These nal~xists too were 
certain of the superiority of la~e-scale agriculture over peasant 
farming, confident that economic development was leading to the inevi-
table demise of the latter. !-'10reover, they also regarded the peasantry 
with a deep-seated fear, considering it to be a reactionary, petty-
bourgeois class which would oppose any attempts to carry out a socia-
list revolution. Acting on t:1ese premises they bitterly criticised 
any breaking-uD of large-scale agriculture, in the belief that the 
economic and political results of such a measure would be harmful to 
the development of socialism. Preservation of large-scale agriculture 
as the basis for socialist farming and the firm refUsal to make any 
concessions to peasant prejudices - these are the characteristics of 
the agrarian policy defended by these revolutionaries. 
However" these i'1arxi s ts had not blindly adopted ~larx: sand 
Engels' prescriptions on agriculture and unquestioningly applied them 
to their own societies. On the contrary, they had their oltm specific 
reasons for espousing such an agrarian programme. In particular, in 
the case of the "left" Bolsheviks, in order to understand their position 
on the agrarian question it is first necessary to consider the evolution 
of Russian Social Democratic thought on this issue. Consequently, an 
account of the developing attitudes of this movement tOl'lards agriculture 
anc the peasantry is necessary. Such a discussion will place the ideas 
held by these t1arxists in their native historical context and, at the 
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same time, will be of assistance in highlighting the innovations made 
by Lenin in his own agrarian policy. 
The acceptance of 1'la rxi sm in the Russ i an Empi re can be traced 
back initially to the 1880's. In this decade it emerged as a new 
revolutionary credo largely in reaction to fue failure in t~e 1870's 
of the Populist movement, which had aspired to transform the Russian 
Empire into a socialist republic, based on the peasant mir. Unfortu-
nately for the Populists, they had found the peasants themselves 
apathetic, if not openly hostile to their cause. 
As a result of this failure, in the early 1880's G. V. Plekhanov, 
together with his old colleagues, P. B. Akselrod and V. I. Zasulich, 
forsook his commitment to Populism. The disheartening experiences of 
the 1870's had led him to disdain the peasants as a reactionary mass, 
from whom, he now firmly maintained, it was imnossible to hope for any 
support in a revolution to overthrow the autocracy.7 
Moreover, Plekhanov also came to believe that the mir, the socio-
economic structure on which Populist dreams of establishing socialism 
directly in the Russian Empire were founded, was disintegrating. He 
argued that since the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 capitalism had 
been developing in the Empire, both in industry and agriculture. He 
continued that this process was eroding the egalitarianism and collecti-
vism that had been characteristic of the mir and gradually was differen-
tiating the peasantry into a class of independent capitalist farmers, 
on the one hand, and a class of rural proletarians, on the other.8 
Plekhanov now rested his hopes for socialist t~evolution in the 
Russian Empire on the nascent industrial proletariat. However, he 
asserted that before such a revolution could occur it was necessary 
to encourage the development of capitalism itself. The growth of 
capitalism would strengthen the ranks of the proletariat, which as a 
result of this same growth eventually would, in Plekhanov's opinion, 
acquire the political consciousness and organisational experience 
necessary to carry out its appointed task of overthrowing capitalism 
itself and constructing socialism. Consequently, he insisted that it 
\1aS the duty of Social Democrats in the Empire to support any measures 
which would promote the advance of capitalism - and to oppose any 
policies which would hinder such progress. 
181 
Of course, the adoption of this position had quite definite 
ramifications for the attitude that Russian Marxists should take 
towards the question of agrarian policy. Plekhanov himself, and later, 
in the 1890's, the ilLegal ~1arxists", such as P. B. Struve and N. I. 
Ziber. insisted that the destruction of the mir was vital if caoitalism 
-- ' 
was to develop freely. Consequently, the division of the existing 
communal lands among the peasants should be sanctioned. This measure 
would remove the remaining obstacles to the growth of capitalism in 
the countryside and would lead to the increasing concentration of 
agricultural production in the hands of a class of prosperous farmers 
(kulaks), who also would provide an expandin('"J mar!~et for capitalist 
industry. At .the same time, the remainder of the peasantry would 
become proletarianised, and either flee the land to join the ranks of 
the urban workers or form a new and growing class of agri cultura 1 
labourers. 9 
Nevertheless, these Marxists had no intention of destroying the 
large capitalist estates that already existed in the Russian Empire. 
It seems that they considered such a policy to be reactionary, both 
in the economic sense ~ common to r'larxists of their age, they regarded 
large-scale agriculture as more efficient than peasant farming - as 
well as politically, since this would only swell the ranks of the 
peasants whom they believed to be innately counter-revolutionary. 
Indeed, they considered that the quiescence that the peasantry displayed 
during the famine of 1891 to be a further indication of its political 
apa thy. 
In fact, the maj ority of Russ i an t~arxi s ts conti nued to ignore 
the peasants as a potential revolutionary force until the revolution 
of 1905. Admittedly, in 1903 the newly founded Russian Social Demo-
cratic \'/orkers' Party (R.S.DJLP.) had adopted a special aqrarian pro-
gramme, although it appears to have taken this step largely as the 
result of Lenin's initiative. This programme advocated the return of 
the otrezki to the peasants, that is, the strips of land taken from 
them by the pomeshchiki at the time of the emancipation. Certainly, 
it seems that Lenin formulated this policy with the aim of attracting 
the peasants to support the proletariat in a revolution against the 
autocracy, yet he also hastened to claim that such a measure would be 
122 
economi ca lly progressive. He a rgued that the return of these otrezki 
to the peasants would cause the dissolution of the estates of the 
Domeshchiki, which he cateaorised as feudal latifundia rather than I J 
capitalist farms, and at the same tine would make independent peasant 
farming a viable proposition, which in turn would accelerate the devel-
opment of capitalism in the countryside. 10 
However, the events of 1905 compelled the Russian Social Democrats, 
both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, to revise their traditional neglect 
of the peasants, since in the revolutionary upheaval against the auto-
cracy in that year the peasants in fact had played a ~rominent part. 
In general, the Social Democrats agreed that substantial concessions 
to the peasants I desire for land should be made, in order to secure 
their support for a revolutionary overthrow of the autocracy. They 
concurred that the lands belonaing to the church, the state and the 
pomeshchiki should be confiscated, yet they "'Jere divided about what 
should be done with this land thereafter. 
Eventually, this division was reduced to one between the t1enshe-
viks and the Bolsheviks. At the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the 
R.S.D.W.P., held in Stockholm in 1906, the Mensheviks successfully 
proposed that the confiscated lands should be "municipalised!!, that 
is, t:,ey should be put under the control of "democratic organs of 
local self-government." Subsequently, these lands, or those lion which 
petty farming was being conducted", a reservatior. which implied that 
existing large capitalist farms should be preserved intact, were to 
be divided for use among the peasants. The advocates of this policy 
argued that this would be a progressive measu re, since by destroying 
the remnants of feudalism in the countryside it would foster the growth 
of capitalism in agriculture - and, accordingly, the intensification 
of the class struggle there. ll 
The Bclsheviks, on the other hand: were prepared to go even 
farther to satisfy the peasants' demands. While Lenin himself came 
out in favour of the nationalisation of the land in 1906, he accepted 
the agrarian policy proposed by S. I. Borisov (Suvorov) and supported 
by the majority of the Bolsheviks. 12 Borisov advocated that the land 
\'Jhich had been confiscated, ''lith the exclusion of those "properties 
on which communal agriculture [could] be conducted,!! immediately should 
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be partitioned among the peasants, that is, the peasants should be 
granted the ownership, not just the use of the land. 13 Lenin himself 
provided the theoretical justification for such action. Insisting 
that the large estates in Russia were largely feudal rather than capi-
talist, he maintained that the division of the land among the peasants 
in fact woul d "clear the ground for ... and provi de a more general, 
extensive and firm basis for capitalism's further development!! in 
agriculture. 14 Essentially, this was the stage to which the Russian 
~1arxists had developed their views on the agrarian question before 
1917. Consequently, the question which must be answered is why the 
"left" Bolsheviks believed that this programme was no longer applicable 
after the October revolution - and instead defended an agricultural 
policy that hearkened back to that espoused by t~arx and Engels. 
The solution to this prcbleT!1 rests on their interpretation of 
the nature of the revolution in 1917. Certainly, in the revolution 
of 1905, which the oven/helming majority of Russian ~1arxists considered 
to be bourgeois-democratic, it seems that the future "leftists" did 
not oppose some concessions to the peasants' desire for land, since 
at that time, by further destroying the remnants of feudalism in the 
countryside, such measures \'lould foster the development of capitalism. 
HO\,/ever, by 1917 these Bolsheviks had come to believe that the Russian 
Empire was ripe for socialist, not si~ply bourgeois-democratic revolution. 
Admittedly, they justified this claim by arguinq that the recent devel-
opments in Russ i an industry had created the necessary prerequi sites for 
socialism - they tended to ignore agriculture, althou0h N. I. Bukharin 
did maintain in 1917 that capitalism in Russian agriculture had deve-
loped significantly after 1905. 15 Nevertheless, despite their neglect 
of agriculture, they still insisted that the agrarian programme which 
had been aprropriate in 1905, at the stage of bourgeois revolution, 
now had to be revised. 
I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, a prominent Bolshevik theoretician -
with V. A. Bazarov he had translated ~pital into Russian, he was the 
co-author, with A. A. Bogdanov, of A Course of Political Economy, 
which became a standard Bolshevik textbook, and in 1917 he had been 
editor of Sotsial-Demokrat and Izvestiia, Bolshevik papers published 
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in Moscow1 6 - and a leading member of the "Left Communist" movement in 
1918, clearly explained ':~hy the old Bolshevik agrarian programme \lIas 
no longer applicable. At first, he accepted that in the 1905 revolu-
tion it had been justifiable for Social Democrats to agree to a divi-
sion of the land among the peasants. On the one hand, such a measure 
would have resulted in the "destruction of pome~hchik .landownership, 
the support of the old political order, ... and DpJ the elimination of 
one of the most serious obstacles to capitalist development .... " He 
continued that this policy would also have led to the "formation of 
such farms [large capitalist farms] which would guarantee the rapid 
development of agriculture through capitalism to socialism." HOIIJever, 
he insisted that after the October revolution this programme \vas no 
longer suitable. The Bolsheviks were now facing a totally different 
situation than that in 1905. Since the po.rty It/as novl implementing a 
policy designed at the "proletarian organisation of industry,!' he 
declared that it would be inconsistent if it surrendered "agriculture 
into the power of petty-bourgeois illusions."l? In effect, Stepanov 
was arguing that since the October revolution was socialist, then 
the party had to carry out a socialist agrarian policy. An examination 
of the agrarian programme defended hy Stepanov and his fellow thinkers 
in 1918. and later, will reveal what these Bolsheviks considered to 
be the characteristics of such a policy. 
Analvsis of the "Left Communists !II criticisms of the land socia-
lisation lal'l'18 of February, 1918, supported by Lenin and passed into 
law by the Third Congress of Soviets, proves that they were convinced 
of the superiority of large-scale agriculture and strove to maintain 
this. A pro-Leninist participant in the debates on this law in early 
1918 justly summarised the arguments of the "Left Communists" in the 
following statement: 
The ne\v land law is characterised by the majority of its 
critics as a reactionary act. Its reactionary character 
is seen chiefly in that it opens the way to a small-scale 
economy, that it creates and strengthens the number of 
"petty farms", that it causes an inevitable shift of all 
agriculture towards a natural economy, with the ;nT~itable 
consequence of this, the fall in its productivity. ~ 
The "Left Communists'" ovm arguments against land socialisation 
merely confirm the fairness of the preceding account. In a series of 
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discussion articles on the question of land socialisation which appeared 
in Izvestiia and Pravda in January and Fehruary, 1918, E. A. Preohra-
zhensky, a leading tlleftist" in the Bolshevik party, defended typical 
tlLeft Communist" premises. He attacked the land socialisation law on 
the ~Jrounc!s that it did not say a word about the reconstruction of 
agriculture on socialist foundations. This required the preservation 
of the large estates for collective cultivation and also the encourage-
ment of the small peasants to establish communal forms of farming. 20 
Instead this law sanctioned the division of the existing large estates 
among the peasants. Part of Preobrazhensky's critique reads: 
The protection of the capitalist farms from disintegration 
and the transfer of them entirely into the hands of the 
Soviets has not been envisaged. On the contrary, there is 
a point about rewarding the batraki with land ... which 
proposes the breaking un of such farms into small allot-
ments and It/hi ch is both deeply reacti onary from the econo-
mic point of view and deeply unjust to the agricultural 
proletariat.2l 
Preobrazhensky developed his critique of land division in the 
particular case of Russia after three years of war. He asserted that 
since the majority of the poorer peasants had insufficient stocks of 
seed, tools and especially draught power to work any allotments given 
to them production would fall disastrously as a result of land division. 
He was convinced that "we [the Bolshevik government] cannot allow 
ourselves the luxury of an uncontrolled small-scale economy in such 
difficult conditions .,,22 
Stepanov outlined in greater detail the "Left Ccmmunistt! criti-
cisms of the economic consequences of land socialisation. Resting his 
case on the familiar Marxist assumption that large-scale agriculture 
was more efficient and productive than peasant farming, he argued that 
an equalising division of the land among the peasantry, which land 
socialisation in fact meant, would hamper the technical anrt economic 
development of agriculture. Productivity would not only fall as a 
direct result of division but orogress tOI.'Jards the superior system of 
large-scale socialist agriculture would also be delayed. First, the 
economies of scale which would result from the application of modern 
machinery in agriculture could only be obtained on large farms, not 
within a system of peasant small-holdings. Moreover the modern 
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equipment It/hich alrea.dy existed in Russia for the extensive cultivation 
of the large estates could not be optimally used if these were broken 
up into a myri ad of small peasant farms. Hence Stepanov saltl 1 and 
socialisation as an economically retrogressive measure, re-establishing 
in the countryside a less efficient mode of production and at the same 
time destroying the prerequisites of the socialist agriculture of the 
future. 23 
In the following year, 1910, a new left opposition, the Democratic 
Centralist movement, emerged within the Bolshevik rarty. This group, 
however, offered no essenti a 1 cri ti ci sm of the agrari an programme then 
supported by Lenin and his associates. One plausible eXDlanation of 
this absence of criticism is that from the summer of 1918 Lenin had 
in effect commenced a campaign to reverse the effects of the land 
socialisation. In face of peasant resistance to give up grain to feed 
the towns and the Red Army Lenin proposed the requisitioning of the 
peasants' surpluses - committees of poor peasants (kombedy) \'Iere 
formed to assist in extracting these surpluses from the kulaks and 
middle peasants - and also encouraged the establishment of large-scale 
collective forms of agriculture. As early as July, 1918, the Moscow 
Congress of Soviets had urged a change of policy in this direction; 
in November, 1918, the Commissariat of Agriculture set aside subsidies 
to promote the transition from individual to collective farming; and 
in December, 1918 a resolution much in the same spirit was passed by 
the Second Congress of the Councils of the National Economy. The 
culmination of this change in policy was the new land law of February, 
1919, which contrary to condoning individual peasant farming stressed 
the urgency of creating a system of large-scale communal agriculture; 
no longer would the division of the land be given priority.24 Unlike 
the land socialisation law Itlhich had emphasised the satisfaction of 
the peasants' desire for their own individual holdings, this law rele-
gated such satisfact~n to last; land was to be used primarily for the 
needs of collective farming, admittedly of various forms. 25 
Therefore in 1919 the Democratic Centralists had no cause to 
criticise the party's agrarian policy_ Lenin and the majority had 
re verted, albeit temporarily, as the future was soon to show, to the 
traditional ~1arxist programme of supporting large-scale collective 
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agriculture, as the "Left Communists" of 1918 had sought. 
The next swing of the pendulum in Bolshevik agrarian policy, 
however, provoked stonny criticism from a new left opposition in the 
party, the Horkers' Opposition. After Lenin had introduced the NevI 
Economic Policy (NEP), which made concessions to individual peasant 
farming, the \'Jorkers' Opposition came forvlard \,lith a defence of the 
old and familiar r·1arxist premise of the superiority of large-scale 
agriculture. Like the preceding oppositions they too had no concern 
for the peasantry,26 \<Jhom they considered doomed by the development 
of capitalism. They criticised the NEP on the grounds that it was an 
economically reactionary measure which was artificially delaying the 
transition to nevI socialist collective farming by its efforts to prop 
up the individual peasant producer. S. P. r·1edvedev, one of the leaders 
of this movement, repudiated these efforts in the following words: 
VIe [the !Norkers' Opposition] consider ... that small pro-
duction in the conditions of t~e NEP ... is doomed .... All 
attempts to save it, to help it to survive a~9 even to 
develop are reactionary, Utopian efforts .... 
These "left" Bolsheviks were not alone in the belief that large-
scale a9riculture was a progressive form of farming, necessary in 
socialist society. The t·1arxist revolutionaries in Russian Poland, the 
Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P.iL) 
based their agrarian programme on the same premises. They too appeared 
to be of the traditional r1arxist persuasion that large-scale capitalist 
agriculture was economically superior to peasant farming. J. ~'1archlewski, 
their authority on agrarian matters, maintained that " ... [large-scale 
farmin9] leads to a higher stage of development than peasant agriculture 
as a result of its better technique .... ,,28 Therefore to break up 
the large estates by an equalising division of the land among the poor 
and landless peasants would cast agriculture back tc a less efficient 
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state, with the inevitable consequence of this, a fall in production.~J 
At the same time the destruction of large-scale agriculture would 
demolish one of the prerequisites for the socialist organisation of 
economic life. Rosa Luxemburg summarised the position of the S.D.K.P.iL. 
on this question in these words: 
In the first place, only the nationalisation of the large 
landed estates, as the technically most advanced and concen-
trated means and methods of agrarian production, can serve 
as the point of departure for the socialist mode of produc-
ti on on the 1 and. .. for it is thi salone whi ch affords the 
possibility of organisin0 agricultural production in 
accord with the requirements of interrelated, large-scale 
socialist production. 30 
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The pro-Bolshevik ~1arxists in Latvia, the revolutionary wing of 
the Social Democracy of Latvia (S.D.L.), also fully shared the theory 
of agricultural development formulated by r~arx and Engels and framed 
their policy in accord with this. From the origins of their party in 
1904 these Latvian revolutionaries consistently manifested their belief 
in the superiority of large-scale capitalist agriculture, whose gro\,/th 
would lead, on the one hand, to the elimination of small peasant farm-
ing and, on the other hand, to the creation of the foundations for a 
socialist system of agriculture. A leading Soviet historian of the 
S.D.L. has succinctly described its outlook on this question: 
The law of the concentration of canita1 both in the town 
and in the countryside must lead to the triumoh of the 
large enterprise, to the destruction of the small back-
ward peasant farm. The more large farms there are, the 
more the "rrerequisites ll for socialism. The Latvian 
Social Democrats argued in approximately this manner. 31 
Given these theoretical premises it was perfectly logical for the 
S.D.L. to oppose the breaking-up of the large estates. Division of 
these among the peasantry was considered an economically regressive 
measure, contrary to the course of economic development. It would re-
establish a less productive form of farming in the countryside, simul-
taneously destroying the material basis for the socialist transformation 
of agriculture. In 1906 the S.D.L. outlined the attitude to agriculture 
which it stubbornly defended until 1923: 
Social Democrats can neither sympathise with the expropria-
tion of large peasant farms nor \/ith the division of large 
estates into small allotments. To exnrooriate now compul-
sorily the land from the large landowners in order to create 
three or four times as many small farms v/ould be sturidity 
of the most extreme kind. This would mean delaying capita-
list development, obstructing the concentration of capital 
and the differentiation of the rural population into a 32 
proletariat and bourgeoisie where this has already begun. 
Belief in the economic superiority of large-scale farming similarly 
was a fundamental determinant of the attitude which the t'1arxist revolu-
tionaries of Lithuania, the internationalist wing of the Social Democratic 
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Party of Lithuania (S.D.P.L.), adopted tmvards agriculture. Any divi-
sion of the large estates, apart from destroying the foundations for the 
large-scale agriculture deemed appropriate for a socialist economy, would 
greatly increase the numbers of less efficient peasant small-holdings, 
\'Ihich would inevitably produce less. They imagined that the country 
would suffer disastrously from this fall in production, arguing that 
lithe division and parcelling out of the estates and khutors will lead 
on ly to economi c confus i on and hunger. ,,33 
However, to be fair to tile revolutionary Marxists in Poland, Latvia 
and Lithuania, it must be admitted that they had their 0\,1n particular 
reasons for subscribing to Marxist orthodoxy regarding their agrarian 
policies. Basically, they argued, with some measure of justice, that 
the development of capitalism in agriculture had advanced further in 
these regions than in Great Russia itself, ~hich meant that agrarian 
programme that Marx and Engels had formulated as appropriate for revolu-
tionary socialists \'Ias applicable. 
The clearest example of this situation was Latvia, v/hich had a 
radically different agrarian history from Russia itself. Here the 
peasants had been emancipated, admittedly without land, before 1820 and 
had been transformed into tenant farmers. However, peasant land hunger 
continued to exist, a fact which impelled the tsarist government in the 
1840 l s to pass measures enabling the peasants both to buy their land 
and also to increase their holdings, largely to avert the danger of 
future agrarian unrest. This policy stimulated the grovJth of a class 
of peasant farmers. Furthermore, the Latvian peasants, unlike their 
Russian counter-parts who were still united in the miC, where agriculture 
continued to be practised according to the old feudal strip system, 
34 independently owned their land in consolidated plots. 
Moreover, after the emancipation of 186', when capitalism began 
to expand generally in the Russian Emnire, it appears that the growth 
of capitalist agriculture in Latvia accelerated. Cy the turn of the 
century this development had led to a clear class differentiation in 
the Latvian countryside. On the one hand, t~ere existed a small number 
of large estate owners, usually Baltic Germans, and of wealthy Latvian 
farmers - often referred to as the flgrey larons:! -, who together owned 
more than 70 per cent of the land, and a numerous landless peasantry 
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and rural proletariat. Indeed, the Latvian Social Democrats emphasised 
that 70 per cent of those engaged in ac:riculture in Latvia It/ere ba_!!'aki, 
while in Russia itself agricultural labourers only amounted to 20 per 
cent of the rural population. 35 
The Latvian Social Democrats in general inferred from their ana-
lysis that capitalism in agriculture had become firmly established in 
Latvia. A~ricultural production had become increasingly concentrated 
in large-scale enterprises, and the majority of the rural population 
had become proletarianised. Accordingly, they maintained, especially 
the pro-Bolshevik wing, that the conditions in the Latvian countryside 
were ripe for the direct socialist transformation of agriculture, even 
if this was not so in Russia itself. In 1917, P. 1. Stuchka stronCJly 
defended this position. He accepted that in Russia, where cultivation 
of the land within the mir on the old strip system, an exceedingly 
primitive form of agriculture, was still prevalent, the division of the 
land, by stimulating the formation of private landed prooerty, and, 
consequently, the development of capitalist agriculture, would be a 
progressive measure. 36 Yet such a division of the land into small-
holdings in Latvia itself would be a reactionary policy, since this 
would destroy the existinq large capitalist estates, the basis for 
future socialist agriculture. Stuchka unequivocally declared: 
... if we admit that for Russia the division of the largG 
estates and the ensuing oainful process of capitalist 
concentration of the land does not contradict progress, 
we consider that for us this would be a step hack. Even 
the Latvian Social Revolutionaries ... demand cooperative 
cultivation of the land, and not the aforementioned [demand 
forJ "equalising use" ... that arose in the conditions of the 
backward countryside of autocratic Russia .... If the path 
of the Russian Social Revolutionaries leads through sociali-
sation to capitalism which has still not been attained there, 
then we must boldly transform tbe capitalism that exists in 
our agriculture into socialism. 37 
Agrarian conditions in the Kingdom of Poland also were different 
from those in Russia itself, in that capitalist agriculture there too 
had developed more extensively. Certainly, the S.D.K.P.iL. itself 
was convinced that this was the case. Like their Latvian comrades, 
they believed that the land had become concentrated in the hands of 
capitalist producers. In turn~ this had led to-the radical class 
differer.tiatior. of the Polish countryside, so that in the first decade 
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of the tV/entieth century a small number of landed magnates, \llho owned 
huge estates, as well as an increasing class of prosperous, independent 
peasant farmers stood opposed to a growing mass of landless peasants 
and agricultural labourers who worked on the lands of the former. In 
fact, by 1910 this rural proletariat numbered about two million, while 
there existed only one million peasant farmers, the overwhelming major-
ity of whom, moreover, were exceedingly small. 38 
Consequently, given this grm"lth of capitalism in agriculture, it 
seems that these Polish ~~arxists concluded that any policy which would 
reverse this would be reactionary, and thus imper~issible. They con-
sidered any division of the land to be such a measure. Not only would 
this destroy the existing large capitalist estates, but at the same 
time would strengthen that class which they had come to regard as a 
dangerous opponent of socialism, namely, the independent farmers (kulaks). 
The revolutionary Lithuanian r1arxists also maintained that capital-
ism in agriculture in L ithiania was considerably more advanced than 
in Russia itself. They claimed that before 1914 the majority of pomesh-
chiks had transformed their estates into large capitalist farms. ~10re­
over, they continued that the remaining land had become concentrated 
in the hands of the middle and large peasants, who also conducted 
capitalist agriculture, with the help of the hired labour of the land-
less peasants and rural proletariat, on their already consolidated 
farms (khutory) - as S. Girinis, himself a member of the S.D.P.L., 
argued, for a lengthy time there had been no obshchina, or mir, in 
Lithuania. 34 Furthermore, they insisted that this process ~capitalist 
gro\;lth in agriculture had been intensified by the Stolypin reform, so 
that after 1905 the concertration of production and the differentiation 
of classes in the countryside had become even more pronounced.40 
Accordingly, it arpears that their opposition to any division of 
the land in Lithuania was also based on their assessment of the pecu-
liarities of their native agrarian structure. Presumably, they believed 
that the re-partitioning of the land, while perhaps progressive in 
Russia, would negate the developments already made by capitalism in 
Lithuanian agriculture, destroy the prerequisites of socialism in the 
countryside, that is, the large capitalist estates, and in the very 
process increase the ranks of the propertied, whom they too feared 
wo~ld be bitterly opposed to any socialist reforms. 
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The preceding account clearly establishes one major influence on 
the approach of these Marxists to the agrarian question. Applying the 
teachi ngs of r·1arx and Engels, they unreservedly accepted the "founding 
fathers'" conviction of the economic superiority of large-scale agri-
culture.41 They regarded this as a progressive feature on the inexorable 
onward march of history towards the Nirvana of socialism and as such 
requiring preservation. However it would be erroneous to assume that 
their defence of large-scale agriculture was determined solely by some 
crude determinist belief in its superiority to peasant farming. On the 
contrary, they also had strong political reservations about the conse-
quences of any division of large-scale agriculture. As heirs to the 
virulent anti-oeasantism of traditional Russian and East European 
~1arxism they too feared and mistrusted the influence of the peasantry, 
whom they regarded as inalienably hostile to socialism. Accepting this 
premise they claimed that any revolutionary agrarian policy, such as 
land divisiqn, which promised to increase the strength and numbers of 
the peasantry', must be rejected since this would swell the ranks of 
those opposed to the development of socialism. 
The reactionary political consequences of any division of the 
land was certainly an important factor in the formation of tre "left" 
Bolsheviks' views on the agrarian question. Bukharin, a leading "Left 
Communist" until 1921, was undoubtedly influenced by this fear of 
peasant opposition to socialist revolution. At the Sixth Congress of 
the Bolshevik party in the summer of 1917 he issued a warning, later 
developed by the "Left Communist" movement of 1918, that support of 
the peasants' seizure of the pomeshchiks' land would prove to be a 
double-edged sVlOrd for the Bolsheviks. \tJhile admitting that t~is 
tactical line could secure the support of the peasants for a coup 
against the Provisional Government, he was wary of the longer term 
consequences of this. He was afraid that this policy would result in 
the creation of a numerous '~satiated peasantry" who, once it had secured 
the land, would desert the revolution and join the anti-socialist forces 
47 in Russia in defence of its property. -
Later, in his major treatise on sociology, Historical Materialism, 
Bukharin presented what can be interoreted as a general theoretical 
justification for the distrust which he~ and presumably many of his 
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fello\lJ Bolsheviks, manifested towards the peasantry. In essence, he 
maintained that by virtue of their socio-economic position as private 
producers the peasants must be considered to be innately hostile to 
socialism. He defended this view in the following manner: 
In other words, the peasantry - for instance - 1 ack several 
of the elements necessary to make them a communist class: 
they are bound down by property, and it \-/ill take many 
years to train them a new view, which can only be done by 
having the state power in the hands of the proletariat; 
also, the peasantry are not held together in production, 
in social labour and common action; on the contrary, the 
peasant's entire joy is in his own bit of land; he is 
accustomed to individual management, not to cooperation 
with others.43 
Fear of peasant reaction is cited by M. D-skii as a fundamental 
source of "Left Communist" opposition to the land socialisation law 
of February, 1918. Summarising the "Left COr.1JT1unists '" critique he 
argued that they essentially objected to this law because by approving 
the division of the large estates it would swell the ranks of the 
counter-revolution. He described the "Left Communists'!! reaction in 
the following manner: 
... the new law, impregnated as it is with an individu-
alistic tendency, disunites the labouring peasant masses, 
atomises them and opens the doors wide for the creation 
of a rural petty-bourgeoisie, which, economically backward 
and feeble, is a very reaCtionary class everywhere, ah/ays 
and in all respects.~4 
Fear of the peasantry as a restraining, even corruptive influence 
on the socialist character of the Bolshevik 00vernment's policies with-
out doubt was a leitmotif of the "Left Communists '" polemics against 
Lenin in 1918. In their Theses and Kommuni~, their theoretical journal, 
the "Left Communists" bitterly criticised Lenin for jettisoning the 
principles accepted by the party in 1917 in order to apnease peasant 
pressure and prejudices. Apart from land socialisation they saw thr. 
spectre of peasant pressure on other actions taken by the revolutionary 
government. They took the Treaty of Brest-L itovsk as an example of 
this. They considered that the failure to wage a revolutionary war 
against the forces of world imperialism, accepted party policy in the 
pre-October period, in favour of a heinous peace with Germany was 
caused by Lenin's desire to placate the peasantry.45 Generalising 
from this they feared that the party would bow further to peasant 
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pressure and fail to carry out the policies v/hicr alone could guarantee 
the further development of Russia towards socialism. The proclaimed 
this in their Theses: 
But as a result of the immediate, direct consequences of the 
peace, the reduction in class activity and the increased 
declassing of the proletariat in the main revolutionary 
centres, as a result of the increased class rapprochement 
between the proletariat and the poor peasants (who after the 
signing of peace under the pressure of their demands and 
influence must become a bulv/ark of Soviet pov/er), there 
arises the strong possibi 1 ity of a ter.dency towards devi a-
ti on on tbe part of the maj ority of the communi s t pa rty and 
Soviet power led by it into the channel of petty-bourgeois 
po 1 i ti cs of a new type. 
In the event that such a tendency shoul d materi ali se, 
the working class will cease to be the leader and guide of 
the socialist revolution inspiring the poor peasantry to 
destroy the rule of finance capital and the landowners. It 
will become a force which is dissipated in the ranks of 
the semi-proletarian petty-bourgeois masses, which see as 
their task not proletarian struggle in alliance with the 
~!est European proletariat for the overthrow of the imperia-
list system, but the defence of the petty proprietor father-
land from the pressure of i~perialism. This aim is also 
attainable through compromise with the latter. In the 
event of a rejection of active proletarian politics, the 
con~uests of the workers' and peasants' revolution will 
start to coagulate into a system of state capitalism and 
petty-bourgeoi s economi c re 1 a ti ons . "The defen ce of the 
socialist fatherland" will then prove in fact to be the 
defence of a petty-bourgeois motherJgnd subject to the 
influence of ir.ternational capital. 
This foreboding of the consequences of peasant influence helps 
explain the "Left Communists'!! opposition to any land division. They 
believed that by strengthening the peasantry such a measure vlOuld 
obstruct the development of the revolution towards socialism. 
t1oreover the "Left Communists" ""ere convinced that an equal divi-
sion of land among the peasants would only create the conditions for 
the restoration of capitalism in the countryside. Stepanov clearly 
outlined the "Left Commun.ist" case. He contended that any policy of 
land equalisation would prove to be impractical and Utopian, for not 
every peasant family owned the cattle, seed and equi pment necessary 
to cultivate the allotment given to them. Consequently this land 
would become reconcentrated in the hands of the prosperous peasants 
who had the means to work it. Thus land division vlould re-sow the 
seeds of capital i sm in the country and in the long run the poor and 
exploited peasants would gain nothing.47 
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In essence the Workers' Opposition shared the same belief that 
any concessions to the peasants would prevent the growth of socialism. 
They vehemently criti cised the NEP, It,hi ch permitted the peasants to 
farm individually and freely market the surpluses left to them after 
the government had deducted its tax in kine!., as a retL~rn to petty-
bourgeois capitalism. They also saw NEP as rrecluding the rapid 
development of industry which was vital if the proletariat, the class 
basis of socialism, was to be preserved and strengthened. They feare~ 
that this concern to placate the peasantry and total disregard of the 
proletariat could only result in even greater peasant influence on 
party policy which would lead to the degeneration of the revolution. 48 
The S.D.K.P.iL. shared similar anti-peasant views, a fact which 
placed it squarely in the tradition of orthodox narxism - although one 
must also remember that in general the revolutionary gentry and intel-
ligentsia in the Kingdom of Poland had become disillusioned earlier in 
the nineteenth century by the political a~athy typically manifested 
by thc Polish peasants. From its origin this party had regarded the 
peasantry as an innately reactionary class, hostile to socialist and 
even bourgeois--democratic revolution. At the Sixth Congress of the 
S.D.K.P.iL. L. Tyszko, one of the party's leaders, scathingly rejected 
the peasantry as a revolutionary force: 
The action of the proletariat, strivinq to shake the very 
foundation of the contemporary economy ... is in the given 
revolution a historically necessary factor of primary 
importance, without \,111ich it is completely impossible to 
visualise the revolution .... But in this stru9gle the pro-
letariat will be opposed by every social class, often 
including the peasantry. Il.nd therefore to strive towards 
a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry means the 
same as aspiring to arm \,/ith a dictatorship that class 
which at a certain stage in the revolution will turn its 
power and all the weapons it has conquered against the 
proletariat and certain results of the revolution. The 
Bolsheviks' mistake is that thcy have gazed into the 
revolutiona ry face of the peasantry but they forget about 
its other reacti onary face Vlhi ch is a more perman~Bt one, 
more linked vlJith the conditions of its existence. -
This antipathy of the S.D.K.P.iL. tDl'/ards the peasantry was 
forcefully expressed by Rosa Luxem~urg in her seminal pamphlet, T~ 
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Russian Revolutio~, where she bitterly criticised Lenir!s agrarian 
policy after the Bolshevik seizure of power. She objected to Lenin's 
acquiescence to a division of the land of the large estates among the 
peasants on the grounds that this had created a numerous class of 
propertied peasants VJho would defend their nevlly acquired land against 
future efforts of the revolutionary government to carry out a socialist 
recons tructi on 0 f agri culture: 
The Leninist agrarian reform has created a new and more 
povJerful layer of popular enemies of socialism in the 
countryside, enemies whose resistance will be much more 
dangerous and stubborn than that of the noble large 
landov/ners .50 
However Rosa did admit that it would have been unfair to expect 
Lenin to socialise agriculture immediately, to solve "the most diffi-
cu1t task of the socialist transformation of society.t:5l Yet she still 
contended that Lenin should at least have kept intact the large estates 
and in this way avoided adding a new class of landed peasants to the 
forces of counter-revo luti on. She sa,,! concessi ons to the peasants as 
incompatible with the development of socialism.52 
The Latvian Social Democrats also 1:Jere afraid of the prasantry, 
which they held to be a petty-bourgeois class with interests little 
di fferent from those of other 1 arger 1 andowners .53 Therefore they 
regarded any compromises with the peasantry as anathema, for attempts 
to satisfy peasant prejudices would be cletrimental to the proletariat 
and harmful to the gro1.'lth of socialism. They defended this premise in 
the fo 11 ovli nq manner: 
The Latvian Social Democratic ~/orkers' Party, Vlhile opposing 
any sort of exploitation and oppression, in the meantime 
limits its Vlork to the direct defence of proletarian interests 
and therefore does not undertake to present demands whi ch 
Vlould exclusively benefit the peasan~s. The Latvian Social 
Democra ti c Horkers 1 Party opposes the i nclusi on of demands 
in its programme which only benefit the peasants and promote 
the strengthening 0 f treir property at the eXjJense of society 
and the workers (the Iskraist "otrezki ") .... 54 
This was another basis for the continued rejection, in 1919, of 
an~f division of the pomeshchiks' estates by the revolutionary "<ling of 
the S.D.L. This would convert the batraki back into peasant small-
holders who would be hostile to socialist revolution, which promised 
55 to destroy individual property. 
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The revolutionary t1arxists of the S.D.P.L. also based their 
agrarian policy on the premise that concessionstofuepeasantry and 
progress towards socialism were contradictory. They too considered 
the peasantry to be an innately anti-socialist class, interested solely 
in the preservation and extension of its O\t/n property. Z. 1. Angarietis, 
the Commissar of Agriculture in the first, short-lived Communist govern-
ment of Lithuania in 1918-1919, revealed perfectly clearly the distrust 
that he and his comrades had of the peasants. In 1912, outlining his 
attitude towards the peasants, in particular the middle peasants, he 
declared: 
They, together with the proprietors who own 20-30 desyatinas, 
make up those IIworki ng-men" who support a 11 kinds OtSoci a ,-
movements, the populists and the clerical parties. They 
are perpetuallY wavering, inconsistent elements. Since this 
stratum wants only to own more and more land, in revolution-
ary times it vd11 support the revolution only in so far as 
this will bring it some land. 
These farmers (10-20 desyatinas) are numerous. The 
workers wi 11 have to take them into account and act very 
cautiously. It will not be necessary to take away their 
land, since we will have sufficient already. Nor will it 
be necessary to give them any of the confiscated land, since 
they possess enough land. Nor can we win them round with 
promises that when the revolution is victorious they will 
be enriched with the landlord estates. It would be a great 
blow to the Lithuanian revolution to give them the lands 
from the big estates. They would then form a numerous army 
of mi dd 1 e propri etors in the countrys i de, suffi ci ently strong 
economically to oust the agrarian proletariat and to take 
all agricultural affairs into their own hands. As the urban 
I"/orkers in Lithuania are few in number they could also be 
a great threat to the towns. Suitably Qrganised they could 
become the real masters of Lithuania. 50 
Accordingly, they rejected any compromises with the peasants since 
they feared that this tactic would strengthen the latter and, consequently, 
jeopardise any steps that the proletariat might take tov!ards socialism. 
Indeed, explaining retrospectively the rationale behind their agrarian 
policy V. S. Mitskevich-Kapsukas essentially confirmed /\nqarietis' 
analysis. Discussing the origins of this policy he stated: 
... at the Eighth Congress of the S.D.P.L., at the beginning 
of 1909, the demand for the confiscation of eo~eshchi~ land 
and for a separate agrarian proqramme was ellmln~on the 
grounds that the destruction of the large estates and the 
conversion of the agricultural proletariat into petty pro-
prietors (by means of the division of the land) was harmful 
to the working class. 57 
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The preceding account serves to demonstrate that these ~1arxists, 
quite independently and for their own reasons, had come to defend a 
basically identical agrarian programme, one, moreover, \'!hich typically 
was advocated by the radical "leftists" in the Bolshevik party until 
1929. Furthermore, the basic principles that were emphasised in this 
programme - the belief that large-scale agriculture \'las necessarily 
more efficient than peasant farming, and the categorisation of the 
peasantry as a virulently reactionary class - hearken back to those 
espoused by r·larx and Engels themselves. 
These "Left Communists': too demanded the preservation of large-
scale agriculture as the ,economically necessary foundation for the 
future system of socialist agriculture; the breaking-up of this would 
also strengthen the peasantry, a counter-revolutionary class. ~1oreover 
they accepted the proviso of the t:founc'ing fathers 11 against the use of 
force to coerce the peasants into a collective system of agriculture; 
rather they were to be left in possession of the land vlhich they farmed 
and rersuaded, hopefully by the exampl e of the more productive communes 
set up on the large estates, voluntarily to relinquish independent 
farming and establish their own cooperative forms of agriculture. 
On the other hand, an analysis of Lenin's approach to the 
agrarian question convincingly proves that he was prepared to jettison 
the prescriptions of orthodox Marxism whenever he felt that such action 
was required to secure the support of the peasant majority behind the 
revolutionary Russian proletariat, or its state. 
It is important, however, to realise that Lenin too accepted the 
traditional doctrine that small peasant farming was destined to be 
replaced by the superior large-scale mode of agriculture which would 
become the basis for socialist collective farming. 58 In the early summer 
of 1917, less than half a year before he agreed to the division of the 
large estates among the peasantry, he maintained that "the party of the 
proletariat must make it clear that small scale farming under commodity 
production cannot save mankind from poverty and oppression. ,,59 ~10reover 
Lenin also had no illusions about the class nature of the peasantry 
and their attitude tovlards socialism. In the middle of 1918 Lenin 
defended the cl ass i ca 1 Marxi s t categorisati on of the peasantry, arguing 
that "they [the peasants] are guided by no other ideals than their own 
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narrow interests," that "they are against us. They do not believe in 
the nel'J order. ,,60 
However Lenin did not carry out the agrarian programme consonant 
with these traditional Marxist premises. In 1917 he supported the 
division of the land among the peasants; subsequently in 1921, in 
response to peasant opposition to the forcible extraction of their 
grain and to the state monopoly in trade, as well as their reluctance 
to participate in collective forms of agriculture, Lenin introduced the 
NEP which placated the peasants by replacing the prodrazverstka by a 
limited tax in kind, by allowing the free marketing of any surpluses 
left after this tax, and by giving them the right to farm individually 
if they so desired. 
At the basis of Lenin's refusal to adhere to the classical 
Marxist agrarian programme was a realistic evaluation of the conse-
quences which would flow from implementing it. He came to understand 
that strict enforcement of this programme in the Russian Empire would 
so alienate the peasant majority that the chances of the Bolsheviks' 
successfully seizing and consolidating political power ..,Jould be 
gravely jeopardised. 
Since the early 1900's, and particularly since the revolution of 
1905, Lenin had become very aware of the revolutionary potential of 
the peasants in the struggle against the autocracy. To win them to 
the side of revolution he \1/a5 prepared to modify the accepted t1arxist 
agrarian programme, even up to the point of acquiescing in the peasants' 
confiscation and division of the pome~~chiJ52' lands. 61 In 1917 he 
adopted a similar strategy to secure peasant support for the Bolsheviks' 
overthrow of the Provisional Government. Grm'ling realisation of the 
peasants' and agri cultura 1 1 abourers' "1 and hungerll whi ch was evi dent 
in their "spontaneous" seizure of.:the pomeshchiks' estates during 1917 
led him pragmatically to abandon his proposal to establish collective 
farms on these lands after the revolution. Instead he agreed to the 
division of these estates among the peasants, in the belief that only 
this policy could assure the Bolsheviks of the peasants' support and 
prevent their desertion to the side of counter-revolution. Lenin 
defended himself by arguing that the primary objective of the Bolsheviks 
in lSl7 should be the seizure of political power. If concessions to 
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the peasantry, such as land division, were required to ensure the 
success of this action, then such a move was tactically permissible -
and, moreover, perfectly consistent with narxism, which in his opinion 
was just a "guide to action, not a dogma" -, since after the revolution 
it would be possible to convince the peasants of the advantages of 
large-scale, "mechanised socialist agriculture. He summarised his 
position as follows: 
The peasants want to preserve their small farms, to distri-
bute the land on an equal basis, and periodically to equa-
lise their holdings .... Let them do so. No sensible 
socialist will part from the poor peasantry because of 
this ... provided political power has been transferred to 
the proletariat, the rest [the formation of socialist 
agriculture] will come quite naturally, as the result of 
"force of example", prompted by experience itself. 
The transfer of nolitical Dower to the nroletariat -
this is the essential ihing .... 62 . 
Lenin, of course, offered a theoretical justification of this 
policy. Unlike his "leftist" prota90nists he argued that the large 
estates in the Russian Empire were feudal 1atifundia, not capitalist 
farms. Therefore he contended that it was in fact a progressive oolicy 
to divide these estates among the peasants for this would allow the 
rapid development of capitalist agriculture, \-lith the consequent dif-
ferentiation of the rural population into a prosperous peasantry and an 
agricultural proletariat. The latter would then become the ally of 
the industrial proletariat in its struggle for socia1ism. 63 
All theorising about the defensibility of land division from the 
viewpoint of ~1arxist doctrine apart, there is no doubt that this policy 
was a realistic response to the attitudes and aspirations of the 
peasants and agri cultura 1 labourers. t1any contemporary accounts demon-
strate that conventional r·1arxist agrarian policy, directed towards the 
establishment of socialist agriculture, had no appeal for the rural 
poor. On the contrary, they reveal the desire of this stratum to 
divide the large pomeshchik estates and to cond~ct individual farming 
on these 1 ands . 
Lenin was not the only Bolshevik to perceive that these aspira-
tions existed among the rural poor. An unsigned editorial in Izvestiia 
in January, 1918 stated that the land socialisation law was just a 
de facto ratification of the egalitarian land division which the 
j 
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peasants had been independently carrying out since the collapse of 
the autocracy in February, 1917.64 Klementii, who defended the Leninist 
approach to land socialisation, also contended that an egalitarian 
land division was the only oractical response to peasant aspirations. 
He shared Lenin's opinion that no subjective basis for a socialist 
reorganisation of agriculture existed since the peasants longed to 
divide the pomeshchiks' land; therefore he accepted that the land 
socialisation law was a necessary measLlre at that time. 65 v. ~1esh­
cheriakov, also a supporter of'lenin's agrarian policy, in view of the 
peasants' psychology questioned the viability of a socialist transforma-
tion of agriculture in the immediate post-revolutionary period: 
But was it really possible to undertake in November, as an 
immediate task, the bringing about of socialism - the system 
of socialised labour on socialised land? Ever'ybody can 
understand that this was not possible .... The peasant 
masses have no idea what socialism means and want only a 
free additional allotment of land on egalitarian principles. 
We had to accepttha t programme as it was. . .. Though the 
law is a considerable improvement on the old order there is 
not a grain of socialism in it .... 66 
Desoite the different agrarian conditions in Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Poland, where there were more individual peasant small-holdings 
and a larger rural oroletariat than in Great Russia, the asoirations 
of the poor peasants and agricultural labourers there corresponded to 
those of their Russian counterparts. They too were interested in 
acquiring their own piece of land, not in the reorganisation of agri-
culture into the collective farms that were regarded as appropriate 
for socialism. 
S. Pestkovskii, an astute Bolshevik observer of the Soviet revolu-
tion in Lithuania, maintained that the Lithuanian peasants sought the 
division of the pomeshchiks' estates among themselves, not the estab-
lishment of communes on these lands as the revolutionary governme'nt 
proposed. 67 Even Anqarietis, the Commissar of Agriculture who drew 
up this government's agrarian programme, admitted that the peasants 
were only interested in the division of the lanrl, althouqh at the same 
time he argued that this was an unacceptable policy for r·1arxist revolu-
t o ° 68 lonanes. 
The situation in Latvia proved to be the same. Krastyn has 
gathered much evidence in support of the contention that the small and 
J 
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and landless peasants there also wanted an egalitarian division of the 
land rather than the creation of communes on the large estates. 69 He 
cites the statement of a Latvian peasant, Sobolev, made at a conference 
of non-party workers and peasants of the Rezhitskii uezd in 1919, as 
representative of the attitude of the peasants. Sobolev declared that 
"the peasants who sent him [to the conference] asked him to say that 
the land should be the people's, that a peasant should have as much 
land as he could work v/ithout hired labour.,,70 The attitudes of the 
small peasants and agricultural labourers in Poland turned out to be 
no exception to this pattern. Certainly, Marchlewski claimed that the 
rural proletariat in Poland did not want any division of the land since 
they realised that because of the land shortage in Poland such a 
measure would only result in the creation of a series of unviable dwarf 
farms .11 Yet, in retrospect, it appears that r1archlewski 's assessment 
was mistaken. Subsequent studies indicate that the proletariat and 
semi-proletariat in the Polish countryside in fact were bent on the 
division of the existing large estates into inrlividual small-holdings 
rather than on the communal cultivatinn of these that the S.D.K.P.iL. 
72 advocated. Moreover, there are qrounds for accepting this latter 
conclusion. At its Second Congress, in 1923, the Communist Party of 
Poland, the successor of the S.D.K.P.iL., abandoned the agrarian pro-
gramme traditionally defended by revolutionary t1arxists in Poland. 
It now declared that the victory of socialist revolution in Poland 
depended on the alliance (smychka) betv/een the proletariat and the 
peasants, to guarantee which it renounced its former insistence that 
the large estates should be preserved intact as the foundation for 
collective socialist agriculture in favour of a policy of ~~land to the 
7" peasants" . .) It is plausible to regard this reversal of policy by 
the Polish Marxists as tacit admission that their previous estimate of 
the aspirations of the rural poor had been incorrect, and also as an 
indication that they had come to understand that concessions to the 
peasants' hunger for land was vital if their support was to be won. 
The preceding description of the "Left Communist" and Leninist 
agrarian policies raises a number of questions. First, there ;s the 
problem which the word "Left" itself connotes. In this case the word 
"Left" is a misnomer for the flLeft Communists" were in the mainstream 
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of orthodox Marxist thought, strictly following the teachings laid 
down by t1arx and Engels themselves. Lenin and his associates were the 
"deviants ll , pragmatically abandoning accepted doctrine when this threa-
tened to thwart the conquest and consolidation of ·power. 
At the same time, while the agrarian programrne of the !lLeft 
Communists" may have been more orthodox than that of Lenin and his 
associates, it cannot be considered to have been democratic, in the 
sense that it was designed to satisfy the demands of the people as a 
whole. On the contrary, the "Left Communists" were quite prepared to 
disregard totally tre desire for the land of the greater part of the 
peasantry, the majority of the population in the Russian Empire, on 
the grounds that any concessions to the individualist aspirations of 
the peasants would endanger the avowedly socialist character of the 
revo 1 ution . 
Second, so-called IlLeft Communism" proves to be a r.1ore widespread 
ideology than previous studies have indicated. The dominance of 
Leninism in the post-revolutionary period, as Itlell as a concentration 
on analysing the rival tendencies strictly within the Bolshevik party 
itself, have tended to relegate "Left Communism" .to a place on the 
periphery of the revolutionary r~arxist movement in the Russian Empire. 
On the basis of the above study it is plausible to postulate that the 
doctrinaire "Left Communist ll approach to the agrarian question was 
more typical of revolutionary r~arxists than the path of expediency 
followed by Lenin. 
Finally, there is the fundamental question of the viability of 
the "Left Communist" ideology. The claim that implementation of the 
"Left Communist" agrarian programme alienated the peasantry from the 
revolutionary regimes is credible. The peasants simply wanted land, 
irrespective of whether f·1arxist theory regarded this as reactionary or 
not. A proletarian dictatorship v/hich failed to satisfy this demand 
would be faced by a recalcitrant peasantry and its prospects for sur-
vival in a peasant dominated country can justifiably be doubted. An 
examination of the abortive Soviet revolutlons in Lithuania, Latvia 
and Poland gives much credence to this argument for the failure of 
the revolutionary governments there to secure peasant support was a 
principal cause of their downfall. 
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In Lithuania the refusal of the Soviet government to satisfy 
peasant IIland hunger" by a division of the large pomeshchik estates -
and the stripping from the small peasant proprietors of all their 
political rights - disillusioned the peasants and caused them to desert 
the revolution. Hence they \'/ere left prey to the influence of the 
counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie which was qUick to seize on this 
peasant disaffection in its struggle to overthrow the revolutionary 
regime.?4 The Lithuanian bourgeoisie won the support of the peasants 
by promising an allotment of land to everyone of them who voluntarily 
joined the \tJhite Army .15 
The same phenomenon occurred in Latvia. The revolutionary govern-
ment's rejection of land division - and its conversion of existing 
peasant property into public land to be rented from the state - alien-
ated the peasantry and rural proletariat and laid them open to suasion 
by forces of counter-revolution. As one Soviet commentator on the 
abortive revolution in Latvia has remarked: 
But for the counter-revolution this "destruction of the 
property of the peasants'1 created a great opportunity 
for speculation 6n the private property instincts of the 
peasants. At the same time the broad masses of the land-
less peasantry who were the real sunport for Soviet power, 
practically~ for the realisation of their dream about land, 
received nothing. Before them, as far as they did not 
become lessees or polovniki, was open only one perspective; 
work in socialist "farge-scale enterprises where by l~~ they 
did not even h~ve the right to own their own cattle. 
Likewise in Poland the agrarian programme advocated by the S.O.K.P.iL. 
failed to attract the small and landless peasants to the side of the 
revolution. Preservation of the large estates intact for communal socia-
list farming had no appeal for them. They too wanted their own indivi-
dual plot of land and the peasant parties which promised this to them 
easily outbid the S.D.K.P.iL. for the loyalty and support of this 
majority of the Polish population.?? 
Indeed, it appears that the revolutionary r1arxists in Poland, 
Latvia and Lithuania themselves came to realise that their failure to 
\vin the support of the peasantry vIas an important contributory factor 
in their failure to win power. In the early 1920's they independently 
revised their agrarian programmes, abandoning their earlier calls for 
the preservation of the large estates intact .. Nmv they adopted policies 
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that \lJere clearly Leninist in spirit. They conceded that it was neces-
sary to satisfy the aspirations of the poor peasants and landless 
labourers by dividing the land amongst them if they ",ere to be attracted 
into the revolutionary struggle to overthrow the existing bourgeois 
regime. 
The revolution only survived in Russia itself, albeit at the 
cost of temporary concessions to the peasants. In 1921 amidst a sea 
of peasant insurrections the vulnerability of the revolutionary regime 
to peasant opposition was clearly evident. Then Lenin recognised that 
the transition to the NEP was vital in order to appease the insurgent 
peasants. He realised that it was necessary to bend to peasant pres-
sure if the Bolsheviks were to stay in power - and in the lon~ run 
construct a socialist society in Russia. 
One conclusion is obvious from this account. Although the "Left 
Communists" correctly evaluated the peasants as an anti-socialist class, 
that is, one that was intent on defending its individual property 
against the collectivism that was an integral principle of socialism, 
every time their interests were ignored the revolution was either threa-
tened or destroyed. Strict adherence to orthodox Marxist doctrines 
and the seizure and consolidation of political power aoparently were 
mutually incompatible in the Russian Empire. Lenin \'/as very aware of 
this potential pm'ler of the peasants to overthrow the dictatorship of 
the proletariat and accordingly made concessions to them in the interests 
of preserving the then fragile Bolshevik government. Only in 1929 when 
the Bolsheviks had become more secure and possessed ample means of 
coercion did they act to remove once and for all this class, which as 
long as it existed would threaten the security of the Soviet regime. 
On Stalin's initiative agriculture was forcibly collectivised - and 
the peasantry eliminated as an independent political force in Soviet 
Russia. 
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Chapter 5. 
THE ORGArnSATION OF niE DICTlHORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT. 
After devoti ng the precedi ng t\'10 chapters to an exami na ti on of 
the "Left Communists I" attitude towards the role of two of the important 
segments of imperial Russian society, the national minorities and the 
peasantry, in the anticipated socialist revolution, it is no\'l a logical 
step to proceed to an examination of the attitude of these t1arxists 
tm'lards the role lt/hich they assigned to the proletariat in the revolu-
tionary transition to socialism. As has already been shovtn, they, 
unlike V. I. Lenin, denied that the peasantry or nationalities could 
act as allies of the proletariat in this revolution. At the same time, 
they defended the belief that once the revolutionary overthrow of 
capitalism had been accomplished the consolidation of the socialist 
system necessarily required that the proletariat as a whole be allowed 
to actively participate in its construction. At the root of this stand 
was the conviction, however illusory it might seem in retrospect, that 
the proletariat had the natural abilities successfully to complete 
this task - in fact, the "Left Communist" movement of 1918 even took 
pride in calling itself a "proletarian communist" movement. l Lenin, 
on the other hand, adopted a less optimistic view of the capabilities 
of the proletariat "spontaneously" to bring about the revolutionary 
transition to socialism. He believed that the proletariat was incap-
able of acquiring the level of political consciousness necessary for 
this in the course of its routine struggle to extract economic conces-
sions from the capitalist system - at best, it would achieve a ~trade 
union consciousness,,2 - and, therefore, that an outside agent would 
be essential to lead the pr61etariat into the "kingdom of freedom." 
From this premise he developed the theory that the formation of a 
party of self-conscious professional revolutionaries usually from the 
intelligentsia, was vital in order that this vanguard could instil 
into the otherwise backv/ard proletariat the requisite socialist con:-
sciousness. In fact, numerous of his declarations to the contrary, 
Lenin refused to entrust the development and successful completion 
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of the socialist transformation of society to the independent actions 
of the \'JOrkers but rather assigned this task to tI-Je party. 
In order to understand more clearly these differing views on 
the role of the proletariat in the building of socialism held by the 
"Left Communi s ts II and Leni n, a difference t'efl ected in thei r divergent 
opinions on the proper methods of organising the post-revolutionary 
state, it is first essential to place their ideas in the context of 
~1arxist thought on this subject. As a preliminary, therefore, a brief 
analysis of Marx's and Engels' own teachings will be instructive. In 
this case, it will be pertinent to focus attention, first, on their 
own theory of the origins of a revolutionary socialist consciousness 
and, related to this, their views on the natural capacities of the 
proletariat to achieve this, and, second, on their own prescription 
of the principles and measures which should characterise the revolu-
ti onary s ta te. 
In broad, schematic terms, r·larx and Engels formulated a philo-
sophy of history in which history is seen as a orocess \'1herein man, 
as a consequence of the economic developments that had been the product 
., 
of his own actions, had gained an increased mastery over nature.~ Yet, 
despite this progress, they maintained that man still was alienated 
and oppressed and vwul d remain so until soci ety was roorgani sed on a 
communal and collective basis. They believed that this continuing 
estrangement of man was the result of the same economic developments 
which had led, on the one hand, to an increasing division of labour 
and, on the other, to the growth of private property, capital, in the 
means of production~ \'1hich had alienated man from the products of his 
labour. They were convinced, however, this oppression and alienation 
had culminated at the stage of bourgeois society, in which the capital-
is t mode of production had become extensively developed. They con-
tended that the flowering of capitalism had created both the objective 
economic preconditions - basically a high level of material wealth, 
the product of industrial growth - necessary for its overthrow and at 
the same time had created the class, the proletariat, vlhich would be 
its "gravedigger. 1I Thye predicted that the proletariat would rise and 
destroy the existing bourgeois order of state and society and replace 
this system by its ovm revolutionary dictatorship, vJhich would usher 
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in a new dawn in human history in which man for the first time VlOuld 
be free to control his own destiny. 
At first glance" the impression received from this schema of 
l'larx's and Engels' theory of history is fatalistic. It appears that 
they regarded the revolutionary destruction of capitalism by the prole-
tariat and the advent of socialism as inevitably determined by the 
objective process of economic, and, determined by this, political and 
social development. However, a closer, more accurate examination of 
their thought reveals that this narrow, determinist interpretation of 
their historical philosophy is one-sided and wrong. While it is undeni-
able that their philosophy does possess a strong strand of determinism -
in general, they did believe that economic development was the ultimate 
cause of all movement in history and, more specifically, that the emer-
gence of the capitalist mode of production had created the objective 
prerequisites, somehow defined, for the transition to socialism4 
at the same time they insisted that it vias impossible to consider this 
transformation to be in any way automatically assured. On the contrary, 
they asserted that it still remained the task of men, in this case of 
the proletariat, to utilise these economically determined conditions 
to overthrow capitalism and reconstruct society on socialist foundations. 5 
This activist contention, that limen make their own history," 
albeit under given objective conditions,6 played a fundamental part 
in Marx's and Engels' thinking about the manner in which socialism 
would be realised. For them, socialism was not simply the destruction 
of capitalism anc! the system of private prorerty which characterised 
it. Although they considered this destruction to be an essential 
stage, they believed the quintessential aim of socialism to be the 
creation of a society in which man for the first time would be free to 
control his own destiny and, consequently, by overcoming his alienation 
be able to realise his t:truly human potentialities. lI? t'larx described 
the kernel of socialism as "the real appropriation of the human essence 
by and for man; ... therefore as the complete return of man to himself 
'1(' h )b" ,,8 as a socla l.e. uman, elng .... 
However, Marx and Engels denied that this change in man, the 
fundamental objective of socialism, could await the changed material 
conditions of life which would emerge in the socialist society of the 
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future. They emphatically believed that this "change in consciousness" 
could not occur merely as a consequence of a "change in circumstances", 
but that these changes must take place in conjuncture since, in their 
minds, this !:change in consciousness" was vital for the successful 
establishment of socialism itself. t1arx defended revolution as the 
only means to ensure this: 
80th for the production on a mass scale of this Communist 
consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, 
the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, an 
alteration which can only take place in a practical move-
ment a revolution: this revolution is necessary, therefore, 
not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown 
in any other way, but also because the class overthrwing 
it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of 
all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society 
ane"I.9 
At this juncture, however, the determinist strand in narx's and 
Engels' thought re-appears. They held fir~ to the belief that the 
development of capitalist society itself would automatically ensure 
this necessary change of consciousness within the proletariat, which 
had been thoroughly impoverished and dehumanised by this. Marx 
unequivocally asserted that the "very living conditions of the prole-
tariat under caritalism would bring it to a consciousness of its own 
inhumane situation and hence aware of the need to liberate itself."10 
Capitalism had unwittingly created this class in opposition to itself 
v/hich in its struggle for the overthrol:! of bourgeois society \'Jould 
become not only a "cl ass in itself" - a class as a result of its 
objective pcsition under caritalism - but a "class for itself" - a 
class both conscious of its common bonds and of the need to change 
. . h . t 11 1tS 1n umane eX1S ence. 
Convinced, therefore, that the proletariat would acquire a revolu-
tionary socialist consciousness as the natural consequ0.nce of its misery 
under capitalism and of its struggles against this system, they cate-
gorically rejected the notion that an external ~lite leadership was 
needed in order to bri n9 to the workers the cons ci ousness necess ary 
for their revolt against the bourgeois order and the creation of a 
socialist society. ~1arx bluntly attacked this concept: 
The emancipation of the working class must be the work of 
the working class itself. Ide cannot, therefore, cooperate 
with people who openly state that the workers are too 
uneducated to emancipate themselves and must first be 
freed from above by ohilanthropic big bourgeoisie an~ 
petty bourgeoisie.-12 
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From this it is clear that Marx and Engels had no truck with 
B1anquism, the basic postulate of which was that a strictly organised 
and disciplined party of self-conscious revolutionaries could substi-
tute itself for the masses in the overthrow of capitalism and maintain 
itself in pO\;'er by di ctatori a 1 measures unti 1 mass support coul d be 
mobilised. 13 In fact, there is little in their thought which points 
to a role for an organised party of Communists, separate from and 
standing above the mass of the workers. They regarded Communists 
chiefly as lithe most advanced and resolute section of the working class 
parti es of every country ... vlhi ch pushes forward a 11 others; on the 
other hand, theoreti ca 11y, they have over the great mass of the pro 1 e-
tariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the 
conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian move-
ment. 1I14 
Aoart from this firm conviction that the proletariat v{Qu1d con-
sciously secure its own liberation from the miseries of capitalism, 
Marx and En0els also bequeathed to their successors a programme, admit-
tedly rudimentary and incomplete - they left behind no definitive 
blueprint for the construction of socialist society'5 -, of practical 
measures which they considered to be essential in the transition to 
socialism. Moreover, an examination of their proposals makes it 
plausible to postulate that these were designed to ensure that the 
workers remained in control of their revolutionary state, which would 
consequently allow them to take an active part in the building of 
socialism. 
A great part of Marx's and Engels' thinking about the institu-
tional structure appropriate for the revolutionary workers' state 'lIas 
inspired by the spectacular but brief victory of the workers of the 
Paris Commune, which was regarded, rarticularly by Engels, as an embry-
onic dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, an examination of 
their reflections on the experiences of the Commune will provide some 
insight into their vision of the structure which the post-revolutionary 
state should acquire. 
In broad terms, Marx and Engels asserted that the first, yet 
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vital step towards the socialist transformation of society was the 
destruction of the existing bourgeois state. The Commune confirmed, 
they declared, that lithe working class cannot simply lay hold of the 
ready made [bourgeoii) State machinery, and wield it for its own 
purposes;,,16 in other words, the proletariat could not build social-
ism \-lith the institutions of the bourgeois state. On the contrary, 
it had to replace this with its o',-m revolutionary state - the dictator-
ship of the proletariat - which, after an undefined period of trans-
ition from capitalism to socialism had been accomplished under its 
alls pi ces, itself wou 1 d "wither away. II 
In particular, t1arx and Engels welcomed the assault made by the 
Communards on the bureaucratic~ hierarchic and centralised character 
of the institutions of the bourgeois state. They praised the establish-
ment of the principle of the election of all officials, v/ho could be 
removed at v"i11 by the workers, as an effective attack on bureaucracy, 
an attack \'/hi ch they felt was reinforced by the payment to all such 
officials of the average worker's wages.'? r1oreover, they also 
approved of "the radical decentralisation of pOVler and authority to 
local Communes proposed by the Parisian Communards, although at the 
same time they, distinct from the anarchists, insisted on the need to 
maintain some form of central 90vernment, again to be elected by and 
responsible to the workers, to exercise the fe"l, but important national 
functions which they argued would remain after the revolution. Further, 
they especially endorsed the abolition of the regular army, standing 
above the populace, in favour of a militia of armed workers under the 
leadership of elected officers; the other coercive arm which the bour-
geois state possessed, the police, was also ~o become responsible to 
and revocable by the elected representatives of the ~eople. They 
claimed that such a programme of measures would guarantee lithe self-
government of the producers. ,,18 Summarising his interpretation of the 
Significance of tr.e Commune, ~1arx declared that it Itlas "essentially 
a \vorkinCJ-class qovernment. ... the nolitical form at last discovered 
to work out the ~conomic emancipati~n of labour.,,19 
Hhile defending the political programme implemented by the Com-
mune, Marx also firmly supported its plans for the expropriation of 
private property. He feared that if the "economic foundations ll of 
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the old order were not destroyed, if control over production was left 
in the hands of the bourgeoisie, then the political rule of the workers 
was doomed. 20 To prevent thi s defeat, it was vita 1 that the v/orkers 
themse lves take over the owners hi rand admi ni strati on of producti on. 
In retrosrect, Engels even held that the sin01e most important decree 
of the Commune was that which established the principle of the workers' 
t 1 f · d t 21 con ro 0 1n us ry. 
Finally, apart from their commendation of the particular politi-
cal and economic measures enacted by the Commune, ~1arx and Engels also 
considered it to be living proof of their basic oremise that the 
workers would independently find their own path to salvation. Marx 
proclaimed that the Communards, even in the most arduous of circum-
stances, had demonstrated the spontaneous capabilities of the nrole-
tariat to destroy the bourgois order and organise their ovm revolu-
tionary state, a major step,in the transition to socialism. Marx 
extolled this facet of the Communards' experiment: 
L'lhatever the merits of the single measures of the Commune, 
its qreatest measure was its ovm orqanisation, extemnorised 
with the Foreign Enemy at one door and the class enemy at 
the other, rroving by its life its vitality, confirr.ling 
its thesis by its action. 22 
Before analysing the different positions which the "Left Commu-
nists" and Lenin adopted on the question of proletarian der.locracy, a' 
brief digression into the realm of nineteenth century Russian revolu-
tionary thought is necessary, in order to resolve one problem that 
will arise in the ensuing discussion. This problem focusses on the 
divergent interpretations of r1arxism held by the "Left Communists " and 
Lenin. They both claimed to be the heirs to the teachings of ~1arx and 
Engels, yet paradoxically their ideas on the construction of socialism, 
more specifically, on the role which must be allocated to the workers 
themselves in this process, were quite contradictory. 
HO\,fever, the difference between them 6n this point was certainly 
not a new phenomenon in the history of the revolutionary movement in 
the Russiar. Emrire. Similar disputes on ti~'part that the masses must 
play in the socialist transformation of society had been eviclent in 
the ranks of the Populists in the later nineteenth century. The major 
issue which had divided these revolutionaries revolved around this 
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same question and in many respects foreshadowed the divergent stands 
that the "Left Communists ll and Lenin took regarding proletarian 
democracy. 
The positions adopted in the 1870 ls by P. N. Tkachev, on tte one 
hand, and by the members of Zemlia i Volia, then the dominant strand 
of revolutionary Populism, on the other, clearly revealed what the 
essential differences of opinion were on this issue. A follower of 
P. G. Zaichnevskii, one of the first Russian revolutionaries to espouse 
"Jacobinll ideas, Tkachev insistently denied that the masses lion their 
0'1'" initiative [would] begin to fight against the misery that surrounds 
them. 1123 In other words, he gravely doubted the spontaneous abi 1 i ti es 
of the peasantry to ri se and overthrow the autocracy. On the contrary, 
he maintained that it was necessary to establish a self-conscious 
vanguard, which, given the political repression that was present in 
tsarist Russia, h'ad to take the form of a highly centralised, disci-
plined and conspiratorial party of professional revolutionaries, which 
then could exploit the existing qrievances of the people and channel 
them into a revolt directed against absolutism. 24 
Tkachev continued, moreover, that even after the oporessive 
state machine had been destroyed, state pov/er itself would not imme-
diately IIwither away.1I Instead, he believed that the revolutionary 
vanguard must preserve the state, now transformed into a revolutionary 
dictatorship, and use its power to establish a new social order, based 
on the principles of freedom and equality, since he feared that left 
to their own devices the masses would be equally unable to complete 
the work of social reconstruction successfully.25 
Yet Tkachev was not in the mainstream of revolutionary thought 
durin9 the 1870 1 s. In fact, it appears that the majority of Populists, 
defending the rectitude of the principle of lithe hegemony of the masses 
over the educated elite, n26 violently objected to Tkachev IS ideas. 
Bas i ca 11y, they feared that after the overthroll/ of the autocracy in 
the fashion that Tkachev proposed the revolutionary vanguard vJOuld 
perpetuate itself in polt/er and forgo the rarlical transformation of 
soci ety, in the name of whi ch it had sei zed power. 27 
Admittedly, in the late 1870's a substantial segment of Zemlia 
i Volia in part adopted Tkachevls programme, in the belief that the 
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success of their "to the people ll movement depended upon the conquest 
of political freedom. This group was to form the nucleus of Narodnaia 
Volia, which emphasised that the autocracy had to be overthrovm, by 
conspiratorial and terrorist methods if necessary, in order that the 
struggle for social revolution could be continued su~cessfully. Indeed, 
they were quite prepared to accept that a revolutionary vanguard could 
carry out the initial pO.litical revolution, but once this had been 
accomplished they insisted that power should be transferred immediately 
into the hands of the masses, whom they assumed would rise spontaneously 
in response to the actions of the vanguard. 28 
Even then, however, many revolutionaries refused to have any 
truck with such notions of cons!1iratorial revolution and remained true 
to their democratic princioles. For example, G.< V. Plekhanov, both 
as a Populist and then as a Marxist, remained convinced that a social 
revolution could only be aC:lieved by the action of the masses them-
selves, that "the emancipation of the workers should be accomplished 
by the workers themselves." Indeed, it often apDears that he consis-
te~tly defended the proDosition that the successful socialist trans-
formati on of soci ety depended vita 1l.v on the lise If-prope 11 ed activity 
f h II • '"t?9 ate masses , n carry' ng, out .. -
Nevertheless, a certain dichotomy \I/as also evident in Plekhanov's 
position on this question. He too appears to have doubted the ability 
of the mass of the workers spontaneously, in the course of their daily 
economic struggles, to acquire the level of political consciousness 
that he considered to be necessary if they were successfully to carry 
out a re~olutionary socialist overthrow of capitalism. Consequently, 
he assigned a special role to the socialist intelligentsia, who alone 
could "bring [this necessary] consciousness into the working class.,,30 
Yet at the same time he put careful limits on' the part that this intel-
. / ligentsia was to play. He did not contend, apparently, that an elite 
organisation of intellectuals could substitute themselves for the 
masses as the sole conscious driving force of the revolution. Indeed, 
while he believed that the intelligentsia must "elucidate for. them 
[the mass of the workers] the princi pa 1 points II of their programme, he 
still insisted that the workers too had an important, independent role 
to perform in this process~ namely, that t!1e "detailed elaboration 
223 
of [theitj programme must, of course, be left to the Horkers them-
1 ,,31 se ves .... 
Accordingly; there are grounds for questioning whether Plekhanov's 
commitment to the principle of a democratic revolution, made solely and 
independently by the workers, I'Jas as unambiva 1 ent as some commentators 
have suggested. 32 However, the opposite point of view, that Lenin 
alone, by subscribin0 to and developing the idea that a strictly orga-
nised elite party of intellectuals was absolutely vital in order to 
guide, ev'en cajole the otherwise politically backv/ard proletariat into 
carrying out the socialist revolution, since independently it would 
not, and could not attain the required revolutionary consciousness in 
its day to day confrontations with capitalism, was in fact the right-
?? 
ful heir of Plekhanov is itself a one-sided conclusion.~J 
Rather, it seems correct to contend that Plekhanov's Marxism 
vias open to two divergent, yet legitimate interpretations - the demo-
cratic and the dictatorial, or Jacobin. 34 , While Lenin e~phasised an~ 
elaborated upon the latter strand in Plekhanov's thought, the democra-
tic strand also found its disciples. In the 1390's a number of Russian 
tlarxists, notably represented by S. N. Prokopovich and E. D. Kuskova 
among others, were highly critical of the almost Blanquist notion 
inherent in the r1arxist northodoxy" bequeathed to them by Plekhanov 
that the success of socialist revolution was more dependent on the 
actions of the intellectual leadership than of the mass of the vJorl':ers 
themselves. Stressing the importance of the independent role of the 
workers in the struggle for, and eventual victory of socialism, they 
insisted that every possible encouragement should be given to them to 
organise themselves as a means whereby they could achieve the neces-
sary political consciousness to fulfil their historical mission. 35 
In fact, the Russian t,1arxistmovement, as the Populist movement 
before it, was almost continually plagued by a similar division into 
"Jacobin" and "democratic" wings. One obvious manifestation of this 
characteristic vias the split of the Russian Social Democratic ltlorkers' 
Party (R.S.D.t~.P.) into a !ldemocratic<l ;·1enshevik and a "Jacobin" Bol-
shevik faction after 1903 - although before 1905 the Mensheviks them-
selves ""ere not noteworthy for the democratic organisation of the party 
committees that they controlled. 36 Later, however, and much more 
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pertinent to the following analysis, the Bolsheviks themselves were 
to be separated on the same broad lines. On the one hand, the "left" 
Bolsheviks defended the democratic principles within Marxism - and 
indigenous Russian revolutionary thought. Lenin's interpretation of 
~larxism, on the other hand, continued to be characterised by elements 
if not directly derived from, at least consistent with the ideas 
espoused by Tkachev and the Russian "Jacobins:'. Just as before 1917 
he had insisted that an organised and disciplined party of revolution-
aries alone could hone to overthrow the autocracy, so after the October 
revolution he clung to the belief that such a party was still necessary 
to direct the workers, themselves lacking the necessary political 
consciousness, ~ the construction of socialism. 
Certainly, an examination of the thought of the various "Left 
Communist" gt·oups on the role It/hich the proletariat should play in the 
construction of socialism makes it nlausible to postulate that, as 
adherents of the teachings of r~arx and EnCJels, they shared the latter's 
belief that the lasting victory of socialism required that the prole-
tariat take a conscious and independent part in this task. At the 
same time, they also defended as vital a number of nrinciples which 
Marx and Engels held to be inalienable features of the organisational 
structure of the revolutionary state, infue fear that any abandonment 
of these principles would threaten the workers' control of the revolu-
tion ann their creative particination in building of socialism. If 
this haopened, they warned that the revolution would deqenerate. 
Despite the occasional variations in the arguments presented 
by the various groups of "Left Communist:' in defence of proletarian 
democracy, the contention still remains that they all ",ere essentially 
defending the freedom for the workers themselves to actively partici-
pate in the task of socialist construction. However, given these 
disparities, in the interests of clarity it is expedient to examine 
the positions adopted by these qroups in turn. Therefore, the ideas 
of the three major oppositions to Lenin within the Bolshevik party in 
the period 1918 till 1921 - the "Left Communist" movement of 1918, the 
Democratic Centralists and the ltJorkers' Opposition - on what they held 
to be the correct methods of soc; ali s t cons tructi on w; 11 be ana lysed 
first. Subsequently, once the essence of their thought has been 
225 
divined, an analysis of the vievls of the revolutionary 1Jlarxist \flings 
in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania on the part of t~e proletariat in the 
achievement of socialism \'/i11 be given. limvever, since in these 
regions the revolutions failed to survive for any length of time, the 
debates on the Droper methods of organising the revc-)utionary state 
did not have time to develoD as they did within the ranks of the Bol-
sheviks in Russia. Yet some indication of the thinkinq of these 
Marxists on this issue can be obtai~ed by an examination of their 
words and deeds, where appropriate, both in the pre-revolutionary 
years and during their brief spells in power. 
Gefore proceeding to examine the conflict between the afore-
mentioned left oppositions to Lenin over the question of the organi-
sation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Soviet Russia, it 
will prove useful to look at the contention that in 1°17 the Bolsheviks 
as a whole, including Lenin, held in common a set of premises on which 
they believed that the revolutionary state should be founded. Hhile 
a number of critics in retrosrect have argued that the principles 
espoused by the Bolsheviks in 1917 did not form a comprehensive and 
coherent political and economic programme for the construction of 
socialism in Russia and, consequently, that this lack of a practical 
Horthodox Rolshevi sm !l37 left the door oren for future doctrinal debates 
on this fjuestion, ~this does not mean that at the time the Bolsheviks 
did not believe that these principles had to be incorporated in the 
organisation of the revolutionary state. Indeed, the Colsheviks them-
selves readily admitted that in 1917 they had not sufficiently thought 
out beforehand the measures vlhich 1:lould ensure the implementation of 
their ideals. 38 However, this does not remove the need to understand 
that in 1917 there did exist an orthodox "Bolshevism", albeit in the 
form of a set of general principles which future experience proved to 
be unrealistic, and that the ensuin~ debates among the Rolsheviks 
revolved around the question of the means by which to realise these 
principles 
An examination of the views held by the Bolsheviks in 1017 on 
the structure of the dictatorship of the proletariat and on the methods 
of socialist construction serves to justify the contention that in 
1 a rge part these were inherited from (·1arx I sand Enge 1 s 1 ovm refl ecti ons .39 
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The Bolsheviks too accepted that first of all the existing bourgeois 
state would have to be smashed. By the beginning of 1917 Lenin himself 
had co~e to agree that N. I. Bukharin had been correct when he had 
earlier advocated such action. 40 Later, after his return to Russia in 
April, he found it necessary to convert his fellow Bolsheviks there to 
this point of view, since under the leadership of L. B. Kamenev ann 
J. V. Stalin, they had become reconciled to the fact that it would be 
necessary to support the Provisional Government for ar ur.detcrrr.ined, 
yet apparently lenqthy period, until the prerequisites for socialist 
revolution had matured .. Lenin vlOuld have none of this, on the contrary 
insistin0 that this bourgeois rf~gime must be overthrown. He argued 
that this must be done in such a way that would involve the destruc-
ti on of the exi sting bureaucrati c and central i sed system of government, 
v/hich would be replaced by a decentralised administration of soviets, 
elected by the vJOrkers 10cally.41 Hide pov/ers of autonomy Vlere to he 
granted to these soviets, although a central government, also elected 
by and responsible to the workers, would be established too in order 
to carry out functions of a national character. Furthermore, the stand-
ing army, as \tlell as the police, \"/as to be abolished, in favour of 
a workers I militia in which the officers too would be elected from the 
ran ks. t:oreover, in order to des troy the economi c pO'lJer of the bourge-
oisie, the basis of its political supremacy, land, the banks and large-
scale industry were to be nationalised and the administration of these 
was to be placed under the strict control of the local organs of the 
workers. 42 As Lenin was to repeatedly claim in 1~17, such a state, 
in which all Dower resided in the hands of the workers I soviets, could 
be equated v4ith r·1arx IS and Engels I ovm ideas on the Paris Comnune.43 
Yet while these measures 1'Jere perfectly consistent wi th r1arx IS 
and Engels I own prescriptions, the Bolsheviks developed in more detail 
their own distinct ideas on the structure of the revolutionary state. 
The noti on of the sovi ets as the organs of the revo 1 uti onary rul e of 
the workers \-laS a peculiarly Russian concept, \'/hich presumably was 
based on the experiences of the 1905 revolution when these bodies 
spontaneously arose to become the representative institutions of the 
revolutionary proletariat. In addition, th= 8olsheviks, perhaps influ-
enced by the anarcho-syndicalist views which were then quite v.Jidespread 
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in the ranks of European socialists, emphasised t!lat factory-plant 
committees (fabzavkomy) I'lere to be the primary units of industrial 
administration, at the enterprise level. 44 Further, they allocated a 
s pecifi c role to the old bourgeoi s managers and techni ci ans - the 
later much maligned spetsy - in the new administration of industry, 
yet they were to be under the direct control of and stri ctly account-
able to the elected organs of the workers. 45 Moreover, to ensure fur-
ther against the evils of bureaucratic self-seeking, the Golsheviks 
insisted, as t1larx and Engels had done, that these sp~tsy, like all 
other officials in the proletarian state, were only to be paid an 
average worker's wage. 
The goal to which the Bolsheviks aspired, as far as it can be 
deduced from the principles that they espoused throughout 1917, can be 
described succinctly. It is perfectly justifiable to accept the con-
clusion that at that time they envisaged post-revolutionary Russia to 
be an egalitarian commune state administered from below by the workers 
themselves .46 
In the spring of 1918, however~ about six months after the seizure 
of POlt/er, a srlit developed within the Rolshevikss between the "Left 
Communists!! and Lenin and his associates, over the issue of whether an 
administrative structure based on the principles espoused in 1~17 
would be able to effectively restore Soviet Russia's economy, ravaged 
by the costs and dislocations of the war and revolution, as well as 
by the disruptions caused- by the spontaneous establishment of Itlorkers' 
control itself,47 to the level from Itlhich the transition to socialism 
would be possible. In the face of stark experiences which cast doubt 
on the effectiveness of vlOrkers' control as a means to economi c recovery, 
Lenin pragmatically jettisoned the "utopian ll programme of 1917 - a 
proqramme of which he had at times been a passionate advocate - in 
favour of an alternative policy of industrial administration, also 
discernible in his thinking of 1917.48 
In glaring contradiction to the vision of the post-revolutionary 
di cta to rshi p as ria statel ess soci ety admini stered sDontaneously and 
democrati ca lly by the working c1 ass, ,,49 Leni n proposed that the Sovi et 
government should establish an economic order modelled on the system 
of state capitalism in order to revive Russia 1 s fast failing economy. 
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He decl ared that the use of state capital ism would be both to the imme-
diate material benefit of the workers as well as a great leap forward 
in the transition to socialism, provided that the proletariat, in the 
50 form of its revolutimary state, remained in control of this system. 
Reiterating a number of ideas on methods of organisation which he had 
previously expressed in the late summer of 1917,51 Lenin maintained 
that to achieve a successful transition to socialism it was vital to 
preserve and strengthen the most advanced and progressive features of 
capitalist economic organistion. The banks, trusts, syndicates and 
other large-scale, centralised organisations, such as the postal service 
and the consumer societies, which even under capitalism were bringing 
about increasing control and planning of the economy, were to be re-
tained and further developed by the revolutionary state as the orere-
quisites of the future socialist organisation of production. Hov/ever, 
in order that the utmost advantage be taken of this economic apparatus, 
Lenin argued that it would also be essential to utilise the services 
of the spets:[ \"Jho had the experience to administer this system - by 
breaching the principle of egalitarianism and paying them higher salaries 
if necessary .. since he believed that the workers thefTlselves v/ould be 
unable to immediately operate this system.5? Moreover, he also feared 
that decentralisation, the granting of widespread pmvcrs of administra-
tion in the economy to the fabzavkomy or the trade unions, and even 
to the local soviets, would reduce the efficiency of the methods of 
economic organisation that he was proposing and hence impede economic 
recovery. In effect, Lenin was advocating the preservation of a 
strictly centralised, bureaucratic system of economic manage~ent, atten-
dant upon ~I/hi cll was the retention of one-man management by apf10inted 
spetsy, rigid and uncompromising labour discipline and the use of 
material incentives. He defended this orogramme as essential if in-
creased production, the basis for the socialist transformation of 
society, was to be realised, apparently acting on the conviction that 
if the power to run industry was bestowed upon "an unskilled labourer 
or a cook," that is, upon the oroletariat itself, econoMic anarchy 
would result and the factories would grind to a standstill .53 
At the same time, the I1Left Communists!! agreed that measures 
had to be taken in order to overcome the economic chaos endemic in 
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Soviet Russia. However, they saw Lenin~s programme, which aimed at 
restoring the ailing economy by state capitalist methods, as a fright-
ful deviation from the proper path of socialist reconstruction. They 
believed that the revolution had been fought to destroy capitalism and 
liberate the proletariat from its capitalist chains. now Lenin was 
propsing to re-establish a system in which the spetsy continued to 
rule over the workers, in which the old harsh forms of labour disci-
pline over the workers \'1ere restored, together with material incentives 
which they considered to be divisive of proletarian unity, and in 
which workers I control VJas effectively rendered powerless. This just 
would not do! They categorically refused to accept the solution to 
the problem of post-revolutionary economic ruin offered by Lenin, 
firmly defending the programme for an egalitarian, democratic organi-
sation of the economy by the proletariat itself. 
At the very heart of the lJLeft Communi sts I lJ criti ci sms of Leni n IS 
economic proposals and of their own policies for the restoration of 
industry it is possihle to discern a fundamental belief It/hich harks 
back to what they thought the teachings of Marx 1nd Engels were. They 
insisted that the proletariat, by its own class self-creativity 
fsam~deia~l~ost~ ,54 alone could successfully accomnlish the transi-
tion to socialism. If the proletariat itself was denied the oppor-
tunity to discover the correct IItra.nsitional or~anisational forms'155 
for the consolidation of socialism, then no other class or group, 
neither the old capitalist administrators nor even the party, could 
substitute itself for the proletariat in the achievement of this. 
N. Osinsky, a major IILeft C.ommunist!! theoretician, defended this prin-
ciple without qualification: 
We stand for the construction of proletarian society by 
the class creativity of the vJOrkers themselves, not by 
ukaze of the I capta ins of indus try I •••• ~Ie proceed from 
trust in the class instinct, to the active class initiative 
of the oroletariat. It cannot be otherwise. If the prole-
tariat does not know how to create the necessary prere-
quisites for the socialist organisation of labour, no one 
can do this for it and no one can compel it to do this .... 
Socialism and the socialist oraanisation of labour must 
be constructed by the proletar~at itself, or not at all, 56 
and somethinq else will be constructed - state capita1ism. 
In the light of this credo it is wholly plausible to interpret the 
!!Left Communists III opposition to Leninls economic measures and their 
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own policy proposals as means to ensure this vital freedom of action 
for the workers. 
In detail, the "Left Communists" objected that the use of state 
capitalist methods to revive the economy must entail the restoration 
of a hierarchical industrial administration, in which the !TIanagers of 
enterprises, appointed by the central government regardless of the 
wishes of the workers, would be granted dictatorial powers over the 
workers. Other features associated with the old exploiting capitalist 
system, such as authoritarian discipline over the workers and material 
incentives, would also have to be re-imoosed. The consequences of 
all this, they argued, would be the diminution of the role of all 
the organs of \10rkers· control, whether the fabz_avl:<?:rny at the plant 
level or, at the broader local level, the soviets of workers· deputies 
and the sovnarkhozy, in the administration of industry. Thus the 
active participation of the proletariat, this sine~ua non of genuine 
socialist construction, would be stifled. 57 
~~oreover, the "Left Communists" esrecially condemned the role 
allocated to the spetsy in the economic administration. Although they 
conceded reluctantly that even after the proletarian revolution it 
would still be necessary to utilise the knowledge and skills o~ the 
spetsy in the organisation of large-scale industry, a knov/ledqe which 
the proletariat would initially lack, they adamantly opposed granting 
them any position of authority in the economy.58 Defending the organi-
sational principles which they believed to have been agreed upon in 
1917, they maintained that the ~etsy Itiere to be given purely technical 
administrative tasks, under the strictest supervision cf the organs 
of workers· control. They bitterly objected to the increased authority 
in the direction of the economy v,hich Lenin proposed to grant to them, 
remonstrating that they would not allow themselves to be used by the 
proletariat but rather would take advantage of their positions to 
carry out a policy in the interests of their ovm class. Osinsky, in 
the belief that the spetsy were so indelibly stained with the mores of 
capitalism that they would be psychologically unable to implement a 
genuine socialist programme, emphasised the danger that "our teachers 
(i .e. the spetsy) will not help us build socialism but on the sly they 
will prepare a real caritalist trust, they \'Iill conduct their own 
231 
class po 1 i cy . ,,59 In the "Left Commun is ts '" mi nds, the pro 1 etari at 
alone could perform the duties of the "gravediCjger" of capitalism and 
they found it incomprehensible to expect that the spetsy would help 
to dig their own graves. 
In his history of the Russian revolution, held in esteem by 
r,1. N. Pokrovsky as one of the seminal works of 801shevik scholarship,50 
L. N. Kritsman, himself a prominent fi qure in the IlLeft Communi s t" 
movement, amassed evidence which confirmed this fear. From a series 
of questionnaires completed by the spe!?y he concluded that the over-
v/helming majority of them were still hidebound by their old capitalist 
ideology. r~oreover, they also hankered after the restoration of capi-
talism and were implacably hostile to the rule of the proletariat. 
Consequently, he believed that at best their service in the interests 
of the revolutionary state would be performed badly and reluctantly 
and that often they would deliberately sabotage the Itlork of socialist 
t t · 61 cons ruc 10n. 
The !lLeft Communi sts", hov/ever, perceived another profound danger 
in Lenin's plans for the economic reconstruction of Soviet Russia. 
They bitterly criticised his scheme to leave larqe-scale industry in 
the hands of its owners who in return would manage this and, it was 
hoped, increase production. Contrary to Lenin's claim that this would 
not constitute a threat to the survival of the revolution since the 
proletarian state VJould have ultimate control over industry, the "Left 
Communists" believed that this would prove to be an extremely perilous 
course to folloVJ. Defending a deep-rooted Narxist premise, that "ro li-
tics is built ultimately on economics,,,r;2 a number of leading "Left 
Communist" theoreticians, notable among whom were N. 1. Bukharin, 
Osir.sky and Kritsman, charged that Lenin!s concept of state capitalism-
"state regulation of private capital and modern economic management,,63 -
vIas incompatible VJith the survival of the proletarian dictatorship. 
They were convinced that the maintenance of capitalist power in the 
economy would preclude the continued existence of the Dolitical rower 
of the rroletariat. Bukharin painted a despairing picture of what he 
foresa\'1 as the inevitable outcome of such a policy: 
vJe [the "Left Comnunists"J picture the matter concretely: 
let us suppose that Soviet power (the_dictatorship of the 
proletariat, supported by the poor peasants), while 
organlslng nominally, in words, state regulation, in fact 
transfers the business of administration to the 'organisers 
of trusts' (i.e. to the capitalists). Hhat transpires in 
that case? In the economy there grows and is strengthened 
the real power of capital. And the political casing either 
little by little degenerates beyor.d recognition, or at a 
certain point 'bursts', because the protracted 'command 
power' of capital in the economy is incompatible with the 
'command power' of the Droletariat in politics. 64 
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As an alternative to Lenin's olans for economic reconstruction, 
the "Left Communists" put fon-/ard their ovm set of policies which was 
essentially a restatement of the Bolshevik lIprogrammel! of 1?17. To 
prevent the restoration of capitalism they first demanrled the immediate 
socialisation of the "commandinn heights" of the economy, that is, of 
the banks and large industrv. They were certain that nationalisation 
alone was not sufficient to ensure the development of the revolution 
towards socialism, arguing that nationalised industries existed in 
capitalist countries like Germany and the United States. Socialisation 
necessarily involved the destruction of the DOHer of caoital and the 
capitalists in the economy, which mei'lnt that there would be no place 
for the preservation of private trusts even under state control, as 
Lenin proposed, and that the snetsy would not be emnloyed in positions 
--'----
of authority in the administration of industry lest they utilise their 
power in their own class interests. 65 
Furthermore, they insisted on the establishment of a system of 
local control for the socialised economy, by kollegia of workers at 
the plant level and by local sovn~_khozy elected by t~le workers at 
the oblast' level. In addition, the local soviets of \>Iorkers' deputies 
were to be granted \>Jide powt3rs of autonomous acti or. and freed from the 
hierarchical control of centrally appointed oolitical commissars. 
They believed that this programme alone, by guaranteeing the consistent 
devolution of economic and political DOVler to the local level, could 
effectively check the increasing bureaucratisation in Soviet Russia. 
r.1oreover, this would also 9ive the mass of workers the opoortunity to 
actively take part in the construction of the ne\>1 socialist society 
which could "be accomplished only by the efforts of the whole prole'-
tariat .... ,,66 Shortly after the Bolsheviks' successful COUD, Bukharin 
had stressed the imrortance of this principle, declaring that the 
mass participation of the workers in this socialist transformation 
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was vital if the objectives of the revolution were to be consolidated: 
... without the greatest self-activity of the masses them-
selves there will be no victory. And just as the prole-
tariat in its armed struggle produced a Red Guard, so it 
must form a guard of organisers in the factories, the 
plants, the mines ... and the officAs. If it does this, 
then the victory of socialism will be assured. 67 
Nevertheless, while advocatin~ the decentralisation of economic 
and political power within the new Soviet state to bodies elected locally 
by the workers, such as the sovi ets, sovnarkhozy and even the fabzavkomy, 
at the same time the "Left Communists ll insisted, as the Democratic 
Centralists and the Workers' Opposition were also later to do, that it 
was not their intention to reduce Soviet Russia to a series of un con-
~(') 
nected, self-governing, anarcho-syndicalist communes.(O On the contrary, 
they believed that the construction of socialism required that Russia's 
polity and in particular its economy should be administered according 
to a central plan, aimed to serve the needs of the working class commu-
nity as a whole, rather than the establishment of a myriad of artels 
which would satisfy only the parochial aspirations of the workers 
6Q included within each of them separately .. 
Certainly, the goal of thc:se "leftists" to establish a politico-
economic structure in which central regulation in the general interests 
of society was balanced by an effective devolution of power to the local 
organs of the workers was consistent with narxist orthodoxy on the ques-
tion of the. organisation of the revolutimary state. Yet conformity 
with theory vIas in itself no guarantee of the workability of such a 
system. For example, while Osinsky, ostensibly to guard against the 
bureaucratic degeneration of the younq workers' state, stressed the 
pressing need for "a precise definition of the powers of the subordinate 
G .e. local] organs in order to protect their self-creativity, and, at 
the same time, to prevent their arbitrary actions,')() he nevertheless 
failed to elaborate a framework in which this desired division of powers 
between the centre and localities could be practically realised. Admit-
tedly, he did propose that the central administration, to be elected 
by the workers, or, more'probably, 'Jy their various re!,resentative 
bodies, was to be responsible for the formulation, and financing of the 
overall economic plan, and was to have general supervisory pov/ers to 
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ensure that it was carried out. The detailed administration of the 
plan, however, was to be left to the locally elected organs of the 
workers, such as the sovnarkhozy, and at an even lov/er, purely "execu-
tive-technical" level, the fabzavkomy.71 Yet Osinsky, characteristic 
of his felloh' 1!1eftists", was unable to orovide a satisfactory method 
of resolving potential conflicts between the central administration, 
concerned with the framing and implementation of policies in the 
interests of the community at large, and these local bodies, by their 
very nature less capable of perceiving broader social interests and 
more concerned \-Jith the pursuit of their narrower, sectional interests. 
In such cases where conferences between representatives of tile centre 
and the localities were unsuccessful in resolving the differences 
between them, as Osinsky, perhaps rather naively, hoped that they 
would, for all their defence of vlOrkers I initiative at the local level, 
Osinsky and his fellot-/-thinkers assigned the ultimate power of decision-
making to the centre, as their theory of socialism demanded, "Jhich 
could override any protestations from the loca1ities. 72 
Hm'lever, the "leftists" now found themselves in a rather ironical 
position. Having accepted the prinCiple that in a socialist society 
ultimate power must reside \'lith the central administration, they still 
attacked this administration for over-reaching its competences by 
contravening the rights of the localities - although they themselves 
were unable to define in any precise functional or practical sense what 
these were! - and thus fostering the grov/th of bureaucratism. Neverthe-
less, despite the criticism that can be levelled against the "leftists" 
for the impreciSions and contradictions within the administrative frame-
work that they envisaged as appropriate for a socialist Russia, it is 
only fair to add that the issue of the proper relationshio between 
central control and local initiative in modern industrial democracies 
remains a question which socialists have yet to resolve. 
By the summer of 1913, however, after most of its support had 
melted a"Jay, the "Left Communist" opposition dissolved itself. Since 
~,1arch the "Left Communists" had gradually lost their following among 
the rank and file. Defections from their camp initially had begun 
then, in response to the apparent unreality of their continued oppo-
sition to peace with Germany. After the treaty of Brest-Litovsk had 
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been concluded, the "Left Communists'" support dwindled further, this 
time in reaction to the failure of their programme for the administra-
tion of industry by the \IJorkers themselves to restore production. In 
fact, it appears that the majority of Bolsheviks believed that the 
system of workers' control itself had contrihuted to the calamitous 
fall in output. Ironically, even A. G. Shliapnikov, then the Commis-
sar of Labour, but in the future to become a leader of the Workers' 
Opposition and an impassioned defender of workers' control, then agreed 
with this conclusion. 73 
The outbreak of Civil \~ar, in nay and June, hammered the final 
nail in the coffin of "Left Communism." Lenin's roli cy of industrial 
administration. which reimposed the hureaucratic central control and 
strict labour discipline that he considered to be necessary if the 
srontaneously anarchic, and economically disastrous actions of the 
workers themselves were to be curbed, was accepted since this series 
of measures alone promised a rapid increase in production, noVi imme-
diately necessary if Soviet Russia's failin0 economy were to he revived 
sufficiently to meet the sharply increased demands place upon it by 
the growing military strus,gleJ4 t10reover, at the same time Lenin's 
negotiations Vlith the capitalists had broken dOVin and, consequently, 
he \lIas forced to abandon the pol i cy that he preferred - to preserve 
a state capitalist system in the first stage of the transition period 
to socialism -, in favour of the ranir! nationalisation of the !'command-
ing heights" of the economyJ5 In oart, this action also satisfied the 
demands of the surviving "Left Communists" and any remaining grievances 
over the trend to bureaucratisation ann centralisation then evident 
in the revolutionary state were shelved in face of the grave crisis 
presented by the outbreak of Civil Har. This threat impelled the Bol-
sheviks to sink their differences and to unite in t~e interests of 
survival against the common foe. 76 
Nevertheless, the demise of the "Left Communist!' r.1ovement should 
not be taken as an indication that the issues which it had raised had 
been finally resolved. While Lenin's pragmatic approach to overcoming 
the economic ruin in Soviet Russia may have been justified in the 
interests of the immediate survival of the revolutionary state, his 
theoretical justifications of the socialist character of the policies 
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that he introduced to achieve this did not satisfy a number of his 
fellow Bolsheviks, as the future was soon to reveal. Questions focLls-
sing on the proper role of workers' control, on t~e place and power 
of the sretsy in economic administration, and on the respective functions 
and authority of central and local or~ans, both political and economic, 
in a genuine revolutionary socialist state \'/ere repeatedly raised by 
"leftists" in the party in the ensuing years. 77 
From 1919, when the fear of the mil itary overthrow of the 801 shevi k 
regime was beginning to wane, voices were aqain raised in the ranks 
of the Bolsheviks by the oflPosition which became known as the I)emocratic 
Centralist movement. These oppositionists, in whose ranks Osinsky and 
T. V. Sapronov, also a former "Left Communist" \'1ere prominent, too 
defended the democratic programme espoused by the party in 1917, in 
protest against the intensifyin~ bureaucratisation, centralisation and 
militarisation then growing within the revolutionary state.7E~ At the 
basis of their critique it is also Dossible to detect the fear that 
this trend was stifling the active participation of the workers in 
the tasks of economic and political organisation, a participation which 
they considered to be a vital element in the socialist transformation 
of society. 
In 1920 these Democratic Centralists presented a platform, drawn 
up by Osinsky, Sapronov and V. N. r1aksimovskii, in which they outlined 
the principles on v/hich they essentially based their rejection of the 
party·s current policies. Specifically, they opposed the hierarchical 
re-organisation of the administration of industry, in which all enter-
prises of a given branch of industry were directly subordinated to the 
authority of cer:tral organs, the glavki, rather than to local bodies, 
such as the ~ovnar~hozy. ~10reover, they violently objected to the 
re-introduction within each enterprise of o~e-man manage~ent. What 
infuriated them even more about this development was that almost invar-
iably the single director of the enterprise, aonointed from the centre 
instead of being \elected by the workers themselves, turned out to be 
one of the odious ~etsy, whom they believed still to be ingrained 
with the old mentality of capitalism and, therefore, incapable of 
honestly carrying out any policies consistent with socialist principle/9 
- Sapronov had no doubts that "the specialist ... [ylOuld] work not for 
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the revolution, but for the counter-revolution.,,80 They held that if 
industry were organised on such lines this could not but result in the 
restoration of an authoritarian, bureaucratised administration typical 
of capitalism, the antithesis of all that the revolution had fought 
to destroy. 
1'10reover, they also were highly critical of the similar tendencies 
tovJards the re-emergence of centralisation anc authoritarianism in the 
political structure of the Soviet state. Sapronov was their leading 
spokesman on this issue, bitterly protesting against the attack on the 
powers of the 1 oca 1 sovi ets by the party centre whi ch vIas effectively 
stripping them of any autonomous authority and subordinating them to 
centrally appointed political commissars. They insisted that the re-
imposition of a hierarchical system of government would further accele-
rate the growth of bureaucratism \\fhich, to their dismay, was already 
Of 81 
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In opposition to this dangerous drift towards the re-establishment 
of a bureaucratic, authoritarian system which they feared would con-
strict, in Sapronov's words, "the self-activity of the masses,~182 the 
Democratic Centralists called for the radical and widespread restora-
tion of workers' democracy in the organisational structure of the Soviet 
state. They believed that the first step needed to ensure this was the 
real devolution of effective economic and political authority to the 
local representative organs of the workers. Concretely, they demanded 
the cessation of all interference in the work of the local soviets by 
the party centre, in the person of its appointed cOlT1l.Jissars. In the 
economy, they argued for the return of a large measure of administrative 
po\'1er to the 1 oca 1 0 rgans of workers' control, both to the fabzavkomy 
at the enterprise level and to the sov~arkhozy at the regional level. 
t10reover, in the place of one-man manaIJement in industry, administration 
by kollegia, elected hy the workers, was to be universally restored. 
Emphasising a principle which he had espoused earlier as a member of 
the "Left Communist" movement, Osinsky again maintained that administra-
tion hy kollegia alone would allow the w.orkers to 1I1earn the art of 
administration," and at the same time enable them to supervise the 
activities of the spetsy whose organisational ski 11s, they orud:!ingly 
admitted, were still nec:essary.[,3 They felt that only by giving back 
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political and economic power to these bodies, which would be guaranteed 
the autonomy to independently fulf; 1 the directives el'lanating from 
the central authorities, could the revolutionary state be protected 
from the bureaucrat; c dangers of over-central i sati on. Furthermore, 
this thorough democratisation and decentralisation of !)ower within the 
Soviet apparatus alone could ensure that the workers would have the 
freedom and opportunity actively to participate in the construction of 
socialism. FollOll/ing in the footsteps of the ':Left Communists", the 
Democratic Centralists held this to be an inalienable component of 
the successful building of a socialist society, since if this I![y/as] 
not supported by the proletariat in the provinces, then it [would] 
inevitably collapse.,,84 
A little later than the Democratic Centralists, in late 19l~ and 
ear ly 1920 ~ another group of '!lefti sts'" cOf:1fJosed 1 ar0ely of v:orkers 
rather than of intellectuals, appeared in the now re-named Communist 
Party. This Horkers' Opposition also coalesced in defence of the demo-
cratic principles promulgated by the Bolsheviks in 1917, since by 
1920 both trade union independence and II/orkers' control in industry 
had a 11 but vani shed. These had been superseded by a hi erarchi ca 1 
system in v/hich industry was run by centrally apfJointed spetsy - and 
in which centrally appointed commissars ruled over the trade unions 
and the workers' soviets. 85 While the Workers' Oppositionists agreed 
with the Democratic Centralists' critique of the bureaucratic and 
authoritarian development of the Soviet state and shared their fears 
that the subversion of proletarian democracy resulting from this vlOuld 
lead to the perversion of the ideals of the revolution,8n they did not 
accept their analysis of the roots of this phenomenon. The Horkers' 
Opposition denied that the source of these evils lay simply in the over-
centralisation of political and economic power in the state, and even 
in the party apparatus and, therefore, could be easily rectified by 
the effective devolution of power to the various local political and 
economic authorities elected by and responsible to the workers. Rather, 
they saw the power and influence of non-proletarian elements, the 
peasantry, the bourgeoisie and the spetsy, to be at the root of the 
bureaucratisation then infecting the whole political and economic 
organisation of the state and party. In order to check and reverse 
239 
this dangerous cancer and so return to a course of genuine socialist 
construction they maintained that it was vital to have faith inthe 
abilities of the workers and restore real workers' administration in 
all state and party bodies. This alone, which Vlould i:1volve flurgin(1 
the elements alien to the proletariat from all positions of power and 
authority, could guarantee the transition to a society based on true 
. l' .. 1 87 SOC1a 1st pr1nc1p es. 
The protests which the Workers· DDposition levelled against the 
authoritarian policies of industrial and political organisation then 
being pursued by Lenin and his supporters in the party clearly show 
that these "leftistsll were again raising the issues first voicerl by 
the "Left Communists:! in the sprinq of 1918, issues which they consid-
ered to still remain unresolved. At the same time, at the very heart 
of their critique it is also possible to perceive a staunch commitment 
to the principle of proletarian democracy, that is, to the principle 
that if socialist society was to be built on solid foundations, then 
the working class as a whole must be actively involved in its construc-
tion. 
The Workers' Oppositionists attacked Lenin's policies on a number 
of issues previously broached by the "Left Communists'! and Democratic 
Centralists. They unremittin01y opposed the system of the appointment 
of all plenipotentiaries, vlhether in administration of industry, the 
trade unions, the soviets or the party itself, instead of their elec-
tion by the rank and file of the proletariat. They asserted that the 
consequent concentration of power in the hands of the party hierarchy 
was inevitably leading to the bureaucratisation of Soviet life and 
undermining the independent role I'Jhich the vlOrkers had to play in 
th O 88 1 s . 
Furthermore, they were narticularly critical of the regression 
to a hierarchical organisation of the economy. They objected that the 
workers· control of industry, as exercised through their elected kol-
leqia, had been universally replaced by the system of one-man manage-
ment by a central nominee. r10reover, what horrified them even more 
was that these restored industrial lIautocrats" had almost all been 
recruited from the ranks of the spet~ whom they regarded as so indoc-
trinated by their old capitalist mores that they v/ould by nature be 
incapable of effectively carrying out socialist principles in t~e 
80 opera ti on 0 f indus try. ~ 
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As an alternative to Lenin's policies, the Wor~ers' Opposition 
presented its O\'in set of measures for the economic and political admini-
stration of the revolutionary state, a programme v/hich it defended as 
alone consistent with the principle of the collective administration of 
society by the mass of the \'lorkers themselves, VJhich in their eyes was 
the hallmark of socialism. They contended that the first, yet vital 
step to stem the onrushing tide of bureaucratism in all its shapes and 
forms was the re-introduction of the election of all officials, in 
industry, the trade unions, the soviets and the party, by the workers. 
In particular, to check the bureaucratisation prevalent in the organi-
sation of industry, which the Harkers' Oppositionists considered to be 
of primary importance, since in their minds the organisation of produc-
tion by the vJorkers themselves was the ~~e_~~a non of socialism,90 they 
demanded the restoration of an effective system of workers' control. To 
ensure this, they proposed that the proletariat itself, united in its 
trade unions, should be given the right and responsibility to run 
industry, as the programme adopted at the Eighth Party Congress in 
March 1919 had envisaged.~l In detail, they demanded that at the grass 
roots level all industrial enterprises should be administered by elected 
collegia of workers and, at a higher level of economic administration, 
all candidates for positions of authority in the economy nominated by 
the workers through their trade unions should be mandatorily binding 
on the Supreme Counci 1 of the National Economy (IJesenkha). 92 
Certainly, these policies \'Jere attractive, at least theoretically, 
and also laudable in their intention of devolving effective political 
and economic power into the hands of the workers themselves. Indeed, 
there is little reason to doubt that Lenin himself agreed that measures 
based on such principles ultimately were required if socialism was to 
be built. Yet he refused to implement such measures at that ti~e. To 
attribute this action, or rather inaction just to selfish machinations 
on Lenin's part to restrict power and privilege to his ovm entourage 
would be unjust. The ensuing discussion of the validity of the "Left 
Comnunists' II assessment of abilities of the workers themselves success-
fully to administer the revolutionary state and economy will demonstrate 
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that there were good reasons why Lenin refused to entrust this admini-
stration into the hands of the workers. 
Regardless, the Workers' Oopositionists remained convinced t~at 
their programme for the restoration of proletarian democracy would 
guarantee the creative participation of the workers ir.thesocialist 
transformation. They were certain that this was the sole safeguard 
against the bureaucratisation and deqeneration of the wor~ers' state. 
They argued that it was folly to try, as they thouqht Lenin \'Jas dOin9, 
to build socialism by the decrees of the party centre and by the employ-
ment of the spetsy to execute these. 93 Standina firmly in defence of 
the teachings of the "founding fathers", they too assi"ned the task of 
socialist construction to the proletariat itself. A. t1. Kollontai, 
earlier a "Left Communist" and nOV1 their leading and most articulate 
theoretician, unequivocally declared: 
The Harkers' Opposition has said what has lono aqo been 
printed in the Communist r,1anifesto by r1arx and Engels: the 
building of Communism can and must b2 the \'Jork of the toil-
ing masses themselves. The building of Communism belongs 
to the \'Jorkers .94 
~loreover, Kollontai even went so far as to deny that the party, 
the vanguard of the proletariat, could substitute itself for the mass 
of v:orkers in the successful completion of socialist construction. She 
repeatedly argued to the effect that while the vanguard "can create 
the revolution, ... only the whole class can develop through its every-
day experience the practical work of the basic class collectives.,,95 
In fact, in the revolutionary state she assigned to the party no more 
than the role of guaranteeing to the workers the freedom tl/hich they 
needed in order to enable them to accomplish this transformation on 
their own initiative. In her mind, the proletarii'l.t vIas now to take 
the control of its own des ti ny out of th~ hands of the party. 96 
This interpretation of the views of the Harkers' Opposition on 
the role which the proletariat should fulfil in the Soviet state, an 
inter~retation which can also be justifiably applied to the views of 
the "Left Communists" and the Democratic Centralists, contradicts that 
offered by scholars of differing political persuasions, who claim that 
these "leftists" It,ere just concerned with a defence of democracy within 
the ranks of the Bolshevik party.~7 A more sympathetic, yet wholly 
credible reading of their views suggests that they in fact vlere committed 
242 
to a broader defence of proletarian democracy for the working class as 
a whole. Despite at times confusing references to the status of the 
party, the outcome 0 f their pleas for an effective system of workers' 
administration in the revolutionary state, if successful, would have 
been to reduce the role of the party vis ~ vis that of the class itself. 
Their attachment to proletarian democracy, furthermore, apnears to 
have been founded on a deeply rooted conviction that this was an inte-
gral part of the successful socialist transforrr.ation of society v/hich, 
if frustrated, could not but lead to the degeneration of Soviet Russia 
aVJay from socialism. Much more literally than Lenin, the~1 accepted 
Marx's and Engels' precept that the workers themselves could and must 
build the nevi socialist society on their own native abilities which 
would be raised in this very process as they learned from the mistakes 
which would inevitably be made. In their minds, therefore, the means 
were very much an inextricable part of the end that they sought. ~1ore­
over, this trust in the capacity of the masses to achieve their ovm 
liberation and spontaneously to organise their ovm just and egalitarian 
society was not an alien phenomenon in Russian history. The Narodniki, 
particularly v!hen they went "to the people", disnlayed an analogous 
faith, however unrealistic it proved to be, in the innate abilities of 
the peasantry to overthrow the autocracy and preserve the mir as the 
foundation of a nev!ly freed, humane social order; the "Left Communists" 
had the same "populist" trust in the Russian nroletariat, althouqh the 
tasks which confronted it were far greater, since it would have to 
build a totally new society, rather than simply to maintain existing 
institutions as the basis of socialism. 
Later, Kritsman offered what can be termed a theoretical justifi-
cation for the participation of workers en ~ass~ in the building of 
socialism, which it is plausible to argue was an unspoken assumption 
of the "leftists!: in the ranks of the Bolsheviks. In language remini-
scent of the young r,1arx, he maintained that the fundamental objective 
of socialism, "the further conquest ancl transformation of nature (the 
progress of technology) ... and the further conquest and transformation 
of tre nature of man himsel f ... r1 VIas a "creative task. 1198 Hoy/ever, in 
order to achieve this final goaJ it was essential that the working 
masses themselves consciously take part in the socialist transformation 
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of society, a task ~vhich they could successfully accomolish only if 
they were given the freedom to exercise their latent creative abilities 
and learn in the very process doing this. He concluded by arguing that 
this "mass creativity is the basic characteristic of Comrnunism.,,99 
However, the defence of fJroletari an der:ocracy by the Democrati c 
Centralists and the Workers' Opposition, like that of the IILeft Communists" 
before them, disintegrated v/hen the very survival of the Bolshevik regime 
was threatened. In 1921, in face of widespread peasant revolts against 
the exactions of "1'Jar Communism ll and the Kronstadt rebellion, compounded 
by the decimation of the Bolsheviks' proletarian support in the Civil 
I'Jar, Lenin successfully demanded the cessation of all opoosition and 
the restoration of unity in the ranks of the ~arty in order to overcome 
th . .. 100 H' th 1 l' th t h .. t d I lS CrlS1S. 1S ru , ess OglC a t, e sltuatlon vIas 00 angercus 
for the I!utopian!l policies proposed by the IIl eftists': won him majority 
support for the condemnation of all factions, except his own, in the 
party. Loyalty to the party, and fear that the very existence of the 
revolutionary state was at stake, compelled the majority of the opposi-
ti oni s ts to bow to the wi 11 of the maj ori ty, a lthough a hard core of 
Democratic Centralists and of the \'iorkers' Opposition continued to 
't" th t fL" 1" 101 crl lClse e enor 0 enln s DO lCles. 
It is necessary to preface an examination of the viev/s of the 
revolutionary ~1arxists of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania on the question 
of proletarian democracy and the part which they believed that the pro-
letariat must play in the socialist transformation with two qualifica-
tions. First, the heritage and influences which acted on these Marxists 
were different from the Bolsheviks. Second, unlikethe Bolsheviks in 
Soviet Russia, these revolutionaries failed to consolidate themselves 
in power for any length of time. Consequently, evidence of their 
thought and actions while holding the reins of power on the methods of 
organising the revolutionary dictatorship in the transition period is 
considerably more limited than in the case of the Bolshevik "leftistsll 
who were continually at loggerheads with Lenin on this issue. tleverthe-
less, a judicious examination of their vie\vs does permit some conclusions 
to be drawn about their thinking on this issue. 
Any discussion of the attitude of the Social Democracy of the 
Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P.iL.) to~ards the role of the 
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workers in the building of socialism must focus attention on the thouqht 
of Rosa Luxembur9, whose ideas were essentially at the heart of this 
party's position on this question. Throughout her illustrious revolu-
tionary career, prematurely cut short by her brutal murder in 1919, 
she displayed a devotion to the defence of the principles of proletar-
i an democracy unsurpassed among the advocates of revol uti onary ~1arxi ST71. 
The tasks which Rosa Luxemburg believed that the proletariat 
would fulfil in the revolutionary transformation of society place her 
firmly in the libertarian wing of the revolutionary socialist movement, 
I'Jhere she defended basically the same principles of workers' democracy 
as Marx and Engels had previously done. Even more consistently and 
explicitly than the "leftists" in the Bolshevik party, she contended 
that the v/orkers would "spontaneously': acquire the consciousness and 
abilities necessary for the establishment of socialism in the course 
, ,. 
of their daily struggles for economic improvement "Iithin the capitalist 
system. She categorically denied the need for, ilnd efficacy of a 
dictatorially organised, conspiratorial party which v!Ould substitute 
itself for the proletariat as the builder of socialism. This belief 
was to become the accepted doctrine of the S.D.K.P.iL., endorsed by 
L. Jogiches, the party's nominal leader, at the Sixth Party Congress 
in December, 1908. 
\~e are a mass party, \'JG try to increase the proletariat's 
cons ci ousness of its ro 1 e, "Ie can 1 ead it but we cannot -
and in no sense must we try - to be a substitute for it in 
the class struggle .... (On the other hand, we must equally 
not obliterate the distinction betl'/een the Darty organisation 
and the politically shapeless mass - like the opportunist 
wing of the Russian Social Democratic \~orkers' Party 
suggests.) 102 
The practice of the S.O.K.P.iL., however, did not live up to its 
words. In fact, Jogiches orqanised the oarty much in the lILeninist" 
sririt , as a highly centralised, authoritarian body \-nth little in the 
way of an independent role in the shaping of its activities C]ranted 
to the rank and file, let alone the workers as a class. 103 
However, Rosa Luxemburg herself, since the early years of the 
twenti eth century, had determi nedly defended her phil osophy of "non-
organisation" in oDoosition to Lenir., whose own ideas on the respec-
tive roles of the party and the working class in t!;e revolutionary 
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transition to socialism were anathema to her. She rejected Lenin's 
contention that the proletariat could inderendent1y attain nothing 
more than a "trade union consciousness" - that it would be interested 
only in immediate economic gains and amelioration v/ithin the existing 
capitalist structure - and that, consequently, the establishment of 
an ~lite party of professional revolutionaries, usually dra\'/n from the 
ranks of the intelligentsia, was vital in order to inculcate into this 
othen~ise backward class the revolutionary socialist consciousness 
necessary for the overthrow of capitalism and the construction of 
. l' 104 SOC1a 1sm. 
Horeover, she saw no panacea for the evils of opportunism within 
the Social Democratic movement in Lenin's organisational scheme. In 
her opinion, the only certain safeguard against this reactionary ten-
dency vias an educated and politically conscious proletariat, strong 
enough to absorb any declassed petty-bourgeois e1e~ents which joined 
the ranks of Social Democracy. She feared that Lenin's plan of organi-
sation, with its strong emphasis on centralism and hierarchical disci-
pline, together with its elitist exclusiveness, would in fact stifle 
the development ofa mass proletarian movement and so would make Social 
D • bl . t . f1 105 emocracy even more susceptl e to opportunl s 1 n uences. 
This critique of Lenin's methods, however, did not anpear out of 
thin air, but was heavily coloured by her experiences in the German 
Social Democratic movement. These had instilled in her the conviction 
that the conservative leadership of German Social Democracy vias itself 
a factor inhibiting the "spontaneous" revolutionary energies of the 
rank and file of the proletariat. From this flowed much of her dis-
trust of any attempts to set up a hierarchic organisation over the 
revolutionary movement of the workers, and also much of her faith in 
the actions of the masses themselves as the only \'1eapon against these 
potentially reactionary bodies. Luxemburg defended her position on 
this issue quite unambiguously: 
The tendency is for the directing organs of a social-
democratic party to playa conservative role. As experi-
ence shows, every time they conquer new ground ... they 
develop it to the utmost, but at the same time soon trans-
form it into a bulwark against further innovations on a 
vJider scale. 
Everyone is surprised at the remarkable diversity 
and flexi9i1itv~ yet at the same time firmness of the 
contemporary tactics of German Social Democracy. Yet this 
only means that our party in its daily strW}91e, down to 
the 'smallest details, has adapted itself admirably to the 
present conditions existing in a parliamentary re~ime, 
that it ~as been able to use all these conditions ... while 
rema i ni ng true to its pri nci p 1 es . . . . However, thi s very 
adaptation of its tactics is closing wider horizons, so 
that there is an inclination to regard parliamentary tac-
tics as immutable .... 
To grant to the leading organ absolute powers ... , 
as Lenin proposes, means artificially to strengthen to a 
very dangerous degree the conservatism which inevitably 
is inherent (in such a body] even vdthout this. If social-
democratic tactics are not to become the creation of the 
centra 1 committee, but of the party ,as a whole - or, even 
better, of the whole movement -, then the separate party 
or9anisations, obviously, must necessarily have that free-
dom of action, which alone will give them the opportunity 
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to use all the means for the intensification of the struggle 
that a given situation presents, and equally to develop 
their revolutionary initiative .... 106 
The events of the first Russian revolution of 1905 apparently 
strengthened her convictions. She consi0ered that the actions of the 
Russian proletariat had confirmed her belief that the workers themselves 
could develop their own organisation i~ the very heat of revolution. 
Her letters to Karl and Luise Kautsky in this period are striking 
testimony of her faith in the masses. In one of them, written in early 
1906 from Saint Petersburg, she lauded the spontaneous organisational 
achievements of the workers: 
To pick up the, thread again: the unemployment - voil~ la 
elace de la revolution - and no means of curbing it. But 
1n connection therewith there is developing a quiet heroism 
and a class consciousness of the masses that I Vlould very 
much 1 i ke to show to the dear Germans. Everywhere the 
workers of their own accord make such arranqements as, for 
instance, having the erTlOloyed give a day!s wages each '.'/eek 
to the unemployed .... jl,nd here is an interesting result 
of the revolution: in all factories, conmittees elected by 
the vwrkers have come to life lIall by themselves," \'/hich 
decide about conditions of work, employment and dismissals 
of workers, etc .... 
People think that the strugqle has been abandoned, 
but it has only gone down into the depths. And at the 
same time the organisatio~ progresses untiringly .... 107 
At the same time, these letters also reveal her doubts that a 
leadership standing above the workers would prove able to conduct a 
consistently revolutionary policy. She expressed her scorn for the 
reactionary attitudes of the workers I leaders to the Kautskys: 
From the situation as a whole one can gather that in 
Russia too the lelections l are going by the board. A.gainst 
nine-tenths of the elections the workers have declared a 
boycott and that, too, contrary to the directions of one-
half of the Social Demosracy! Tr.e rr.asses ~ere have once 
again proven wiser than their Ileadersl.I00 
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The same belief in the spontaneous revolutionary capacities of 
the workers and of the ,necess ity to permi t them free express i on formed 
the foundation of her subsequent critique of the dictatorial methods 
of organising the revolufionary dictatorship which were being imple-
mented by Lenin and his followers in 1918 after the Bolshevik seizure 
of pO\ver. Her defence of proletarian democracy not only has a super-
ficial resemblance to the ideals upheld by the various factions of 
'lleftists ll in the Bolshevik party itself, but a deeper analysis also 
reveals the same kernel of thought at the basis of this, namely the 
commitment to mass proletarian creativity as a factor itself essential 
for the socialist transformation of society. 
Rosa Luxemburg was deeply afraid that·the authoritarian policies 
pursued by Lenin from the spring of 1918 would inevitably frustrate 
the establishment of a genuine socialist society. Like f\:arx and Engels 
before her, she believed thatthe participation of the workers them-
selves was vital for the success of the socialist cause, since through 
this action alone could they revolutionise their consciousness as well 
as the social, political and economic structure of society. She 
attacked Lenin1s policies on the grounds that they were subverting any 
independent creative action by the proletariat, averring that "socialist 
democracy [isJ not something which begins only in the promised land 
after the foundations of the socialist economy are created.~l109 On 
the contrary, she defended proletarian democracy as an inalienable part 
of the very construction of socialism, succinctly stating her case so: 
Public control is indispensably necessary. OthervJise the 
exchange of experiences remains only with the closed circle 
of the officials of the nel" regime .... Socialism in life 
demands a complete spiritual transformation in the masses 
degraded by centuries of bourgeois class rule. Social 
instincts in the place of egotistical ones, mass initiative 
in the place of inertia, idealism .... Decree, dictatorial 
force of the factory overseer, Draconic penalties, rule 
by terror - all these thin9s are but palliatives. The 
only way to a rebirth is the school of public life itself, 
the most unlimited, the broadest democracy and public 
opini on .110 
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While she accepted the revolutionary destruction of the old 
bour0eois state and the establishment of a revolutionary dictatorshin 
of the proletariat as necessary stages in the transition to socialism, 
she insisted that this dictatorship had to be of the proletariat as a 
class over the bourgeoisie and otner non-oroletarian elements, not a 
dictatorship of the elite narty over the mass of the proletariat. She 
feared that the coercion and repression of the workers which would 
result from the authoritarian measures being taken by Lenin and his 
supnorters in the Bolshevik Darty would lead to the de0eneration of the 
revolutionary state into just such a bureaucratic dictatorship of the 
few leaders over the many workers. To her, thi s vlOul d be a pervers i on 
of the humanitarian ideals for which the revolution had been fought. 
In order to thwart this danger~ she pleaded that the dictatorship of 
the proletariat must be synonomous with the widest democracy for the 
workers themselves: 
Yes, dictatorship. But this dictatorship consists in the 
manner of applying democracy, not in its elimination, in 
resolute, energetic attacks upon the well-entrenched rights 
and economic relationships of bourgeois society, without 
which a socialist transformation cannot be accomplished. 
But this dictatorship must be the work of the class, and 
not of a little leading minority in the name of the class -
that is, it must proceed step by step out of the active 
participation of the masses; it must be uncer the control 
of complete puhlic activity; it must arise out of thel'l 
growinq political traininG, of the mass of the people. ' 
Unfortunately, R.osa Luxemburg had little to say about the measures 
which she thought would ensure the creation of such a socialist demo-
cracy. Hhile she openly supported the implementation of the nrogramme 
outlined by t1arx and Engels in The Communist f·lanifesto vlhich was designed 
to destroy the bourgeois order,~h-;-\'~a~~Qul-arly vague about the 
institutions which would take its place. She justified this on the 
grounds that socialism could only be ~a historical product, born out 
of the school of its own experiences, born in the course of its reali-
sation, as the results of living history, which ... has the fine habit 
of a h/ays produci ng along with any real soc; a 1 need the means to its 
satisfaction, along with the task simultaneously its solution.',1l3 
However, in her very fi na 1 s oeech, made to the found; ng Congress of the 
German Communis t Pa rty in January, 1919, she ; ndi cated ; n broad terms 
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that she felt that the revolutionary state should be constructed, like 
the Paris Commune, on a system of locally elected Horkers· councils 
which should be assigned leqislative and executive authoritv in both 
political and economic affa~rs.114 ~ 
Turning to an analysis of the thought and actions of the revolu-
tionary Marxists in Latvia, particularly of their leader and ablest 
theoretician, P. I. Stuchka - lIa great figure now forgotten, [v/hoJ 
instituted a strictly egalitarian regime in his Sovictised Latvia!,1l5 
-, this serves to reveal that they too defenrled the principle of prole-
tarian democracy and even tried to implement it in 1919 vlhen they 
briefly held power from January till t·1ay. r10reover, it turns out that 
they also adhered to the premise that vlithout the active participation 
of the workers from the outset the construction of sccialism would 
rest on rocky foundations. 
From its birth in 1904, the Social Democracy of Latvia (S.D.L.) 
took pride in the fact that it was more of a mass party, composed 
largely of vwrkers, than the Bolshevik Darty, v/hich vias then essentially 
an elite organisation of revolutionary intelliqentsia. t·1oreover, the 
S.D.L. also possessed a tradition of democratic oraanisation - in 
1906, when it joined the Russian Social Democratic t-Jorkers· Party on 
a ·federative basis, it insisted on its freedom to deal v/ith its orqani-
sational problems independently of the Bolsheviks, with their '!omni-
scient and all-seeing central committee. l1ll6 t10reover, after 1906 the 
S.D.L. was largely lIpurged ll of intelligentsia, to become almost exclusi-
vely a party of workers who proved sufficiently conscious to lead the 
proletarian movement themselves. 117 It apparently had little sympathy 
with the Lenini~t notion of the n~ed for the intelligentsia as the 
medium through which alone the workers could attain a revolutionary 
socialist consciousness. While it may v/ell be true that the issues of 
party democracy and IIspontaneity" were not matters of theoretical dis-
cussion in the S.D.L. in the pre-revolutionary period, it would appear 
that in its practice the party operated in accord with these principles:18 
The principles and policies adopted by Stuchka during the period 
of revolutionary ebb and flow in Latvia from 1917 till 1919 reveal a 
continued attachment to the tradition of proletarian democracy. ~1oreover, 
it is also possible to discern a clear commitment to the prescriptions 
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of ~larx and Enge ls, both \vith respect to the specifi c measures neces-
sary to establish a genuine and effective dictatorship of the prole-
tariat and also to the underlying belief that if the workers did not 
actively manage the transition to socialism, then it was doomed to 
fail ure. 
In January, 1919 Stuchka declared that the revolutionary wing of 
the S.D.L. - now renamed the Communlst Party of Latvia - would put 
into effect a programme whose direct objective was the establishment 
of socialism. He had no truck with the idea of state capitalism as a 
means vihich the revolutionary state could profit by in this transition 
and categorically rejected any policies which would leave the capital-
. t· . t . f th . t . th . 1 . t . 1 119 lS S ln any POSl 10n 0 au .. on y, el I er economlC or po 1 lca . 
In common \vith all revolutionar.y ~1arxists,Stuchka defended the 
need to destroy the bourgeois state apparatus - the standing army, the 
police and the bureaucracy - and to replace it with a dictatorship of 
the proletariat as the basic orerequisite of any policies of socialist 
. ,120 transformatlon. Positively, he prooosed a number of measures which 
he considered had to be introduced in order to guarantee the proletarian 
character of a revolutionary state. First of all, he advocated the 
expropriation of the "commanding heights" of the economy, of large-
scale capital, in order to destroy the material foundation on which the 
political power of the bourgeoisie was hased. 121 'Further, in order to 
ensure the real control of the state and economic aoparatus by the 
proletariat, and to thwart the re-appearance of a bureaucratic system 
of administration, all officials were to be elected by and responsible 
to the workers in the regions in 't/hich they served; the central authori-
ties had the right only to protest against the election of these officials 
but could not remove them without the consent of the regions .122 ~10re­
over, Stuchka vigorously defended the belief that egalitarianism was 
a powerful weapon in the stru991e to combat the grov/th of bureaucratic 
c~reerists in the new order. 123 He also supported the establishment of 
an universal system of workers· control, implemented through the trade 
unions, at the enterprise level. 124 The engineers (spetsy) too, althouqh 
it would remain necessary to use their skills, were to be treated with 
the utmost circumsnection and subjected to the strictest control of 
the v.JOrkers; unlike Soviet Russia, where there was "an unshakable trust 
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in the engineer," in Soviet Latvia there '.'Ias "a trust in the \'/orkers.,,125 
However, while he favoured the widespread devolution of power and 
authority to the grass roots, Stuchka also insisted on the preservation 
of a strong degree of centralisation in the overall political and 
economic administration of Soviet Latvia. Yet this centralisation, he 
argued, would not breach the principles of socialist democracy since 
every central authority, including the Central Committee of the party, 
would be elected by the workers through their local organs. 126 He even 
instituted regular bi-monthly meetings of the central and local authori-
ties - impossible in Soviet Russia because of its vast size - in order 
to ensure the effectiveness of local influence on national policy.127 
Beyond these specifi c measures, ho\,/ever) Stuchka was ar'amant 
that it V,laS vital that the mass of workers "consciously put [this pro-
gramme] into practice.,!128 Otherwise, these policies, ~\!hich can be 
interpreted as a means to guarantee the freedom for workers! partici-
pation, would remain lifeless decrees unless they were implemented by 
the workers themselves. Standing squarely' in defence of Marx!s and 
Engels· assertion that the liberation of the workin0 class and the 
creation of socialism could only come from its o'.'m actions, Stuchka 
declared: 
The construction of socialism - this is the task of the 
proletariat itself and, if we say that the liberation of 
~he working class can only be the work of the working 
class itself, then this apnlies equally to the process 
of socialist construction. 129 
The revolutionary wing of the Lithuanian Social Democratic move-
ment (S.D.P.L.) too advocated what in essence was a "leftistll programme 
for the organisation of the revolutionary state. Despite the absence 
of a solid revolutionary proletarian base, the consequence of the 
paucity of developed industrial centres in Lithuania,130 these revolu-
tionary r,1arxists - v/ho had by then formed themselves into the Communist 
Party of Lithuania - proclaimed the establishment of a rroletarian 
dictatorship in Lithuania in necember, 1919, in whose organisation 
they assigned a large role to the workers themselves. 
Like their comrades elsewhere, the Lithuanian Marxists demanded 
the destruction of the bourgeois order, especially the army and the 
bureaucracy, as a necessary preliminary to any constructive socialist 
measures. Then, high in their list of policies to transform society, 
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they called for the rapid nationalisation of all large industrial and 
commercial enterprises. r,10 re over , in these enterprises a system of 
workers' control, implemented throuqht the trade uniors, was to be 
instituted. 13l Furthermore, vlary of the example of Soviet Russia where 
after the revolution a highly bureaucratised and centralised administra-
ti ve structure had emerged, a structure Hhi ch itself had 1 ed both "to 
a bottleneck of paper \'lork and also of localism, I~ they insisted that 
the orinciples on which the oroletarian dictatorship in Lithuania v·las 
•• j j 
to be built must ensure an effective democratic centralist system in 
~'1hich .. there vIas a real devolution of authority to the proletariat. 
They pictured this as a system in which the local workers' soviets 
and revo 1 uti onary commi ttees had autonomous pm'Jers to carry out the 
decrees of the central authorities - and also to delay the implementa-
tion of measures Hhich they felt to be unacceptable in vievl of local 
conditions. At the same time, these local organs were guaranteed the 
right to participate in the formation of national policy.132 
Underpinning their ideas on the correct methods to structure the 
revolutionary state was the helief that the proper organisation of 
this was vital if the workers were to be allowed to take an active 
part in its political and economic administration. They considered 
this to be a fundamental condition for the survival of soviet power in 
Lithuania and for the consequent socialist transformation. The First 
Congress of Soviets, held in February, l01~, stressed the importance 
of workers' participation: 
The self-activity of the toiling masses in all affairs in 
their localities is the best condition for the flourishinq 
of soviet power. Every worker, every landless or land-
starved peasant must firmly remember that now he is not 
only a citizen of a soviet country, but also a real builder 
of soviet life in the country.133 
The vievls of these different groups of revolutionary t1arxists on 
the role which the proletariat would be able to play in the construction 
of socialism makes plausible the contention that, despite their diffe-
rent backgrounds and the different influences acting on them, they 
belie~d, as Marx and Engels did, that the workers themselves were 
capable of reshaping society on socialist principles. f10reover, they 
shared the common fear that if the workers v:ere deni ed the opportunity 
to exercise their creative talents in building this nelti society, then 
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the sought after goal of socialism would itself be frustrated by the 
attempt to achieve it by incorrect means. Thetefore, they demanded the 
implementation of a programme, much of which had been previously 
defended by ~larx and Engels as an ins urance of pro 1 etari an democracy, 
which woul d ensure that the workers were guaranteed the necessary free-
dom to take part in and control the building of socialism. 
Before attempting to assess if there was any basis in fact for 
these Marxists to entrust socialist construction to the proletariat 
in the Russian Empire, it will be pertinent to this question first to 
examine Lenin's ideas on the role which the proletariat would be able 
to play in this transition. At the same time, this V/ill aid in further 
delineating what distinguished this strand of "leftist!! ideology. 
From his early days in the revolutionary 1t1arxist movement Lenin 
had scorned the idea that the proletariat would be able spontaneously 
to acquire in its day to day economic struggle the degree of revolu-
tionary consciousness necessary to overthrow capita1ism. On the con-
trary, as he repeatedly emphasised in Uhat Is To Be Done, his first and 
most important '.'Jark on the question 0 f the role of the revel utionary 
party, he was convinced tha.t an elite of revolutionary intelligentsia 
alone could attain this level of consciousness. In his mind, it was 
the task of this vanguard to inculcate the requiied revolutionary 
socialist v/i11 into the mass of the workers, who would othenrJise only 
seek immediate economic gains and amelioration within the existing 
capitalist system, rather than the destruction of this system itself. 
Moreover, in order successfully to accomplish this task he argued that 
the revolutionary intelligentsia must organise itself into a centralised, 
disciplined, conspiratorial party, both to protect themselves from the 
attempts of the autocracy to suppress them and to ensure that they were 
able to maintain their revolutionary consciousness in face of the over-
whelming spontaneous trend of the workers to conduct "trade unionist" 
1 . t' 134 po 1 1 cs . 
Almost two decades later, after the succe,ssful seizure of power 
by the Bolshevik party and the establishment of a proletarian dictator-
ship, it is still possible to see this same leitmotif - this disdain 
of the abilities and political consciousness of the workers - at the 
basis of Lenin's ideas on the methods of socialist construction. He 
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was convinced that the workers, left to their own devices, would inevi-
tably fail to move to\'1ards the creation of socialist society and that 
their feeble, fumbling s~ontaneous efforts to do so would threaten the 
security of the revolutionary dictatorship in Soviet Russia - and the 
disruptive consequences of workers· control in industry seemed to him 
abundant proof of this. On occasion he onenly stated that the right 
to exercise this dictatorship could not be safely left in the hands of 
the sti 11 backward proletariat, but Jl1ust be entrusted to the vanguard -
in Lenin·s mind, this was synonymous with the party - which alone pos-
sessed the knol'iledge and skills necessary to administer this and lead 
the masses ir. the socialist transformation. At the Eighth Congress of 
the Russian Communist Party, If/hich took place in ~~arch, 1919, he 
declared.: 
so far we have not reached the stage at which the 
working people could participate in government. Apart from 
the law, there is still the level of culture, which you 
cannot subject to any law. The result of this low cul-
tural level is that the Soviets, which by virtue of their 
programme are organs of government bv the working people, 
are in fact organs of 90vernment fo~~.~wo~kllr1Q_Deo!J~by 
the advanced section of the Qroletarlat, lnlt not ~tlle 
working people as a whole.13~ 
Later, in 1921, in the course of the debate on the role of the 
trade unions in the administration of industry, Lenin again chided the 
spontaneous abilities of the workers to administer the revolutionary 
state themselves. This role he reserved for the party, arguing: 
Does every worker know how to run the state? People work-
ing in the practical sphere know that this is not true, that 
millions of our organised workers are going through what 
we always said that the trade unions were, namely a school 
of Communism and administrCltion. Hhen they have attended 
this school for a number of years they will have learned to 
administer, but the going is slow. We have not even abo-
lished illiteracy. We know that the workers in touch with 
peasants are liable to fall for non-prol~tarian slogans. 
How many of the workers have been engaged in government? 
A few thousand throughout Russia and no more. If we say 
that it is not the Party but the trade unions that put up 
the candidates and administrate, it may sound very demo-
cratic and might help us catch a few votes~ but not for 
lonq. It will be fatal for the dictatorshiD of the nro-let~riat.136 . , 
Some commentators, hm;lever, notably r.1arcel Liebman, deny that 
Lenin subscribed to such ~litist views regarding the capacities of the 
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workers. He even argues that Lenin,as Marx and Engels before him, had 
a "profoundly revolutionary belief in the people as the agents of their 
own liberation."137 Admittedly, in a brief millenial phase largely 
inspired by the revolutionary upsurge of 1917, Lenir. made many declara-
tions to this effect, culminating in his prophetic work, State and 
Revolution, in which he envisioned the proletarian dictatorship as a 
genuinely democratic state in whose administration all the workers would 
participate. 138 Yet Lenin's rhetoric was not vindicated by his actions 
after the Bolsheviks came to power. 1\ renetratinq critic, familiar 
with Lenin and his thought and actions, Rosa Luxemburg, praised his 
defence of proletarian democracy as a prerequisite of the survival and 
purity of the revolution. Nevertheless, while she championed his 
verbal support for the administration of the revolutionary state by 
the mass of the workers, she castigated him for carrying out policies 
which in fact were subverting this very principle. She sadly v/rote of 
his actions: 
No one knovls this [the need for nroletarian democracy) 
better, describes it more penetratingly; repeats it more 
stubbornly than Lenin. But he is comt l etely wrong in 
the means he employs. Decree, dictatorial force of the l3r) 
factory overseer, Draconic penalties, rule by terror .... ~ 
HavirC] nOl'! examined the different views of Lenin and the "leftists" 
on the role of the workers in the construction of socialism, it still 
remains to try to assess the viability of their ideas in the light of 
revolutionary reality. t10st evidence of the results of the workers' 
participation in the administration of the revolutionary state comes 
from Soviet Russia itself, where the revolution was able to maintain 
itself in power. 
First, there is one general observation worthy of note. Even by 
1917 the Russian Empire, a relatively late starter in the industrial 
revolution, was still a backward, comparatively unindustrialised country. 
Consequently, the proletariat v!as weak both numerically - the peasantry· 
comrosed the oven/helming majority of the !!opulation - and also lar0ely 
uneducated, with little experience of the organisation and administra-
tion of a modern state and industrial economy_ Indeed, this latter 
shortcomi ng was comnounded by the fact that vwrkers' orqani sa ti ons , 
like trade unions, had been illegal till the early l~On's. It was into 
this social milieu that the f:leftists'l defended the application of the 
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principles of nroletarian democracy, first elaborated by r~arx and 
Engels in the light of West Euronean experience where there had existed 
relatively strong, educated an~ organised workin9-class movements. 
The weight of evidence concerning the effects of workers' control 
on the functioning of Russian industry during the revolutionary frenzy 
of 1917 and early 1912 makes sad reading. Predictably, the "Left 
Communists rl denied that workers I control i'JaS disrupting the economy. 
Os i ns ky, for one, argued that the vwrkers had suffi ci ent acumen to 
take over and administer industry in the interests of the revolutionary 
state. He justified this contention by pointin0 to the events in the 
Don Basin where he argued that the miners had srontaneously taken over 
the pi ts, had decl ared them to be s tate property and had even succeeded 
in operating them on their O\'1n initiative. 140 A. Lomov (G. I. 0plJokov), 
another enthusi as ti c '!Left Communi s t", asserted that producti on in the 
enterprises of the Central Region of Russia had risen after January, 
1910, largely as a result of the workers independently taking over 
their plants and runnin0 them on their o\,.'n. He blamed any fall in 
production on the effects of insufficient materia1s, lack of money to 
pay the workers and lack of provisions to feed them. 141 
HOi'leVer, the observations IJf other contemporary observers cast 
c;rave doubts on the val i dity of the "Left Communi sts (:, idyll i c assess-
ment of the abilities of the Russian workers to organise and operate 
industry. L. C. Krasin, "/ho before 1917 had lived a double life, com-
bininq a career as a leading revolutionary Social Democrat, at least 
until 1910~ with one as a highly respected engineer, and who after the 
October revolution agreed to put his skills at the service of t~e young 
Bolshevik government, painted a generally grim picture of the effects 
of workers' control on the level of industrial production. In a letter 
to his wife, written in May 1918, he declared: 
The prospects for some categories of the urban proletariat 
are absolutely hopeless. The illusion of becoming masters 
where they formerly were slaves has demoralised the so-called 
working class. Nobody is getting any work done, and the 
raihvavs and all nroductive machinery are rapidly falling 
. - 142' ...
1 nto decay .... 
A more damning condemnation came from Shliapnikov, more damning 
since he himself \'las one of the fevi workers in the leading echelons of 
the Bolsheviks and later \Vas himself to become a convinced "leftist" 
257 
in the ranks of the Workers' Opposition. In 1912, however, he was so 
utterly shocked by the chaos and disruptions on the railway system 
which resulted from workers' control that he sternly supported the 
restoration of one-man management, strict labour discipline and material 
incentives, all of which were later to be anathemas to him, in order to 
ensure the operation of this vital lifeline. His account of the atti-
tudes of the \-lOrkers belies all the rousing declarations of the "Left 
Communists" about the capacities of the workers to build and administer 
the revolutionary state or. their own initiative: 
The picture which presented itself to me as a result of 
t:lese reports is a very sad one. It bri nCls us face to 
face with the necess ity of taki ng the most ri gorous measures 
for the re-establishment of labour discipline on the rail-
ways at any cost and before all else .... ~loreover, the 
railway crews, being not at all interested in the exploita-
tion of the railways, sometimes refuse to man the trains .. . 
they either pretend illness or else simply refuse to go ... . 
The disorganisation and demoralisation that prevail 
in the railway shors defy description .... In a word, from 
the moment the railway employees were guaranteed a minimum 
v/a0e they ceased to display any minimum degree of effici-
ency ... we hear from all the class conscious elements ... 
the same complaint: we must at any nrice get our railway-
men interested in the exoloitation of the roads. This 
may be done by introducing piecework ... and payment per 
ver~. This is the ?nly painless method to raise the 
en1 ci ency of the ra 11 way employees .... 143 
Therefore, workers' control must have come to a very dubious pedi-
gree in the eyes of many Bolsheviks, who would be hesitant, consequently, 
to place the very fate of the revolution into the hands of the apnarently 
anarchic workers. Moreover, this attitude could have only been rein-
forced by the Civil War, in which many of the most advanced and conscious 
members of the proletariat were sacrificed in the military struggle -
and others were driven back to the countryside by hunger in the towns. 
So, it is not surprising that in 1921 Lenin and his follm·1ers in the 
party were reluctant to entrust the future development of the revolution 
towards socialism to a decimated, still disintegrating and largely back-
d k · 1 144 war wor 1ng c ass. 
Furthermore" it is also possible to question whether the left 
Bolsheviks' assessment of the attitudes and aspirations of the workers 
was consistent with the tasks that they assigned to them. V!hile it is 
now widely accepted that much of the imnetus for the establishment of 
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workers' control came from the workers themselves, organised in their 
factory committees,145 this in itself is not sufficient to prove that 
the workers' goal was the same as that of the left Bolsheviks. In fact, 
there is much evi dence to the contrary. I. r1. t":aiski i, sti 11 a r,1enshevi Ie 
in 1917, described the objective of the workers in anarcho-syndicalist 
terms - they vlanted to take the ownership of their enterprises into 
their own hands -, asserting that "in my observation it is not some of 
the proletariat but most of the ;.>roletariat, espeCially in Petrograd, 
If/ho look upon workers' control as if it were actually the emergence of 
the kingdom of socialism.,,146 nore significantly, Shliapnikov aqain 
agreed that anarcho-syndicalist ideas were widely influential among the 
\vorkers, who failed to realise that in socialist society industry should 
belong to the state and the working class as a whole, rather than to 
the individual factory committees. 147 The "Left Communists" themselves 
were aware of these anarchic tendencies among the workers and opposed 
them. Osinsky vehemently denied that "the workers of any given enter-
prise should be the sole masters of this enterprise,:' arguing that such 
a role l'las inconsistent with the construction of a socialist society 
which demanded that the centrally planned economy be administered by 
the wdrkers for the benefit of their class as a whole. 148 Bukharin 
too was afraid that the workers of any given enterprise would take 
possession of it into their own hands. He maintained that any establish-
ment in which this took place would inevitably degenerate back into an 
t · t r 1 d . t l' t l' 149 U h t' . . en erpn se run on Ile 0 cap' a 1 s , nes. nowever, W a , s s, gm-
ficant about all this is the inconsistency in the "Left Communjststr! 
atti tude towards the workers. On the one hand, they called for the 
workers themselves to build socialism and fought to ensure them the 
freedom to rio this, while on the other hand they feared that if the 
workers were in fact free to orqanise the economy after their own 
desires trey would tend to pursue anarcho-syndicalist rather than social-
i st objectives. The sense of their defence of proletarian democracy 
is again thrown into doubt. 
In Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, where the revolutionary Marxist 
parties failed to consolidate themselves in power, there is a lack of 
evidence regarding both the aspirations of the workers and of their 
abilities to administer the state and economy. Admittedly, before the 
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outbreak of war in 1914, Poland and Latvia had been among the most 
industrialised and advanced regions of the Russian Empire, with a rela-
tively strong and organised Vlorking class. Hm'1ever, the war altered 
this situation. Industry \'Ias either destroyed, or evacuated to Russia 
or Germany to save it from the ravages of the battleground. This, 
combined vdth the mobilisation of the workers for military service, had 
d · d h 1 t . b . th t· 150 LJ • tl eC1mate t e pro e ar1an ase 1n ese coun r1es. [ence, 1n le 
years of revolutionary flux when the Po1isr. and Latvian revolutionaries 
proposed to entrust the construction of socialist society to the workers, 
they VJere placing its fate in the hands of a small and by then demora-
lised section of the population. 
The situation in Lithuania was equally, if not more dismal. Histori-
cally, it had lacked a numerous working class, a fact which hecame 
particularly obvious when the revolutionary Marxists there attempted to 
set up a Soviet republic in 1919. There was such a shortage of capable 
workers that they were compelled, to a far greater extent than the Rus-
sians, to employ non-communists in the 90vernment. 151 Therefore, their 
attempts to create a workers· state, administered by the workers them-
selves, SGem ludicrous in retrospect. Yet at the same time these 
Lithuanian t1arxists believed that revolution vias imminent in the rest 
of Europe - Kapsukas declared that "if one takes it [Lithuania] isolated 
from other countries, then in it there can be no talk of socialist 
revolution,,15? -, so it is rlausible to imagine that they exrected to 
receive help from the advanced West European workers in setting up 
their proletarian dictatorship. 
It is temrting to conclude from this that Lenin's position was 
vindicated after all. Believing that the Russian proletariat was weak 
and backv/ard and thus incapable of carrying out the socialist trans-
formation of society of its own accord, he rejected ~'larx 's and Engels' 
teachings on the role of the workers in the transition to socialism. 
However, in keepina with the narxist metr.od of social analysis, he 
adapted theory to what he perceived practice and experience to be and 
assigned the leading part in the socialist revolution, in both its 
destructive and constructive stages, to the vanguard of the proletariat, 
the party, until such time as the vlorking class as a whol e became 
sufficiently conscious to take this task into its own hands. However, 
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this raises a problem which revolutionary socialists then and since 
have debated, without reaching any definitive answer. The question is 
whether the concept of a vanguard party, leading the revolution and 
governing the proletarian dictatorshin in the name and supposed interests 
of the workers, is consistent with the traditional socialist premise 
that the workers themselves must actively take part in the building of 
socialism. 153 The Russian experiment offers no clear cut answer. 
The failure of the revolution to spread to the rest of Europe and 
the losses suffered in the Civil \rlar certainly helped postpone any 
attempts that might have been made towards devolving more power to the 
workers themselves. Yet even without these comp 1 i cati ons there sti 11 
seems to be no guarantee that the party, once it has consolidated itself 
in po\t,cr~ will in the future divest itself of authority and hand it 
over to the \vorkers. Thi s seems to depend on the attitude of the party, 
especially of its leaders, who may be reluctant to carry this act out, 
not necessarily just out of a selfish greed for potter and the privileges 
that rule conveys, but also since they may genuinely believe that they 
alone possess the knO\'l/ledge and talents necessary to keep society moving 
towards socialism. For whatever reason, a dictatorship over, not of 
the pr61etariat would be created and the ultimate purpose of socialism -
the establishment of a society in \·thich man would be the conscious 
master of his material and social life - would be frustrated. 
It was this Blanquist tendency in Lenin's thought and actions that 
troubled a number of the "leftists". They feared that the authoritaria-
nism and implicit ~litism iR Lenin's methods would be incompatible with 
the achi evemer.t of the freedom for whi ch they had fought. ;,loreover, 
however much they now appear as starry-eyed romantics who idealised the 
proletariat, their warnings against the ossification of Soviet Russia 
into a bureaucratic tyranny as the result of the use of Leninist poJicies 
n'Ow seem almost uncanny. It is fitting to end with the words of a promi-
nent "Left Communist'J on the dangers which he saw in Lenin's use of 
authoritarian means to construct a socialist society. E. A. Preobra-
zhensky, criticising the suppression of workers' control in the admini-
stration of the railways, predicted: 
The party apparently will soon have to decide the question, 
to what degree the dictatorships of individuals will be 
extended from the railroads and other branches of the 
economy to the Russian Communist Party .... 154 
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Conclusion. 
The preceding study has served to demonstrate that the positions 
defended by the various "leftll oppositionists within the Bolshevik 
party in the early years of Soviet rule in Russia and by the revolu-
tionary r,larxists of the Kingdom of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania "'lith 
respect to the problems of nationalism~ agriculture and the peasants, 
and proletarian democracy were essentially the same, and quite distinct 
from the vields of Lenin and his associates on these very issues. 
At first sight, moreover, the particular policies adopted by 
these narxists seem to be more consistent with the principles and 
doctrines espoused by Marx and Engels themselves than were the policies 
advocated by Lenin. This fact can lead quite easily to the conclusion 
that these r·1arxists simply assimilated the doctrines first developed 
by the '1founding fathers " and dogmatically attempted to apply them. 
Hhile they did come to subscribe to similar prescriptions as t1arx and 
Engels more often than Lenin did, their policies were formulated on 
the basis of an independent application of Marxist methods and prin-
ciples to the analysis of the particular economic, social and political 
conditions of their own epoch and native societies - and, accordingly, 
should not be regarded as the blind acceptance of dogma. 
In fact, this study has been concerned to examine in depth and 
detail the very factors which impelled these ~1arxists to arrive at 
\vhat in the end turned out to be a common set of principles. It has 
shown that the influences which were behind their adoption of the same 
programme ItJere qui te specifi c to each di fferent group- Vii th the admi t-
ted exception of a commonly held theory of imperialism, which led them 
to the same views regarding the imminence and scope of socialist 
revolution. In turn, this conclusion itself raises the question whether 
given the different tendencies that affected these t1arxists it is 
legitimate to treat the common theoretical construct that they elabo-
rated as a coherent "Left Communist ll ideology. Certainly, in understand-
ing the evolution of the thought of these various Marxists it is 
essential to take cognisance of the diverse influences on the formation 
of their ideas. Yet this admitted diversity need not negate the 
existence ofa doctrine that with justification can be termed "Left 
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Communism. II Irrespective of the particular influences that did lead 
these ~1arxists to espouse the same policies, there was a common premise 
at the basis of their actions. They were convinced that the alter-
native policies \'/hich Lenin advocated as necessary if the proletariat 
and its vanguard, the party, "'Jere to seize and maintain themselves in 
power were such that in themselves they would frustrate the achievement 
of the end to which they and Lenin both aspired, namely, the construc-
tion of socialism. 
This conclusion itself leads quite logically to another broad, 
yet important question. This involves both the validity of their 
critique of the policies of Lenin and his associates as incompatible 
with the realisation of socialism, and also the viability of the mea-
sures that they themselves proposed. To be sure, any attempt to answer 
these questions necessarily involves some degree of speculation, but 
nevertheless some conjectures can be made. 
The second part of this question is easier to answer. The avail-
able evidence suggests that the possibility of success for the IILeft 
Communists'" programme was slight. In Soviet Russia itself, their 
advocacy of the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat 
based on lIorthodox li t1arxist principles, that is, one democratically 
governed by the workers themselves, appears to have been founded on an 
unrealistic estimate of the abilities of the workers to administer, 
independently and success fu 11y, a modern po 1 ity and economy. t10reover, 
"leftist" policies in agriculture, such as were implemented briefly 
during the period of "Vlar Communism ll , by their total disregard of the 
aspirations of the peasant majority only succeeded in embittering this 
class and so much alienating it from the government that in the inter-
ests of preservin~ Communist powe" Lenin and his associates were forced 
to make concessions to the peasants, whose demands in large measure 
were satisfied by the introduction of the NEP. 
Furthermore, the failure of the Marxist revolutions in Poland, 
Latvia and Lithuania can be seen as additional confirmation of the 
political unreality of the IILeft Communists'" vievJs. Certainly, the 
national and agrarian policies defended by the revolutionary Polish, 
Latvian and Lithuanian t1arxists - their rejection of any concessions to 
the na ti ona 1 sentiment that was strong among a 11 s tra ta of their own 
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societies, including the workers, and their refusal to make any com-
promises with the peasants' widespread desire for their own land - were 
at least contributory factors in the failure of these ~1arxists to con-
solidate themselves in power. However, it must be admitted that foreign 
intervention also played a crucial role in their defeat, although the 
interventionists themselves and their allies, the Polish, Latvian and 
Lithuanian gentry and bourgeoisie, were able to exploit the underlyinq 
nationalism in these societies at large, as well as the unsatisfied 
land hunger of the peasantry, to win broad indigenous support in their 
counter-revolutionary campaigns" 
Implicit in this conclusion is an apparent vindication of the 
policies that Lenin advocated and put into practice. Realising and 
accepting the force of oppressed nationalism, the strength of the 
peasantry and its aspirations for land, and the numerical weakness and 
the immature socialist consciousness of the working class itself, he 
was readily prepared to revise orthodox t:larxi s t doctri n,= in order to 
adapt it better to the social and political conditions that existed in 
the Russian Empire - an action which is perfectly consistent with the 
methodological principles of r~arxism itself, which prides itself on 
its praxis, that is, the amendment of its theory if practice proves it 
to be mistaken. Moreover, it has to be admitted that it was in great 
part as a result of Lenin's political perspicacity and the ensuing 
tactical innovations that he made in f'larxist revolutionary theory that 
the Bolsheviks ItJere able to seize power and successfully to retain it 
in the follm'ling period of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary 
turmoil . 
Nevertheless, this success in itself is no ansv/er to the validity 
or otherwise of the "Left Communists'!! critique of Lenin's policies. 
They had never denied that they could maintain themselves in power if 
they were willing to make the compromises with what they considered to 
be the true principles of socialism that Lenin proposed. They insisted, 
however, that such compromises inevitably \'IOU 1 d resul t in the degene-
ration of the rev01ution, since they believed that the successful 
realisation of socialism depended on the means employed to achieve this 
end. 
The only test of their claim is the experience of Soviet Russia 
itself, \'1here alone the revolution survi'red. The failure of t~e 
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revolutions in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania excludes them from purvievJ 
in any attempt to answer this question. Nevertheless, even in the case 
of Soviet Russia it is necessary to exercise a great deal of caution 
in assessing the correctness of the "Left Communists '" rredictions. 
This problem initially requires some opinion as to whether the 
Soviet Russia that was born of the revolution has remained a genuine 
workers'state. Certainly, it appears that hovfever Soviet Russia is 
defined - and there have been a number of definitions presented -, it 
woul d be most perverse to term it a workers' state, in the sense that 
the power to administer and govern it lies in the hands of the working 
class itself. Rather, it has become much more of a dictatorship over 
the proletariat, with power de facto residing in the hands of the 
party, supported by the military, a secret police and a "new class" 
of privileged bureaucrats and technocrats. 
Accordingly, it would be easy to conclude that the degeneration 
which the !!Left Communists': considered to be the inevitable result of 
the policies of socialist construction proposed by Lenin, particularly 
his reliance on authoritarian administrative measures at the expense 
of proletarian democracy, has in fact come about. Certainly, they 
must be given credit for perceiving one very possible development v/hich 
would ensue from such methods. Yet the question still remains whether 
this evolution was the terrible outcome of Leninist procedures, that 
is, whether the roots of the bureaucratic ossification of Soviet Russia 
can be attributed solely and simply to Leninism, or whether additional, 
more specific and objective social, economic and political factors must 
be introduced to explain satisfactorily why this strand within Leninism 
~vas nurtured. Indeed, one can justifiably question if the ':Left Commu-
nists II themselves, despite their genuine and deep-rooted commitment to 
the principles of proletarian democracy, would have been more successful 
in establishing a socialist workers' state if they had replaced the 
Leninists at the helm of the Soviet state in 1918, or in the immediately 
following years. Undoubtedly, they would have been faced with exactly 
the same pressing problems as Lenin and his associates were, name1y, 
the task of building socialism in an economically backward country, 
with a largely destroyed industrial base and with a rapidly disintegrat-
ing working class which itself was prone to anarchist tendencies, a 
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country, moreover, which was dominated by a peasantry recalcitrant to 
their notions of socialism, and which, after the failure of the revolu-
tion to spread to the industrially advanced states of West Europe, was 
externally threatened by a combination of far stronger, hostile powers. 
In these circumstances, it is legitimate to ask if Leninist ideology 
is even required to explain" the measures taken by the Bolshevik govern-
ment in the interests of its survival. 
Such questions cannot be definitively answered, since great histo-
rical experiments, such as the Russian revolution was, cannot be repeated, 
with certain key variables altered, as in the natural sciences, and the 
results compared. Yet judicious speculation tends towards the conclu-
sion that many of the measures that the young Bolshevik government 
introduced in the early years of its existence were in large part prag-
matic responses to objective circumstances, and necessary if the regime 
were to maintain itself. Consequently, while the "Left Communists" may 
have been correct that the means used in the construction of socialism 
would determine the outcome of this process, it is plausible to venture 
that they too, provided they desired to maintain the revolution in power, 
would have had to adapt their firmly held principles to a harsher reality 
that they could not control - or perish, a fate which many of them 
avowedly preferred to the risk of tarnishing the name of the revolution 
by compromises to preserve it in power at the cost of sacrificing its 
proclaimed goal, socialism itself. 
A final question which often arises in studies of this nature is 
whether the Russian revolution, and the" different variants of Marxism 
espoused by the IILeft Communists!1 and Lenin, can be used as evidence 
to confirm or deny the viability of Marxism in general. The apparent 
di lemma that presents itself is that the consistency to principles 
displayed by the IlLeft Communists" seems to be unrealistic and dooms 
Marxism to political impotence, while the pragmatic policies employed 
by Lenin inevitably lead to the perversion of the Marxist vision of 
socialism. The author is of the opinion that any attempts to generalise 
about the validity of Marxisr;] from the particular experiences of the 
Russian revolution is a perilous task, and one which remains without 
the scope of the historian qua historian. 
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